




101

GIFT OF  
SEELEY W. MUDD  
*and*  
GEORGE I. COCHRAN MEYER ELSASSEN  
DR. JOHN R. HAYNES WILLIAM L. HONNOLD  
JAMES R. MARTIN MRS. JOSEPH F. SARTORI  
*to the*  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
SOUTHERN BRANCH



JOHN FISKE

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below

Due Date







JOHN FISKE, LL.D., LITT.D.

AUTHOR OF "OUTLINES OF COSMIC PHILOSOPHY," "AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS,"  
"THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY," "THE DISCOVERY OF  
AMERICA," "OLD VIRGINIA AND HER NEIGHBORS," "THE  
DUTCH AND QUAKER COLONIES," ETC.

VOLUME XXII  
OF  
A HISTORY OF ALL NATIONS



LEA BROTHERS & COMPANY  
PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK

1870

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1905, by

LEA BROTHERS & CO.,

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. All rights reserved.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.  
BY LEA BROTHERS & CO., PHILADELPHIA,

PRESS OF  
WILLIAM J. DURAN, PHILADELPHIA.

# GENERAL CONTENTS.

(FOR ANALYTICAL CONTENTS, SEE PAGE 401.)

## INDEPENDENCE OF THE NEW WORLD.

### CHAPTER I.

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| FIRST AND SECOND WARS WITH FRANCE . . . . . | PAGE<br>17 |
|---|------------|

### CHAPTER II.

|                                     |    |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| THE CAROLINAS AND GEORGIA . . . . . | 42 |
|-------------------------------------|----|

### CHAPTER III.

|   |    |
|---|----|
| THIRD AND FOURTH WARS WITH FRANCE . . . . . | 58 |
|---|----|

### CHAPTER IV.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY . . . . . | 101 |
|--|-----|

### CHAPTER V.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION . . . . . | 136 |
|--|-----|

### CHAPTER VI.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| THE SEVERANCE FROM GREAT BRITAIN . . . . . | 189 |
|--|-----|

### CHAPTER VII.

|                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| THE ESCAPE FROM ANARCHY . . . . . | 267 |
|-----------------------------------|-----|

## CHAPTER VIII.

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| PROBLEMS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC . . . . . | 321  |

## CHAPTER IX.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| THE SPANISH REVOLT AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE . . . . . | 371 |
|--|-----|

|                               |     |
|-------------------------------|-----|
| ANALYTICAL CONTENTS . . . . . | 401 |
|-------------------------------|-----|

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

| FIGURE   | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 1. Bartram's ground-plan and cross-section of Onondaga Long House. (Morgan, "Houses of American Aborigines.") . . . . .  | 29   |
| 2. Seneca Long House. (Morgan, "Houses of American Aborigines.") . . . . .   | 21   |
| 3. La Salle. ("Magazine of American History," vol. viii.) . . . . .  | 23   |
| 4. Hennepin's map of the Northwest, 1683. (From Hennepin's "Description of Louisiana.") . . . . .  | 25   |
| 5. Kaln's view of Niagara Falls. (From "Gentleman's Magazine," 1751.) . . . . .  | 26   |
| 6. La Salle's discovery of Louisiana, 1684 . . . . .   | 27   |
| 7. Cotton Mather. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xxv.) . . . . .  | 39   |
| 8. William Stoughton, presiding justice in the witchcraft trials . . . . .   | 32   |
| 9. William Phipps . . . . .  | 33   |
| 10. Pierre Lemoine d'Iberville. (From an unlettered print in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 34   |
| 11. Frontenac. (From the statue by Hebert, in Quebec.) . . . . .   | 36   |
| 12. Robert Livingston . . . . .  | 39   |
| 13. James Oglethorpe. (After an engraving by E. Bust.) . . . . .   | 52   |
| 14. General James Oglethorpe. (From an engraving by S. Ireland, after a sketch from life at the sale of Dr. Johnson's books, February 18, 1785, where the General was reading, without spectacles, a book he had purchased.) . . . . . | 53   |
| 15. Lemoine de Bienville. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xiii.) . . . . .   | 55   |
| 16. Governor William Burnet . . . . .  | 62   |
| 17. Sir William Johnson. (From an engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 63   |
| 18. Governor Jonathan Belcher. (From a mezzotint by Faber, after a painting by Phillips. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 64   |
| 19. William Shirley. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xx.) . . . . .  | 65   |
| 20. William Pepperell . . . . .  | 67   |
| 21. Pepperell arms. ("Magazine of American History," vol. ii.) . . . . .   | 68   |
| 22. Thomas Hutchinson. (From an unlettered proof by Wileox. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 69   |
| 23. City of Louisburg with its fortifications. (Map by Captain Ince, 1745.) . . . . .  | 71   |
| 24. Valley of the Shenandoah . . . . .   | 74   |
| 25. View of Albany in the eighteenth century . . . . .   | 75   |
| 26. Robert Dinwiddie . . . . .   | 76   |
| 27. Col. George Washington. (From a mezzotint by Max Rosenthal, from a painting by Charles Willson Peale, done at Mount Vernon, 1772. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                  | 77   |
| 28. General Braddock. (After an etching by H. B. Hall.) . . . . .  | 79   |
| 29. Major Robert Rogers. (From a mezzotint published in London, October, 1776. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 80   |
| 30. Earl of Loudon. (From a mezzotint by Faber, after a painting by Ramsay. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 82   |

| FIGURE   | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 31. Sir Jeffrey Amherst. (From a mezzotint, after a painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 83   |
| 32. General James Grant, of the Pennsylvania expedition, who despised American methods of bush-fighting  | 84   |
| 33. Washington. (From a mezzotint by Max Rosenthal, after an original painting by Charles Willson Peale, done at Valley Forge, 1778. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) | 85   |
| 34. Marquis de Montcalm. (From an engraving by Varin, after a painting by Sergent. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 86   |
| 35. Plains of Abraham. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xi.)  | 87   |
| 36. Maj.-Gen. James Wolfe. (From a mezzotint by Houston, after a painting by Schaak. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 88   |
| 37. Death of General Wolfe. (From an engraving by Woollett, after a painting by West. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 89   |
| 38. View of harbor of Havana. (From an old Dutch print by Amsteld, after a painting by Schenk. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)                                       | 90   |
| 39. Sir Edward Hawke. (From a mezzotint by MacArdell, after a painting by Knapton. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 91   |
| 40. Choiseul. (From an engraving by Adam, after a painting by Vanloo. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 92   |
| 41. Henry Bouquet  | 95   |
| 42. Cadwallader Colden. (From an engraving by Graham, after a painting by Matthew Pratt. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 98   |
| 43. Newport, Rhode Island, in 1730   | 101  |
| 44. Pownall's view of Boston in 1757   | 102  |
| 45. Thomas Pownall, Royal Governor of Massachusetts, 1757-61. (After an unlettered mezzotint print in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)                            | 103  |
| 46. Christ Church, Philadelphia. (From an engraving by Malcolm, in the "Universal Magazine," 1788. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)                                   | 105  |
| 47. St. Paul's Episcopal church, Edenton, N. C., 1745. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xxviii.)  | 106  |
| 48. Birthplace of Israel Putnam, at Danvers, Mass.   | 107  |
| 49. Fac-simile heading of "Connecticut Courant." ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvii.)  | 109  |
| 50. Pepperell mansion, Kittery Point, Maine. ("Magazine of American History," vol. ii.)  | 111  |
| 51. Liberty Hall, the Livingston mansion, at Elizabeth, N. J. ("Magazine of American History," vol. ii.)   | 114  |
| 52. Schuyler house, at Albany. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.)   | 115  |
| 53. Jonathan Edwards   | 116  |
| 54. Yale College and State House, New Haven  | 118  |
| 55. Stratford, Va. The home of the Lees. ("Magazine of American History," vol. x.)   | 121  |
| 56. Chamber in Van Cortlandt Memorial House. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xv.)  | 129  |
| 57. Thomas Prince, historian   | 131  |
| 58. David Rittenhouse, astronomer. (From a mezzotint by Savage, after a painting by Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 132  |
| 59. J. S. Copley. (From an unlettered engraving after a painting by himself. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 134  |

## FIGURE

| FIGURE  | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 60. Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 1900   | 137  |
| 61. Faneuil Hall, Boston  | 139  |
| 62. Christopher Gadsden. (From an etching by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 140  |
| 63. Richard Henry Lee   | 141  |
| 64. Thomas Jefferson. (From a lithograph by De la Motte, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 144  |
| 65. The Botching Tailor, George III., trimming the empire into pieces. (From a scratched letter-proof of a rare mezzotint by John Simpson. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)                                    | 145  |
| 66. Gen. George Washington. (From an unlettered proof of engraving by H. B. Hall, after a painting by James Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 147  |
| 67. Thomas Paine. (From a mezzotint by James Watson, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 148  |
| 68. Samuel Chase. (From an engraving by Forrest, after a painting by Jarvis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 154  |
| 69. Charles Carroll, of Carrollton. (From a lithograph by Childs & Tuman, after a painting by Sully. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 155  |
| 70. John Dickinson. (From an unlettered mezzotint, after the original painting in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 157  |
| 71. Col. Isaac Barré. (From an engraving by Cadell, after a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 160  |
| 72. George Grenville. (From a mezzotint by Watson, after a painting by Hare. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 163  |
| 73. Faesimile of "Pennsylvania Journal," 1765. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvii.)   | 165  |
| 74. Old South Meeting-House, Boston, Mass.: interior  | 167  |
| 75. Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia  | 170  |
| 76. Lord North. (From a mezzotint by Burke, after a painting by N. Dance. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 173  |
| 77. James Otis. (From an unlettered proof by Jackman. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 174  |
| 78. Samuel Adams. (From an engraving by Hall, after a painting by Copley. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 177  |
| 79. John Hancock. (From an engraving by J. B. Longacre, after a painting by Copley, in 1765.)   | 178  |
| 80. Joseph Warren. (From an unlettered proof in mezzotint by Webb. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 181  |
| 81. Ladies of Edenton, N. C., signing an agreement not to drink tea, or use any article imported from Great Britain. (From a rare mezzotint published in London, March, 1775. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) | 183  |
| 82. Thomas Gage. (From an unlettered engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)   | 190  |
| 83. Sir William Howe. (From a mezzotint by Corbitt, published in London, November, 1777. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 192  |
| 84. Richard, Lord Howe. (From a mezzotint by Corbitt, published in London, 1777. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)  | 193  |
| 85. Three Paul Revere scenes. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xv.)  | 194  |

| FIGURE   | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 86. Earl Percy. (From a mezzotint by Turner, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 195  |
| 87. Maj.-Gen. Charles Lee. (From an engraving published in Paris, 1775, after a painting by Campbell. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 197  |
| 88. Israel Putnam . . . . .  | 199  |
| 89. Richard Montgomery . . . . .   | 202  |
| 90. Guy Carleton. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.) . . . . .  | 203  |
| 91. The State House at Philadelphia. (From an engraving by Fadden on the plan of Philadelphia, surveyed by Scull & Heap, published in London, March, 1777. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . . | 205  |
| 92. Robert Morris. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 207  |
| 93. Maj.-Gen. William Moultrie. (From an engraving by Seriven, after a painting by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 209  |
| 94. Maj. Gen. John Sullivan. (From a rare mezzotint, published in London, August, 1776. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 212  |
| 95. Sketch of Palisades, near Fort Lee, by Lord Rawdon. (From the Emmet collection, Astor Library, New York.) . . . . .  | 214  |
| 96. Sketch of Palisades, near Fort Lee, by Lord Rawdon. (From the Emmet collection, Astor Library, New York.) . . . . .  | 215  |
| 97. Lord Cornwallis. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.) . . . . .   | 217  |
| 98. General Burgoyne. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.) . . . . .  | 219  |
| 99. Lord George Germain, afterward Viscount Sackville. (From a mezzotint by MacArdell, after a painting by Reynolds. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                       | 220  |
| 100. Gen. Philip Schuyler. (From a painting by J. Trumbull.) . . . . .   | 221  |
| 101. John Stark. (From an unlettered mezzotint, after a portrait by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 222  |
| 102. Thayendanegea (Joseph Brant). (McKenney's "Indian Tribes.") . . . . .   | 223  |
| 103. Cliveden: the Chew House, Germantown, Pa. ("Magazine of American History," vol. iv.) . . . . .  | 226  |
| 104. Baron Riedesel. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.) . . . . .   | 228  |
| 105. Madame Riedesel. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.) . . . . .  | 229  |
| 106. Horatio Gates. ("Magazine of American History," vol. v.) . . . . .  | 230  |
| 107. Benedict Arnold. (From an engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 231  |
| 108. Caricature representing the commerce of Great Britain in the form of a cow. (From an unlettered proof in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 235  |
| 109. Sir Henry Clinton. (From a copy of a mezzotint. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 236  |
| 110. Marquis de Lafayette. (From a rare mezzotint by Charles Willson Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 237  |
| 111. Washington and Charles Lee at Monmouth . . . . .  | 238  |
| 112. Charles Henry, Count d'Estaing. (From an engraving by Gumeher, after a painting by Sublet. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 239  |
| 113. Anthony Wayne. (From a sketch by Col. J. Trumbull.) . . . . .   | 240  |
| 114. Joseph Brant (Thayendanegea). (From a mezzotint published in London, February, 1777, after a painting by Romney. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                      | 242  |

| FIGURE   | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 115. George Rogers Clarke. (From an engraving by F. B. Welch.) . . . . .   | 243  |
| 116. John Paul Jones . . . . .   | 245  |
| 117. Kasimir Pulaski. (From a lithograph by Villain, after a Polish painting. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 247  |
| 118. Baron de Kalb. (From an engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 248  |
| 119. Francis Marion. (From an unlettered proof of an engraving by Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 249  |
| 120. Count Rochambeau. ("Magazine of American History," vol. v.) . . . . .   | 250  |
| 121. Specimen of Continental money . . . . .   | 251  |
| 122, 123. Specimens of Continental money . . . . .   | 252  |
| 124. Specimen of Virginia currency . . . . .   | 253  |
| 125. Specimen of New Jersey currency . . . . .   | 253  |
| 126. Beverley Robinson House, Arnold's headquarters. ("Magazine of American History," vol. iv.) . . . . .  | 254  |
| 127. Major André. (From an engraving by W. G. Jackson.) . . . . .  | 255  |
| 128. André rowing ashore from the Vulture. (From a sketch by himself.) . . . . .   | 256  |
| 129. Capture of André. (From an engraving by Jones & Smilie, after a painting by Durand. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 257  |
| 130. Major André. (From a sketch by himself, with pen, the day before his execution.) . . . . .  | 258  |
| 131. Benedict Arnold in effigy. (From a wood-cut representing the procession in Philadelphia, September 30, 1780. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                  | 258  |
| 132. Henry Lee. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.) . . . . .  | 259  |
| 133. Banastre Tarleton. (From a mezzotint by Smith, after a painting by Reynolds. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 260  |
| 134. Daniel Morgan. (From an engraving by J. F. E. Prudhomme.) . . . . .   | 261  |
| 135. Francis, Lord Rawdon, Marquis of Hastings. (From an engraving by Collyer, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                 | 263  |
| 136. Count de Grasse. (From an etching by H. B. Hall.) . . . . .   | 265  |
| 137. Count Vergennes. (From an unlettered engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 268  |
| 138. Right Hon. Charles James Fox. (From a mezzotint by Pether, after a bust modeled from life by Nollekens. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                       | 269  |
| 139. Henry Laurens. (From a mezzotint by Green, after a painting by Copley. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 271  |
| 140. John Jay. (From an engraving by A. B. Durand.) . . . . .  | 272  |
| 141. Benjamin Franklin. (After a painting by Duplessis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 275  |
| 142. Ruin of Great Britain through loss of her colonies. (From an unlettered French caricature, published in a memoir of Franklin. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . . | 276  |
| 143. William Pitt. (From a mezzotint by Gold, after a painting by Owen. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 278  |
| 144. Medal commemorating the new constellation of states . . . . .   | 280  |
| 145. John Adams. (From a lithograph by Matte. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 285  |
| 146. Jared Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, member of the Federal Convention. From an etching by Albert Rosenthal, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale.   | 287  |

| FIGURE   | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 147. James Bowdoin . . . . .   | 290  |
| 148. Daniel Boone. (From an engraving by Longacre, after a painting by Chester Harding. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                              | 291  |
| 149. Lexington, Ky., in 1782. ("Magazine of American History,") . . . . .  | 296  |
| 150. Benjamin Lincoln. (From an unlettered proof after Chappel. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 298  |
| 151. Alexander Hamilton. (From a mezzotint by Max Rosenthal. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 300  |
| 152. James Madison. (From an engraving in stipple by Edwin, after a painting by Smart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                               | 302  |
| 153. Oliver Ellsworth. (From an engraving by Maverick, after a painting by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                 | 304  |
| 154. William Samuel Johnson. (From an engraving by Ritchie, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                              | 305  |
| 155. Roger Sherman. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xiii.) . . . . .   | 306  |
| 156. Gouverneur Morris. (From an engraving by Jackman. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 309  |
| 157. Edmund Randolph. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 310  |
| 158. George Mason. (From an etching by H. B. Hall.) . . . . .  | 311  |
| 159. Rufus King. (From an engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 314  |
| 160. George Clinton . . . . .  | 318  |
| 161. Alexander Hamilton. (From an unlettered proof, after a painting by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                    | 319  |
| 162. Maj.-Gen. Henry Knox. (From an unlettered engraving by Savage. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 322  |
| 163. Marietta in 1790. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xx.) . . . . .  | 323  |
| 164. Vauxhall Garden, New York, 1803. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvi.) . . . . .  | 324  |
| 165. Martha Washington. (From an engraving in mezzotint by John Sartain. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 325  |
| 166. Mrs. John Jay. (From an unlettered proof, after a painting by Pine. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 327  |
| 167. Mrs. Alexander Hamilton. (From an autotype, after a painting by Sharpless. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                      | 328  |
| 168. Mrs. James Madison. (From an unlettered proof, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                              | 329  |
| 169. Alexander Hamilton. (From a bust in the New York Chamber of Commerce.) . . . . .  | 330  |
| 170. Edmond Charles Genêt. (From an etching by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 332  |
| 171. Fisher Ames, defender of the Jay Treaty. (After a painting by Gilbert Stuart.)  | 334  |
| 172. Mrs. John Adams. (From an unlettered artist proof, after Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 336  |
| 173. Elbridge Gerry. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.) . . . . .   | 337  |
| 174. Joseph Hopkinson, author of "Hail Columbia," 1798. (From an engraving by Longacre, after a portrait by Sully. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 338  |
| 175. Rev. Francis Asbury, Methodist missionary preacher. (From an engraving by Tanner, after a painting by Paradise. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . . | 339  |

## FIGURE

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| 176. Eli Whitney, inventor of the cotton-gin. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.) . . . . .  | 341  |
| 177. Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, 1801-1813. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvi.) . . . . .  | 350  |
| 178. Escape of the Constitution. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xxix.) . . . . .  | 352  |
| 179. Battle of Constitution and Java. (From a mezzotint by Pocock, from a sketch by Buchanan. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                      | 355  |
| 180. Captain Isaac Hull. (From a mezzotint by Freeman, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                 | 356  |
| 181. Sir Philip Broke. (From an unlettered engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 357  |
| 182. Stephen Decatur. (From an engraving by Henry Meyer, after a painting by Jarvis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                               | 358  |
| 183. Arthur St. Clair . . . . .  | 359  |
| 184. Tecumseh. (Powell, "Annual Reports, U. S. Bureau of Ethnology," vol. xiv.) . . . . .  | 360  |
| 185. Elskwatawa, the Shawnee prophet. (Powell, "Annual Reports, U. S. Bureau of Ethnology," vol. xiv.) . . . . .   | 361  |
| 186. Sir Isaac Brock . . . . .   | 362  |
| 187. Brock Monument on Queenston Heights . . . . .   | 363  |
| 188. Commodore Oliver H. Perry. (From an engraving by Meyer, after a painting by Jarvis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                           | 364  |
| 189. Battle of Lake Erie. (From an engraving by Murray, Draper, Fairman & Co., after a drawing by Sully & Kearney. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . . | 365  |
| 190. Commodore Thomas Macdonough . . . . .   | 366  |
| 191. Maedonough's victory at Lake Champlain. (After an engraving by B. Tanner, from a painting by Reimagle. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .        | 367  |
| 192. Andrew Jackson. (From an engraving by Longaere, after a painting by Wood. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                                     | 367  |
| 193. Peace of Ghent, 1814, and Triumph of America. (From an engraving by Chataigner, after a design by Phanton. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .    | 368  |
| 194. Sir Edward Pakenham. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 369  |
| 195. Battle of New Orleans. (From a colored engraving by J. Yeager, after a painting by West. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                      | 370  |
| 196. View of Lima. (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 371  |
| 197. Toussaint Louverture. (From an unlettered engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 374  |
| 198. Toussaint Louverture. (From Rainsford's "Black Empire of Haiti.") . . . . .   | 375  |
| 199. Jean Jacques Dessalines. (From an engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 376  |
| 200. Ferdinand VII. of Spain. (From Walton's "Spanish Colonies," vol. i.) . . . . .  | 378  |
| 201. Francisco Miranda. (From Antepara's "South American Emancipation Documents," London, 1810.) . . . . .   | 380  |
| 202. Simon Bolivar. (From an engraving by Longaere, after a Spanish painting in Lima. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                              | 382  |
| 203. Belgrano. (From Mitre's "Historia de Belgrano.") . . . . .  | 383  |
| 204. Don Ambrosio O'Higgins. (Arano's "Historia de Chile," vol. vii.) . . . . .  | 384  |
| 205. View of the harbor of Valparaiso. (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 386  |

| FIGURE  | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 206. William Miller. (From John Miller's "Life of Gen. Miller.") . . . . .  | 387  |
| 207. View of Mexico. (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia.) . . . . .  | 390  |
| 208. Miguel Hidalgo. (From Alaman's "Historia de Mejico," tom. i.) . . . . .  | 391  |
| 209. José Maria Morelos. (From Alaman's "Historia de Mejico," tom. iv.) . . . . .                                     | 392  |
| 210. Agustín de Iturbide, proclaimed Emperor of Mexico, 1821. (From Alaman's "Historia de Mejico," tom. v.) . . . . . | 393  |
| 211. James Monroe. From a lithograph by N. Currier. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   | 398  |

## LIST OF PLATES.

| PLATE  |  | PAGE |
|--|--|------|
| I. Hennepin's View of Niagara Falls. (From his "Nouvelle Découverte," Amsterdam, 1698.) . . . . .  |  | 25   |
| II. La Potherie's View of Quebec, 1700. (From his "Histoire de l'Amérique Septentrionale," Paris, 1722.) . . . . .   |  | 29   |
| III. The Iroquois Chiefs who visited London in the time of Queen Anne. (From a mezzotint by B. Lens, after a drawing from life by B. Lens, Jr. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . . |  | 36   |
| IV. Right Hon. William Pitt. (From a mezzotint by R. Houston, after a painting in the possession of the Earl of Temple. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .                        |  | 81   |
| V. Benjamin Franklin. (From the copper-plate engraving by Éd. Girardet, after the original painting by Ary Scheffer.) . . . . .  |  | 134  |
| VI. Charles James Fox. (From an engraving by H. Robinson, after a painting by Opie. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  |  | 142  |
| VII. Patrick Henry. (From an engraving by Jackman. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   |  | 150  |
| VIII. Thomas Jefferson. (From an engraving by Dequevauviller, after a drawing by Desnoyes. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   |  | 161  |
| IX. George III. in his youth. (From a mezzotint by R. Purell, after a painting by T. Frye. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   |  | 172  |
| IX.-a General Israel Putnam. (From a painting by H. I. Thompson in the State House at Hartford, Conn.) . . . . .   |  | 199  |
| X. General Nathaniel Greene. (From a mezzotint by Green, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  |  | 257  |
| XI. General George Washington. (From an engraving by Le Mire, after a painting by La Paon. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .   |  | 265  |
| XII. Washington. (From an original lithograph by Rembrandt Peale, done from his own painting. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.) . . . . .  |  | 319  |
| XIII. The Capitol at Washington, 1900 (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia) . . . . .   |  | 320  |



# INDEPENDENCE OF THE NEW WORLD.

## CHAPTER I.

### FIRST AND SECOND WARS WITH FRANCE.

WE left the little colony of New France in 1663, at the moment when the direct control of it passed from the company of the One Hundred Associates into the hands of the crown. Its white population then numbered only 2000, whereas that of New Netherland was about 10,000, and that of the New England colonies nearly 50,000. It was desirable that the strength of New France should be increased, and this work was taken in hand by one of the ablest administrators of the seventeenth century, the famous Colbert. Into his schemes for improving the situation, Louis XIV. entered most heartily; for he set great store by his American possessions. Louis hoped to found in Canada a despotism even more complete than that which Richelieu had inaugurated in France, for in the wilderness he expected to meet with fewer obstacles. Having once established a state in the New World that should fill out his ideal of statecraft, the king expected to go on and wrest from the English the long strip of seacoast which they had secured.

The lands of Canada were held in feudal tenure, or by knight service. To the king, as overlord, the vassal paid his rent and other feudal dues in so many days of military service. Within his own domain, the seigneur or lord of the manor exercised very extensive powers. He held manorial courts which could inflict any penalties that were not capital. As a general rule, the seigneur divided up his great estate into small portions, which he sub-let to small farmers or peasants. These tenants were bound by sundry feudal necessities, as for example, that of grinding their corn at the lord's mill and paying him about seven per cent. of the crop for the privilege; but on the whole, such feudal requirements were less numerous and less burdensome than in France. These tenants in Canada were called Censitaires. In order to prevent

too great an accumulation of property in the hands of a few seigneurs, it was provided that estates should be shared among the children of a deceased lord, save that the eldest usually took a double share, including the manor-house. From such an arrangement, it was not easy for a strong landed aristocracy to arise; and in point of fact, there was in ancient Canada no such check upon the omnipotence of the bureaucracy. The Canadian seigneuries remained on substantially their original footing long after the English conquest, and were not abolished until 1855, when the seigneurs resigned all their time-honored privileges in exchange for a stated compensation.

The immediate government of New France was vested in the Sovereign Council, which consisted of three most important personages: the governor, the bishop, and the intendant. The attributes of ancient royalty were parcelled out among these three officials. Concerning the bishop's functions, no explanation is needed. The difference between the governor and the intendant might be tersely summed up in the statement that the former was the military head, and the latter the civil head, of the province. The intendant combined in his person the functions of chief justice, chief of police, and superintendent of trade; so that he reminds one curiously of the personage called Snake woman in ancient Mexico. Moreover, the intendant might be made to serve as a kind of spy upon the governor, and in that capacity to make reports about him to the king. In such wise was the governor's autocratic power limited, not by a representative body responsible to the people of New France, but by a fellow-autocrat responsible only to the king.

Another part of the intendant's duty was to travel about the colony and pry into the affairs of every household, in order that whatever was wrong might be set right, and the wants of the people provided for. We can imagine the wrath and the hooting which such an official would have provoked in any English colony that ever existed, but in Canada this sort of thing was thought to be quite proper. No enterprise of any sort was undertaken without an appeal to the king for aid. Bounties were attached to all kinds of trades in order to encourage them, and at the same time it was attempted to prescribe the exact percentage of profit which might be legally earned. If people got out of work, they were to be supplied with work at the cost of the government. In order to foster a taste for shipbuilding, the king had ships built at his own expense; yet at the same time the ships which came over from France often went home empty, save the privileged ones which by royal edict were allowed to carry furs or lumber. In order to encourage the

raising of hemp, it was proposed that all hemp grown within the colony should be purchased by the king at a high price. To encourage agriculture in general, the king sent over seeds of all sorts to be distributed among the farmers gratis, while the intendant went about to see that the seeds were duly planted. While native industry was thus sedulously fostered, foreign trade was absolutely prohibited. Prohibitory tariff's with duties from 50 to 500 per cent., such as our modern protectionists dearly love, were not resorted to; for Louis XIV. knew a device worth two of that: foreign goods were seized wherever found, and solemnly burned in the streets. The interests of landed property were also looked after. As it is inconvenient that one's farm should be too small, nobody living in the open country was allowed to build a house on any piece of land less than a certain prescribed size, under penalty of seeing his house torn down at the next visit of the intendant. That the morals of these favored farmers might remain uncorrupted by the splendid vices of great cities, they were forbidden to go to Quebec without permission from the intendant, and anybody in the city who should let rooms to them was to be fined one hundred livres for the benefit of the hospitals. In 1710, the inhabitants of Montreal were prohibited from owning more than two horses or mares and one foal apiece, on the ground that if they raised too many horses they would not raise enough cattle and sheep.

With a thousand such arbitrary and foolish though well-meant regulations, the people of New France were hampered and restricted; so that, in spite of the advantages of the country for agriculture, for fisheries, and for the fur-trade, there was nothing surprising in the facts that business of every kind languished, and that the population increased but slowly. The slowness of increase of the population early attracted the attention of the French government, which labored earnestly to counteract the evil. No inhabitant of Canada was allowed to visit the English colonies or to go home to France without express permission. Settlers for Canada were diligently enlisted in France and sent over in shiploads every year, being paid bounties for going. Women were sent over in companies of two or three hundred at a time, all carefully sorted and selected as to social position, so that nobles, officers, bourgeois, and peasants might each find wives to suit them; and each of these prospective brides brought with her a dowry paid by the benevolent king (and for that purpose wrung by his tax-gatherers from the groaning peasantry of France, who really footed all these bills). The arrival of these women was usually accompanied by a royal order that all bachelors

in the colony must get married within two weeks under penalty of not being allowed to hunt or catch fish or trade with the Indians. Every father of a family who had unmarried sons over twenty years of age or unmarried daughters over sixteen was subject to a fine unless he could show good cause for his delinquency. The father of ten children received a pension of 300 livres a year for the rest of his life, while he who had twelve received 400, and people in the upper ranks of society who had fifteen children were rewarded with pensions of 1200 livres. Yet in spite of all these elaborate devices the white population of Canada, at the end of the reign of Louis XIV, in 1715, after half a century of such careful nursing, did not reach a total of 25,000.




FIG. 1.—Bartram's ground-plan and cross-section of Onondaga Long House.

We can partially understand this failure if we duly consider the fact that the anxiety of Louis XIV, to increase the population of Canada did not carry him so far as to tolerate heresy there. No Huguenot was allowed to enter the colony upon any terms whatever, and about 1685 the Marquis Denonville reported to the king that, so far as he could ascertain, there was not a single heretic in Canada. Now at that very moment the persecuted Huguenots of France were beginning to swarm from their native country, in spite of all the king could do to prevent them. The migration was much more numerous than that which founded all the thirteen English colonies ; and if it had been directed into Canada, it might soon have made a powerful state. But, as it was, all this vast strength was entirely lost by France and went to increase the power of the English colonies, as well as of England itself and Holland and Northern Germany. In similar wise, as regards migration in general, no European family in possession of its senses would move to a country so hampered with annoyances as Canada, when other communities offering political freedom along with their other advantages were situated next door. Under these circumstances, it is not strange that the English population of North America grew to a million while the French population was reaching 25,000.

One might suppose that, in view of this disparity in numbers, New

France need never have become a formidable adversary to the English colonies. But the danger from New France consisted largely in her power of setting her Indian allies into motion. This was at times a very serious danger, and might have acquired a deadly significance if the French had ever succeeded in winning the friendship of the Long House. The plans of the leading French pioneers were very bold; they covered vast stretches of territory, and their ultimate failure may make them seem to have been visionary from the start. However that may have been, there can be no doubt that much careful thought, followed up by most consummate heroism of action, was put into the work of making France supreme in the New World. Never was any work taken up by an abler or more devoted set of men. If New France failed to overcome her English neighbors, it was not for any want of intelligence or vigor or courage on the part of individual Frenchmen; but it was first and chiefly due to the suicidal methods of government introduced by Louis XIV.




FIG. 2.—Seneca Long House. (Morgan, "Houses of American Aborigines.")

The circumstances under which the French first entered this continent tended to draw them far into the interior. The migration was not one of families, but of traders and explorers, aided by missionaries. It became necessary to win the friendship of the Algonquin tribes on the St. Lawrence; and in doing this, Champlain naturally incurred the hostility of the Long House. Something like a military necessity was thus created for the French to occupy positions far enough westward to interfere with Iroquois attempts to cut off their fur-trade. Consequently, we soon find them establishing their ill-fated missions on Lake Huron, while their *courreurs de bois*, or "runners in the woods," penetrated as far as the Sault Ste. Marie. It was natural that out of such a beginning should have grown those adventurous schemes for controlling the Mississippi valley and checking the westward advance of the English, which

form such a picturesque portion of the history of New France. Had the contest been merely one of rivalry for the monopoly of the fur-trade, perhaps France might have succeeded; but the factor with which she had not the strength to deal was the quiet and solid growth of a great self-governing agricultural population between the Atlantic seaboard and the Alleghany Mountains.

After their recovery from the shock inflicted in the destruction of the Huron missions, the French turned their attention more earnestly than before to the work of humiliating or converting the Long House. Just about the time that the English took possession of New Netherland, two men of remarkable ability were put in charge of Canadian affairs. Jean Talon was appointed intendant of the province, while the Marquis de Tracy as governor took command of the military forces. This officer brought with him one of the most famous regiments of regular troops in the French service, known as the regiment of Carignan-Salières. Fortresses were soon built at Chambly and other points on the Richelieu River, in the hope of warding off Mohawk incursions into Canada. The tawny warriors, however, did not wash off their war-paint, and soon became so annoying that Tracy in a long march southward invaded their country. It was a very dangerous thing to do, and under other circumstances might have brought upon Tracy the ruin which in later years fell upon the too venturesome Braddock; but the Mohawks seem to have lost heart in the presence of the 1300 finely armed and gorgeously attired Frenchmen, for they retreated before them without offering any effectual resistance. The result of the campaign was that the French took several villages and burned their long wigwams to the ground, thus depriving the Mohawks of their winter stores of food.

This blow served to quiet the enemy for some years, while the French went on extending their explorations and their missionary work until they entered the region between the Sault Ste. Marie and Lake Winnipeg. In 1670, Nicholas Perrot arrived at the spot where the city of Chicago was afterward built, and in the course of this journey he heard of a stream flowing southward which the Indians called Mississippi, which means "great water," and not "father of waters," as is commonly said. The Algonquin word *Missi* is identical with the first part of the name Michigan, which means "great lake," and also with the first part of the word Massachusetts, which means "great hill." When the news of this river was reported to Talon, he wished to know more about it, and sent out Father Marquette and a fur-trader named

Joliet to explore it, if possible, to its mouth. As these worthy men passed the mouths of the Missouri and the Ohio, they met with Indians armed with muskets and wearing garments of English cloth, which had probably found their way thither from New York. Our explorers hoped to find the Mississippi River emptying into the Pacific Ocean or the Gulf of California; but, after passing the mouth of the Arkansas, they concluded that it must flow into the Gulf of Mexico. They heard that the lower tribes were fierce and unfriendly, and they had no desire



FIG. 3.—La Salle. ("Magazine of American History," vol. viii.)

to come into collision with Spaniards. So Joliet and Marquette turned their canoes northward and returned to the Jesuit mission at Green Bay.


Soon afterward came to Canada the greatest of all her governors, one of the most interesting men of his time: Louis de Buade, better known by his title, Count Frontenac. Under this enterprising man, the work of exploration was conducted on a great scale by two men whose names stand unsurpassed in the history of such work. Robert de La Salle (Fig. 3), was a native of Rouen, member of a noble family well known in Normandy. He had received a good college education and spent some time at court before coming out to the American wilderness and leading for a

while the life of a *coureur de bois*. He entertained magnificent dreams of empire for France, and was inspired by them to acts of marvelous heroism and devotion. His friend and comrade was Henri de Tonty, a gentleman whose father left his name upon the Tontine system of life annuities of which he was the inventor. The young Tonty, after losing one of his hands in battle, replaced it with one of steel, after the fashion of Goetz von Berlichingen. This steel hand was always covered with a woolen glove, and many a time the Indians were edified and amazed by the terrific blows which this young knight could deal. Throughout all the arduous work of La Salle, Tonty was his faithful and intelligent supporter.

It was in 1673 that La Salle first penetrated southward from Lake Erie until he discovered the Ohio River and explored a large portion of it. On a later expedition in 1679, he built and launched on the Niagara River, near Tonawanda, a small ship called the Griffin, which he sent to the Green Bay mission for furs, while he and Tonty proceeded overland to a point on the Illinois River, where they built a blockhouse, and there underwent such sufferings that they named it Fort Crèvecoeur, or Heartbreak. It was expected that the Griffin would carry back to Niagara her rich cargo of furs, which would thence be taken upon canoes to Montreal and sold. In this way, money would be obtained for fresh resources for the expedition; but the winter passed without any word ever coming from the Griffin, and, from that day to this, nothing has ever been known of her fate. At length, unable to endure the suspense, La Salle left Tonty in command of Fort Crèvecoeur, while he started with only five companions on a walk of five hundred miles through the virgin forest. Perhaps the most interesting feature in this terrible march was the fact that this delicately reared nobleman showed powers of endurance which neither his red nor his white comrades could rival; and when he reached the Niagara River, it was with five jaded invalids upon his hands, whom he put into a canoe and paddled another five hundred miles to Montreal. When he returned to Illinois River in the following summer, it was a terrible sight that met his eyes. His party came upon the ruins of the principal village of the Illinois, which a party of Iroquois had lately captured and burned. The Illinois had made an alliance with the Frenchmen, and this had drawn down upon them the wrath of the Long House. A powerful war-party of Senecas overpowered the Illinois, burned their principal town, and massacred half the inhabitants. Meanwhile the garrison at Fort Crèvecoeur had mutinied, and half of them, break-



PLATE I.



Hennepin's View of Niagara Falls,

From his "Nouvelle Decouverte," Amsterdam, 1688.

*History of All Nations*, Vol. XXII, page 25.

ing away, proceeded to Lake Erie, where they embarked in canoes and cruised about in the hope of finding and killing La Salle and seizing upon all his supplies for their own use and behoof. Their plans were so far carried out that there was a canoe-fight; but the issue of it was not what they expected, for La Salle totally defeated them and sent their ringleaders in irons to Montreal for Frontenac to make an example of. As for Tonty, with the loyal part of the garrison, they had fled before the Iroquois to Green Bay. After all these vicissitudes, our explorers seemed no nearer the mouth of the Mississippi than at the beginning, and they now felt it necessary to return to Montreal and organize a new expedition.




FIG. 4.—Hennepin's map of the Northwest, 1683. (From his "Description of Louisiana.")

One of the Frenchmen upon the Illinois River was at this time making an expedition of his own. Father Hennepin, with a few friends, journeyed to the northwest and penetrated far into the country of the Dakotas. After his return to Europe, this ingenious traveller published a narrative of his adventures in an entertaining book, which contains the first plate ever engraved of Niagara Falls (PLATE I.) and also what is probably the earliest engraving of an American bison, from Father Hennepin's own sketches. There was glory enough for one man in what this priest had done, but he was foolish enough to spoil it by inventing an elaborate falsehood. He pretended that he had sailed down the Mississippi River; but the data for testing this claim are abundant, and it has been completely refuted.

One of the disadvantages under which La Salle labored was the jealousy of most of the fur-traders. There was some reason for fearing that his complete success would be rewarded by a monopoly of the fur-trade in certain districts ; consequently, many obstacles were thrown in the way of his success. He was always obliged to keep watch against foul play, and on at least two occasions he was poisoned. All these things, however, failed to shake his determination ; and at last, in the spring of 1682, he descended the Mississippi River to its mouth and took formal possession of all the country drained by it, while he named it Louisiana, after his royal master.




FIG. 5. Kalm's view of Niagara Falls. (From "Gentleman's Magazine," 1751.)

The next step was to found a colony. There had been a new fort built on the Illinois River, and Tonty had been left in command there, while La Salle returned to France to obtain the means for making a settlement at the mouth of the Mississippi River. But this attempt resulted in worse ruin than any of the others. The captain missed his way and landed the company upon the coast of Texas. There some of the ships were wrecked in a storm, while others were seized by pirates ; and thus the captain disappeared, leaving La Salle's party helpless upon that lonely coast. After two years, the life there became unendurable, and La Salle started eastward for the Mississippi in the hope of ascending it to Tonty's fort on the Illinois. But there were traitors in the camp. La Salle was a stern disciplinarian, and his demeanor was sometimes overbearing. They had not proceeded far on their way when a quarrel arose, in the course of which a few wretches lay in ambush, and, as La Salle passed the spot, they shot him dead.

The exploration of the Mississippi River from its upper waters to its mouth by La Salle was regarded by the French as virtually the discovery of that river. The work of Soto was more than half forgotten, and at all events his discovery had never been followed by Spanish occupation of the country. It was in the hope of following up the work of discovery immediately by occupation and settlement that this last ill-fated expedition of La Salle had set forth, but the effect of his death was to postpone that work for several years. His achievements, however, had already done much toward sketching out the goodly empire which his countrymen expected to obtain in the New World. It was a common doctrine that a Christian nation which discovers a river




FIG. 6.—La Salle's discovery of Louisiana, 1684.

in heathen territory establishes a claim of ownership upon all the country that is drained by that river. According to this notion, when La Salle planted the fleur-de-lis at the mouth of the Mississippi, he conferred upon France a claim to all the vast territory lying between the summits of the Appalachian range and those of the still unknown Rocky Mountains. To establish this claim, however, actual settlement was needed; and it was the intention of Louis XIV. to establish a chain of forts along the Mississippi valley and at intervals upon the shores of the Great Lakes, so as to connect with Fort Frontenac upon the site of the present town of Kingston, at the foot of Lake Ontario. It was believed that with such a chain of forts it would be possible to sway the policy


of the Indian tribes in such wise as to gain permanent control over the country.

Closely connected with this scheme was the plan for pushing down the Hudson River and driving the English from New York. Such a step would cut off the New England colonies from their southerly neighbors, and would transfer from English into French hands the immensely lucrative fur-trade, of which the Hudson River was one of the principal pathways. As we have already mentioned, this scheme was completely frustrated by the warriors of the Long House. In 1687, the year of La Salle's death, these barbarians began cutting off the fur-trade from the upper lakes. In the summer of 1689, they invaded Canada, laid siege to Montreal, and devastated the country far and wide. They even forced the French to abandon Fort Frontenac, but did not leave them time enough to destroy it, so that a great abundance of fire-arms and other military supplies were carried off by the exulting barbarians. When Frontenac returned from France, he saw that no time was to be lost in striking a counter-blow. Early in 1690, he sent out three war-parties of French Canadians and Indians to attack the exposed frontier settlements of the English. The first of these parties, commanded by Iberville, was destined for Albany; but, changing its purpose, it swooped upon Schenectady and destroyed that village after massacring sixty of its inhabitants. The second party, commanded by Hertel de Rouville, started from Three Rivers and made its way through the wilderness to Salmon Falls in New Hampshire, where the horrors of Schenectady were repeated. Hertel then joined the third party coming from Quebec under Portneuf, who took command of the united forces. They attacked the blockhouse at Casco Bay, but met with a sturdy resistance. After some days, the New Englanders surrendered the fort on condition that no injury should be done to life or property. But Portneuf shamefully violated his promise and handed over his prisoners to the Indians to be tortured to death, while he pulled down the fort and burned the village.

After dealing these heavy blows, Frontenac sent a party to the northwest, which defeated a small force of Iroquois and liberated an immense quantity of furs which for the past three years had been unable to come below Michilimackinac. When all this valuable property was brought to Montreal, it set up a revival of trade in Canada. Fortune seemed in all directions to smile upon Frontenac. We have already seen how a congress of the English colonies had been convened in the city of New York by Jacob Leisler, and how an expedition against



PLATE II.



La Potherie's View of Quebec, 1700.

From his "Histoire de l'Amérique Septentrionale," Paris, 1722.

*History of All Nations, Vol. III, page 29.*

Canada was there concerted. Soon after the congress, Sir William Phips, the first royal governor of Massachusetts, sailed with a fleet of seven small ships against Port Royal in Acadia, and captured it. This was but the prelude to a more extensive operation, in which, with a fleet of thirty-two ships, carrying more than 2000 men, Sir William sailed up the St. Lawrence and attacked Quebec (PLATE II.). After a stubborn fight which lasted three days, Frontenac remained master of the field. Another expedition, commanded by Fitz-John Winthrop, started from Albany to operate against Montreal and serve as a diversion in favor of Phips; but Winthrop also was defeated.

These repeated calamities and disasters threw all New England into a deep gloom. Massachusetts was burdened with such a debt that it was thought necessary to issue a kind of paper money known as bills of credit, and to make them a legal tender. With this curse the colony was plagued for more than forty years. One of the immediate effects of the disasters seems to have been a spasmodic development of the belief in diabolism then generally current. The superstitions relating to witchcraft were then rapidly dying out from civilized minds, but there were still many people who entertained them in all their crudity. Of convictions and executions for witchcraft, there had been perhaps half a dozen in Massachusetts before the year 1690. Indeed, Mrs. Ann Hibbins, sister to Richard Bellingham, deputy governor of the colony, had been hanged on Boston Common on a charge of dealings with the Evil One. In 1689, the same fate overtook a poor laundress named Glover, who was supposed to have bewitched a family of four children. The circumstances of this case attracted the attention of one of the most remarkable young men of the day, Rev. Cotton Mather, son of the president of Harvard College. Cotton Mather (Fig. 7) was then in his twenty-fifth year, and had been graduated at Harvard ten years before. The fame of his learning had already reached the Old World, and there can be no doubt as to the vast amount of his reading in all directions. His philosophic depth did not correspond with the sweep of his learning; but he had much sound common sense, with remarkable prudence and tact. Like many other eminent men of the time, Mather believed in the reality of witchcraft; it was natural, therefore, that he should study with some care the case of the children supposed to have been bewitched by Mrs. Glover, and of course he wrote a small book about it, for he wrote books, either great or small, about almost everything. The number of books (mostly mere tracts) written and published by him during his lifetime exceeds four hundred. His little treatise on the

witchcraft in Boston attracted much attention on both sides of the ocean, and it is possible that this fact may have had some connection with the sudden panic which soon followed.

The scene of this panic was a small farming community known as Salem village, some three or four miles out from the town of Salem; it is now a part of Danvers. For some years, a most bitter and truculent feud had been going on between the partisans and opponents of the minister, Rev. Samuel Parris. This person had come to Salem from Barbados,



FIG. 7.—Cotton Mather. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xxv.)

and had brought with him two Indian servants known as John Indian and his wife Tituba. These Indians were adepts in palmistry, fortunetelling, second sight, and other such barbaric lore, with which they greatly amused the minister's daughter and niece and half a dozen other girls of the village, who, soon after Christmas, 1691, formed a habit of meeting at the minister's house to while away the long winter evenings. It was not long before these girls had learned sundry of the Indians'

tricks, when suddenly it appeared that they were under some constraint to go on with their antics, whether they would or no. They would writhe convulsively, get on all-fours under the table, make sounds of barking and mewing, and otherwise comport themselves in an unseemly manner. Parris invited doctors and ministers to inspect these children, and it was sagely concluded that they were suffering from witchcraft. They felt obliged to confess that this was the case, and named as their tormentors, first, the two Indians, and presently, a couple of wretched and friendless old white women of the village.

If the matter had stopped here, there would have been nothing especially remarkable about it; but a far more serious turn was soon given to it. One of the afflicted children, an extremely precocious girl of twelve, was daughter of Sergeant Thomas Putnam, uncle of the Israel Putnam who figured so conspicuously in the next generation. His wife, a lady of rare beauty and accomplishments, had for some time suffered from mental disease. There can be little doubt that a jury of modern experts would have pronounced her insane. She had been deeply implicated in the village quarrel, and was one of the minister's most violent partisans. After the witchcraft affair had made some progress, Mrs. Putnam was more than once seized by hysterical convulsions, and gave other symptoms which were understood to indicate witchcraft. Now, when we consider that Mrs. Putnam, with her daughter Ann, her maid-servant Mercy Lewis, and the minister Parris, were the four principal agents concerned in the witchcraft panic, we can perhaps understand the fact that the most prominent among the persons accused belonged to the opposite party in the long village feud. It cannot be called a case of conspiracy in the ordinary sense, but the form which their delusion assumed led them to single out their enemies as victims. After a few weeks, the afflicted girls mentioned two of the most highly respected Christian women in the community as their tormentors. It was this step that created the panic; for it was at once felt that if such godly women as Rebecca Nurse and Martha Corey could be selected by the devil as his instruments, what safety was there for anybody? The foundations of public confidence were thus disturbed. Every man became suspicious of his neighbor, and in the course of the summer more than 200 people were arrested, nineteen of whom suffered death on the gallows, while one sturdy old man was pressed to death for refusing to plead. It is very commonly believed that some of the Salem witches were burned; but such was not the case. The twenty exonerations just mentioned were all that occurred. There is no case on record

of the execution of any white man or woman in New England by burning.

The witchcraft at Salem village is one of the cases most worthy of study, inasmuch as the details have been preserved for us with great fullness and accuracy. It is also interesting because it occurred at a moment when the superstition was fast losing its hold upon men's minds, so that many of the participators in the Salem affair lived to renounce their belief in witchcraft altogether. It is well known how




FIG. 8.—William Stoughton, presiding justice in the witchcraft trials.

Samuel Sewall, one of the judges, afterward publicly humiliated himself for the share which he had taken in the tragedy; and poor young Ann Putnam did likewise, accusing herself of shocking wickedness and attributing it to the direct suggestion of the devil. As for Cotton Mather, he declared that "there had been a going too far in that affair," but such a statement did not involve any change of attitude on his part. His relation to the Salem panic has been made the subject of widespread popular misconception. In the year 1700, the belief in witchcraft was

attacked by a Boston merchant named Robert Calef, who treated with acrimony the book which Cotton Mather had published after his investigation of the Glover case. The misrepresentations of Calef have been handed down by historians, each one simply repeating his predecessor, until it has become generally believed that Mather was the chief instigator of the cruelties at Salem. This popular error was first exposed by the poet Longfellow, who, in preparing his tragedy of "Giles Corey," went back to the original sources of information. Some controversy ensued upon this, but the matter was finally set at rest by the



*William Phipps.*

FIG. 9.—William Phipps.

late Dr. W. F. Poole. In point of fact, if Cotton Mather's advice had been taken, there would not have been a single execution for witchcraft. The judges of the court appointed for trying the witches asked advice from the Boston ministers, who in response presented the court with a list of instructions drawn up by Cotton Mather, the youngest of their number. Among the rules there laid down was one which rigorously forbade the admission of what was called spectral evidence, and which also excluded as unsound testimony the writhings of the accusers in the presence of the accused. It may be explained that spectral evidence

meant the stories of apparitions which the accusing children professed to have seen. Mather condemned all such evidence as "devil's legerde-main," and furthermore said that Satan is too great a rascal to deserve much credit as an accuser. If this rule of Mather's had been followed, the verdict in every one of the trials would perforce have been "not guilty."

The course of military events was not calculated to dispel the gloom which had been gathering over New England since 1690. As long as Frontenac lived, it seemed impossible to make any headway against the



FIG. 10.—Pierre Lemoine d'Iberville. (From an unlettered print in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

French. Iberville was one of his ablest lieutenants, and, in three years of warfare along the Maine coast and on the Acadian border, he had decidedly the best of it. The men of Massachusetts claimed for the eastern border of their province the river St. Croix, which now separates Maine from New Brunswick; but the French asserted their right to everything east of the Kennebec. In the warfare of these years, the villages of York and Oyster Bay were destroyed and their inhabitants massacred, and finally the fort of the New Englanders at Pemaquid was

taken and destroyed. Iberville promptly followed up these successes by invading Newfoundland and capturing the English fortress at St. John's and laying waste the greater part of their settlements. He then turned northwestward upon Hudson Bay. In 1667 Charles II. had chartered the Company of Hudson Bay, with a monopoly of all its fur-trade, which time has shown to be enormous almost beyond belief. The king's cousin, Prince Rupert, was the leading personage among the grantees, and until recent years the vast northwestern portion of North America was known as "Rupert's Land." A most interesting commercial company was this of Hudson Bay, always successful in securing ability and honesty in its officials. As the Cunard Steamship Company boast that in the sixty years since their enterprise began they have never lost a life, so the Hudson Bay Company feel a pride in telling that in more than two centuries they have never had in their employ a dishonest clerk or a defaulter. In Iberville's time, the work of this great company was only beginning. The great northwest had not been penetrated, but sundry forts had been built on the shores of Hudson Bay. These were one after another taken by the French, and in 1696 the last one, Fort Nelson, was captured by Iberville, thus winning this region for Louis XIV.

Early in the spring of 1697 the horrors of Schenectady were repeated at the village of Haverhill on the Merrimac, which was destroyed by a party of French and Algonquins under Hertel de Rouville. This affair was long popularly remembered through the exploit of Hannah Dustin, the wife of a farmer in the neighborhood. The man was working in the field, with seven young children playing about him, while his wife, who had lately given birth to another, lay ill in the farm-house, attended by a young girl and boy of the neighborhood. As the Indians came yelling into the village, enting off Farmer Dustin from all hope of rescuing his household, he found it nevertheless possible to take his children away to a place of safety. The scene enacted in Dustin's house was typical. Mrs. Dustin and the boy and girl were taken prisoners. Her baby was slung against a tree, knocking out its brains; and presently the party started for Canada. The boy understood the Algonquin language, and one evening, in the woods of New Hampshire, he overheard enough to know that the fate in store for himself and companions on reaching Canada was death by slow fires. When he told this to Mrs. Dustin and the girl, it was decided to make a bold stroke for freedom; so one night, while the Indians were asleep, their three white captives remained awake, and, stealthily arising, each seized a tomahawk, and in

a few moments the three had crushed the heads of the eleven sleeping Indians. Then, taking a canoe which was at hand, and not forgetting to secure the eleven scalps as proof of what had been done, Mrs. Dustin and her comrades floated down the Merrimac to Haverhill. From all the colonies came lively congratulations at her escape, and she received a bountiful reward in scalp-money.

Meanwhile the old lion, Frontenac, had made his deadly spring. He had determined to invade the Mohawk country. His first attempt in

1693 was unsuccessful, for his troops were obliged to retreat after an obstinate but indecisive battle with Peter Schuyler. A second invasion in 1696 had better fortunes. In a very remarkable forest campaign, the French, with their Algonquin allies, penetrated to the very heart of the Iroquois confederacy, destroyed villages, burned crops, and slaughtered warriors until they had dealt the Long House a blow from which it never quite recovered. Few sights could be more picturesque than that of the indomitable Frontenac (Fig. 11), now in his seventy-eighth year, carried through the wilderness on the shoulders of his tawny allies, whose yelps and screeches bore frequent testimony to the admiration with which his repeated successes filled them. The next year, the Long House sent a deputation of warriors to Quebec, to sue for peace; and things were wearing a black look for the English, when, in the course of 1697, Frontenac died, and presently came the news of the treaty of

Ryswick. The result of the eight years of terrible fighting in Europe had been indecisive; yet Louis XIV. had clearly met with his match in William III., and it looked as if an insuperable barrier had been set to his progress in the north and east. As far as Ameria was concerned, all that the French had won by their skill and gallantry was handed back to England by a stroke of the pen. Their only permanent achievement was the punishment they had inflicted upon the Long House.



FIG. 11. Frontenac.

PLATE III.



The Iroquois Chiefs who visited London in the time of Queen Anne.

From a mezzotint by B. Lens, after a drawing from life by B. Lens, Jr. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

*History of All Nations*, Vol. XXII, page 36.



Peace, however, was destined to be of short duration. The giant war just ended was about to be followed by another still more tremendous; and each year made it more apparent that the great object for which England and France were fighting each other was slowly changing in character. The war of William III. against Louis was, in many of its aspects, a struggle of Protestantism against the Counter-Reformation; but it also had its commercial side. It was partly a war for colonial empire, for maritime supremacy, and for the control of North America. Among its significant incidents were the great sea-fights of Beachy Head and La Hogue. The war of the Spanish Succession, which was soon to follow, was the death-blow to the hopes of the Counter-Reformation; but its most conspicuous aspect was the struggle for colonial empire, and the great victories of Marlborough left Great Britain the most commanding power in the world.

If we ask for what purpose Louis XIV. wished to place his grandson, Philip V., upon the throne of Spain after the failure of the Hapsburg line, the obvious answer is that he wanted to have the control of Spanish resources and Spanish policy in French hands. He hoped to obtain for France a goodly share in the great treasure-houses of Mexico and Peru; and moreover, it would be likely to put at his disposal the Spanish Netherlands, which otherwise formed an uncomfortable buffer in the case of his attempts upon Holland. Moreover, it was to be hoped that the combination of French and Spanish fleets might be able to overcome the English on the ocean and crush the rapidly growing commerce of England.

The war, which broke out in 1702 and lasted eleven years, was in Europe a war signalized by mighty battles, such as Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet; but in the New World, it was what Lafayette would have called "a war of skirmishes and outposts."

Throughout Massachusetts, the sickening tale of firebrand and tomahawk was repeated. The Maine coast was hideous with murders; in the interior, the barbarians penetrated as far southward as the towns of Simsbury and Waterbury; while in the upper valley of the Connecticut, there occurred a horror rivalling those of King Philip's war. The town of Deerfield had already suffered so much that it was unable to pay its minister's salary, and had to receive support from the General Court for that purpose. In February, 1704, the village was attacked by a party of 250 French and Indians, led by the formidable Hertel de Rouville. The attack was made on an intensely cold night, a little before day-break. Sixty of the inhabitants were slaughtered, and a hundred were

carried off to Quebec to be ransomed or burned to death, as might happen. Among the captives was Rev. John Williams, the village pastor, who was ransomed three years afterward and made his way to Boston, where he published an account of his sufferings under the title, "The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion." He tells us how, as the captives were led from home through snow nearly knee-deep, his wife, who was in feeble health, soon showed symptoms of weariness, and on the second day sank to the ground, whereupon one of the Indians instantly slew her with his tomahawk. In the course of the march of three weeks, nineteen fellow-prisoners were thus murdered because of their inability to keep up the march. Mr. Williams' clean clothes were taken away from him, and in their place he was covered with Indian rags swarming with vermin, much to his disgust. After some weeks, he was sent to Montreal, where the governor, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, released him from the Indians and saw that he was treated with kindness and courtesy; but it was still two years and a half before the exchange of prisoners could be arranged, which restored him to his home.

Four years after this savage exploit, in the midsummer of 1708, Hertel made a second attack upon Haverhill, where, after a brisk fight, he was driven away, but not until after he had slain about forty of the inhabitants and burned several houses. In the following spring, an attack was made upon Exeter, where some of the victims were burned at the stake. Then yet another assault was made upon Deerfield; but the inhabitants were forewarned and reinforcements were at hand, so that the enemy were quickly repulsed.

Such affairs as these maddened the New England people, and a modification of old Cato's war-ery began to be heard in the land: "*Canada delenda est.*" Such a thing might have been accomplished, but it required more ability than the English had then at their disposal in America. Francis Nicholson, who had been successively governor of New York, Virginia, and Maryland, was now commander-in-chief of the English forces in America. In 1709, he organized an expedition consisting of English war-ships, with a force of colonial soldiers, for the purpose of attacking Quebec; but, as the season was growing too late, so that there was some danger of encountering ice in the St. Lawrence River, Nicholson changed his plan and swooped upon Port Royal in Acadia. The result was the surrender of Port Royal and the easy conquest of the peninsula.

Two years later, Nicholson prepared another expedition on a grander

scale. Seven of Marlborough's best regiments were sent over to Boston, and with them a fleet of fifteen ships-of-the-line. This force was to attack Quebec, while Nicholson was to proceed from Albany against Montreal. The force was adequate for its purpose, but the best of instruments can accomplish little in the hands of bunglers; and such were the British general, Sir John Hill, and the British admiral, Sir Hovenden Walker. This old seafarer committed the same kind of mis-



*Robert Livingston*

FIG. 12.—Robert Livingston.

take which in later days proved fatal to Braddock. He despised the local knowledge of New England pilots, in the same spirit that Braddock despised the local knowledge of Virginia backwoodsmen. The result for Walker was the total wreck of eight of his great battleships upon treacherous reefs in the St. Lawrence, and this unexpected disaster was too much for the admiral; he gave up the enterprise and sailed away for England, and, when the news reached Nicholson on Lake

Champlain, he saw that the only thing left for him was a retreat to Albany.

Thus it appears that in this second French war, as in the first, but little glory was gained by English arms in America. Between the first and second wars, however, there was a marked difference. Under Frontenac, the French had generally been victorious, and they had conquered from the English important territory which the ensuing treaty obliged them to hand back. Under Vaudreuil, the French had scarcely held their own. The massacres wrought by their Algonquin allies had little or no military value, and one important province they had lost. The conquest of Acadia by Nicholson far more than outweighed any successes on the French side. But the results of the fighting in Europe were decisive enough. France was thoroughly beaten and Louis XIV. effectually humbled. It is true that the treaty of Utrecht in 1713 left the Bourbon prince, Philip V., upon the Spanish throne, but only after the chief objects which his grandfather had in mind in placing him there had been effectually frustrated. The Spanish Netherlands were taken from Spain and retained in the possession of that Hapsburg family through which Spain had first obtained them. Henceforward until the French Revolution, they were known as the Austrian Netherlands. So far from being swayed by the house of Bourbon, they were made subject to its most bitter enemy.

With regard to maritime and colonial supremacy, France was obliged to give up all claim upon Newfoundland and the Hudson Bay region. England retained Acadia, which was henceforth known as Nova Scotia; and the name of Port Royal was changed to Annapolis, in honor of the reigning sovereign. In this region, France kept only the islands of Cape Breton and Prince Edward, with a few very small ones, while she retained her claim to a share in the fisheries. In the West Indies, she was obliged to surrender to England the important island of St. Christopher. The greatest acquisition, perhaps, was that which England made at the expense of Spain, namely, the so-called "Asiento Contract," which transferred from Spain to England sundry great commercial monopolies, and, among them, that of the African slave-trade. We shall presently see that one melancholy result of this victorious treaty was greatly to tighten and strengthen the hold of the baneful institution of negro slavery upon several of the American colonies. In regard to cause and effect, the war of the Spanish succession and the Civil War in America 150 years later come nearer together than most people realize.

In this second French War, other colonies than those of New York and New England were more or less implicated. The discoveries of La Salle had given the French an interest in the Gulf of Mexico, while the West India Islands and the Spanish settlements in Florida were an abiding source of dread for the southernmost English colonies. It is time for us to turn our attention to the continental region lying between Florida and Virginia, and point out how English colonies came to be planted there.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE CAROLINAS AND GEORGIA.

THE stretch of coast more or less vaguely comprised between the limits of Virginia and Florida was called Carolina at least as early as the reign of Charles I., when Lord Baltimore for a moment entertained the idea of planting a colony there. In 1663 this territory was granted by Charles II. to eight lords-proprietors in acknowledgment of great services which they had rendered him. These men were George Monk, Duke of Albemarle, Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, Anthony Ashley Cooper, afterward Earl of Shaftesbury, Lord Craven, Lord Berkeley of Stratton, and his brother, Sir William Berkeley, governor of Virginia, together with Sir George Carteret and Sir John Colleton. The grant constituted a palatinate something after the fashion of Maryland, except for the all-important difference that here there were eight lords-palatine instead of one. Shaftesbury was the most active in constructing a constitution for this new colony, and the document was drawn up by the great philosopher, John Locke; but it must not for a moment be supposed to give expression to Locke's ideas of what government ought to be. This elaborate constitution was from the beginning unworkable and very little practical heed was ever paid to it, whereupon some writers are pleased to contrast the worldly wisdom shown by William Penn in his constitution for Pennsylvania with the dreamy impracticality of the metaphysician Locke; but such a contrast is very silly, for Penn was expressing his own ideas, while Locke was giving shape to those of Shaftesbury. His own ideas were not very far from those of Penn, and the only clause of the constitution which ever proved valuable was conceived in precisely the same spirit of toleration. This liberal policy, which was inaugurated between the years 1670 and 1690, determined large numbers of the Huguenots then leaving France to shape their course for Carolina. The first settlement made within the limits of Carolina was on the northern shore of Albemarle Sound in the years 1653-64. The people were emigrants from Virginia, and their settlement became known as the Albemarle colony. Another settlement known as the Clarendon colony was made at the mouth of Cape Fear

River in 1665, while five years later a village called Charles Town was begun at Albemarle Point on the Ashley River. Two years later another village was started at Oyster Point, on the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper rivers. This situation was found much cooler and more breezy than the other, and so it grew faster until by 1680 the population numbered 2500. Soon afterward the old settlement was abandoned and the new one took its name, which was presently modified into Charleston.

The early career of the Albemarle colony was extremely turbulent. This was partly due to the character of the migration by which it was peopled. In order to attract settlers, the Albemarle legislature enacted that nobody could be sued for the next five years for any act of delinquency committed outside the colony. In particular, all debts contracted outside were expressly outlawed, and newcomers were for the first year exempt from every kind of tax. The result was to draw the shiftless part of Virginia's white population across the frontier, where it was not strange that they showed a tendency to set law and order at defiance, every man doing that which was right in his own eyes. Another source of trouble was that wretched Navigation Act which was born to make trouble everywhere. In defiance of that act a brisk smuggling-trade grew up between Albemarle Sound and Massachusetts Bay, and the attempts to suppress it only tended to make the little colony more wayward and rebellious than ever. One trivial incident may suffice to give us a picture of the time. A certain John Culpeper, surveyor-general of Carolina, got into serious difficulties in the Ashley colony, so that in order to save his neck he deemed it prudent to fly to that rogues' paradise (as good Virginians called it), the colony of Albemarle. Once safely there, he set up as a virtuous tribune of the people and proposed to set the Navigation Act at defiance. With many people this made him at once the hero of the day. Just at this moment, in December, 1677, a New England schooner hove in sight, and it was soon learned that she was loaded with delicious molasses and with that still more seductive daughter of molasses known among tipplers as rum. On arriving at the landing-place the Yankee skipper boldly went ashore, but had not proceeded far when he was arrested for smuggling and taken before the governor, who held him to bail in a thousand pounds. This act, of course, excited wild popular indignation against the governor, and their wrath was still further inflamed by the news that the Machiavelian Yankee had promised to go away without landing. The thought of losing so much good liquor was unendurable

to these men of Albemarle; and while they besought the skipper not to leave the river, they were ready to countenance almost any act that should baffle the governor. The match was thus laid for an explosion, and with characteristic temerity the governor himself proceeded to light it. On board the schooner was a gentleman named Durant, a wealthy and influential settler well known as an encourager of smuggling. The governor was rash enough to go aboard the schooner and arrest this gentleman on a charge of treason. For Culpeper and his friends, this was the signal to act. They at once arrested the governor and his council and put them in jail, while they convoked the assembly, appropriated all the funds in the treasury, and chose Culpeper for their governor. For the next two years Culpeper had quite a frolic in his *Msatia*; but presently, on receiving intimations that troops were about to be sent from Virginia for the purpose of restoring the legitimate government in Albemarle, he thought best to go boldly to London and give his own version of the recent affairs. In this he was so successful that he would very likely have returned to his colony, had he not suddenly been arrested for misappropriating certain funds of the Albemarle treasury. Such a misdemeanor might be regarded as constructive treason, and so the summer of 1680 witnessed the trial of Culpeper before the king's bench. He was acquitted of this capital charge; but in the course of the trial his reputation was so far broken down that he could get no further appointments, but returned to his old quarters in the Ashley colony, where he soon found occupation in his old trade of surveyor.

If the career of Culpeper in the government of Albemarle may be called somewhat shady, that of his successor was a case of Egyptian darkness. The name of this creature was Seth Sothel. To him the Earl of Clarendon had sold out his share in the Carolina palatinate, so that he came in the double capacity of lord-proprietor and governor. He arrived in Albemarle in 1683, and soon proved himself a thief and bully of the lowest sort. It is difficult to find any redeeming trait in his character, for his rapacity and cruelty were equalled only by his cowardice. He would interfere with the probate courts so as to prevent people's wills from being administered, then he would assume the office of administrator and fatten upon the estate. Like that sanguineous lawyer, Mr. Wemmick, he had a fondness for all sorts of portable property and was apt to lay hands upon it without much preliminary scrutiny of the ownership. If people acquiesced in his proceedings, very good; if not, he had them arrested for seditious conduct, and, pending their stay in

jail, administered their estates for his own behoof. It was only necessary, however, for some one to denounce this man to frighten him out of his wits, and presently he was fain to accept banishment rather than be sent to London for trial. Then he betook himself to the Ashley colony, where he found everything in hot water. The good people of Charleston had a knack of catching Indians for slaves, which led to savage reprisals; and to this source of trouble were added those that were furnished by the Navigation Act. One incident of that turbulent time may be cited as among the rarest curiosities in that museum of human folly known as civil government. It was part of the constitution of the Ashley colony that laws passed by its assembly should expire at the end of two years unless renewed by a fresh act. Now the quarrels between the governor and his assembly grew so bitter and boisterous that word came from the lords-proprietors in England that no more assemblies should be convened without orders from them. The natural result was that after two years not a single statute law was in force within the colony. So things went on until 1690, when Colleton, the governor, deemed it necessary to proclaim martial law. Just at this moment the fugitive lord-proprietor, Sothel, arrived upon the scene from Albemarle, and by virtue of his high authority called together an assembly which deposed the governor; but scarcely had this been effected when the kaleidoscope gave another turn. Sothel's partners in London, hearing of his misdeeds, sent out an order for him to return to London and answer sundry charges; but the rascal understood so well the consequences of such a trial that he preferred to take to the woods, and history knows him no more.

About this time the Clarendon colony on the Cape Fear River was abandoned. The influx of population into Carolina was not great enough to sustain three colonies, and Clarendon was the least favorably situated of the three. The colony on the Ashley River occupied by far the best position for trade with the West Indies or with New England or with Europe, and the colony of Albemarle profited by its proximity to Virginia. These two colonies had from the beginning had distinct governments, and they continued to grow up as distinct communities, although several attempts were made to unite them under a single magistrate. By the year 1690 it was becoming customary to speak of North and South Carolina. An epoch was made in 1695, when the two colonies were placed for one year under the rule of the illustrious Quaker, John Archdale. He was a man of power, integrity, and tact. He knew how to be at the same time unflinching and conciliatory, while his

fairness was such that he won the support of all classes. A single year of such a man did much toward bringing order out of chaos; and this desirable result was greatly helped by the improvement in the character of the population, due chiefly to the arrival of large numbers of Huguenots. Under Archdale's able successor, Joseph Blake, the Huguenots were admitted to the same political rights and privileges as the English settlers; and this was probably the most important step that had yet been taken toward founding a sound and healthy commonwealth.

One more victory over narrow prejudices was necessary before this good work could be perfected. The first decade of the eighteenth century was in England noted for a revival of the persecuting spirit; this was perhaps due to the feelings called forth by the mighty war against Louis XIV. It became the mark of a good Englishman to hate all Catholics, and it was easy to extend this frame of mind until all persons outside the Established Church were included within its measure of hatred. This was the time when the English Parliament passed the anti-Presbyterian laws, which drove so many sturdy Protestants from the north of Ireland to the American colonies; and it was in just the same spirit that an attempt was made to secure religious conformity in South Carolina. The governor who came out in 1703, Sir Nathaniel Johnson, undertook to force through the assembly a law depriving all dissenters of political privileges. This would practically have put back the Huguenots where they were at the outset, and would have included others with them; but after a hot struggle the scheme came to nought, the governor was totally defeated, and the result was the gaining of political rights for all manner of dissenters.

While these things were going on in South Carolina, the course of events in the northern colony was somewhat similar. There was an attempt to disfranchise dissenters, and it failed. It was complicated with an attempt to impose upon public officers certain test oaths which Quakers were unable to take, and so many Quakers had arrived in the colony that this was getting to be a serious matter. For six years there was a state of anarchy, culminating in 1711 in the suppression of Carey's rebellion.

The character of the North Carolina population was now steadily improving, and among the best of the newly arriving elements were the Huguenots in the vicinity of Bath, and the Swiss led by Baron de Graffenreid, who founded the town of New Berne. The increase of population brought with it one of the usual results: the frontier was moved some miles further inland, encroaching more or less upon the Indian

hunting-grounds. Thus quarrels arose, multiplied and extended by reprisals, until some fearful massacre by the red men ushered in a war in which they were the losing party. So it was in North Carolina. A glance at the distribution of tribes in that neighborhood will help to make the case clear. The tribes who contended for the mastery of the territory between Virginia and Florida were of three distinct stocks. From Cape Lookout northward as far as the Virginia border, they belonged to that great Algonquin family which held the Atlantic coast as far as Labrador. South of Cape Lookout were various tribes known as Tutelos, Monacans, Manahoacs, Waterees, Waxhaws, and Catawbas. These were formerly supposed to belong to the Maskoki family, along with the Creeks and Choctaws; but in recent years it has been proved, to the surprise of many people, that they belonged to the celebrated Sioux family, which now has its headquarters in Dakota. Westward and northwestward of these Sioux, holding the southern ends of the Appalachian range, was another great Indian people, formerly classed with the Maskoki, but now known to be genuine Iroquois; namely, the Cherokees, most intelligent of southern Indians, as their kinsmen of the Five Nations were the most intelligent Indians of the north. In North Carolina yet another Iroquois tribe, known as Tuscaroras, occupied such a territory as to intrude deeply into the Sioux or Catawba country. The first blow at the white settlements was struck by the Tuscaroras in September, 1711. In that month Baron d' Graffenried set out in his boat from New Berne to explore the Neuse River. His companions were a negro servant and John Lawson, the surveyor-general of the colony, against whom the Indians cherished a fierce grudge, because they had observed that the exercise of his profession was invariably followed by the loss of some privileges on their part; so they seized poor Lawson and the negro and burned them alive. Graffenried was imprisoned and sometime afterward ransomed. Almost simultaneously with these murders there came dreadful massacres at New Berne and in the Bath precincts and along the Roanoke River. Several hundred persons were killed in these affairs, and the prospect was beginning to look gloomy, when it turned out that delivery was at hand. Colonel John Barnwell, with a few white men and a large force of Creeks, Yamassees, and Catawbas, made the long forest march from South Carolina to the Neuse River, and there in an obstinate and murderous battle completely defeated the Tuscaroras. Two years afterward the palisaded fort of that tribe at Snow Hill was stormed by another South Carolinian officer, Colonel James Moore; and so greatly weakened were

the Tuscaroras by these two defeats that they ventured no longer to keep up the contest, but retired to the foot-hills and made their way northward into the valley of the Susquehanna, and so on into the wilderness of central New York, where they were received into the famous confederacy of Five Nations, henceforth to be known as the Six Nations.

This expulsion of Tuscaroras from North Carolina occurred in 1713, the year of the treaty of Utrecht, which terminated the war of the Spanish Succession. While that war was attended with brisk fighting at the northern extremity of the English colonies, it was once attended by something like a scare at the southern extremity. On a hot day in the midsummer of 1706, a fleet of French and Spanish ships approached Charleston harbor and summoned the city to surrender; but they were presently driven away by a mixed land and naval force under Colonel William Rhett. The end of the war was followed by trouble with the neighboring Indians, and it was generally believed that the Spanish authorities at St. Augustine secretly incited the red men to acts of murder and pillage, just as it was believed in New England that similar acts were encouraged by the authorities at Quebec and Montreal, even in time of peace. In the present instance there was a widespread conspiracy of Creeks, Catawbas, Cherokees, and Yamassees, not less than seven thousand warriors, against the colony of South Carolina. It was one of the most formidable combinations ever made by Indians against white men. The war began in April, 1715, with the massacre of ninety white people at Popocaligo, and it lasted more than a year, during which both sides lost heavily, at the rate of about one white man to a score of Indians. The name of Charles Craven deserves especial honor for the skill and boldness with which he handled the resources of South Carolina in this terrible devastating war.

His successor, Robert Johnson, who came out in 1717, was the last governor under the lords-proprietors. As the burden of Craven had been the Indian war, so Johnson's burden was the pirates. Already in speaking of the administration of Lord Bellomont in New York, we had occasion to remark upon the great extent to which piracy flourished at the beginning of the eighteenth century. We may repeat here that one of the chief causes of this phenomenon was the rapid growth of a wealthy mercantile marine without as yet any sufficient naval protection. The Carolina coast was peculiarly exposed to pirates, because of the numerous lairs which those wretches had established for themselves upon various West India islands. At first it was not altogether certain that

the pirate was an unwelcome visitor. He was apt to have plenty of gold money with him, and enjoyed spending it lavishly; and the citizen who sold him goods for twice their worth did not feel bound to question too scrupulously the source whence his gay customers got their money. But a few years later, when society had become more orderly, the pirate was felt to be an intolerable nuisance, and Execution Dock was oftentimes decorated with long rows of dead ruffians, swinging in chains. About the time of Governor Johnson's arrival in 1717, it was reported that there were more than fifteen hundred pirates on the North Atlantic coasts, with their headquarters on the island of Nassau and along the Cape Fear River, whence they sallied forth upon their ravaging expeditions. The most formidable of these ruffians was best known under his sobriquet of Blackbeard. Tales innumerable are told of his hardihood and insolence. In June, 1718, he appeared in Charleston harbor with four stout war-ships and captured several vessels. One of them contained several prominent citizens of Charleston just starting for London. The astute Blackbeard forthwith sent a messenger ashore with a list of provisions, tools, and medicines, which the pirate ships needed. Blackbeard allowed Governor Johnson forty-eight hours in which to procure these necessities and send them on board. If at the end of that time they were not forthcoming, the governor must not take it amiss if he were to receive from Blackbeard a present of the severed heads of all his prisoners. Of course there was nothing for the governor to do but meekly submit; he knew that the pirate had the city completely at his mercy. The supplies were therefore provided without a moment's delay, and Blackbeard's prisoners were released.

This, however, was one of piracy's last frolics. In the course of that same summer the island of Nassau was captured and garrisoned by regular troops. Shortly afterward Blackbeard was slain in a fight and his crew were hanged, and by dint of such wholesome measures the American waters were at length cleared of piracy by the year 1730.

Before that date a political revolution had been wrought in the two Carolinas. The Indian wars had created a large public debt; and since the lords-proprietors were now drawing a goodly income from the country, it was felt that they ought to contribute something toward the payment of this war debt. But the lords-proprietors were too short-sighted to comply with any such popular demand, and sometimes bitter quarrels arose. For example, on one occasion when the assembly wished to raise money by selling Yamassee lands to settlers, the lords-proprietors interposed and laid claim to those lands as part of their proprietary domain,

to be exploited for their exclusive benefit. Finally a crisis was precipitated at the end of 1718 by the breaking-out of war between England and Spain. As the Spaniards were threatening Charleston, it became necessary to raise money. A tariff act had been passed for such a purpose, but the proprietors had vetoed it. It was now proposed to disregard the veto and collect money under the act, but the chief justice would not allow such a proceeding. He announced that the court would sustain delinquents who should plead the veto against the collector. The situation thus became a complete deadlock, which the assembly soon terminated by resolving itself into a convention which deposed the lords-proprietors. This was of course a revolutionary proceeding of the boldest sort. The convention virtually stepped into the place of the king, when it deprived the proprietors of the territory and jurisdiction which he had bestowed upon them, and when it went on to depose Johnson as proprietary governor, and to offer to reinstate him as royal governor. Upon Johnson's refusal to recognize the convention, it appointed Colonel James Moore governor. In this juncture there was no help for Johnson but the militia, but the militia preferred to support Governor Moore. In truth the whole logic and morality of the situation was in favor of the assembly and against the proprietors, and it was not strange that when the news reached London the assembly was upheld and the overthrow of the proprietary government confirmed. George I. sent out as royal governor Sir Francis Nicholson, the same gentleman who has already figured in our narrative in many different capacities. It was after a while proposed in Parliament that a certain sum of money should be granted his Majesty wherewith to buy out the lords-proprietors and thus extinguish their title. This was at last accomplished in 1729, and henceforth both the Carolinas remained royal provinces until 1776.

This change from the proprietary to the royal form of government was made all the more easily because it was strictly in accordance with the policy toward which the crown had been inclining ever since the accession of James II. It will be observed that all the old proprietary governments had by the third decade of the eighteenth century been extinguished, except those of the Penns and the Calverts. The latter, it will be remembered, had been restored in 1711, when the fourth Lord Baltimore abjured the Catholic faith. The governments of the Penns and the Calverts had the rare good fortune to survive until the Declaration of Independence. All the others were before that time swept by the board, and for this there was one great underlying

reason: the proprietors, as a rule, consulted their own interests rather than those of either the people or the crown, and consequently they united crown and people against them. It was for the interest of the people to have the proprietors bear their fair share of the public burdens, and it was also for the interest of the crown to have the proprietors thus assist in augmenting the revenues. By their selfish short-sightedness the proprietors alienated the royal favor, and no one was a more active enemy to the proprietary government toward the close of the seventeenth century than the king's collector of customs, Edward Randolph. In other particulars the same point was illustrated. Each proprietary government, when first set up, was charged with the duty of doing its best to convert and civilize the Indians in its neighborhood; and thus it enlisted the favor of the church and of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. But after some years had elapsed, the fact became apparent that their lordships were doing nothing to evangelize the Indians; and thus they lost the sympathy of the religious and charitable bodies in England. No doubt all these evils were most keenly felt where the proprietorship was lodged in a number of men rather than in a single individual. As a general rule, for practical purposes in this world, a single-headed governor is better than one with many heads. It often happens that a dozen men, each of whom would behave with wisdom and integrity if acting alone, will conduct themselves more or less like fools and knaves when constituted into a board. Probably the secret of this lies in the division of responsibility; but however this may be, the fact is common enough. Maryland and Pennsylvania furnish by far the best instances of proprietary government in America. Here the government was not only lodged in single individuals, but among the Calverts and Penns were several of signal ability. In the case of Carolina the complaints were perhaps greater than elsewhere. The proprietors were by charter bound to build churches and chapels, as well as blockhouses for defence against the Indians; but these duties they neglected, and allowed all the expense to fall upon the colonists. They furnished very inadequate aid against the pirates; they secured the appointment for political purposes of incompetent or venal officials; and at times they sought to abrogate or override salutary laws which had been passed by the assembly and approved by their own governors. Under these circumstances popular feeling ran so high that in 1719 the gallant Colonel Rhett declared that unless the crown should sanction the overthrow of the proprietors, there was danger that the people would rise in rebellion against the crown itself.

The acquisition of the whole Carolina territory by the crown was completed, as we have seen, in 1729. At that time the division between North Carolina and South Carolina, which had been developed by circumstances, was formally adopted and recognized. At the same time a new commonwealth was called into being for the purpose of strengthening the frontier against the hostile Spaniards in Florida and the West Indies. This new commonwealth originated in a military scheme of Colonel James Oglethorpe (Figs. 13 and 14),



*James Oglethorpe*

FIG. 13. James Oglethorpe. (After an engraving by E. Bust.)

a brave and high-minded officer who had served in the army from an early age and had won distinction in Marlborough's campaigns. At that time there was much commercial distress in England, arising from injudicious speculation. The opening-up of waste or uncultivated land is almost sure to create eras of extravagant hope and reckless speculation, which are inevitably followed by spasms of bankruptcy and despair. As we shall hereafter see, the history of the United States during the nineteenth century abounds in illustrations of com-

cial panics due chiefly to the rapid westward advance of our frontier. One of the earliest precursors of this series of panics was the great South Sea Bubble, which so captivated people's minds in the days of George I. In 1730 such great prisons as the Fleet and the Marshalsea were crowded with persons who could not pay their debts, whereupon Oglethorpe conceived the bright idea of offering them liberty and other inducements to migrate to America. This idea found such favor that in



FIG. 14.—General James Oglethorpe. (From an engraving by S. Ireland after a sketch from life at the sale of Dr. Johnson's books February 18, 1785, where the General was reading, without spectacles, a book he had purchased.)

1732 a tract of land was assigned for the new colony, and a government was created for it. It is worth noting that, in spite of the long hostility of the crown to proprietary governments, that of the new colony was organized upon very similar principles. The colony, which was named Georgia after George II., was put in charge of a board of trustees, which was analogous to a company of lords-proprietors, but with powers more strictly limited and defined than had hitherto been the case. Some of the provisions for the government cannot be understood

without reference to the military purpose which in Oglethorpe's mind was closely connected with his scheme of charity. The government of the trustees was to be an absolute government, and there was to be no assembly elected by the people; an arrangement which becomes intelligible when we remember how extremely niggardly all the colonial legislatures were in granting money for military purposes, even in times of utmost peril. Negro slavery was prohibited within the limits of the colony, a provision which was probably suggested by the imminent danger of servile insurrection incited by Spanish emissaries from Florida; by interposing between South Carolina and the Spaniards such a neutral zone, it was hoped that this danger might be averted. The sale of rum and other ardent spirits was also strictly prohibited; a provision in which we deservy the desire to avoid complications with the Cherokees and other neighboring tribes of Indians. Legislative attempts at preventing colonists from selling rum to their dusky neighbors had hitherto generally proved futile; but clearly, if ardent spirits were prevented from finding their way into the colony, they could not be sold to the Indians, and thus one fruitful source of danger would be closed up. All these provisions are thus clearly intelligible as parts of a coherent scheme; but it is worth mentioning that, while the prohibition of negro slavery was distasteful to many planters, it was defended by sundry high-minded colonists with arguments which condemned slavery on moral grounds.

The territory of Georgia was at first assigned with the carelessness of geography so common in British grants of land in America. As finally arranged, the boundary between Georgia and South Carolina followed the Savannah River; and its effect was to cut off from South Carolina some of its occupied territory. Probably this was unintentional and arose from the course of the river being roughly taken as nearly east and west, instead of from northwest to southeast, as is really the case. The effect is shown in the South Carolina censuses of 1721 and 1734. In the former the white population was reckoned at 14,000, along with 32,000 negroes; or in all, 46,000. Ten years later we find that the white population had fallen off one-half or down to 7,000, while the number of negroes had fallen off to 22,000, and the total population showed a diminntion of one-third, and appeared as 29,000. This paring-down of South Carolina, however, did not materially affect her growth at the time, since the greater part of her population was still on the seaboard, and the territory which remained to her was sufficient to support immense accessions of people. As

regarded her westward expansion in the future, she was practically deprived of any territory sustaining toward her the same relation which Tennessee originally bore to North Carolina and Kentucky to Virginia. The greater parts of the states of Alabama and Mississippi were in later days carved out of Georgia, with only a very narrow rim along the southern border of Tennessee, which had been left to South Carolina by a provision which amounted to little more than an act of courtesy. Practically, however, this territorial restriction has probably interfered but little with South Carolina's importance in the American Union from the days of Christopher Gadsden down to the present time. In particular, the immediate influence of the South Carolina type of society upon Georgia and the other states on the Gulf of Mexico has probably been as great as if all had been settled from the beginning without the interposition of Georgia.

From a military point of view, it may be said that Oglethorpe's colony was founded none too soon; for since the time of La Salle, the French had been gradually but steadily strengthening their grasp upon the interior. They had built the fortresses of Kaskaskia in 1700, Cahokia in the same year, Detroit in 1701, and Vincennes in 1705; thus connecting the lower great lakes with the Mississippi valley and covering their fur-trade with the tribes of the Northwest, while they put themselves into a position to dispute with the Five Nations the control of the tribes between Lake Michigan and the Ohio River. While all this was going on, the able General Iberville, who had played such a conspicuous part in the first French war, turned his attention southward and founded Mobile in 1702. Nothing deterred by the ill success of the second French war, LeMoyne de Bienville (Fig. 15) proceeded in 1718 to lay the foundations of the city of New Orleans. In those days of the Family Compact, when France could generally count on support from the Spanish Bourbon, it was clearly high time that the English power should be prolonged toward the southwest.

Oglethorpe's colony did not consist solely of insolvent debtors, for it was soon joined by large numbers of Protestant Germans and Scotch



FIG. 15.—LeMoyne de Bienville.  
("Magazine of American History,")

Highlanders. Even the New England provinces contributed their quota and founded the little town of Sunbury. Under Oglethorpe's judicious management, the beginnings of the new commonwealth were thrifty and auspicious. Its military purpose was amply justified in the war with Spain, which broke out in 1739. Disputes relating to colonial affairs were prominent among the causes of this war. For many years British trade with America was harassed by the Spaniards. It was no unusual thing for a Spanish cruiser, meeting an English merchantman, to seize her upon some frivolous pretext and carry her off to some port in the West Indies or South America, where the case would be submitted to some Spanish tribunal. As a natural result, the English ship was apt to be confiscated as well as all her cargo; and happy were the sailors and passengers if they succeeded in getting off without a long term in jail, subject to all manner of brutality and outrage. For such high-handed proceedings, Sir Robert Walpole tried every means in his power to secure satisfaction from the Spanish government without resorting to war. At Pardo, early in 1739, it was agreed that Spain should pay to the British government a round sum of money whereby the losses of British subjects might be compensated. The people of England had already arrived at a degree of indignation such that they preferred war to an arrangement of this sort. Consequently, when the stipulated time for payment arrived and Spain made no sign, Walpole's government promptly declared war and sent a great fleet to the West Indies under command of Admiral Vernon, while Oglethorpe was ordered to attack the Spaniards in Florida. Oglethorpe, like a good statesman, had secured the alliance of the powerful Creek confederacy, and his arrangements for dealing with the enemy were admirable. After several minor incidents Oglethorpe completely defeated the Spaniards in the decisive battle of Frederica, July 9, 1742. After this battle the Spaniards no longer were a source of alarm to our southern borders, and Oglethorpe presently returned to England, intending to come back and share the further fortunes of his colony; but circumstances detained him in England, where he lived long enough to shake hands in 1785 with John Adams as minister from the independent United States to the court of George III. After his departure from Georgia, the government by trustees grew more and more unpopular. One of the great staples of the seaboard in that colony, as well as in South Carolina, was rice, the cultivation of which called for negro labor, and in those days negro labor meant slave labor. Hence the efforts of the trustees to enforce the anti-slavery provision in the charter was of

itself enough to ruin their popularity, and it can be well understood that their attempts to prevent the sale of spirituous liquors did nothing to restore it. Accordingly in 1752 the trustees were bought out by the British crown, and a provincial government was introduced of the usual type, with royal governor, council, and elective assembly.

Having thus witnessed the beginning of the youngest of the English colonies in America, we are in a position to continue with our narrative of the great struggle with New France until the final overthrow of that power.

## CHAPTER III.

### THIRD AND FOURTH WARS WITH FRANCE.

THE war which broke out in 1689 between Louis XIV. and William III. was the beginning of what might be called for American purposes the Seventy Years' War against France. For while that period was occupied by four successive wars, separated by intervals of peace, these intervals were nevertheless little better than armed truces in which each of the two great antagonists kept nursing his warlike spirit while he awaited an opportunity for renewing the strife. During those seventy years the dominating fact in the development of the English colonies was the continuous presence of the enemy. As we shall see hereafter, it gave such a complexion to the political contests in each colony between the royal governors and the elected legislatures as to make it wellnigh inevitable that the overthrow of the French power would entail the speedy revolt of the English colonies against the government of the mother country.

With the later progress of our narrative, these points will be further elucidated. For the present let us observe some of the circumstances which justify us in calling the interval between the second and third wars merely a period of armed truce.

In 1689 and the years immediately following, when Father Marquette was busy with his explorations among the upper lakes, there was in his company a young Jesuit priest named Sebastian Rasle. This young man was cast in a mould like most of the best Jesuit missionaries of that day. He was a man of ability, scholarship, integrity, dogged bravery, and unflinching devotion. In 1693 he was summoned eastward to a position near the centre of the struggle on the Kennebec River, which the French claimed as the western border of Acadia. A few miles above the site of Augusta, this young priest collected a party of Christianized Algonquins, and built there a chapel and blockhouse with a few rough cabins. The spot is still known by its old name of Norridgewock. This step was an illustration of the ordinary French method of proceeding in establishing what would to-day be called its "spheres of influence" over the native

tribes. For example, the triangle of forts—Cahokia, Vincennes, Detroit—might be regarded as establishing such a sphere of influence among the western tribes as to neutralize most effectually the suzerainty which the Five Nations sought to exercise over them; so in like manner the establishment of Father Rasle on the Kennebec was the centre of a potent sphere of influence over the tribes of the northeastern coast, among whom, since the overthrow of the Tarratines in 1678, the Abenakis were now perhaps the most important. The men of New England well understood that one such missionary priest was capable of doing as much good to his own cause and as much mischief to the enemy as a whole regiment of soldiers. It was consequently a legitimate operation of war when in 1707, during Father Rasle's absence from Norridgewock, Colonel Hilton attacked and burned the place with some loss of life to its people. Rasle was not the man to be ruffled by such a bit of ill fortune; so after the end of the war he quietly rebuilt the place and resumed the work of making it the centre of a sphere of influence.

During the next ten years there was more or less emigration from Massachusetts into the Maine district, so that Governor Shute felt it desirable to renew by treaty his amicable relations with the eastern tribes. A conference was held on an island in the Kennebec River. The governor of Massachusetts reminded the red men that, like himself, they were subjects of George I. Therefore everlasting friendship should be sworn between white men and red men, and it would be well if the latter should learn the religion of Englishmen, for which purpose he offered them one of Eliot's Bibles with a learned parson to expound it. In reading the reply of the Indians we must not forget that they were believed to have Father Rasle in their company, although he remained invisible at a safe distance in the woods. The reply of these Catholic converts declared that they did not set up their private judgments in matters of religion, but were quite satisfied with their present spiritual guides. As for the King of England, they had nothing against him so long as he left them in undisturbed possession of their lands; but they believed that he had no claim to the country east of the Kennebec; indeed, they had been assured by the Marquis de Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, that France had not ceded to Great Britain the eastern shores of that stream. Now, inasmuch as the treaty of Utrecht had forever ceded Acadia to Great Britain, with the boundary at the river Ste. Croix, it was evident that the Mentor to whose thoughts these Indians gave voice was playing a false part, endeavoring to maintain as long as possible the French claim upon the ceded territory between the Ste. Croix and

the Kennebec. It is evident that such a situation might bring on war at any moment. For the present, Governor Shute overawed the Indians, so that they gladly bound themselves to do no damage to English settlers east of the Kennebec.

Nevertheless, as the months passed by, the Indians did not refrain from acts of hostility; they slew Englishmen at places both east and west of the Ste. Croix, and they inflicted serious damage upon the property of English settlers. When Shute made complaint to the nearest French magistrate, the governor of Cape Breton, that officer replied that it was none of his business. This answer so irritated the General Court of Massachusetts that they proposed to send a party of 150 men to Norridgewock with instructions to bring back to Boston either the obnoxious Rasle himself or a promise for his surrender, sealed with a proper number of Indian hostages. This step was perhaps not too spirited for the occasion, but it greatly displeased Governor Shute for two reasons: first, he was extremely averse to war and wished to tread gingerly; secondly, he thought that in such a step the General Court was transcending its powers and meddling with his especial department of the public business. Thus there grew up a hostility between the governor and his legislature, which ended only with Shute's departure for England in 1723. The affairs of Massachusetts were left in the hands of an extremely able man, Jeremiah Dummer, the lieutenant-governor. Meanwhile, in November, 1721, a New England force had visited Norridgewock, but not in time to prevent Rasle's escape. They seized a parcel of letters, however, which confirmed the worst suspicions they may have entertained. One was from Vaudreuil to Rasle, asking him why his Indians did not hurry up and make short work with the English settlers east of the Kennebec. "It cannot be because they are short of ammunition," said the foxy old marquis, "because I send them enough myself." As if this were not enough, there was another missive from the intendant of Canada, informing Rasle that the government at Versailles had been requested to allow Vaudreuil to attack the English openly instead of confining his aid to secret supplies. A third letter revealed the fact that an intrigue was going on with the Penobscot tribes to secure their aid for their brethren of the Kennebec. All this was bad enough to supply Massachusetts with food for discussion during the whole winter; but the advent of summer only made things worse, when a party of sixty warriors crossed the Kennebec and carried away a number of New Englanders as sureties for their own hostages, who had been taken to Boston. Before another month had elapsed, news

came that the Indians had burned the town of Brunswick, while another letter had been captured in which the governor of Canada announced that he had received orders from France to assist the Indians. The General Court thereupon decided to make war at once, not against France, but against the offending Indians; and so there blazed out a war which lasted for two years with the usual atrocities. The war raged along the entire coast of Maine, and inland as far as the upper waters of the Merrimac and Connectient. Nearly all the Algonquins between the St. Lawrence and Penobscot Bay were concerned in it, and their movements were directed in great measure by Father Rasle himself from the centre of his sphere of influence at Norridgewock. The tale of Indian massacre was repeated at Falmouth, Berwick, Wells, York, Scarboro, Saco, Dover, Oxford, Kingston, Chester, Northfield, and at Fort Dummer, where the village of Brattleboro now stands; but as usual, the white men came off victorious and the Indians suffered ten-fold the damage they inflicted. In August, 1724, the Massachusetts men captured and destroyed Norridgewock, where Father Rasle, bravely fighting, was shot dead at the foot of the great cross which he himself had set up in the marketplace.

One of the features of these savage wars was the setting of a price upon Indian scalps, and it is astonishing to find that this price was sometimes as high as one hundred pounds. It was not strange, therefore, that guerilla fighting should have been carried on with the simple purpose of getting prize-money. On such an expedition was Captain John Lovewell engaged in the spring of 1725, with varying fortunes. At one time, coming suddenly upon ten sleeping Indians near Conway in the White Mountains, it was very easy to brain them all and turn an honest penny. But, as often happens, the pitcher went to the well once too often and incurred the fate of such pitchers. On the 7th of May, as Lovewell with thirty-four men was prowling in the neighborhood of Saco, he fell into an ambuscade and was attacked by a large force of Indians. The result of the first onset was the death of Lovewell with eight of his men, and the wounding of three others. The fight was kept up by Ensign Wyman until only nine of the men were left unhit. By that time the Indians withdrew, and most of Wyman's remnant escaped to places of safety. A little sheet of water near the scene of the action now bears the name of the defeated captain, somewhat abbreviated; it is called Lovell's Pond. The story of his unhappy fight was made the subject of a ballad, which for many years was to all New England people as familiar as Chevy Chace.

The cost of this bloody business during the four years 1721-25 was probably equivalent to more than a million dollars in our modern money. Such was the state of things which could exist on one of our frontiers during a season of profound peace between the French and English governments. I think we are justified, therefore, in saying that such intervals were merely periods of armed truce.

During the thirty years which followed the treaty of Utrecht, the work of planting fortresses went on slowly, but the French showed more activity than the English. Although the peninsula of Acadia, or Nova Scotia as it was now beginning to be called, had been handed over



FIG. 16.—Gov. William Burnet.

to the English by the treaty, they made very little progress in colonizing it. We have seen how they established a seat of government at Annapolis; but they occupied very little more than that town, together with a few fishing-posts. The scanty population of the peninsula was almost entirely French in blood and entirely French and Catholic in sympathies. France simply awaited an opportunity for recovering the peninsula; and for this purpose, as well as in order to threaten New England, a great stronghold was built on the island of Cape Breton and received the name of Louisburg. Again with a view of cutting off the English from the northwestern fur-trade, the French built a fortress

on the Niagara River; but this act was far more than counterbalanced when Governor Burnet, of New York (Fig. 16), bought the land at Oswego from the Six Nations and built a fort there. The result of this measure was to divert a large portion of the fur-trade from Fort Frontenac and the river St. Lawrence to Oswego and the Mohawk valley. This was one of the most important steps that had been taken since the death of Frontenac. The French had wellnigh exhausted their arts of diplomacy in trying to detach the Long House from the English alliance. By the close renewal of commercial intercourse between the English and the Six Nations, this serious danger was prevented.



FIG. 17.—Sir William Johnson. (From an engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Another important incident in this connection was the arrival of William Johnson (Fig. 17) from Ireland in 1738. This man was one of the most interesting personages in the history of his time. Amassing great wealth by the fur-trade, he bought extensive tracts of land in the Mohawk country and there erected two strongholds known as Johnson Castle and Johnson Hall. He was a man of abundant tact, who knew how to deal with Indians, and he made himself loved and admired by them as few white men have ever been. Whoever visited either of his fortified mansions was sure to find groups of Indians lying about and

smoking their pipes, or standing in groups, talking over the news of the day. The great influence of Johnson over the warriors of the Long House kept them from succumbing to Jesuit intrigues and breaking off their alliance with the English. Already, before Johnson's arrival, the French had built the famous fortress of Crown Point near the southern extremity of Lake Champlain, where its waters begin to narrow. The purpose of this step was to prevent the English from advancing to the northward and at the same time to establish a convenient base of operations for an invasion of the Mohawk country, or even of the Hudson valley.



FIG. 18. Gov. Jonathan Belcher. (From a mezzotint by Faber after a painting by Phillips.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

In the far west, the work of exploration and discovery was not neglected by the French. In 1731 a party of wood-rangers, with a missionary or two, started from Michilimackinac, led by the Sieur Verendrye. This party made its way to Lake Winnipeg and ascended the Red River of the North as well as the Saskatchewan. Twelve years later one of the sons of Verendrye ascended the Missouri River until he came within sight of the Rocky Mountains. So great was the sweep of French adventure, while the English had not yet crossed the Alleghanies,

The year 1742, which was marked by this long exploring journey of the younger Verendrye, was also the year in which England took part in the War of the Austrian Succession. On the death of the Emperor Charles VI, in 1740, the male line of the Hapsburgs became extinct. In accordance with his will, his daughter Maria Theresa succeeded to his hereditary dominions, thus becoming Queen of Bohemia



*W. Shirley*

FIG. 19.—William Shirley.

and Hungary and Archduchess of Austria. In order to legalize this succession, it was necessary to set aside the Salic law which excluded women from the throne. Charles had effected this to the best of his ability by an instrument drawn up in 1720 and known as the Pragmatic Sanction; but after Charles's death, France and Spain united with Bavaria to place Charles Albert, Elector of Bavaria, on the hereditary thrones of the Hapsburgs. In 1741 the diet at Frankfort elected

Charles Albert emperor under the style of Charles VII., and the alliance against Austria was joined by Saxony and Prussia. In the following year, after Frederick the Great had won two victories, Maria Theresa prudently bought him off by cessions of land in Silesia, and England took up arms in her behalf. The great English victory of Dettingen soon followed; and in 1745 the Duke of Lorraine, who had married Maria Theresa, was elected emperor under the style of Francis I. The original pretext for the war had thus vanished, and from the outset no one had made any progress toward disturbing the young queen in her hereditary dominions; but the war lasted in a desultory way until 1748, when it was ended by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, whereby all parties reciprocally restored their conquests.

As between France and Spain on the one hand, and Great Britain on the other, this war was a struggle for commercial and maritime supremacy, and the question of the Austrian succession was simply a pretext. In America hostilities began in Nova Scotia, where a force of a thousand men commanded by DuVivier attacked Annapolis unsuccessfully. William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts (Fig. 19), was prompt in returning the blow, and his celerity well illustrated the adage that in military affairs, more than anywhere else, time is money. Shirley soon raised a little army of 4000 men and a small fleet. The command was given to William Pepperell, who was presently joined by half-a-dozen British seventy-fours under Commodore Warren. This force sailed for Louisburg. It was an audacious enterprise. Louisburg had been built from plans drawn by Vauban, one of the greatest of modern engineers, and it was reckoned the strongest place in America after Quebec, and among Old World fortresses only Gibraltar was considered its superior. It was defended by an excellent officer, Duchambon, with 1300 men, and so strong were the works that this force was deemed adequate to hold it against ten times their number, yet its fall was speedy. Warren's fleet blockaded the harbor and effectually kept away all supplies and reinforcements. Pepperell skilfully effected a landing and captured the so-called grand battery, one of the harbor defences, so that its heavy guns were turned upon the city and did terrible execution. At length, after the New England batteries had approached close to the west gates, after several sallies from within had met with bloody repulse, and just as the British seventy-fours were about to open fire, the French commander hoisted the white flag.

This triumphant capture of Louisburg astonished the world; and in New England, as well as in the mother country, the news was received with

vociferous exultation. Pepperell (Fig. 20) was made a baronet, the only instance of a native-born American receiving that honor. France was stimulated by the news to extraordinary efforts. The greatest fleet that had ever crossed the ocean, no less than forty ships of the line, together with frigates and transports, commanded by the Duke D'Anville, set out in the hope of reconquering Louisburg, capturing Boston, and restoring the balance of fortune. But the winds did not blow favorably for that mighty fleet; it was scattered here and there by stormy weather, its



*W<sup>m</sup> Pepperell*

FIG. 20.—William Pepperell.

admiral died, and several ships were lost. Finally the surviving vessels made their way back to France without having accomplished anything. Not yet daunted, the French government sent another fleet commanded by Jonquier; but this fleet was overtaken by Admiral Anson in the Bay of Biscay and completely destroyed. When peace arrived, therefore, it found Louisburg still in English hands. France, however, had the means for buying it back. The war had raged in Hindustan as well as in Europe and America, and France had conquered the province of Madras. This was now exchanged for Louisburg; and so once more

the lilies of Bourbon guarded for France the approach to Canada, while they threatened the good people of Boston and Newport.

At this retrocession of Louisburg, the men of New England were naturally indignant. In order to appease them, Parliament voted that adequate compensation should be made for the expense of Pepperell's expedition, and Massachusetts took occasion of this payment to put her own finances upon a sound footing. Ever since the failure of the Phipps expedition in 1690, New England had been toiling under the curse of an inconvertible paper currency. Small notes were issued under the name of bills of credit, varying in value from a couple of shillings to ten pounds. They were made a legal tender by the colonial governments which issued them, and they were receivable for dues at the public treasury. The inevitable results followed. The promissory notes issued




FIG. 21. Pepperell arms.

by a government which had no cash to pay its debts of course fell in value. Coin was then driven from circulation, and there was an immense inflation of prices, with sudden and disastrous fluctuations. The disturbance to trade became most annoying; and in that day, as in ours, there were always to be found plenty of ignorant demagogues who maintained that the proper cure for the disease was the issue of more paper currency, just as the drunkard who wakes in the morning with parched throat and burning forehead seeks relief by pouring down another glass of whiskey. Pretty much the same nonsense was talked between 1737 and 1750, as afterward in 1786, and again in 1873, and yet again in 1896. But it is to be noted that the three states of southern

New England exhibited contrasts which furnish us with a fine object-lesson. In Connecticut, the land of steady habits, the issues of paper-money made but little headway, and the general prosperity was unabated. In Rhode Island the advocates of rag-money were greatly in the majority, the ensuing distress was repeatedly met with fresh issues, and the commerce of that little state was wellnigh destroyed. In Massachusetts the two parties were quite evenly balanced; but after a while the hard-money men won a decisive and permanent victory, and the prosperity of the commonwealth returned with leaps and bounds. This victory of the sound-money party in Massachusetts was unquestionably owing to the clear insight and determined courage of Thomas Hutchinson (Fig. 22), who was then speaker of the House of Representatives. He was great-great-grandson of William and Ann Hutchinson, who had been banished in 1636 for their share in the Antinomian sedition. His family were honorably distinguished for the resolute courage with which they declared their opinions, and no one of them was braver than Thomas. The share of the Louisburg indemnity which was awarded to Massachusetts happened to be very nearly equivalent to the total amount of paper currency circulating in the colony at its ordinary valuation of eleven for one. There was no use in trying to raise such a currency to par. Hutchinson therefore proposed that the coin sent from England should be used to buy up all the rag-money, which was forthwith to be thrown into the fire, and a statute passed against the issuing of any such money in the future. This proposal gave rise to one of the most savage political contests in all American history; but



*Thomas Hutchinson*

FIG. 22.—Thomas Hutchinson. (From an unlettered proof by Wilcox. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

after a year Hutchinson won a complete victory, his policy was carried out to the letter, and so sudden and brilliant was the return of prosperity that the praises of Hutchinson in 1749 were as plentiful and loud as the scoffs and jeers of the year before.

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was followed in Europe by eight years of peace; but in America the interval was one of restless truce, in which each party was eagerly planning how to resume the struggle to the best advantage. There was the question as to the Acadian boundary, which the treaty of Utrecht did not settle, neither did the little Norridgewock war. Galissonnière, the governor of Canada, maintained that France had never really ceded anything but the Nova Scotia peninsula, and he insisted upon keeping his hold upon New Brunswick and all of Maine east of the Kennebec River. This shrewd man saw that something must be done to retain for France the vast inland region explored by La Salle and his successors. The English seaboard colonies were steadily advancing their frontiers toward the Alleghanies. In the second decade of the century there had begun those two great streams of immigration, one from the north of Ireland, the other from the Rhenish Palatinate, which first met in Pennsylvania, and, passing beyond the Quakers and other earlier settlements, constituted a formidable buffer against the Algonquin tribes of the Ohio valley. This compound stream of immigration had poured into the Shenandoah valley (Fig. 23) and made its settlements among the mountains of Carolina. A British occupation of the whole Alleghany region was plainly threatened, and Galissonnière sought to forestall it by bringing over ten or twelve thousand colonists from France at the government's expense and settling them in the Alleghany regions from Lake Erie southward, perhaps as far as Tennessee; but this enterprise was too vast for the government of Louis XV. To occupy the immense territories discovered by the patient genius of her explorers was a task to which France was unequal. The governor of Canada was obliged to resort to the device of marking the property as his royal master's instead of taking possession of it for him. It was altogether rather a pretty farce. A certain gentleman bearing the name of Celoron de Bienville started from Lake Erie and proceeded to the Alleghany River, and so on to the Ohio, marking his course by nailing to the trees sundry metallic plates on which were emblazoned the arms of France, while near the foot of the same trees were buried leaden plates which declared that the soil belonged to the Most Christian king. This expedition of Celoron portended a speedy collision; for English traders had already begun flocking into the Ohio valley through that




FIG. 23. City of Louisburg with its fortifications.

natural gateway where the waters of the Alleghany and Monongahela unite to form La Belle Rivière, as the French translated its Indian name. Since Celoron had taken possession of the country, these Englishmen must be warned off, and accordingly the French built Fort Venango on the Alleghany River.

While these things were going on, the affairs of Nova Scotia once more rose into prominence. An important step was taken by the Eng-

lish toward securing their control of the country, when in 1749 they sent out a large fleet filled with colonists and built in Chebucto harbor a city of three hundred houses, which they called Halifax, after the earl of that name, who was president of the Board of Trade. This step was soon followed by the building of Dartmouth on the further side of the same harbor; and again by the arrival of a large company of Germans, who founded Lunenburg in that vicinity. We are thus brought to an incident which has been by many writers grossly misconceived. A great deal of sentiment has been wasted over the wholesale banishment of the Acadian peasantry; but as we look carefully into the facts, we shall see that this banishment was strictly a military necessity, which the folly of these simple-hearted people, heightened by the gross fatuity of their priestly advisers, brought upon themselves. No one can blame the Acadian peasants for preferring to be subjects of Catholic France rather than of Protestant England; nor was it strange, since they were always on the lookout for some change of fortune which would transfer their allegiance, that they should neglect the duty of loyalty toward the government under which they actually lived. This imprudence was stimulated by the counsels which these farmers kept receiving from the numerous emissaries who were always moving about the country and were in communication with the authorities at Quebec. Among these Jesuit priests there were many differences; some were ready to give prudent counsel, while others went all lengths in their devotion to the interests of France, which in the existing situation seemed identical with the interests of their order. One of these Jesuits was the Abbé le Loutre, who was chief of one of the Miemac missions. The methods of this able man were not unlike those of Father Rasle. He incited the Indians of his mission to acts of bloodshed and pillage, as for example in 1751, when they inflicted upon Dartmouth a shocking massacre. On another occasion they burned the flourishing village of Beaubassin at the neck of the little isthmus of Chignecto; for although the inhabitants of this village were good Frenchmen, it was feared that they were falling under British influence; and rather than allow this, it was thought best to turn them out into the woods. On opposite sides of the little Missignash Creek stood the French Fort Beausejour and the English Fort Lawrence, bandying hard words with each other and occasionally exchanging shots. Captain Howe, the commander of Fort Lawrence, was a man of engaging demeanor and quite popular with the Acadians, which made him a serious obstacle to the schemes of LeLoutre. One day a party of Miennes lay in ambush on the French side of the creek, and one

of them, dressed in French uniform, waved a flag of truce. Captain Howe naturally came down to the water's edge to see what was wanted, when suddenly he was riddled with bullets from the skulking savages. The responsibility for this villainy was never distinctly brought home to anybody. LeLoutre tried to pass it off as a wanton deed of the Miemaes; but it was generally believed to have been a deed of his own contriving, and in this belief the French commander of Fort Beausejour concurred. LeLoutre was too valuable a man to the French interests to be visited with punishment; but one can understand why the English governor of Nova Scotia should have offered a hundred pounds to anyone who should bring him in, dead or alive.

Late in the year 1754, when the energetic Major Lawrence was governor of Nova Scotia, he learned that the French were planning an invasion of the peninsula, relying upon Fort Beausejour as a base, and trusting upon the Acadian population rising in their favor. On hearing this news, Lawrence saw the advantage of being first in the field. He got 2000 troops from Governor Shirley, of Massachusetts, marched against Beausejour, and captured it. It now became necessary to deal with the problem presented by the abiding hostility of the Acadian people. The English governor at Halifax had not sufficient force to hold the isthmus of Chignecto, with such a disaffected population intervening. It had been the English policy to treat the Acadian peasants with all possible kindness; they had even been exempted from payment of taxes, and absolutely nothing was required of them except an oath of allegiance to George II.; but under the influence of their spiritual advisers they refused to take this oath. After the capture of Beausejour, Governor Lawrence decided with great reluctance to demand from these people the oath of allegiance and to banish from the peninsula all who should persist in their refusal. The number of persons exiled in accordance with this stern resolve was about six thousand. The deportation was effected with as much humanity as was possible. There was no separation of families, and, so far as possible, whole neighborhoods were sent away in company. They were set ashore at various places in the English colonies, and in many cases their own preferences were consulted. It was natural, therefore, that a large number should prefer Louisiana, where they could be subjects of the King of France. The descendants of these deported Acadians may be seen to-day in Louisiana, recognizable by sundry peculiarities of speech and demeanor. After the fall of New France, which took away their capacity for mischief, they were allowed to return to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,

where their descendants now form an important part of the population. It will be observed that this deportation of Acadian peasants, which was a military measure of rather large dimensions, occurred when the governments of France and Great Britain were technically at peace with each other; but in America things had come to such a pass that the two rival powers were like bull-dogs whom nothing could restrain from flying at each others' throats. Ever since 1748 it had been obvious to clear-sighted people that a further war could not be averted. The English colonies, in spite of their great preponderance, were ill pre-




FIG. 24. Valley of the Shenandoah.

pared for such a contest, because of the difficulty of insuring concerted action among them. This difficulty had been felt ever since 1689. It was in order to obviate it that Jacob Leisler had called together in 1690 the first American congress. It was with the same object that William Penn in 1697 presented to the Lords of Trade his famous plan for a federal union of the English colonies. The British crown had endeavored to secure the same end in a rough-and-ready way by appointing the same governor over two or more colonies; as when Governor Fletcher, of New York, had been instructed to take command of the militia of Connecticut, or as when the Earl of Bellomont was appointed governor of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.

It was for the same reason that Plymouth and Maine had been annexed to Massachusetts. But in 1750 it was becoming clear that the next war would be on a much greater scale than its predecessors. It was likely to involve all the English colonies, and therefore some means of raising a continental revenue was desirable; thus the question of a federal union was once more raised. In 1754 a congress was convened at Albany, on account of its proximity to the Long House. In the coming struggle the Iroquois were likely to furnish valuable assistance, and it was desirable to come to some specific understanding with them. The occasion afforded a favorable opportunity for bringing before a people of the English colonies the question of a federal union. Such was the origin of the famous plan propounded at Albany by Benjamin Franklin, concerning which it only need here be said that if it had been adopted it is quite possible that the severance of the colonies from Great



FIG. 25.—View of Albany.

Britain would not have occurred. We shall return to this subject in a later chapter, where we shall consider the principal features of Franklin's plan and show how directly the rejection of it pointed to such a measure as the Stamp Act on the part of the British government. The people of these colonies had need for discussing such questions in 1754, for black war-clouds were gathering thickly. In 1750 the Ohio company, whose business was the settlement of the country watered by that river, proceeded to survey its banks as far as the present site of Louisville. The French were quick to take the alarm. They crossed Lake Erie and fortified themselves at Presque Isle on the present site of the city of Erie. This was known to the English as French Fort No. 1. Then they advanced a few miles to one of the forks of the Alleghany River, where they proceeded to build French Fort No. 2, otherwise known as LeBoeuf; then they came down to the junction of the forks

and erected French Fort No. 3, better known as Venango. This was getting to be alarming. The Marquis Duquesne had just been appointed governor of Canada, and he made no secret of his warlike preparations. The building of the three forts just mentioned interposed a serious obstacle between the Long House and its vassal tribes of the Ohio valley, while at the same time it established a French sphere of influence among these vassal tribes, which consisted largely of such Algonquins as the Delawares and Shawnees, together with those offshoots from the Iroquois stock known as Wyandots and Mingos. The letting loose of these barbarians upon the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia was a calamity not to be thought of without a shudder.




FIG. 26. Robert Dinwiddie.

The governor of Virginia at that time was a hard-headed Scotchman, Robert Dinwiddie (Fig. 26). He made up his mind that the French must be warned not to come any nearer. This was a delicate affair to manage; a clumsy warning would sharpen antagonism and make matters worse. It was also desirable that the messenger who conveyed the warning should, without showing his hand too openly, play upon the feelings of the Indian tribes with which he should sojourn in the course of his thousand miles of wilderness-travel and dispose them to favor the English. It was also a part of his business to collect information concerning the plans of the French commanders.

For a task of such difficulty, a very old head would naturally be required; but the veteran Scotch governor entrusted it to a mere boy only twenty-one years old, who had lately been busy in surveying the extensive woodlands belonging to Lord Fairfax. The name of this young man was George Washington (Fig. 27), and the difficult task was performed in a way that fully justified the governor's selection. In its purpose of keeping back the French, it was of course a failure; for the



FIG. 27.—Col. George Washington. (From a mezzotint by Max Rosenthal, from a painting by Charles Willson Peale, done at Mt. Vernon, 1772. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

question was already beyond the reach of diplomacy, and nothing but brute force could settle it. The great strategic point involved in the business was the "Gateway of the West," the confluence of the Alleghany and Monongahela Rivers, forming the Ohio. In the spring of 1754, as soon as the frost was out of the ground, the English began building

a fort at that all-important place; but while they were at work a much stronger party of Frenchmen from Venango drove them away, and built French Fort No. 4, which they called Duquesne after the governor. While this was going on, a Virginia regiment was on its way to the spot. Its colonel died, and the command devolved upon George Washington, its lieutenant-colonel. Washington soon came upon a French reconnoitring force and cut it to pieces, after which he made haste to entrench himself at a spot which he called Fort Necessity. His force amounted to something like 350 men. There he was attacked by Colonel Villiers with an overwhelming force, and after a desultory fight of several hours he was forced to capitulate. It is curious and worth remembering that the first military experience of this great general should have been an act of surrender. It is also perhaps worth remembering among odd coincidences that the surrender took place on the fourth of July.

When the British government heard of these things, it sent two regiments to America and appointed to the command of the forces there General Edward Braddock, as brave an officer as could be found in the British army, and capable, very likely, of winning an excellent reputation in European warfare; but even at the present day the conditions of warfare in America are different from those which obtain in Europe, and call for somewhat different methods. On Braddock's arrival in Virginia, there was a rendezvous of about 1000 redcoats and 1200 militia at Winchester. These native troops were experts in Indian-fighting, and well understood the perils of the wilderness. As for the British, who had but lately arrived, they were so lamentably ignorant of such matters that their splendid courage availed them but little. Braddock's initial mistake was of the kind that has ruined so many commanders—it is never safe in warfare to despise the enemy; but Braddock was impressed with the notion that Indians were formidable only to militia, and never could withstand the onset of regular soldiery. Under these dangerous circumstances Braddock's army made its way through the wilderness as far as Fort Necessity and beyond, until it reached the bank of the Monongahela not far from Fort Duquesne. His vanguard was commanded by Thomas Gage, a name which we shall meet again; and under Gage were serving two young captains, Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, destined in later years to an inevitable reputation. At a short distance from the river, as the vanguard was advancing along the forest-trail with scouting parties out on either side to avoid surprise, a French officer, gaily decorated with Indian plumes, came bounding across the path, but suddenly halted and waved his hand. It was Colonel Beaujeu, who

had been hastily sent from Fort Duquesne to find the enemy, and had come up at the head of about 200 Frenchmen and 500 Indians, whom he had posted among the bushes on both sides of the trail. When Beaujeu waved his hand, a hailstorm of bullets came pouring into the English ranks from all directions. The French commander was one of the first men to fall, but the battle was already decided from the start. In that forest-trail, manoeuvring was impossible ; so that the British troops, with their scarlet coats glaring in the July sunshine, simply formed a great animate wall against which the unseen enemy could fire without wasting



*E Braddock*

FIG. 28.—General Braddock. (After an etching by H. B. Hall.)

a shot. With the Virginians it was different. They began scattering behind rocks and trees after the Indian fashion ; but poor Braddock mis-understood these movements, which he attributed to cowardice, ordered them back into close formation, and it is said even struck men repeatedly with flat sword. This insensate behavior ruined everything ; it was simply a scene of massacre. Presently the dauntless Braddock (Fig. 28), after having four horses shot under him, received a fatal wound himself. Amid general panic and confusion the youthful Washington, who was present as a volunteer aid, took command of the Virginian militia, and,

handling them with consummate skill, succeeded in bringing away the whole army to a place of safety. Poor Braddock's bewilderment was pitiable to see. He kept exclaiming, "Who would ever have believed it?" and with his last breath he exclaimed, "We shall know better next time."

It was indeed a fearful blow. Of Braddock's 2200 men, not less than 1400 were killed and wounded; and all this damage had been inflicted by an enemy who did not exceed 700, and whose loss was probably not more than a dozen or two. Moreover, one of the worst features of the case was that it exposed the whole frontier for some hundreds of miles to the horrors of Indian massacre. At the same time, the Americans



FIG. 29. Maj. Robert Rogers. (From a mezzotint published in London, October, 1776  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

did not fail to note the superiority exhibited by their own troops, familiar with American conditions of warfare.

The disasters in the Alleghany region were to some extent offset by the success of William Johnson in New York. That energetic person had collected a force of militia from New England and New York, to which were added several hundred warriors of the Long House. With this army he intended to take Crown Point; but some of Braddock's captured papers conveyed an inkling of this design to the French, and Baron Dieskau was sent to check Johnson's advance. After some manoeuvring the campaign ended in a bloody fight near Lake George,



PLATE IV.



Right Hon. William Pitt.

From a mezzotint by R. Houston, after a painting in the possession of the Earl of Temple. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

in which the French were completely routed. A fort was built on the scene of this battle and named Fort William Henry, after the Duke of Cumberland, while Johnson was rewarded for his victory with a baronetcy.

Perhaps the reader may suppose that during this summer of 1755 the governments of France and Great Britain were at war with one another, but that was not the case. It was not until early the next year, 1756, that war was openly declared. The Seven Years' War, as it is usually called, was the most momentous conflict that the world had seen since the days when Rome was pitted against Carthage. Its object on the part of Austria and Russia was the ruin of the little kingdom of Prussia. The object of France, on the other hand, was to win colonial empire in America and India; but France imprudently allowed this object to become complicated with that of humbling Prussia, and thus a large part of her enormous strength was neutralized in the European struggle. As for England, the dull king, George II., who was disposed to see in Prussia merely a rival of Hanover, was at first inclined to join the coalition against Frederick the Great; but there was in England a statesman of genius, who saw much more deeply into the situation; that was William Pitt (PLATE IV.), who overruled the king's preferences and saw in an alliance with Prussia the surest means of wresting colonial empire from the hands of France. But the general direction of affairs had not yet been intrusted to Pitt. The Duke of Newcastle was then prime minister, and a more incompetent official has seldom existed. The generals sent to America by this person were James Abercrombie and the Earl of Loudon. France, on the other hand, sent out one of her most skilful commanders—Louis de Saint Veran, Marquis de Montcalm. The first blow of this able commander was directed against the centre of the Long House in the summer of 1756. He captured Oswego with 1500 prisoners and a large quantity of military supplies. This blow prevented the English from attacking Niagara. Montcalm's next step was to build elaborate fortifications at Ticonderoga. Meanwhile the Earl of Loudon (Fig. 30), at the head of a large force, set out to capture Louisburg, but contrived to dawdle through the summer without achieving anything. His absence on this expedition denuded the Hudson River of troops to such an extent as to offer Fort William Henry as an easy prey to the enemy. This fort was garrisoned by 2200 men under Colonel Munro, when Montcalm approached with 6000 men and summoned the place to surrender. On Munro's refusal, Montcalm attacked with heavy artillery, which soon began to tell with fearful effect upon the works.

Fourteen miles distant at Fort Edward was a force of 3600 men, commanded by General Webb, who ought to have come up and assailed Montcalm in the rear; but Webb did nothing, and Munro was presently obliged to surrender under a solemn promise from Montcalm that no harm should be inflicted upon any of his people. This promise was more than Montcalm found himself able to fulfil. While Munro's capitulated and paroled troops, many of them having their wives and children with them, were retiring through the woods to Fort Edward, they were set upon by a party of Montcalm's Indians, and an indis-



FIG. 30.—Earl of Loudon. (From a mezzotint by Faber, after a painting by Ramsay. In the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

criminate massacre ensued without regard to age or sex. For nearly a hundred years this horrible affair was mentioned throughout America with sorrow and wrath.

Thus at the end of 1757 the English prospects in America did not seem bright. In Europe the astonishing victories of Frederick at Rossbach and Leuthen gave a more cheerful aspect to the case; but now a change was made in England which put the direct control of the war into the hands of William Pitt, and against the coalition of Pitt with the King of Prussia nothing human could stand. Among Pitt's many great qualities, he was an unerring judge of men; and he now sent to America two generals, Jeffrey Amherst (Fig. 31) and James Wolfe, who soon put a new face upon things. The first task of Amherst and Wolfe was the recapture of Louisburg, in which they were aided by twelve ships-of-the-line, commanded by Admiral Boscawen. The works of Louisburg had been greatly strengthened, and this second siege was

much longer than the first; indeed, it took up so much of the season that no time was left for anything more; but at length it surrendered unconditionally. New England was freed from its standing menace, and the approaches to the St. Lawrence were thrown open for English vessels. This capture of Louisburg was a success of the first magnitude.



FIG. 31.—Sir Jeffrey Amherst. (From a mezzotint, after a painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

In New York, things went differently. General Abercrombie, one of Newcastle's appointees, had so many powerful friends that Pitt had thought it best not to remove him too suddenly. It seemed to him that the desired results might be accomplished by associating with Abercrombie, as second in command, the young George Augustus, Lord Howe, eldest of three brothers who play important parts in American history. Howe was a man of much more decided opinions and

stronger will than Abercrombie, and it might be expected that he would virtually direct affairs. By the soldiers he was idolized, and especially with the provincials he was such a favorite that Massachusetts afterward put up a statue to his memory in Westminster Abbey. Early in July, 1758, Abercrombie advanced against Ticonderoga at the head of 15,000 men, British and American, the largest army that had ever yet been assembled in America. To oppose this splendid force, Montcalm had less than 4000 men; but the position which they occupied was simply impregnable to a direct assault. Whatever advantages



FIG. 32.—Gen. James Grant, of the Pennsylvania expedition, who despised American methods of bush-fighting.

may have been expected from Lord Howe's presence were lost, for he was killed in a preliminary skirmish. Abercrombie's whole theory of the situation was absurd in the extreme. He ought to have occupied some position to the northward, so as to cut off Montcalm's supplies; but his only idea of fighting was to rush against entrenchments. Such prodigies of valor have seldom been seen as were displayed by the English troops, both British and American, on that dreadful day. The result, of course, was failure and retreat with a loss of 2000 lives.

But while the Canadians were rejoicing over this great victory which Abercrombie's dullness presented to Montcalm, there came the news of

a disaster to the French cause which far more than outweighed it. General Bradstreet, with a small force of colonial troops, crossed Lake Ontario and captured Fort Frontenac. This not only cut off from the French the northwestern fur-trade, which was so important in supplying them with the sinews of war, but it also cut the most convenient route by which supplies could be sent from Montreal by way of Lakes Ontario and Erie and Chautauqua Lake to Fort Duquesne. Against that mountain stronghold a force of Americans and British,



FIG. 33.—Washington. (From a mezzotint by Max Rosenthal, after the original painting by Charles Willson Peale, done at Valley Forge, 1778. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

led by an excellent old Scottish general named Forbes, was approaching from the southeast. The difficulty in putting this expedition on foot furnished a lively illustration of the absence of any continental power for raising a continental revenue. The assembly of Pennsylvania thought more of coercing the governor by withholding money than of aiding the war by granting it; so that it became necessary for Benjamin Franklin to send around to the Pennsylvania farmers and beg the loan

of their horses, pledging his personal credit for the repayment. The expedition proved a success. General Forbes, who was ill, presently died, and much credit was won by young Colonel Washington (Fig. 33), who for a part of the time virtually exercised the command. The French garrison, finding it impossible to hold Fort Duquesne, destroyed it as far as possible, and retreated through the forest-trails to Lake Chautauqua and so on to Canada. Hard by the site of the old fort the English built a new one, which they called after the name of their great




FIG. 34.—Marquis de Montcalm. (From an engraving by Varin, after a painting by Sergent. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

war minister, and is still known as Pittsburg. One important practical effect of this conquest was to cut off the tribes of the upper Ohio from the French sphere of influence, and thus to protect the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers.

The prospect for the French in Canada had thus become gloomy, and the news from the Old World did not tend to enliven the situation. In Central Europe a great victory had been won over the French by Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick at Crefeldt, and another by Frederick the Great over the Russians at Zorndorf; while Lord Clive had become all-power-

ful in India, and it was evident that the French dominion there was nearing its doom.

The next year, 1759, witnessed the consummation of the great drama. The utmost efforts of the French in Europe were of no avail against the genius of Prince Ferdinand, and in August they suffered a terrible defeat at Minden. In the week preceding that great battle, Fort Niagara was captured by Sir William Johnson and Ticonderoga by Sir Jeffrey Amherst, who had succeeded to Abercrombie; but the French commander, Bourlamaque, made a stand at Isle au Noix, near the northern outlet of Lake Champlain, and there for some time held the English commander at bay. As for Montcalm (Fig. 34), he had left Lake Champlain for Quebec, which it had become necessary to defend against the armament of Wolfe



FIG. 35.—Plains of Abraham. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xi.)

coming up from its base at Lévisburg. For his defence, Montcalm had 15,000 Frenchmen, partly regulars and partly militia, with 1000 or more Algonquins, while his position was well known to be one of the strongest in the world. To cope with these adversaries, Wolfe had a small army of 9000 men unsurpassed for discipline and fighting qualities. Both French and English were aided by strong fleets. It was in June that Wolfe arrived before Quebec, and into the detailed events of that summer it is hardly worth our while to go in this brief narrative. Let it suffice to say that for two months many devices were tried without success, and the young general might well have been pardoned if he had given up the problem as insoluble; but while his frame was wasted with disease, his persistence against all obstacles grew only the more defiant. At length, when his position was becoming perilous through

scarcity of provisions, he decided to try a forlorn chance which had suggested itself to him. Some three or four miles above Quebec, he descried a steep and dangerous path which a tiny rivulet had cut for itself down the face of the bluff. It was not likely that an attack would be made at this place, but the watchful Montcalm had guarded the top of the little gullying path with a small party of scouts. It occurred to Wolfe that a handful of volunteers might scramble up this pathway under shelter of night and surprise and overpower the guard, so that the entire army could follow them and thus reach the position known as the Plains of Abraham, which crowned the summit of the bluff. The presence of his army in such a position would make it necessary for Montcalm to fight him; and as the ground was an open plain, there was good reason for



FIG. 36. Maj.-Gen. James Wolfe. (From a mezzofint by Houston, after a painting by Schaak. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

supposing that under such conditions Englishmen would prove themselves invincible as usual. It was a romantic thought, worthy of a master mind, and was carried out with beautiful precision. Some miles down stream, the English ships opened such a lively fire upon the French positions confronting them that Montcalm's attention was quite concentrated in that direction. Meanwhile the English soldiery was quietly conveyed in boats to the foot of Wolfe's chosen path. Two dozen volunteers promptly offered their services in leading the way up the dizzy ascent. With little ado they overcame and captured the guard,

and before daybreak the whole English force was resting on its arms on the Plains of Abraham (Fig. 35), ready for battle.

As soon as the astonished Montcalm learned the situation, he advanced to the attack. At first it was an obstinate fight, but the French presently gave way and retreated in ever increasing confusion toward the Charles River. Their defeat left Quebec at the mercy of the English, but neither of the two noble and gallant commanders lived to see its surrender. Wolfe (Fig. 36) was shot three times, and, surviving just long enough to thank God for his victory, died on the battlefield (Fig. 37). That same night, Montcalm, who had been wounded at the city gates, died in the house of a surgeon. His last act was to write a



FIG. 37.—Death of General Wolfe. (From an engraving by Woollett, after a painting by West. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

line to Wolfe, asking his kindly consideration for the people of the captured town. But no entreaties were needed to secure kind treatment. The Canadians had no reason to complain of the courteous and benevolent General Murray, who was left in command of Quebec, and so much kindness was exchanged between victors and vanquished that one could hardly believe they had been so lately engaged in deadly warfare.

In the course of the following year, 1760, a French force under General Levi made a desperate attempt to recapture Quebec; but it was obliged to retire upon Montreal, and early in September articles of capitulation were signed at Montreal, which gave up to England the whole of Canada.

This year 1760, however, was far from seeing the end of the struggle, even so far as the western hemisphere was concerned. The great Frederick went on to win victories at Liegnitz, Torgau, and Reichenbach; but the death of George II. late in 1760 was a most inauspicious event for Prussia, since the new king, George III., suddenly stopped all the English supplies for the war; an act of unfriendliness, if not of treachery, which naturally enraged Frederick and affected his attitude adversely to the British government all through the American war for independence. It was the first of the long series of acts of preternatural folly committed by that unhappy king. In spite of Frederick's overwhelming genius on the field, it might still have




FIG. 38. View of harbor of Havana. (From an old Dutch print by Amsteld, after a painting by Schenek. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

gone hard with him had it not been for the sudden death of Elizabeth of Russia in January, 1762. This fortunate event at once led to peace between Russia and Prussia. At the same time the tardy action of Spain came in just soon enough to complicate matters outside of Europe. Spain's activity in support of France reached such a point that in January, 1762, England declared war against her; and in the course of that year the English captured both Havana (Fig. 38) and Manila, thus gaining control over Cuba and the Philippine Islands. Such events, together with the gigantic naval victory of Sir Edward Hawke (Fig. 39) at Quiberon, convinced the house of Bourbon that a further contest against England was hopeless; and so, on February 10, 1763, this great war was brought to a close by the treaty of Paris. Among the provisions

of this treaty, Cuba and the Philippine Islands were restored to Spain; and in exchange Spain ceded to Great Britain the Florida territory, including the southernmost parts of the present states of Alabama and Mississippi. To reimburse Spain for expenses and losses incurred in helping France, the latter power ceded to her the city of New Orleans with the whole of the mighty province of Louisiana, embracing the whole country drained by the Mississippi River from the crest of the Alleghanies to that of the Rocky Mountains, an area of which extensive portions had never yet been visited by white men. The whole territory



FIG. 39.—Sir Edward Hawke. (From a mezzotint by MacArdell, after a painting by Knapton. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

of Canada, with all claims upon the domains and privileges of the Hudson Bay Company, were surrendered to Great Britain; thus, of the whole western hemisphere, France retained nothing but the two tiny islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon near Newfoundland. She also retained her share in the Newfoundland fisheries.

Such a headlong downfall of a dominion so imposing in outward appearance has seldom been seen. Probably no other treaty ever transferred such vast expanses of territory as this treaty of Paris. The

romantic victory of Wolfe may well be cited among the greatest epoch-marking events in all history. It was a fitting culmination to the contrast in political methods between Frenchmen and Englishmen, which had been showing itself with greater and greater completeness during a century and a half of colonizing work. The experiences of the French and English in North America proved that communities which have retained the power of self-government can easily reproduce themselves under changed conditions and even in a virgin wilderness, while communities which have lost that power of self-government have also lost the power of successfully reproducing themselves under such changed conditions. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, there have been few



FIG. 10. Choiseul. (From an engraving by Adam, after a painting by Vanloo.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

despotisms more searching than that of ancient Canada. We have seen how anxious the French government was to attract settlers to New France; but at the same time we have seen that no Protestant was allowed to enter a French colony upon any terms whatever. When we contrast this narrow policy with that which was pursued in general by the English colonies, we shall have no difficulty in understanding one of the chief reasons why the latter grew so much faster than the former. Besides all this, it is worthy of remark that despotism brought on a carnival of corruption and thievery in the New World as well as the Old. In Canada this wholesale robbery began about 1750 with Jourquière, whose one object in life was to make money by fair means or

foul. The system of peculation begun by this rascal reached its culmination about seven years later under the intendant Bigot, a creature who was placed in that responsible position through the influence of some of the king's wretched women. Bigot was an early and fitting product of the spoils system, which has produced so many like him in the United States in recent days. He applied to his own use and behoof and to the rewarding of his friends the millions of money which were sent over from France to sustain the war against Great Britain. Many a French soldier went barefoot and without rations while Bigot and his hellish crew were fattening themselves at the public crib. Official dishonesty must be counted as important among the causes of the ruin of New France, and the same danger threatens every country and every age that tolerates such rotteness. There is no magic in the name of republic, or potency in republican institutions, that can save any nation which tolerates official corruption or neglects businesslike methods in securing its public servants.

The overthrow of the French power in America was immediately followed by a great Indian war, the most extensive perhaps of all the Indian wars that the white people in America have ever been called upon to face. It originated in a conspiracy of many tribes, which was set on foot by Pontiac, an Ottawa chief, one of the most remarkable Indians of whom we have any knowledge. The red men were quite intelligent enough to realize that the long war just ended, instead of weakening the white men, had advanced their frontier westward, while leaving them apparently as strong as ever. The Ottawas, moreover, and other tribes who favored the French, had not yet become satiated with fighting, and it was to them a source of sore distress and perplexity that the French should abide peacefully by the new treaty. It seemed to Pontiac that the time had come when the red men must combine their forces and make a grand concerted effort to stop the advance of the whites. With this end in view, he not only made many alliances among the Algonquin tribes of the northwest, but he made overtures to the Long House, and succeeded in persuading the Senecas to lend their aid to his schemes. It will be remembered that the French, through their zealous missionaries, had long contended with the English for the favor of the Long House, and from time to time their efforts had been partially successful at the western door of that great confederacy. Loyalty to the English alliance was strongest among the Mohawks and weakest among the Senecas. For a quarter of a century the influence of Sir William Johnson among the Mohawks had been supreme. He had

married that interesting squaw, Mollie Brant, sister of the great Mohawk chief, Joseph Brant, or Thayendanegea, and the loyalty of the whole tribe to that rough baronet was unstinted. Westward, however, the Jesuit missionaries made more headway ; the Senecas were often on the point of listening to their counsels, and this time they did listen.

Pontiac's intention was to begin the chapter of horrors with the surprise and massacre of the English garrison at Detroit. But the plot was revealed to Major Gladwyn, the commander of Detroit, by a young Indian woman who was in love with one of the English officers, so that when the day arrived he was prepared for the occasion and the outbreak was averted. It was not long, however, that the demon of massacre could be restrained. Grim tales of fury came from regions far apart. There was fighting in Michigan, in the western wilderness of New York, and among the mountain-paths of the Alleghanies. One of the incidents of the time still familiar to nearly all travellers was the ambuscade of the Devil's Hole on the Niagara River. The place is still pointed out, hard by the station of that name on the electric railway that runs through the gorge. The rocky walls of the chasm rise to a height of more than 200 feet above the river, which there surges and swells with terrific violence, throwing showers of spray far up into the foliage of the trees that grow out from every damp interstice in the rocks. On the 13th of September, 1763, a provision-train was passing near the perilous brink when it was suddenly assailed by screeching warriors darting from the cover of the woods, while from a low range of hills on the right some hundreds of rifles blazed. In a few moments the whole party had been pushed over into the yawning gulf below—horses, wagons, provisions, and human beings in one confused and mangled heap. In the distance the noise of the conflict was heard by another party of soldiers, who came to the rescue; but these too were caught in ambush and suffered the same ghastly fate as the others. When the garrison of Fort Niagara marched to the spot, it is needless to say that the Indians had all escaped to places of safety, while nothing was left for the rescuers but the shocking sight of the ruin that had been wrought.

The agents in this grisly affair were Senecas, who had no longer the fear of Sir William Johnson before their eyes. The defection of this great tribe removed the only obstacle to the advance of the western Algonquins against the Pennsylvania frontier, and accordingly that wild region soon became the scene of horrors indescribable. Fort Pitt was besieged by the redskins, and maintained itself only with the greatest

difficulty; but many of the frontier forts were taken, and at Michilimackinac the garrison was slaughtered with the usual circumstances of atrocity. At Bushy Run in the Alleghanies occurred one of the most obstinate and murderous battles ever fought between Indians and white men, in which the Indians were thoroughly defeated by Colonel Henry Bouquet (Fig. 41); but one such victory was not enough to end the matter. Through the year 1764, along the slopes of the Alleghanies from Pennsylvania far down into Virginia, the dreary tale of firebrand and tomahawk was continued.



*Henry Bouquet*

FIG. 41.—Henry Bouquet. (From an engraving by W. G. Armstrong, after a painting by Benjamin West. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

It was Pennsylvania, however, that suffered the most severely. The resistance there was less effective than upon the Virginian border. Virginia had a more effective militia law, and public opinion was united against the savages. In Pennsylvania it was otherwise. In that great commonwealth the frontier population, which bore the brunt of the struggle and was most exposed to attack, consisted chiefly of the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians whose families had come over to America during the preceding forty years. These people had obtained grants of land to the west of the old settlements, to which they served as a protection. There was always going on in Pennsylvania a dispute between the

governor and his legislature with regard to sundry questions of internal policy, of which the most important was the question concerning the taxation of proprietary lands. In times of war, therefore, the legislature was apt to make the governor's need of money a lever with which to compel him to yield to their views; and the results were extremely inconvenient for the poor people who were looking to the governor for military protection. Besides this, the Quakers were slow to vote money for military purposes, while, with regard to the Indians, they held views diametrically opposite to those of the Presbyterian frontiersmen. The latter would always have subscribed to the doctrine which makes the phrase "good Indian" synonymous with "dead Indian." But, on the other hand, the Quakers were inclined to believe that when trouble arose between the two races it was always the white men who were at fault. They themselves had, during two generations, pursued a most admirable and honorable policy toward their tawny neighbors, and had never been molested by them. Manifestly, then, if other white men were molested, was it not their own fault? These good people did not realize that now for the first time, by the overthrow of the French power, the tenor of Indian polities had been suddenly and completely changed. For seventy years our good Quaker friends, though they did not quite realize it, had been profiting by the friendship of the Long House; and if the Senecas had remained true to the time-honored policy of their confederacy, it is not likely that Pennsylvania would have been tormented now. But under the existing state of things, it is just as likely that a Quaker population on the Pennsylvania frontier would have been attacked as a population of Scotch-Irish. We can understand how fiercely the fires of civil contention burned between the men of the mountains and the men of Philadelphia, until it came within a hair's-breadth of civil war.

In the summer of 1764, repeated atrocities too awful for description had excited the border population to madness. A cry for instant vengeance was raised; and as usual in such cases, the blow fell in the wrong place, and the innocent were made to suffer for the sins of the guilty. To carry on warfare against the enemy as it should have been done, more military preparation was needed than the government at Philadelphia had been willing or able to furnish. The accumulated wrath of the frontiersmen demanded a victim, and an innocent one was found in the community of Christianized Indians at Comestoga, not far from Lancaster. In all probability these Indians were a remnant of the famous Susquehannocks, who had been nearly annihilated by the

Long House about ninety years before. They had been converted to Christianity, and lived at Conestoga in entire amity with their white neighbors; but now they were made the subjects of an outrage as brutal, wanton, and senseless as anything recorded in history. A party of Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, mostly from the little town of Paxton, and ever since known as the Paxton Boys, suddenly assaulted the Conestoga village and massacred nearly all the inhabitants. The escaping remnant sought refuge in Lancaster, where for safe keeping they were lodged within the prison walls. Thereupon the Paxton Boys marched straight upon Lancaster, and, enraged at the protection thus accorded to the objects of their hatred, they attacked the jail, and, forcing their way in, murdered all the fugitives without regard to age or sex. But even this destruction of the Conestogas did not satisfy the thirst for blood that had been awakened. At various points in Pennsylvania there were communities of Indians who had been converted by Moravian missionaries. The chief of these communities were those of Nain and Weequetank near the Lehigh River, and that of Wyalusing not far from Wyoming. These small communities had been made the subject of so many threats that in the autumn of 1764 they sought and obtained permission to take refuge in Philadelphia. It would seem that the total number of these Indians did not amount to more than 150. When they reached Philadelphia they were greeted by many people with howls and curses, but found in the Quakers efficient friends and protectors. Now when the Paxton men had completed their work of blood at Lancaster, the spirit moved them to march upon Philadelphia and do likewise to the Moravian converts who were sheltered there. Thus they would not only glut the vengeful spirit which had taken possession of them, but they would satisfy an old grudge against the Quakers, whose principles they abhorred and despised. Connected with all this, as is often the case, there was a political grievance. They asseverated that the five frontier counties were inadequately represented in the legislature, and that to this unfair arrangement the Quakers owed their undue preponderance in shaping the policy of the commonwealth. Influenced by such thoughts as these, the Paxton men set forth on their march to Philadelphia. Their numbers have been variously estimated at from 500 to 1500, and it is not unlikely that they may have varied from day to day, now losing, now gaining followers. At Philadelphia there was great excitement, and under the influence of the panic many Quakers came forward and loudly advocated measures quite inconsistent with principles which they had lately been heard to maintain. Parties of

young Quakers purchased firearms and engaged in morning and evening drill, conduct which was severely reprobated by some of their elders. It was thought that the best means of avoiding bloodshed would be to remove the bone of contention, and so the Indian refugees were sent under an armed escort across New Jersey to New York, where they would be under the immediate protection of the royal army. When these Indians

had been conducted as far as Amboy, word was received that they would not be admitted to the province of New York. Sir William Johnson had been in favor of admitting them, but Governor Colden (Fig. 42) would not hear of it. They were accordingly sent back to Philadelphia; but General Gage, who was now, since Amherst's resignation, his Majesty's commander-in-chief in America, sent along with them to Philadelphia a party of regular soldiers for their protection. On their arrival with this welcome escort, they were received with kindness. Indeed, it was observed that the feeling of the Philadelphia people toward these poor refugees was much more friendly now than it had been lately when they were starting for New York. The explanation is not difficult. On the former occasion the people of Philadelphia were taken by surprise and were afraid; now they had so far completed their preparations that



FIG. 42. Cadwallader Colden. (From an engraving by Graham, after a painting by Matthew Pratt. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

they felt able to defy the Paxton men, and consequently some room was left in their hearts for compassion. By the time the Paxton men arrived on the scene, their blood had had time to cool; and when they reconnoitred the situation, the task of entering Philadelphia against opposition did not seem quite so easy as it had looked at a distance. They were therefore ready to listen to the persuasive tongue of Dr. Franklin, who assured them that the dreaded Moravian Indians were too strongly guarded to be capable of mischief, that the political

grievances of the frontier should be treated with due respect in the next assembly, and that meanwhile they had better return home and bend their energies to the defence of the commonwealth, a task for which none were so eminently fitted as they. Thus the spectre of civil war was exorcised and the affair slowly burned itself out in a pamphlet-war between Quakers and Presbyterians, in which the resources of all the type-foundries in the province were strained to the utmost for italics, small capitals, and exclamation-points. In this long controversy there was now and then a gleam of wit, and occasionally a faint twinkling of reason ; but most of it was an unmitigated gall of bitterness from which Pennsylvania literature was long in getting purified.

In spite of its lurid and appalling commencement, the conspiracy of Pontiac suffered the usual fate of Indian attempts at concentrated warfare. The Indian has not sufficient capacity for sustained co-ordination to succeed in such work. The number of tribes which Pontiac at one time seemed to have enlisted in support of his scheme was not less than eighteen ; but at no time was there anything like effective co-operation among such a number, and at all times one or more tribes were liable to prove recreant to their promises. Sir William Johnson well understood this when, in the course of a great parley at Niagara, he never took all the chiefs at once into consultation, but conferred with them in separate bands, approaching them now directly himself, and now through instructed agents, so that he was able to play to the full extent upon their intertribal jealousies, and thus detach a certain proportion of them from their alliance with the others. The high-water mark of Johnson's diplomacy was reached when, by a judicious mixture of soft blandishments with stentorian bullying, he succeeded in winning back the Senecas to their old policy. These proceedings at Niagara left Colonel Bouquet's hands free to deal with the Delawares and Shawnees on the Pennsylvania frontier, and upon these tribes he inflicted such crushing defeats that they were soon fain to sue for peace. Pontiac was thus deprived of his main reliance ; but nothing daunted, he still kept up a brave face while he endeavored at least to rally to his side the tribes along the upper Mississippi River and beyond. While engaged in this forest diplomacy, the great chief came to an ignominious end. One evening he indulged in a deep carouse at St. Louis ; whereupon an English trader, perceiving the opportunity, bribed an Illinois Indian with a barrel of rum to dog his footsteps and murder him. Next morning Pontiac's body was found at the edge of a wood hard by, with its skull beaten to fragments.

Useless butchery was all that ever came of his far-reaching scheme; but the war which it evoked was of no small significance, for it added a climax to the lesson which the events of seventy years had been teaching, that the English colonies in America could not go on any longer in the absence of a continental government which should have adequate taxing powers for continental purposes. There was nothing accidental in the fact that the year 1765, which witnessed the suppression of Pontiac's conspiracy, was also the year of the Stamp Act. We shall treat of this point in a future chapter; but, as we have now arrived at a great turning-point in the history of America, it is worth our while to pause and take a bird's-eye view of the thirteen colonies at that time with reference to their political and social condition, their domestic lives, and their general view of the world.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

IT will be remembered that in the charter of 1606 by which James I. created the Virginia Company, the Atlantic seaboard of what is now the United States was divided into three great zones, in the northernmost of which the New England colonies were planted, while in the southernmost came Virginia with her neighbors to the southward, and in the middle space were founded New Netherland with its appendage, Delaware, and those curiously differing palatinates, Maryland and




FIG. 13.—Newport, Rhode Island, in 1730.

Pennsylvania. It happened that the colonization of these three zones resulted in three distinguishable types of American society; or perhaps it would be more correct to say that we find two strongly contrasted types in the northern and southern zones, while the middle zone, along with sundry marked peculiarities of its own, exhibits in many respects a transition between the two extremes. At the same time we find, among the different colonies planted in each of the zones, such individual differences that it is unsafe to make sweeping generalizations about them without more or less qualification. Thus, while the southern type

of American society is strongly contrasted with the New England type, it is still unsafe to make statements which would cover the two Carolinas along with Virginia, or even the two Carolinas themselves, without carefully indicating the limitations. So, too, while all the New England states have strong characteristics in common, yet the differences between New Hampshire and Massachusetts, or between Connecticut and Rhode Island, are so important that no one can write history correctly while ignoring them. The complication of these results lends great pictur-esque ness to the history of the United States; for in dealing with it we are confronted not with any monotonous type of humanity, but with variations in character, opinion, and achievement, which are profoundly connected with the past history of every section and the peculiar circumstances under which it was settled. The complex aggregate of American social life has thus been determined by the various circumstances of race, physical geography, past history in Europe, and more recent history.



FIG. 44.—Pownall's view of Boston in 1757.

upon this side of the ocean. Bearing these things in mind, let us take a brief survey of the colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century, which is also the half-way period in their existence between the beginning of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.

At the beginning the migration from the Old World which founded these colonies was purely English, except in the case of New Netherland. Of the older colonies, the whole of tide-water Virginia and of Maryland, as well as the whole of New England, showed an unmixed English population. The migration which peopled New England between 1629 and 1641 was astonishingly large for that age; it numbered more than 20,000 souls. But after the outbreak of the great civil war this migration came practically to a standstill. Nearly the whole population of New England in 1765 was descended from the men and women who had arrived before 1640. During the interval the only accessions had been about 150 families of Scotchmen and as many more

of French Huguenots, together with a considerably larger number of Presbyterians from Ulster, whom—until somebody suggests a better name—I shall follow the prevalent fashion and call Scotch-Irish. Concerning these people, more will be said presently. It may be noted that wherever they have come to America, the Scotch, Scotch-Irish, and Huguenot settlers have wrought effects more than proportionate to their numbers. In Virginia and Maryland also, the early population was purely English, although in the Catholic palatinate Irishmen were to be



FIG. 45.—Thomas Pownall, Royal Governor of Massachusetts, 1757-61. (After an unlettered mezzotint print in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

found, not of the peasant type with which later history has made our land familiar, but "fine old Irish gentlemen" who adhered to the fortunes of those Irish peers, the Lords Baltimore. In 1765 the population of tide-water Virginia was still purely English, save the small but important Huguenot addition.

In the case of the later southern colonies the population was also largely English, but the foreign elements were much greater than in the earlier ones. The early days of South Carolina, for example, coincided

in date with the great Huguenot migration from France, and Huguenots came to South Carolina in such numbers as to form from the outset a considerable part of the population.

New Netherland, which was founded by Dutchmen, contained a greater variety of races than any of the other colonies. As has elsewhere been said, more than a dozen languages were spoken on the island of Manhattan in the year 1650. There were Swedes, Germans, Walloons, Bohemians, Danes, and Flemings, with a sprinkling of Portuguese and Spanish Jews. English began to come so early that it was soon found necessary to have two secretaries of state, one Dutch, one English. Next after Dutch and English the prevailing language at New Amsterdam was French, for thither the Huguenot migration first turned its steps. Jews came in such numbers that early in the eighteenth century New York was said to be as good a place for studying Hebrew as any city in Germany. While its principal town was thus cosmopolitan, fine specimens of Dutch communities were to be found in Albany and other towns along the Hudson River, as well as such places as Flatbush on Long Island. In 1765 New York was still the least English of the thirteen colonies.

In the original population of Pennsylvania there was considerable variety, although the English race doubtless predominated. A good many Quakers from the Palatinate, with a few Swedes and parties of Welsh, were present from the start. Of New Jersey it may be said that its population was mainly English, somewhat colored by an admixture of blood from cosmopolitan New York.

But now early in the eighteenth century there started from Europe two streams of migration more considerable than any of their predecessors, unless it be those of the Puritan exodus to New England. The German Palatines began coming just before 1710, and the migration was kept up for not less than twenty years. Some of these Germans entered North Carolina by the seaboard; some found their way to New York, and, going forward to the frontier, penetrated some distance into the Mohawk valley; but by far the greater number landed at Philadelphia and worked their way westward from that point. But a still greater stream of migration was that of the Scotch-Irish, who began coming between 1710 and 1720, and continued to arrive in great numbers until after the Declaration of Independence. It would appear that in the course of fifty years a population exceeding half a million was transferred from Ulster to the American colonies; so that, if our total population in 1765 be estimated at 2,500,000, probably one-fifth

of the number were Scotch-Irish. Of this formidable mass of immigration a small portion came to New England, where they have left some such marks upon the map as Dublin and Londonderry. A certain number, too, established themselves side by side with Germans in New York and New Jersey. But by far the greater part betook themselves to Pennsylvania, where, as we have seen, they obtained grants of




FIG. 46.—Christ Church, Philadelphia. (From an engraving by Malcoln, in the "Universal Magazine," 1788. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

land which brought them on to the western frontier. Next to these pioneers were settled the Germans, whose numbers were reinforced by many adherents of Quietistic sects, such as Mennonites, Dunkers, Moravians, etc. There were so many Germans, and to so great an extent did they congregate together with but slight intercourse with the outer world, that they have retained to this day their original speech,

somewhat modified by English expressions and constructions. Everybody has heard of Pennsylvania Dutch, which is not Dutch at all, but a peculiarly sweet and interesting dialect of High German.

One of the most interesting points about this twofold Scotch-Irish and German population in Pennsylvania was the way in which it continued its migrations. In the case of both races the immigrants came in greater numbers than Pennsylvania could well contain, and therefore that state acquires a new interest for having been the centre of diffusion for this complex and powerful stream in our American population. The inland migration followed the line of the Appalachian ranges, with the




FIG. 47. St. Paul's Episcopal church, Edenton, N. C. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xxviii.)

upland valleys between them, all the way from Pennsylvania down to the Georgian terminus of that great mountain system. Germans and Scotch-Irish therefore form a very important and characteristic element in Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia; and if the effect in Maryland has been less extensive, it is simply because the Appalachian region of Maryland is comparatively insignificant in area. Moreover, from these Appalachian centres these same races went forth as pioneers to build up the commonwealths of Kentucky and Tennessee, and to impart far and wide to the young west its initial characteristics.

Having thus marked out the distribution of races, we have next to

note some of the principal social characteristics of the different sections, and first we may speak of New England. The fundamental feature in the early colonization of New England was the fact that settlements were made not by single families, but by whole parishes or congregations moving at once under the leadership of their pastors and deacons. It is this circumstance which gives to the history of New England some of its most distinctive features. It was connected in its origin with two facts: first, the great dimensions of the migration; and secondly, the underlying religious purpose for which it was made. In the early days of colonization, settlers used to come from the Old World to the New in parties of one to three hundred, and to this rule Plymouth formed no



FIG. 48.—Birthplace of Israel Putnam, at Danvers, Mass.

exception; but the year which brought Winthrop to Massachusetts Bay brought 1000 people, and so rapidly came on the successive reinforcements that within half a dozen years we find as many self-supporting towns established on the bay, while swarming had already begun to the Narragansett country and the banks of the Connecticut. And just as the original shiploads came from England, bringing with them their ancient associations of church fellowship, so these new swarms went off in organized bodies ready to begin life in the wilderness as communities already organized and matured. There was thus in early New England nothing of the riot and disorder, almost nothing of that partial relapse

toward barbarism, which is usually witnessed in frontier communities. When the population of a village increased beyond a certain point of convenience, a portion of the community went out into the wilderness and founded another village; but the migrating portion was as complete and well organized as the portion that remained behind, and from the first morning of its existence the new village had its church with pastor and deacons, its town meetings, selectmen, and constable, as well as its schoolmaster—all the machinery of preserving justice and good order remaining unimpaired by the removal.

Nothing like this compact and organized form of migration had been seen since the days of ancient Greece, when Massilia was founded by Phocaeans, or Syracuse by settlers from Corinth. Such was the rule in ancient Greece and in New England, and in each case its results in preventing a relapse toward barbarism are too obvious to need more than a mere mention. In New England it was doubtless connected with the theocratic ideal of an independent parish church which the founders of New England cherished. The settlers of Massachusetts had not the slightest intention of separating church from state; only instead of the state church established in England, armed with coercive power over the parishes which were its units, they wished to establish myriads of little independent state churches, each one beginning and ending in its own parish. Thus the parish-township of the early New Englander corresponded, though in a shadowy way, to the city-state of ancient Greece; and to this circumstance we must ascribe the fact that the migration was one of parish-townships rather than of a mere congeries of individuals.

This peculiar state of things would soon have been rudely broken up in New England if the economic circumstances had been unpropitious. If Winthrop's people had gone to the James River and undertaken to support themselves by raising tobacco for the European market, short work would have been made of their compact social structure. But it happened that in New England a home was found adapted to the schemes of its occupants. Instead of offering them any great staple, like rice or tobacco, the country simply afforded them a soil not exactly poor, though somewhat niggardly, which gave a moderate reward for intelligent labor and thrift, while it would yield nothing to anything less. It required no great change from the habits of life acquired in the old country for each congregation to settle down upon a small area of land, with moderate-sized farms contiguous to one another, and with a village church and blockhouse within easy reach. Under such circumstances there were no

obstacles to free allodial proprietorship, and, as a rule, each father of a family owned the land upon which that family was supported.

For all practical purposes in early New England the township and the parish were identical. The parish was the township sitting as the congregation in the meeting-house, presided over by pastor or deacon and regulating matters of ecclesiastical cognizance, or discussing questions of public or private morality. The township, on the other hand, was simply the congregation holding its meetings very likely in the same meeting-house, presided over by an elective officer called the moderator, and discussing matters of a secular nature, or enacting by-laws, or appropriating public money for specific purposes, or choosing magistrates for the ensuing year. At first it was usual for the same public building to be

# The Connecticut Courant.

---

MONDAY, October 29, 1764

(Number 80.)

---

HARTFORD: Printed by THOMAS GREEN, at the Heart and Crown,  
near the North-Meeting-House.

---

Hartford, October 29<sup>th</sup>, 1764.

**O**F all the Arts which have been introduced among Mankind, for the civilizing Human-Nature, and rendering Life agreeable and happy, none appear of greater Advantage than that of Painting; for hereby the greatest Genius of all Ages, and Nations, live and speak for the Benefit of future Generations.—

Was it not for the Arts we should be left almost entirely ignorant of all those noble Scenicks which the Antients were endow'd with.

FIG. 49.—Facsimile heading of "Connecticut Courant." ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvii.)

used both for ecclesiastical and civil purposes, so that it was called not distinctively a church, but a meeting-house. But by the eighteenth century it had become common for a second house, known as the town hall or town house, and used chiefly or exclusively for secular purposes, to stand on the village-green not far from the meeting-house. But even at that time, when it was said "The church chooses such a minister," or "The town passes such a measure," it was true that the church substantially consisted of the same persons as the town, the difference being simply in the different purposes for which individuals were convened. With the progress of time this fact became obscured by the introduction of several church organizations into the same township, by the enfranchisement of citizens who were not members of any church, and by

other complicating circumstances. The condition which I am here describing was the original one.

The main outlines of the origin of government by town meeting in New England are not difficult to trace. Our English forefathers a thousand years ago, in the time of King Alfred, had long been accustomed to governing their local affairs by town meetings, which were indeed called by that very name; while the government of a small kingdom like Essex or Northumbria was at least partially limited by the actions of small representative bodies, such as afterward came to be known as county courts. All this was before the feudal system had taken any hold upon England. In the days of the Plantagenet kings, from the twelfth century to the fifteenth—the period which saw the culmination and decline of feudalism—the township became for all secular purposes the manor of some resident or neighboring lord; its rights of self-government were to some extent curtailed by encroachments of prerogative on the part of the lord; but the town meeting, somewhat shorn of its powers, survived in the court-baron. On the other hand, in the ecclesiastical divisions of a diocese, the boundaries of the parishes were very apt to coincide with those of townships, so that the meeting of vestrymen for purposes of local church government corresponded very nearly to the popular manorial court. There was one serious difference, however: the vestry was rather a representative than a primary body. In what was called the open vestry the members were chosen for a brief term by the people; but sometimes the vestrymen acquired the privilege of sitting for life and of filling vacancies by election among themselves, in which case the institution came to be known as a close vestry. In this latter direction, as well as in the encroachments of the lord, there was room for indefinite departure from the principles of free government.

Now the Puritans, in coming to New England, left behind them both lords and bishops. In their ownership of the soil they had no feudal superior, and accordingly what remained of the manorial system was simply the court-baron, with its powers no longer curtailed. In other words, it reverted to the town meeting. So, too, the open vestry, according to the principles of the Independent churches, became merely the parish in its uncheckered legislative capacity; and thus it ceased to be a representative body and lapsed into the meeting of the church, which, as we have seen, was simply the town meeting engaged upon ecclesiastical matters. The condition of society in New England, therefore, so far as its political and ecclesiastical life was concerned, was a

notable change from the conditions left behind in England. In other words, New England, instead of reproducing the England of the Stuarts, reverted in some important respects to the England of the earlier Plantagenets, perhaps here and there even to that of Edward the Confessor. For political liberty this backward step was a gain; it was the recovery of much that had been lost in the old country, while from the general advance of civilization between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries little or nothing was lost. In the days of Charles II, the king's peace was even better preserved in Massachusetts than in England, while local self-government had in a measure renewed its vigor of youth.



FIG. 50.—Pepperell mansion, Kittery Point, Me. ("Magazine of American History," vol. ii.)

This state of things was favored by the social position of the emigrants. No other migration known to history has consisted so exclusively of thrifty and respectable material as that which peopled New England between 1620 and 1640. The shiftless and criminal classes had scarcely any representatives in it. The rank and file did not correspond to the peasants of continental Europe, but consisted chiefly of yeomanry, a class which then greatly flourished in England. The leaders were country squires or country parsons who had in their veins the best blood of England, if by good blood we mean that which derives its characteristics from faithful and disinterested public service extending

through many generations. Many of these squires and parsons, whose families had for a dozen or fifteen generations furnished for their neighborhood its justices of the peace, its county treasurers, the captains and colonels of its militia, its representatives in the House of Commons, its ambassadors to foreign powers, along with heads of colleges and preachers in the church, could look down upon some of the foremost leaders of the peerage as creatures of yesterday. At the same time, these squires and parsons were not separated by any social gulf from the yeomanry of whom they were the leaders; and when all were settled in a commonwealth, there was nothing to hinder a representative democracy from flourishing, while at the same time in social relations there was on the one hand due respect without cringing, as on the other hand there was leadership without arrogance. The presence of the untamed wilderness was there, as everywhere, conducive to social democracy; for it presented frequent occasions in which all classes must lead similar lives and do similar kinds of work. Thus the distinction between the squire and parson and the great mass of villagers was less marked than in the old country.

Such a state of things would have been impossible if servile labor had played any important part in the economies of the New England colonies. But servile labor was from the outset excluded by the laws of nature. The New England farmer had nothing to gain by purchasing negroes to do the kind of work which could be so much better done by the members of his own family and the white neighbors whom he could hire by the day or year. We find, therefore, through the whole colonial period, but few negroes brought to New England. The slavery to which they were subjected was of the lightest kind. In Connecticut, where the number was by far the greatest, it seems to have reached in 1765 some such figure as 2000. These negroes were mostly employed as domestic servants—cooks, coachmen, or gardeners. It must not for a moment be supposed that the question of slavery was at first the subject of any such humanitarian considerations as have been active during the past century. It should never be forgotten that in the age of Queen Elizabeth that eminent sailor, Sir John Hawkins, for initiating England into the practice of kidnapping African negroes, was rewarded by knighthood, together with a crest described in the language of heraldry as “a demi-Moor proper bound with a cord.” If the New England colonies were not cursed with slavery, we are not to infer that it was because of any essential difference in moral attitude between themselves and the people of the southern colonies. This is shown by

the fact that during the greater part of the colonial period New England ships were engaged in carrying negroes from Africa to the Southern states, their owners and skippers making snug little fortunes thereby; and in this kind of business the colony of Rhode Island, so advanced in other respects, was conspicuous.

In a previous chapter we have remarked upon the extent to which the history of New England was influenced by the attitude of the different settlers toward its theocratic ideal. We saw how the colonies of Providence and Rhode Island, Connecticut and New Haven, to which New Hampshire might be added, were founded by people who for one reason or another failed to agree with the founders of Massachusetts. The immediate result of this was to scatter the settlements over a great space in the wilderness, while the method of migration in organized communities prevented the barbarizing effects of such scattering. But from another point of view this scattering exposed the settlements to increased danger from the Indians, and it therefore led to the first American attempt at a federal union. We have already given some consideration to the character and career of the New England confederation.

The juxtaposition of communities differing among themselves in opinions, yet differing so slightly, was favorable to the growth of liberalism and mental flexibility. The great length of the New England coast and the maritime occupations of so many of its people were also favorable to the acquirement of a certain breadth of view. But against these considerations must be set off the fact that the people of New England were homogeneous in blood and traditions, and thus, for want of sufficient conflict of opinions, often betrayed strong symptoms of provincialism. On the whole, a careful survey would perhaps show that they were less provincial than the colonies south of Sandy Hook, while they were less cosmopolitan than New York.

It has often been pointed out that the early introduction of public schools in New England was greatly favored by the compactness of the social life. In that homogeneous society the difficult questions connected with state education had not yet arisen, and one of the most thriving institutions in those days of what Hosea Biglow would call "one-story larnin'" was the village school supported by the public taxes.

Away from the coast, the occupations of the New England people were purely agricultural. As a rule, each farm raised enough for its own support; but beside this, the natural resources of the country furnished valuable materials for exportation, and thus there grew up many thriving

seaports with a considerable development of commerce and banking. The most important exports were furs, lumber, and codfish, and in each of these departments of business large fortunes were made. In the middle of the eighteenth century not only the seaboard towns, but many of the small interior villages, possessed the visible signs of comfort and luxury. Of the country farm-houses, the better sort were similar to small English manor-houses of the Tudor period, only built of wood instead of stone. Those of the poorer sort were seldom inferior to such types as the Ann Hathaway cottage at Shottery. In the seaports and occasionally in the interior might be seen the noble colonial mansions,



FIG. 51.—Liberty Hall, the Livingston mansion at Elizabeth, N. J. ("Magazine of American History," vol. ii.)

many of which still survive in perfect preservation. The middle of the century was characterized by the frequent building of such mansions, among which two of the most famous are in the city of Cambridge; the house of Colonel Vassall, used as headquarters by Washington and since occupied by Longfellow, and the house of Chief Justice Oliver, since the birthplace and lifelong home of James Russell Lowell.

The most eminent of the learned professions in New England was, of course, the clergy. Among the leaders of the migration were an unusual number of graduates of universities, and among these graduates clergymen were largely in the majority. These New England doctors of divinity were usually men of learning, not inferior to that which won

fame for many of the foremost of their class in England. They were usually excellent classical scholars according to the standards of their day, and read the Bible intelligently in Hebrew. Their favorite philosopher was John Locke; and with the literature of theological disputation, so far as Western Europe was concerned, they were pretty sure to be familiar. In the community they were usually regarded with great reverence, which was justified by their upright and commanding characters. But they were not in the habit of claiming deference as something due to their cloth. Even at the time of their greatest power and influence they were in no proper sense a priesthood, but simply the teachers and exhorters of their friends and neighbors. This was so profoundly true that even the fact that the Congregational church was




FIG. 52.—Schuyler house at Albany. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.)

established by the state, and the ministers' salaries paid out of the taxes, did not substantially alter the fact.

Before the days of Andros there was practically, in all the New England colonies save Rhode Island, no other church than the Established Congregational or Independent. Baptists began to spread their opinions at a very early date, but found cold welcome everywhere except in Rhode Island. The first Episcopal church was the King's Chapel, built in Boston during the reign of Andros; but by 1750 Episcopacy had made considerable progress, and its churches might be seen in quite a number of places. The overthrow of the theocracy by the new charter of 1692 was the signal of a reaction against the rigid Puritanism of the preceding age. That great wave of spiritual excitement

known as Methodism, which in its beginning was a protest against the spiritual torpor into which the English church had fallen, swept with considerable power over the American colonies, and wrought no little effect in New England. In some cases it resulted in the founding of Methodist churches; in other cases it introduced subtle but profound modifications into the Congregational churches already existing. It was the era of the mighty preaching of George Whitefield, whose methods were by many people considered irregular, so that some decorous clergy-



*Jonathan Edwards*

FIG. 53. Jonathan Edwards.

men like Dr. Appleton, of Cambridge, would not allow him in their pulpits. A parallel symptom to the effects wrought by Wesley and Whitefield was the series of revivals among the Congregational churches, the most remarkable of which, commonly known as the "Great Awakening," began at Northampton in 1724 under the preaching of Jonathan Edwards, and lasted with some intermissions until the middle of the century. The mention of Jonathan Edwards (Fig. 53) introduces us to the greatest personality among all the New England clergy. He

still ranks as the greatest intellect ever born in the western hemisphere, and one of the greatest the world has seen. He was born at East Windsor, Connecticut, in 1703, was graduated at Yale College in 1720, and thereafter preached in the city of New York, in Northampton, and in Stockbridge. In 1758 he was installed as president of Princeton College, but died only one month later of the small-pox, which was then raging. Of his numerous writings one needs only allude to his "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will," which for metaphysical power and acuteness rivals any of the works of Bishop Berkeley or Immanuel Kant. The publication of this great book, together with the eloquent exhortations of the Great Awakening, gave a fresh impulse to the spiritual life of New England. In many ways the theories of Edwards acted upon the beliefs of his time like a disintegrating solvent. The great importance which he attached to what was called change of heart served to undermine the arguments in favor of infant baptism and thus to increase the number of Baptists. His views upon the will turned many persons toward Arminianism, and thus led them to join either the Methodists or the regular Episcopal church. Furthermore, the discussions aroused by Edwards' speculations on divine justice and the atonement prepared the way both for Universalism and for the Unitarianism which reared its head in Massachusetts toward the end of the century.

The great importance which the early Puritans attached to questions of doctrine as tested by the interpretation of Scripture led them to set great store by philological learning, no less than by metaphysics. To this motive, combined with a genuine desire to convert red men, must be ascribed the early founding of Harvard College in 1636. Its purpose was to train men for the ministry; but one of the first buildings erected was intended for the use of Indians, and it was only when it was found that none came to use it that it was turned into a printing-house. It is worthy of note in this connection that the first printing-press in America north of the city of Mexico was set up in Cambridge in 1639, and followed by a second in Boston in 1675. The second New England college was Yale, founded in 1701 (Fig. 54). The third was the collegiate institution for the education of Indians, founded in 1754 in Lebanon, Connecticut, and removed in 1769 to Hanover, New Hampshire, where it was incorporated under the name of Dartmouth College, from the noble earl who is best known as secretary of state for the American colonies at the beginning of the Revolution. The fourth institution of this kind was Rhode Island College, founded in 1764 and

afterward known as Brown University. Of these colleges, Harvard, which was largest, had in 1765 less than 200 undergraduates, a number which must of course be considered with reference to the small population of that time.

Literature and scholarship flourished in New England more vigorously than elsewhere; but the literature occupied restricted fields, and there is very little of the pre-Revolutionary writing that deserves to be called classic. The first generation of New Englanders was a generation of writers, and the seventeenth century abounds in their letters, journals, memoirs, and controversial tracts. It is partly because of



FIG. 51.—YALE COLLEGE AND STATE HOUSE, NEW HAVEN.

this wealth of material and partly because of the political complexity of this system of commonwealths that New England history has been apt to receive disproportionately spacious treatment as compared with the histories of other sections of our country. Among the earlier controversial works, some of the more significant are "The Bloody Tenant of Persecution," by Roger Williams; "The Bloody Tenant washed White in the Blood of the Lamb," by John Cotton; and other tracts published in the course of the long disputation between those two eminent men. Other books of more than common interest are "The Simple Cobler of Aggawam," by Nathaniel Ward; "The Heart of New

England Rent," by John Norton; "New England's Jonas Cast up at London," by Major Child; and "The Wonder-Working Providence of Zion's Savior in New England," by Edward Johnson. The latter is really a history of the early days, written by a man who believed himself to be one of God's chosen people, and it is written in a vein of rough dithyrambic eloquence. Other narratives of the highest value are the journal of Governor Winthrop and the history of Plymouth Plantation by Governor Bradford. The accounts of Indian warfare by Hubbard, Church, Increase Mather, and Penhallow, with the captivities of Mrs. Rowlandson and Joseph Williams, are all of great interest. Poetry makes a much poorer show. One instance is furnished in the volume by Mrs. Ann Bradstreet, daughter of Thomas Dudley, published in London under the title of "The Tenth Muse Lately Sprung up in America." Much of the verse in this volume would hardly do credit to the poet's corner of a country newspaper, but here and there are a pithiness in the thought and strength in the expression which show that the author only fell just short of being a poet. The only other instance worth citing is Michael Wigglesworth's famous poem on "The Last Judgment," a work of sulphurous intensity. Both these verse-writers were extravagantly admired by their readers and were sometimes compared with the greatest poets of antiquity, to the disadvantage of the latter.

The early part of the eighteenth century witnessed, as we have seen, transcendent work in one direction by Jonathan Edwards, some of whose books remain classic. The most famous literary name of the time is that of Cotton Mather, grandson of John Cotton and son of Increase Mather. This eminent writer was born in Boston in 1663, and died there in 1728. He was a kind of Admirable Chrichton, recognized in the Old World as well as the New as a prodigy of erudition. He was master of many languages, and nothing in human literature, whether it be history, poetry, theology, or science, came amiss to him. His best-known works are the "Magnalia Christi Americana," published in 1702, an ecclesiastical history of New England down to that time, and his "Wonders of the Invisible World," in which he gives his views on the subject of witchcraft. Of the enormous extent of his literary productiveness I have spoken in an earlier chapter, but few of his books have to-day anything more than an antiquarian interest. The next writer after Mather and Edwards to acquire a world-wide reputation was Benjamin Franklin, but I shall defer for a while further mention of him and his work.

Passing from New England, we may next most profitably consider the social system of Virginia, in which we find very marked and striking contrasts to that which we have just been studying. It must be understood that until we come to speak of the Piedmont and mountain regions, our remarks apply only to the seaboard counties, or that which is familiarly known as tide-water Virginia.

Here, as in New England, during the whole colonial period the population was purely English, save for a small but not insignificant Huguenot admixture. The first, and in some respects the most important, characteristic of Virginia was the sparseness of population, the lack of compactness in the settlements. This resulted from economic circumstances so imperious that they would probably have disintegrated the most compact migration that New England ever witnessed; but in Virginia there was no such initial compactness of movement as in New England. The early settlers were not organized congregations, but simply shiploads of individuals brought together merely by the inducements held out to them by the Virginia Company. For a few years the existence of the colony was precarious. Its success was first established by the growing demand for tobacco in Europe, coupled with the fact that the soil of Virginia was one of the best in the world for growing that article of commerce. As soon as it became clear that people living in Virginia could buy whatever they wanted with tobacco, men began rushing to tobacco-fields somewhat as they would flock to gold-mines. The cultivation of this plant does not require skilled labor, but can be successfully managed by immense gangs of cheap laborers working under direction. Thus from an early period the tendency toward somewhat large estates was visible in Virginia, but this tendency did not reach its climax nor did the characteristics of Virginia society become distinctly developed until after the accession of Charles II.

The need for cheap labor was not at first satisfied by the employment of negro slaves. It is true that such negroes were brought to Virginia in very small numbers as early as 1619, but more than half a century elapsed before negro slavery acquired vital importance in Virginia, and yet another half century passed before it took on the proportions with which we are familiar. The need was at first supplied by the temporary enslavement of white men and women, or, in other words, by the employment of indentured white servants. Such people were either, 1, persons transported for criminal or political offences; 2, grown persons or children kidnapped in the slums or on the streets of British seaports, and either sold to the skippers or taken by them to sell on commission; 3, redemp-

tioners, or persons led by some strong desire to come to America, but compelled by poverty to bind themselves to a certain term of labor as payment for the expense of their voyage. For a long time the labor upon the tobacco-plantations of Virginia and Maryland was supplied by these servants. Considerable numbers were also sent to the middle colonies, especially after the latter years of the seventeenth century. Very few were received in New England, because there was very little demand for cheap labor. By far the greater number came to Virginia and Maryland, and this fact has given occasion to much of that cheap and ignorant sarcasm which people in one section of this country seem to take such pleasure in heaping upon another section. We hear it




FIG. 55.—Stratford, Va. The home of the Lees. ("Magazine of American History," vol. x.)

thrown against the colonies in question that there population was largely made up of jail-birds, cut-throats, and so on through other amenities of speech. But if we consider how many people in the seventeenth century were convicted of felony for acts that would now be held as merely misdemeanors, if we further consider how many of the offenders in question must have been condemned for political reasons, we shall see the fallaciousness of such imputations. With regard to the victims of kidnappers, as indeed with regard to the redemptioners, they must generally have come from the lower strata of society; but many of them were worthy persons, and the redemptioners especially often proved themselves useful members of society. Such indentured servants were usually set free after a term of from four to six years; but an ordinary penalty for such slight offences as were very apt to occur was the lengthening of the term of

servitude, and thus it might happen that the white servant remained bound for a dozen or fifteen years. At the end of their term of enslavement the white freedmen might acquire small estates and become tobacco-planters in a humble way, or they might drag out a wretched existence as mere loungers, or they might repair to the frontier and lead a half-savage life as wood-rangers.

The early settlement of Virginia was effected under the auspices of the Episcopal church and before the severance between Episcopacy and the extreme Puritanism had become complete. For the first forty years Virginia contained a good many Puritans, but anything like the Puritan organization it never had. The system of townships never acquired a foothold. When it became necessary for a group of plantations to act together, as, for example, in electing a representative to the General Assembly, the unit of representation which became established was the county, not the township; and this county was organized after the general analogy of counties in England, with their sheriff's, lieutenants, and courts of quarter-sessions. The first representative bodies in Virginia and Massachusetts were alike in so far as each consisted of a governor, a council, and a house of representatives; but there was this important difference: in Massachusetts the representatives sat for townships; in Virginia, for counties. As for parish government, it came to Virginia in the form of the open vestry, and discharged functions somewhat similar to those of the New England township, save that even the open vestry was not a primary, but a representative body.

Now if we pass to the latter half of the seventeenth century we are introduced to the changes which created the Virginia that lives for us in most charming and venerated traditions, the Virginia that moved and composed the Declaration of Independence and became the mother of Presidents. The influx of Cavaliers which began immediately after the execution of Charles I, wrought changes which can readily be discerned. It brought into Virginia a large class of people almost precisely the same as that which settled New England, differing from them in little or nothing save their attitude toward political and ecclesiastical questions. Coincident with their arrival we find the average size of Virginia plantations suddenly increasing, which shows that the newcomers took up much larger tracts of land than the old settlers. This change went on until within a few years the average size of plantations had increased many fold. At the same time we begin to observe a marked and rapid increase in the importation of negro slaves, and this goes on until the treaty of Utrecht in 1713 hands over to England the monopoly of the

African slave-trade formerly enjoyed by Spain and Portugal. After that date negroes are brought to Virginia until they outnumber the whites and their presence is felt to be a nuisance. If we knew nothing but these facts, we should know that there must have been a marked concentration of power into the hands of the great planters; but the fortunes of local self-government in Virginia tell the same story, for soon after the accession of Charles II, and the return of Governor Berkeley we find the open vestry giving way to the close vestry. In other words, we find the control of parish affairs passing into the hands of a small body of notables with the power of self-perpetuation through filling its own vacancies. There thus arises an aristocracy of wealthy planters who keep the management of affairs within their own hands, and tolerate on the part of lesser people only such interference as may happen to suit them. There can be little doubt that Bacon's rebellion, which assuredly was not supported by the magnates of the day, was not merely an expression of dissatisfaction with the tyranny of Berkeley, but involved also an attempt to resist this growth of an oligarchical power.

Except for the modifications due to slave labor, the life of the great planters was analogous to that of the English country squires. In many respects Virginia reproduced the rural England of the Stuart period, as New England reproduced to some extent the life of the Plantagenet period. But there was one feature in Virginia that was quite peculiar and unlike anything in the old country or in the northern colonies: although Virginia was a great exporting community, this circumstance did not avail to build up seaports or towns of any kind. The reason lay in circumstances of physical geography. There are few places on the earth's surface where the land is so frequently and so deeply penetrated by navigable rivers as Virginia. For more than a century these rivers supplied the place of roads, and barges and canoes performed the work which in most countries is done by ox-carts or by horses and wagons. It therefore happened that there were few plantations not within immediate reach of some large river or of the innumerable tiny creeks by which it was fed. It was therefore not necessary for the planter to go to the expense and trouble of sending his tobacco to some large urban warehouse to be shipped to England. The process was much simpler. The ship, which was built either in the old country or in New England, came up to his own private wharf and there took on board its cargo of fragrant bales, paying for them in almost any and every kind of manufactured article that Virginians needed. Life was therefore so much easier without towns than with them that towns would

not grow up, in spite of all that legislation could do to favor them. Bounties and subsidies were liberally offered to people who would undertake to congregate in towns, but it was no use. In 1765, Williamsburg, the capital of the colony, the seat of its university and the headquarters of fashionable life, numbered scarcely 200 houses. Only in one instance to the south of James River, where circumstances were somewhat altered by the development of a lumber-trade, did there grow up anything like town life. This was in Norfolk, which at the time of which we are speaking had a population of perhaps 7000.

This sparseness of population was enough to prevent the growth of town meetings, and hence no such system of public education grew up as that which characterized New England. At the same time there was no such class of learned parsons as made New England a reading and writing country. The amount of literary activity in Virginia was much smaller than in any of the New England colonies. The first generation, indeed, reared in the Old World, produced valuable writings, chiefly of the nature of contemporary memoirs, like those of Ralph Hamor, William Strachey, and the worthy Captain Smith himself; but as we come down toward the year 1765 we find but three books of a classic character: 1, "The History of Virginia," by Robert Beverly; 2, "The History of the Dividing Line," by William Byrd, of Westover; 3, "The Sot-Weed Factor," by Ebenezer Cook, of Maryland. The last-named book, the title of which means "The Tobacco Dealer," is a satirical poem of no mean merit, probably the best thing in verse that was written in America before the nineteenth century. As for Colonel Byrd's book, it is his half-humorous account of the proceedings of a commission, of which he was member, for determining the boundary-line between Virginia and North Carolina. In such a theme one does not look for anything especially thrilling or very funny, but Colonel Byrd's book abounds in wit and wisdom and is written in such admirable English that it is sure to be remembered after many more pretentious books have been forgotten.

If now we follow Colonel Byrd across the dividing line, we encounter in North Carolina a state of society very different from that of its northern neighbor. In the formation of this colony there were two easily distinguishable periods. The first one may be said to have lasted until the third decade of the eighteenth century, when circumstances coincident with the overthrow of the proprietary government wrought a change. In its earlier period, as we have seen in a former chapter, North Carolina consisted chiefly of the colony of Albemarle, which was

little more than an Alsatia for sheltering Virginia's escaped criminals or shiftless white freedmen. Although settlers of a better sort came from both England and France, yet the offscourings of Virginia were present in far too great numbers for the peace of the colony. The first event which heralded a new state of things was the arrival of Germans and Swiss under Count de Graffenreid, just before the great Tuscarora war. The new state of things came with the arrival of Scotch-Irish and Germans in the back country, pouring along the Alleghanies from Pennsylvania. These sturdy people produced effects of the profoundest sort upon Virginia; while as for North Carolina, they almost completely transformed it. Let us observe some of their characteristics.

These co-operating streams of immigration introduced new ecclesiastical facts into the country. The Germans were largely Lutherans, and carried into remote quarters of the country a church which at first and for a long time had appeared only in New York. Other German sects were such as the Mennonites, Dunkers, and Moravians, closely akin in temperament with the Quakers. But far more important were the Presbyterians. Here a word may be necessary to warn the reader against the common error of confusing Presbyterians with Congregationalists. Though there has never been any important doctrinal difference between these two sects, yet the difference between their systems of church government is of great and far-reaching importance; and the two sects, moreover, have very different histories. Congregationalism, which is synonymous with Independency, had a purely English origin. Presbyterianism, on the other hand, which originated in Scotland, is much more closely akin to the Huguenot church and the Reformed Dutch church than to the Congregational. Presbyterianism was first brought to America by the Scotch, who began coming to New York, and especially to New Jersey, after the accession of James II. In New Jersey they have always been a power, and through their university at Princeton have played an important part in American history.

But the principal source of Presbyterianism in the United States is the great Scotch-Irish immigration of which we have already spoken, beginning in the second decade of the eighteenth century. We have followed these Scotch-Irish to Pennsylvania, where in the time of Pontiac's war they probably formed one-third of the white population. The changes which they wrought in Virginia were closely connected with the political form which their Presbyterianism assumed. In Scotland, where Presbyterianism was the established church, it naturally did not protest against the union of church and state; in Ireland,

however, where they were in ill favor with their Catholic neighbors and were grievously harassed by persecuting acts of Parliament, they learned to maintain the principle that civil and ecclesiastical affairs ought to be kept separate. Accordingly, when they reached Virginia and covered the Shenandoah valley with their small farms, they were not long in coming to warfare with the Church of England as then established in Virginia. The struggle began when they were called upon to contribute to the revenues of the Episcopal church, but it soon extended to other things. In their political views they were inclined to democracy, and this tendency was greatly enhanced by the rude conditions of their frontier life. In 1765 were heard some of the first mutterings of the struggle between the Cavalier society of tide-water Virginia and the democratic Presbyterian society of the mountains, ending about twenty years later in the complete defeat of the Cavaliers. In the course of the struggle primogeniture and entails were overthrown, the Episcopal church was disestablished and wellnigh ruined, and an act was passed providing for complete religious freedom.

The effects wrought upon North Carolina by the Scotch-Irish and German immigration were still more far-reaching. While in Virginia the newcomers profoundly modified an old and highly developed social structure, on the other hand, in North Carolina they had to begin at the beginning of things and evolve order from chaos. In this work their personal characteristics and acquired social habits were all-important. They were a sturdy and self-reliant race, industrious and devout, setting a high store by morality and religion. Thus they furnished excellent material for the population of North Carolina. For the most part, their farming was conducted on a small scale; and even when it came to raising tobacco, it was done upon small plantations with comparatively few negro slaves. The period had arrived when servile labor was performed mostly by negroes, and the white servitude of an earlier time was almost entirely superseded. Under these circumstances the more thrifty of Virginia's white freedmen, or their offspring, who could not make a place for themselves in that aristocratic society, found it easy to migrate into North Carolina and become small farmers. In that simpler and ruder society they found themselves more at home. In these ways the general condition of North Carolina was greatly improved. As for the unthrifty and riotous elements, whether descendants of white freedmen or not, they gradually withdrew to the frontier and enjoyed its wild freedom. With the westward advance of population, for age after age, there was thus always present a

fringe of what Southerners call "mean whites," "white trash," or "crackers."

At the time just preceding the Revolutionary War, society in North Carolina was ruder and more isolated than in any of the other colonies; people were more sequestered and knew less of what was going on in the great world outside them, while at the same time there were in the people many vigorous and admirable characteristics. Even to the present day it is probably true that in North Carolina and those eastern parts of Tennessee which are its prolongation we may find a larger number of communities that are queer, picturesque, and old-fashioned through the simple fact of isolation, than anywhere else in English-speaking America.

With South Carolina the case has been very different. After the first wild days the character of the coast population was of a high order. Huguenots came there in greater numbers than to any other colony, while at a later date the Scotch-Irish and Germans not only poured into the mountain districts, but occupied a large portion of the centre with some of the seaboard portions of the state, so that there was more commingling of these elements than in Virginia. There was, for example, no sharp antagonism between Presbyterians and Episcopalians; for although something like an Episcopal church was established in South Carolina, yet its features were so modified as to amount to a practical compromise between the English and Huguenot settlers. The clergy, for instance, were not appointed by the Bishop of London, as was the case in Virginia, but they were elected by their own vestrymen. From such a state of things to the democracy of the Presbyterians the distance was not great.

As compared with Virginia, the South Carolina society must be called democratic; but it was a democracy of the ancient type, which was really an oligarchy of slave-masters resting upon a basis of servile labor. The occupations which the South Carolinians found profitable and upon which they lived were the wholesale cultivation of rice and indigo. For such crops the swampy character of the seaboard and its virulent summer heats were admirably fitted. But it was impossible for white people to endure outdoor labor under such tropical conditions. Such work could only be done by negroes, hence black men were in great demand from the outset. But in spite of this demand, negroes were brought from Africa in such wholesale quantities, after the Asiento business of 1713, that skippers could sell them cheap and still make enormous profits. This state of things made it less economical for the

South Carolina planter to take good care of his slave than to work him to death and buy a new one. Under such circumstances the condition of these negroes seems to have been less miserable than one might have expected, for it may fairly be said that willful or wanton cruelty has not been a characteristic of any portion of the American people. With regard to such questions as relate to the treatment of slaves, it is difficult to arrive at positive conclusions, because it is not easy to determine how far individual instances may be regarded as typical or how far exceptional. It is, nevertheless, I think, easy to draw a line between the two Carolinas, and say that slavery south of that line was more harsh and cruel than slavery to the north of it. There is, perhaps, no testimony more valuable than that of the statute book, which proves that the masters lived in perpetual dread of negro insurrection. A militia force was kept permanently under arms, and an important part of its duty was to patrol the slave quarters and search for hidden weapons. The strictest watch was kept over negroes, and any one who was found away from his plantation without a ticket of leave was liable to severe punishment.

What was of still more importance, as affects the history of the United States, is the fact that in the minds of South Carolinians and Georgians negro slavery was the cornerstone upon which their social fabric rested. They could not imagine their states as continuing to exist if the culture of rice and indigo, or, in later days, of cotton, were to stop; and they could not imagine the possibility of such culture going on by the labor of free negroes. The conclusion was irresistible that either their communities must perish or negro slavery must be perpetuated. Such was what we may call the South Carolina idea. For a century from the time which we are treating, it was the aggressive idea at the South, possessing force enough to drag into alliance with it such communities as Virginia, whose allegiance to the system of slavery was of a far weaker and more uncertain kind. Before leaving South Carolina, one most interesting feature must be mentioned in which it differed from Virginia: there was no such river-system here for accommodating individual planters as existed in tide-water Virginia. It was necessary for them to have a mart for distributing their merchandise, and that mart was naturally Charleston, which was planted at the outlet of their principal navigable waters; consequently, Charleston grew into a city. Partly because of the greater conveniences and attractions of town life, and partly because of the cool sea-breezes which make Charleston so much pleasanter than the sweltering country

inland, the planters dwelt in the city for the greater part of the year, leaving their estates to be managed by hired overseers. Life in Charleston, with its theatre and balls, was somewhat gay. While the schools in the colony were but few and poor, it was customary for the planters to send their children to Europe for an education; and this circumstance gave to their city homes a somewhat more cosmopolitan tone than that which belonged to the rural mansions of Virginia and Maryland.




FIG. 56.—Chamber in Van Cortlandt Memorial House. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xv.)

Such cosmopolitanism, however, was but slight, compared to that which was to be found in New York. Upon the enchanted soil of Manhattan Island all the elements of European life that contributed to the founding of the United States might be found commingled side by side, perpetually reacting one upon another. Although in point of population the province of New York ranked only seventh among the colonies, yet the commercial advantages of the position of Manhattan Island

were already such as to make its city our foremost seaport. In point of population it was surpassed only by Philadelphia. At the time of which we are speaking, the population of Philadelphia was about 25,000, that of New York 20,000, after which came Boston and Baltimore, each with about 15,000, and then Charleston with 10,000 or 12,000. The complexion of New York society was decidedly aristocratic. The descendants of the old patroons were true lords of the manor, with rights of manorial jurisdiction attaching to their territorial possessions. The larger part of the agricultural population along the Hudson River were tenants of these manors. In Long Island, on the other hand, even in its Dutch parts, the arrangements were more democratic; and in the eastern or English part there was little difference from the state of things in New England. In the city of New York were the fine city houses of some of the manorial lords, along with those of the great merchants and ship-owners. The presence of the commander-in-chief, General Gage, with sundry regiments of regulars, added to the picturesqueness of the town and gave it a look of courtliness. New York showed also its cosmopolitanism in having a rough water-side populace like many European seaports. It had its theatre and coffee-houses, its horse-races, balls, and evening parties, and seems on the whole to have been a cheerful place.

Negro slavery never flourished extensively in New York, as the necessary conditions were absent. To so little extent did slavery enter into the life of that mercantile community that by the time of the Revolution it had almost died a natural death. Black men were employed chiefly for menial occupations in households or shops, and were in general mildly treated; but there were instances in which the feeling of race antagonism blazed out in acts of cruelty. Thus in 1712 a small party of negroes undertook to start an insurrection with the hope of escaping from the island, and they murdered several white persons. Twenty-one of these negroes were executed for an example, one by breaking on the wheel, several by burning, and the rest by hanging. Again in 1741, while we were engaged in that war with Spain already mentioned in connection with General Oglethorpe, the occurrence of several fires in New York gave rise to a panic. Some disclosures made by an abandoned girl in a low grog-shop created a belief that Spanish emissaries had incited sundry negroes to burn the city; and this panic was not quieted until fourteen negroes had been burned at the stake and twelve hanged. Most of these victims were probably innocent, as is so apt to be the case in such panics.

With regard to its facilities for education, New York lagged considerably behind its neighbors in the east. Its first printing-press was set up in 1693, and the King's College, afterward known as Columbia, was established under Episcopal auspices about 1750. Mails ran regularly to and from Boston on the one hand, to and from Philadelphia on the other, carried in saddle-bags and taking about a fortnight to traverse the distance between Boston and Philadelphia. The latter city was conspicuous, among other things, as the headquarters of the Continental post-office. From it the mails were carried with tolerable regularity to the southward as far as Williamsburg; beyond which point they were conveyed at irregular intervals, as often as enough mail had accumulated



FIG. 57.—Thomas Prince, historian.

to make it worth while. The first postmaster-general for the English colonies was the worthy Alexander Spotswood, who had been governor of Virginia. He was succeeded by Benjamin Franklin, who held the office until 1774.

Considering the fact that Philadelphia was founded so lately as 1681, the fact that within seventy years it had come to be the largest town in English America was a striking one. For as regards commercial advantages merely, its situation was no better than that of Newport or Boston or Salem. Its rapid growth was part and parcel of the equally remarkable growth of Pennsylvania, which, with only half the length of life of Massachusetts and less than half that of Virginia, had already come to stand next in population to those two foremost colonies. This rapid

growth was a direct consequence of the extremely humane and liberal policy of William Penn, coupled with the influence exerted over a wide European area by his extraordinary personality. Of all the thirteen colonies, Pennsylvania was the most completely democratic. The migration was not like that which peopled New England; it was not a migration of congregations, each with its minister in the pulpit and its squire in the great high-backed pew, nor did it retain even such undemo-




FIG. 58.—David Rittenhouse, astronomer. (From a mezzotint by Savage, after a painting by Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

cratic elements as minister and squire, for Quaker clergymen scarcely differed in dignity from the laity. The population of Pennsylvania consisted mostly of what Abraham Lincoln called plain people; and with its complete religious freedom and its humane and equitable code, it presented peculiar attractions to all who wished to leave the Old World. The population was more heterogeneous than in any of the other colonies, save New York and South Carolina. Its elements we have already enumerated. Of negroes there were more than in any other colony north

of Maryland; in 1765 they may have numbered one-fourth of the population, and many of these were held in slavery. But from the outset slavery was condemned by all good Quakers, and by the middle of the century Quaker meetings had begun passing resolutions in favor of its abolition. Such resolutions sometimes went so far as to threaten the exclusion of slave-holders from the Quaker communion. Here, as in the other Northern states, the economic circumstances afforded no strong foothold for slavery, and that institution did not survive the colonial period. Long before the end of that period there had been so much manumission of slaves that most of the black population of Pennsylvania were freemen. We need not wonder that in such a society there was an unusual opportunity for redemptioners to raise themselves in the social scale, and we find that in point of fact Pennsylvania was the destination preferred by such persons.

The chief occupation of Pennsylvania was agriculture, and the chief crop was wheat. From the outset more wheat was raised than the people could consume, and large quantities were exported along with timber and furs, employing the services of more than 7000 sailors. Pig-iron was also exported to England at the rate of 3000 tons yearly. These facts, and especially the successful culture of wheat, reacted upon Maryland, causing that colony to diverge widely from its older type and to approach the type of the middle colonies. Seventeenth-century Maryland was economically only another Virginia absorbed in the cultivation of tobacco, but in the eighteenth century a great many Marylanders found wheat more profitable than tobacco, so that the culture extended from Pennsylvania over a large part of that state. The founding of the city of Baltimore in 1729 supplied an excellent seaport for both Maryland and Pennsylvania, and hence the rapid growth of that town, which within forty years had caught up with Boston and has ever since remained side by side with it on the list of American cities.

Between the Quakers in Pennsylvania and the Puritans, whether in Holland, Scotland, or New England, there was one difference. We have already remarked upon the fact that the Puritans, being great sticklers for soundness in doctrine, set great store by learning, and, in every country where they became dominant, insisted upon both popular education and upon the endowment of higher institutions of learning. The Quakers, on the other hand, set a comparatively small value upon soundness of doctrine, and allowed great latitude in that respect. They cared much more for the purification of the heart than of the intellect, and when they interpreted Scripture they paid more heed to the Divine

light irradiating their own souls than to the philological lucubrations of erudite critics. Most Quaker preachers were men of slight learning, and in general the sect did not feel the need of colleges. Nevertheless, so strong are the effects wrought in a community by individual initiative on the part of a few strong characters, that Philadelphia soon developed into a centre of liberal culture. Not only was William Penn himself a man of really eminent scholarship and literary power, but the influence which he exerted was powerfully aided by that of such men as the Scotchman, James Logan, and the Welshman, David Lloyd. The



FIG. 59.—J. S. Copley. (From an unlettered engraving, after a painting by himself.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

former of these men attained a European reputation as a naturalist, while his attainments in classical and Oriental languages, as well as in mathematics, were extraordinary. Lloyd was not only deeply versed in history and jurisprudence, but was a skilled philologist. A few such men in prominent positions are often enough to give tone to a community. In Philadelphia the case was heightened by the arrival of Benjamin Franklin (PLATE V.), the Boston boy for whom the atmosphere of New England was not free enough; so that his name and fame have become forever associated with his adopted city. In 1765 the name of Franklin had already made America known in circles of the Old World, where other-

PLATE V.



Benjamin Franklin.

From the copper-plate engraving by Éd. Girardet, after the original painting by Ary Scheffer.



wise it simply called up vague pictures of savages and jungle. The name of George Washington was as yet scarcely known beyond the Atlantic, save that Horace Walpole, on the strength of an expression in one of his youthful letters, had laughed at him as a half-fledged fire-eater. The names of Cotton Mather, of Jonathan Edwards, of Thomas Hutchinson, with others of less significance, were known in England, but Franklin's was known everywhere. A French admirer of his, in addressing to him a letter, "Dr. Franklin, America," apologized for the vagueness of his knowledge, but added, "No matter; were I to address it 'Dr. Franklin, The Earth,' it would still be sure to reach you." In similar wise, Voltaire, some years later, alluded to our Continental army as "Franklin's troops." This wide fame was chiefly due to his experiments in electricity, for which he had received the Royal Society's Copley medal. Many more things he had done for which he was known at home, from the invention of stoves and the compilation of almanacs, up to the founding of the University of Pennsylvania. His autobiography, written at a somewhat later date, is the one undisputed American classic that appeared before the time of Washington Irving.

Such, in brief outline, were some of the salient points in the life of English America at the time of the Stamp Act. It was, in the main, simple and homely in its features, not yet highly picturesque or startling. But in these thirteen colonies political activity was briskly seething, as our next chapter will show.

## CHAPTER V.

### BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION.

WHEN James I. gave his royal assent to the colonization of Virginia and New England, he did so in the belief that the colonies could be governed by the crown, for its own use and behoof, without fear of hindrance from Parliament. In point of fact the colonies themselves generally maintained that Parliament had no authority over them because they were not represented in it; but at the same time their relations to the crown were extremely ill-defined and vacillating, and as a general thing they doled out their allegiance with as scanty and grudging a hand as they possibly could. It was seldom that anything was declared concerning their rights so explicitly as in the proprietary grant of Maryland, which declares that the English crown shall have no authority to raise taxes within the colony. In general, the colonists showed no inclination to press the question of the definition of their rights, preferring to do as they liked so long as they were uninterfered with, while making as few emphatic declarations as possible. It is peculiarly true of the English race that the most independent spirit often takes this quiet method of asserting itself. In this way the object is as likely to be attained as in any other, while there is much less waste of breath in argumentative wrangling than there would be if it were felt to be necessary to settle every doubtful question by a solemn and dogmatic *pronunciamiento*. In this way, though there were occasional and local disputes between the crown and the colonies, even in the seventeenth century, yet anything like a general issue was avoided until the colonies had grown strong enough to maintain their own position successfully. We have already mentioned the assault upon the Massachusetts charter by Charles I. as early as 1635. How far this dispute might have been carried we cannot tell, for the Presbyterians of Scotland soon began the revolt which cost the king his throne and his life, and for the next ten years very little attention was paid in England to American affairs. Hitherto Parliament had not assumed any control over colonial affairs. In 1624 they had grumbled at James I.'s high-handed suppression of the Virginia Company, but they had not gone so

far as to call in question the king's supreme authority over the colonies. In 1628, in a petition to Charles I. relating to the Bermudas, they had fully admitted this royal authority. But after the execution of the king in 1649 a new and somewhat anomalous state of things arose. There was now no king, and all the royal powers devolved upon Parliament,



FIG. 60.—Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 1900.

among other things the prerogative of superintending the affairs of the colonies. Such, at least, was the theory held in England, and it is difficult to see how any other theory could logically have been held; but the Americans never formally admitted it, and in practice they continued to behave toward Parliament very much as they had behaved toward

the crown, yielding as little obedience as possible. Virginia submitted gracefully to the Parliamentary commissioners ; but when these same commissioners seized upon a royalist vessel in Boston harbor, the colonial legislature of Massachusetts debated the question whether it was compatible with the dignity of the colony to permit such an act of sovereignty on the part of the home government. It was finally decided to wink at the proceeding, partly because the Puritans of New England were on general principles friendly to the Puritan Parliament and hostile to the royalists, partly because Parliament, reciprocating the friendly feeling, was inclined to favor New England in its commercial legislation, and it was thought to be impolitic to quarrel with one's bread and butter. At the same time the question of the constitutional supremacy of Parliament over the colonies was not pressed to a direct issue. In 1651 Parliament ordered Massachusetts to surrender its charter and take out a new one, in which the relations of the colony to the home government should be made the subject of fresh and more precise definition. To this request the colony for something like a year vouchsafed no answer ; and finally, when it became necessary to do something, instead of sending back the charter, the legislature sent back a memorial, setting forth that the people of Massachusetts were quite contented with their form of government, and hoped that no change would be made in it. At about the same time Massachusetts ventured upon an act such as in nearly all ages and countries has been supposed to involve an assertion of independent sovereignty. A mint was established, and shillings and sixpenny and threepenny pieces were coined, bearing on the one side a tree with the inscription *Massachusetts*, and on the other side the inscription *New England*, with the date of issue. There was no recognition of England upon this coinage, which was kept up for more than thirty years. Though favorably disposed toward Cromwell, Massachusetts carefully avoided recognizing his authority. When asked to contribute a military contingent for the conquest of the Dutch settlements on the Hudson, she courteously informed his Highness that he might enlist five hundred volunteers within her territory if he could find so many willing to serve. The death of the Lord Protector is not even alluded to in the colonial records.

How Massachusetts continued to persevere in this haughty demeanor until after the revolution which drove James II. from England and Sir Edmund Andros from America has been described in an earlier chapter. It was perhaps not strange that many English statesmen should have believed Samuel Maverick when he declared that the men of New Eng-

land were all rebels, who would be glad at any time to sever the bonds of allegiance which still connected them with the mother country. Yet no statement could have been further from the truth. Though quick to detect and resent all attempts to infringe upon their rights of local self-




FIG. 61.—Faneuil Hall, Boston.

government, the colonists cherished no ill feeling toward England and were very slow to entertain the thought of a political separation. They gloried in the name of Englishmen and looked back upon the beautiful

island they had left, with its ancient civilization and its treasures of history and of art, as upon an earthly paradise. "Farewell, dear England," was the tender cry of Higginson and his friends from the ship's deck, as the shores of their native land sank away from their view. A few years later, in his touching little pamphlet, "New England's Teares for Old England's Feares," William Hooker exclaimed, "There is no land that claims our name but England. . . . There is no nation that calls us countrymen but the English. . . . How do they talk of New England with delight! . . . And when sometimes a New England man returns thither, how is he looked upon, looked after, received,




FIG. 62. Christopher Gadsden. —From an etching by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

entertained, the ground he walks upon beloved for his sake, and the house held the better where he is! How are his words listened to, laid up, and related frequently when he is gone! Neither is any love or kindness held too much for such a man." This was in the great days of the Long Parliament, when the sympathies between the Puritan English on both sides of the ocean were especially strong. But at all times the affection of the colonists for England was earnest and deep, and nowhere else was it so strong as in those two purely English colonies—Virginia and Massachusetts—which were the quickest to resent any interference with local liberties. The idea of a political separation from England was not regarded with favor by the Americans until after the war which became the war of independence had actually begun.

Among American statesmen, Samuel Adams was undoubtedly the first to recognize the necessity for such a separation; yet so late as 1774 we find him writing, "Would to God all, even our enemies, knew the warm attachment we have for Great Britain!"

It was precisely because the American colonists were such good Englishmen, that they were determined to allow no curtailment of their immemorial rights as Englishmen. Their attitude, whether toward the crown or toward Parliament, was dictated not so much by any nice



*Richard Henry Lee*

FIG. 63.—Richard Henry Lee.

theories of constitutional law as by the great underlying principle of English political life, that an Englishman's house is his castle, and that this house can best be managed without interference from the house across the way. So far as the colonists entertained any general theory of the subject, however, they agreed with the royal rather than with the Parliamentary interpretation of their connection with the mother country. They did not deny the paramount sovereignty of the king;

but as Parliament conducted the government only in virtue of being a representative body, they denied that it could legally conduct the government of the colonies, inasmuch as it in no way represented them. By the year 1770 this attitude of the colonies had become clearly defined, so as to admit of distinct expression in a general theory. The political arguments of Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee (Fig. 63) were based on the theory that the British empire was made up of various provinces or departments, equal to each other in political value and each legislatively independent of all the others, while all alike owed allegiance to the king. The people of Great Britain were represented by the British Parliament, which could therefore make laws for Great Britain and impose taxes within its limits. In like manner the people of Pennsylvania were represented by the Pennsylvania legislature, which could therefore make laws for Pennsylvania and impose taxes within its limits. The Pennsylvania legislature could not make laws for Connecticut, because it in no way represented the people of Connecticut; and for precisely the same kind of reason the British Parliament could not make laws for either Pennsylvania or Connecticut, or for any other American colony. If the king wanted money from his subjects in Great Britain, he must ask his Parliament for it; if he wanted money from his subjects in Connecticut, he must ask the colonial legislature for it. For Connecticut to allow the Pennsylvania legislature to impose taxes within its limits would be to make of Connecticut a tributary state, to deprive its citizens of the birthright of Englishmen, and reduce them to the political condition of Frenchmen or Spaniards. No less obviously would it destroy the freedom of Connecticut to allow the British Parliament to take the money of its citizens for public purposes.

This lucid theory simply gave expression to the principles of personal and local independence, for which Englishmen have in all ages contended. It was impossible to deny its validity without undermining the whole structure of English liberties. There was nothing in it which implied hostility to the mother country or disloyalty to the king; and if George III. had been willing to listen to such wise statesmen as Pitt and Fox and Burke, no seeds of political revolution need ever have taken root in the soil of such a doctrine. But George III., like all perverse and obstinate rulers, had an instinctive dislike for men of large and flexible mind and independent character. Not great political thinkers like Pitt and Fox (PLATE VI.) and Burke, but narrow-minded schemers or subservient tools like Bute and Townshend and North, were the advisers

PLATE VI.



Charles James Fox.

From an engraving by H. Robinson, after a painting by Opie. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.



to whom he preferred to listen. The doctrine that taxes are voluntary contributions from the people to the government was one which he would no doubt have been glad to overthrow in England itself, if he had been able; he was at least determined that it should not be acknowledged in the case of the colonies. But the loyalty of the American colonists toward their king was loyalty of the English sort, and would not bear too great a strain. As long as English kings respect the liberties of the people, the people profess to a great fondness for them; and since the revolution of 1688, when the claws of the royal lion were pared and his teeth drawn, the English people have manifested profound loyalty toward the crown, which represents, in a symbolic way, their continuous national existence. Yet during the five centuries ending in 1688 the people of England had risen in rebellion against John and against Henry III., had deposed and put to death Edward II., Richard II., and Charles I., and had driven James II. into exile—so little did their loyalty count, after all, when it came into collision with their sense of personal independence. So the loyalty of the American colonists at once gave way when it became apparent that the king was inexorably bent upon carrying his point. Some began boldly to inquire what title the king had, after all, to supremacy over this country, since our forefathers came over here in great measure because the crown could not or would not afford them sufficient protection in England, and since they came in pursuance of their own ends and not in furtherance of any intentions of the crown? Finally, when the Americans actually came to break with the king, they accused him of entering into a conspiracy to deprive them of their liberties. “He has combined,” says the Declaration of Independence, “he has combined with *others* to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions and unacknowledged by our law; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation for imposing taxes upon us without our consent.” The “*others*” with whom the king is thus said to have “combined” were of course the British Parliament, the existence of which, as a legally constituted body possessing authority over them, the Americans thus refused even by implication to recognize. In rigorous consistency with their theory that the crown was the only power in England to which they had ever owed allegiance, the Declaration of Independence lays all the grievances of the colonists to the charge of the king. It nowhere alludes directly to the Parliament, but by means of such indirect allusions as the one just cited it contrives very neatly to point to the Parliamentary majority as to an irresponsible pack of conspirators

engaged in a nefarious plot against the liberties of a portion of the king's subjects. By wickedly conniving at this plot the king had forfeited his claim to the allegiance of this portion of his subjects, and they now proceeded to depose him, so far as America was concerned, on grounds quite similar to those on which in the preceding century the English had deposed James II. Nothing could well be more ingenious or plausible, and from the American point of view nothing could be more unanswerably convincing.



FIG. 64. Thomas Jefferson. (From a lithograph by De la Motte, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

But while we admire the legal and dialectical skill with which Jefferson, speaking for the colonists, laid all the burden of their grievances upon the crown, we must not forget that after all it was the Parliamentary majority rather than the king that was the actively guilty party. Except for these "others," with whom the king "combined," his own tyrannical disposition would have been harmless enough. The King of England has not since the thirteenth century possessed the right of levying direct

taxes upon the meanest of his subjects, and it was not George III, who imposed upon the colonies the Stamp Act and the tea-tax. If the Parliamentary majorities had gone with Chatham or Burke, the king might have stormed as much as he liked—he could have effected nothing. In point of fact the Parliament did claim the right of legislating for the colonies, though there were grave differences of opinion as to how far it was considerate or expedient to assert this right. In point of fact, moreover, Parliament actually had, at various times, passed laws affecting the commerce of the colonies; and these laws had not been actively



FIG. 65.—The Botching Tailor, George III., trimming the empire into pieces. (From a scratched letter-proof of a rare mezzotint by John Simpson. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

resisted, for reasons which we shall presently discover, but partly, no doubt, because they had never been very actively enforced. Moreover, although under the Stuarts the claims of Parliament to legislate for the colonies were not admitted by the crown, yet after the revolution of 1688 the case was different. The Stuarts had pretended to occupy the throne by divine right; the houses of Orange and Hanover confessedly occupied it by act of Parliament. And as no stream can rise higher than its source, it would have been ridiculous for William III, or any of the Georges to have laid claim in any part of the empire to

an authority independent of Parliament. They did not lay any such claim ; and accordingly, after 1688, the doctrine that the king in council was the sole director of colonial affairs was quite exploded. From the British point of view, colonial affairs, like all others, were henceforth under the direction of Parliament ; and this supreme authority of Parliament was never questioned either by people or by crown.

In this way there arose a complete antagonism between British and American opinion as to the constitutional relations between the colonies and the mother country. With such divergent views, and with such an independent and intractable spirit on both sides, there was sure to be an outbreak as soon as any fundamental question of sovereignty, such as the question of taxation, was put to a practical test. Through the reluctance of the English temperament to push such delicate questions to an irrevocable issue, and through many incidental favoring circumstances, the outbreak was deferred for a long time. It was deferred until the colonies had grown so strong that the task of coercing them was really hopeless. But this immense growth of the colonies itself introduced a new complication into the case, for it was a fact of a kind which the original European theory of colonization had not contemplated, and to which it was not prepared to adjust itself. It was a fact which profoundly affected the whole question of the relations between the colonies and the mother country, and it was owing to their utter failure to appreciate its importance that the king and his majority in Parliament persisted with such fatuity in their attempt to force their own constitutional theory upon the Americans.

According to the theory of colonization in vogue from the time of the discovery of America down to the general overthrow of the European colonial system which marks the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, a colony was a community which existed for the purpose of enriching the country which had founded it. Interpreted in accordance with the barbaric notions of political economy which prevailed until the time of Adam Smith, this doctrine was fruitful in many curious results. At the outset, indeed, the Spanish notion of a colony was that of a military station, which might plunder the heathen for the benefit of the hungry treasury of the Most Catholic monarch. But this theory was short-lived, like the enjoyment of the plunder which it succeeded in extorting. According to the principles and practice of European powers the great object in founding a colony, besides increasing one's general importance in the world and the area of one's dominions on the map, was to create a small community for the pur-

pose of trading with it. And the great purpose in trading was to get gold and silver, for national wealth was supposed to consist solely in the possession of these precious metals. It was not understood that the exchange value or purchasing power of these metals must diminish with their relative abundance, as is the case with any other commodity; and it was accordingly supposed that the more gold and silver any nation could get and keep, the richer it must be, irrespective of all other considerations. The trade between the European nations and their colonies was arranged, as far as possible, by dint of countless legislative devices, in accordance with this grotesque theory. On these principles the American colonies must buy more from England than they sell to it, so that after squaring up the accounts the cash balance may always be received by England. To attain this object more completely, and to prevent any other country from sharing in these benefits, the colonies were required to confine their trade entirely to England. No American colony could send its tobacco or its cotton or its iron to France or to Holland or to any other country than England; nor could it buy a yard of French silk or a pound of Chinese tea except from English merchants. Thus the English merchants secured for themselves a double monopoly, a monopoly of purchases and a monopoly of sales. By a further provision, although American ships might bring goods to England, the carrying-trade between the different colonies was strictly confined to British ships; though, in point of fact, so little attention was paid to this restriction that the carrying-trade between the different colonies was almost monopolized by vessels owned, built, and manned in New England. Next, in order to protect British manufacturers, it was thought necessary to prohibit the colonists from manufacturing. They might grow wool, but it must be carried to England to be woven into cloth; they might smelt iron, but it must be carried to England to be made into ploughshares. Finally, in order to protect British agricultural interests, corn-laws were enacted, putting a prohibitory tariff on all



FIG. 66. Gen. George Washington.  
(From an unlettered proof of engraving by H. B. Hall, after a painting by James Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

kinds of grain and other farm produce shipped from the colonies to ports in Great Britain.

Regulations of this sort were of course very tyrannical as well as very absurd, but it was a long time before the colonists felt them to be so. In point of fact they were neither more absurd nor more tyrannical than the tariff legislation which we have gone on since 1861 enforeing upon ourselves. One might suppose that the colonists, who were so sensitive about their liberties, would have resented the imposition of such commercial restrictions quite as promptly and energetically



FIG. 67. Thomas Paine. (From a mezzotint by James Watson, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

as they resented the imposition of a direct tax. But there was really a marked difference between the two cases. The dulness of the human imagination is such that ten dollars extorted from a man through legislative interference with the natural course of trade, or through a debasement of the circulating medium, does not begin to affect his mind so much as one dollar extorted by a direct legislative demand for it. There is no subject, moreover, on which correct and enlightened ideas are so slow in penetrating the masses of people as political economy. This is partly because the phenomena of produc-


tion and trade, though familiar in some small degree to everyone, are seldom comprehended on a truly great scale, and when so comprehended they are found to be really complicated. And it is partly because almost every man has a selfish interest in some particular monopoly, the maintenance of which is not compatible with the highest degree of public prosperity, and his interest in this particular monopoly will warp his judgment on every economical question that may come up. Even the axioms of geometry would be disputed, said Hobbes, if men's pecuniary interests were affected by them. For these reasons men's ideas on questions of commerce and finance are very apt to be in a hopelessly complicated muddle; and there are, perhaps, no other subjects about which so much nonsense is talked, in which so many transparent fallacies can acquire such sudden prevalence, or in which barbaric prejudices inherited from a predatory state of society survive from age to age with such obstinate vitality. Horace Greeley's argument that the burning of Chicago in 1871 was a "blessing in disguise," because it made work for so many poor people, may serve as an example of the dire confusion of ideas which still prevails. If we read over the idiotic speeches that were made by the inflationists in the American Congress in 1874, or by the "silver men" in 1877, or if we contemplate the marvellous patchwork of tariff legislation under which American industries have suffered since 1861, we need not wonder that two hundred years ago the British government should have thought it right and expedient to impose the Navigation Act upon its colonies, or that the colonists should have failed to perceive anything wrong in principle in the commercial restrictions which it contained. Indeed, this British policy was far less wrong in principle than that by which our American protectionists in the year 1900 undertook to damage and irritate the good people of Porto Rico; and there was far more excuse for it than in these latter days. For a century ago the theory of personal freedom was—among Englishmen at least—very far advanced; but the theory of commercial freedom had scarcely begun to dawn in men's minds anywhere.

There was still another reason why the colonists did not resent the commercial legislation of Parliament, as they afterward resented its attempts to tax them. We have seen that the colonists always admitted in theory the authority of the king; and down to the revolution of 1688 the regulation of commerce had always been one of the royal prerogatives. In the time of the Great Rebellion the Parliament had seized upon this along with other royal prerogatives; and in 1688 it

became an established principle that the regulation of commerce should be henceforth in the hands of Parliament. The colonists would appear to have witnessed this change without any great concern, and probably they troubled themselves very little about it. It mattered little to them how king and Parliament composed their differences, so long as colonial interests were not conspicuously affected. The right to make rules of trade for the whole empire simply passed from one British source of authority to another. It was a very different thing when Parliament claimed the right to impose direct taxes on the colonies; for this was not invading the rights of the crown, it was invading the rights of the colonial legislatures. It did not involve the mere transfer of power from one British source of authority to another; it involved the transfer of power from the colonies to the home government—from America to England. By attentively considering this fundamental difference between the legal aspect of the two cases, I think we shall thoroughly comprehend why it was that the colonists allowed Parliament to pass twenty-nine acts in regulation of their commerce, but instantly rose with unanimous and indignant protest at the passage of the Stamp Act. The one kind of legislation they might regard as oppressive, but they were not quite prepared to stigmatize it as illegal—and so they submitted. The other kind they regarded as not only oppressive, but unquestionably illegal—and so they rebelled. Their behavior was that of a people no less regardful of established legal precedent than determined in the assertion of their liberties; and the contrast finely illustrates the combination of intractable independence with patient decorum which was such a marked feature of the countrymen of Patrick Henry (PLATE VII.) and Samuel Adams.

But while the attitude which the Americans assumed on these great constitutional questions is thus perfectly clear, consistent, and intelligible, we cannot be surprised at the incapacity of the British government to comprehend their attitude. As we have seen, the right to regulate the affairs of the colonies had been seized, along with other royal prerogatives, by the Parliament on the occasion of the expulsion of the house of Stuart; this right had been exercised in various acts restrictive of colonial commerce without any constitutional protest on the part of the Americans; and why should it not continue to be exercised in other acts for the raising of revenue, especially if such acts (like the Stamp Act, for example) were not necessarily oppressive in character, and were intended to operate for the advantage of the whole empire in discharging a war debt which had been incurred for the common benefit of both

PLATE VII.

A cursive signature of the name "Patrick Henry" with a long horizontal line underneath it.

Patrick Henry.

From an engraving by Jackman. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq.,  
Philadelphia.



British and Americans? This reasoning seemed perfectly sound to the average member of Parliament in the fifth year of George III., and one sometimes hears it urged in England even at the present day. It was not, however, considered valid by Pitt, or by the other great statesmen who belonged to the Parliamentary minority at the time when the taxation of the colonies came up for discussion. For, plausible as it may have appeared as a legal argument, its plausibility, after all, rested only upon that old European theory of the nature and purposes of a colony which the enormous increase of the English in America had rendered quite antiquated, which present statesmen like Pitt fully perceived to be antiquated, but which George III. and the Squire Westerns who made up his Parliamentary majority still clung to as firmly as to the Gospel. As long as a colony was held to be merely a commercial station created by the mother country for commercial purposes, it might have seemed well enough that its affairs should be subject to minute Parliamentary supervision, and it might hardly have been thought worth while to grant it a separate representation, though men like Winthrop and Penn, and the other leaders of American colonization, never took so low a view of their work as this. In fact, the ample political privileges which had been conceded to the colonists at the outset were hardly compatible with this narrow view. But, however this might be, the prodigious growth of the American colonies had now rendered the application of the old colonial theory quite preposterous. The thirteen colonies in the year 1770 could in no wise be regarded as so many trading-stations. They had become a great continuous segment of the English nation, including a population of three millions, or more than one-fourth of the whole English race, for the population of Great Britain at that time did not exceed nine millions. This surprising development of the colonies essentially modified the legal aspects of the case, and gave to the Stamp Act the appearance of an attempt to disfranchise three millions of English subjects in a body. Commenting on James Otis's position that "taxation without representation is tyranny," the Tories in Parliament observed that to concede it would be to admit the necessity of Parliamentary reform, since many large and important boroughs in England were unrepresented, but were not therefore considered exempt from taxation. This was very true, and its implications with our case were manifold and profound, as will shortly be pointed out. But the Tories who urged this argument misconceived the dimensions of the problem. The Americans, they said, even if they paid their tax, were no worse off than the people of Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield, or Manchester—large towns of

modern growth which had not yet seened a representation in Parliament. These friends of the king would have shown a much more just appreciation of the case if they had asked themselves what would be likely to happen, and what ought to happen, if Parliament were to shut the doors upon its Scotch members, and then proceed to pass a Stamp Act for Scotland.

The contest over the right of Great Britain to tax the colonies began at a most auspicious moment for American independence. From a wide point of view, it may be said that the history of the United States as a nation begins with the triumph of Wolfe on the Heights of Abraham. In 1755 John Adams, then teacher of a village school at Worcester, predicted that "if we can remove these turbulent Gallies," our people will in another century outnumber the British, and all Europe will not be able to subdue us. In two ways the American Revolution was a direct and immediate consequence of the French war. In the first place, the total overthrow of the French removed the formidable enemy which for nearly a century had so severely annoyed the northern colonies, and which had lately begun to threaten the south also. With the removal of this aggressive enemy, which had openly avowed its intention of keeping them forever cooped up between the Atlantic and the Alleghenies, the English colonies had now no foes or rivals east of the Mississippi. And after the collapse of Pontiac's schemes in 1763 the power of the Indians also was felt to be broken. In the event of a conflict with England the colonies had now no cause to dread an attack in the rear. Nay more, so far as the French were concerned, they might now, in such an event, be counted on for sympathy rather than opposition. For in revenge for the terrible humiliation they had just suffered, it was clear that the French would enjoy nothing so much as seeing England also stripped of her colonial empire in the New World. Indeed, even while he signed his name to the treaty of Paris, Choiseul exclaimed that it would be England's turn next. So that in entering upon their great struggle the Americans could now reasonably hope for the sympathy, and, as the event proved, even for the active and valuable aid, of the French government.

In the second place, it was the French war which directly originated the quarrels that led to the revolt of the colonies. The French war had been incurred in the interests of the colonies as much as in the interests of England; it had saddled the British government with an enormous debt; and it was thought to be no more than fair that the Americans, who had reaped such advantages from the war, should contribute their

quota toward the payment of the debt. People in England, whose relatives had died on the Monongahela and the St. Lawrence, and who were now burdened with taxes on account of this American war, no doubt thought it ineffably mean in the Americans to be so obstinately unwilling to put a threepenny stamp on their legal and commercial papers in order to help defray the war debt. Not so, however, thought the wisest English statesmen, who understood the nature of the constitutional admission involved in the use of the stamp. If the colonial legislatures had been asked to contribute voluntarily to the defrayment of the war debt, they would have cheerfully consented, as indeed they took pains to declare in 1764. As in Hampden's case, it was not the money, but the principle, that they cared for. Nevertheless, as we shall presently see, there was a grave practical difficulty which made the case much less simple and obvious than it seemed to the Americans.

In this brief survey of the relations between the colonies and the imperial government which terminated with the Revolution, I have sought to exhibit in a clear light the very considerable share of independence which the colonies possessed from the very outset. It may be said with truth that the war for independence was undertaken not so much for the acquisition of new liberties as for the protection and maintenance of old ones. With regard to its liberties the English has been the most grandly conservative race in the world. Its political petitions and its bills of rights have been the declaration of principles of self-government hoary with honorable antiquity. Its Magna Charta refers us back to the liberties of Edward the Confessor, and the liberties of Edward but carry us back to the assemblies of freemen described by Tacitus. English self-government dates from prehistoric times; but what other peoples have in the turmoil of ages partially surrendered, the English, by unremitting vigilance, have kept unimpaired, while continually surrounding it with fresh guarantees of permanence. Whatever power, be it that of lord or bishop or king, has sought to infringe upon this liberty of the people, has swiftly paid the penalty of its rashness in disastrous ruin. The American war of independence belonged to the same series of struggles with the Barons' war of the thirteenth century and the Great Rebellion of the seventeenth. It was the struggle of a portion of the English people in defence of a great constitutional principle, and its victorious issue was a victory of English political ideas. It was in no sense of the words a struggle between one people and another, as the Seven Years' War had been a struggle between the France of the Old Régime and England—two nations representing totally different theories

as to how the work of life ought to be conducted. It was a war, indeed, in which, under somewhat different circumstances, the end might have been attained and the colonists have carried their point without the necessity of a political separation from the mother country.

The question has sometimes been asked, What would have been the probable effect upon the material development of the United States if the ties of political union with England had not been severed, as might easily have been the case had Lord Chatham been prime minister in 1770 or in 1774, with a strong majority in the House of Commons? It used to be suggested that in that case we should have become but a second-rate sort of nation, such as we were formerly accustomed to con-



FIG. 68.—Samuel Chase. (From an engraving by Forrest, after a painting by Jarvis.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

sider Canada. It should not be forgotten, however, that the differences between Canada and the United States were far more strongly marked a century ago than they are to-day; and that, even had Canada joined us in our successful war of independence, these differences, which date from the times of Champlain and Winthrop, could hardly as yet have been quite obliterated. It should also be remembered that the growth of the American colonies before the establishment of independence was quite as rapid as the growth of the United States has been since that event. And it is difficult to see what circumstances consistent with the preservation of peace and political freedom could have availed seriously

to check our rate of growth, whether our vague connection with England had been retained or not.

However this might have been, it is easy to point to at least one political advantage, of quite incalculable importance, which grew out of our separation from England. The difficult problem of framing a federal union would no doubt have had its solution much longer postponed had it not been for the war of independence, which made some



FIG. 69.—Charles Carroll, of Carrollton. (From a lithograph by Childs & Imman, after a painting by Sully. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

kind of confederation an immediate necessity. The solution of the problem, moreover, would have been needlessly complicated and encumbered by an attempt to include in the scheme our peculiar relations to a British sovereign and a British Parliament. The experiment of federalism was one which it was in every way desirable that the American people should try for themselves, in accordance with the peculiar circumstances of their civilization, and without the least possibility of

outside interference. The experiment of federalism, if we may so term it, as thus far illustrated in the history of the United States, is one of the most interesting phenomena in the whole history of mankind; for it is an experiment whose results shall determine whether it is practicable for fifty or sixty powerful states to exist side by side without custom-houses or standing armies or frontier fortresses, settling all their differences by law and not by wager of battle. It is an experiment which on a very small scale Switzerland long ago succeeded in solving in spite of profound differences of language, race, and creed. The problem could hardly be approached for the first time on a great scale, as in America, save by groups of people speaking the same language and inheriting similar social and political traditions. Among the great countries of Europe, moreover, it was only England that could send forth groups of people politically capable of dealing with such a problem. Obviously the experiment of federalism could never be tried successfully except by a people of long political experience, and among whom the principle of local self-government had remained intact.

Such considerations lend thrilling interest to the remarkable series of events which resulted in the acquisition of the North American continent by men of English race. A crowd of new suggestions come up, throwing light upon America's place in history. We may begin to regard the settlement of this great country by Englishmen as equivalent to the planting of some of the noblest and most beneficent of political ideas on a fruitful soil so vast in area that their powerful influence shall grow until it sways the actions of men in all parts of the earth. To have established the federal system over one great continent is to have made a fair beginning toward establishing it over the world; and whatever may be the case with peoples less advanced politically, perhaps it may not be too much to look forward to a time when all communities of English race and speech may be united in a bond which allows perfect local freedom to each community, but shall require all questions of international concern to be adjusted peaceably in accordance with general principles respected by all alike.

The most sanguine philosopher of our day, however, cannot suppose that such a grand result will be realized until after a weary amount of blundering. For, to make stupid mistakes and go on repeating them with marvellous patience is one of man's high prerogatives. Let us take a brief survey of the mistakes of temper and judgment which brought about the American Revolution. In the current notions concerning the immediate causes of that memorable event there is too

much vague generalization, with an inadequate grasp of the situation in its definite and concrete details. Let us see if it is not possible to make a statement which shall be at once historically true, and fair to all parties concerned.

First, we must note the fundamental fact out of which the American Revolution took its rise. A revolution need not necessarily have arisen from such a fact, but it did. The fundamental fact was the need for a



FIG. 70.—John Dickinson. (From an unlettered mezzotint, after the original painting in Independence Hall, Philadelphia. (Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

continental revenue, whereas no such thing existed as a continental government with taxing power. This need was vividly brought out by our long war with France. At the time of the treaty with Paris, in 1763, the need for a permanent continental government with taxing power had long been forcibly shown, though people were everywhere obstinately unwilling to admit the fact. For seventy-four years the colonies had been in a condition varying from armed truce to open warfare with France. The struggle began in 1689, when the Dutch stadholder

became King of Great Britain, when Andros was overthrown at Boston, and Leisler seized the government of New York, and Frontenae was sent over to Canada with vast designs. Occasionally this struggle came to a pause, but it was never really ended till in 1763 France lost every rood of land she had ever possessed in North America, except the tiny islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland. At first it was only the New England colonies and New York that were directly concerned in this struggle, and in Leisler's congress of 1690 no colony south of Maryland was represented. But by the time Robert Dinwiddie ruled in Virginia all the colonies came to be involved, and the war in its latest stage assumed continental dimensions. Regular troops from Great Britain assisted the colonies and were supported by the imperial exchequer. The colonies contributed men and money to the cause, as it was right they should; and here the need for a continental taxing power soon made itself disastrously felt. The drift of events had brought the thirteen colonies into the presence of what we may call a continental state of things, but nowhere was there any single hand that could take a continental grasp of the situation. There were usually twelve separate governors to ask for money, and thirteen distinct legislatures to grant it.<sup>1</sup> Under these circumstances one of the least troublesome facts was that colonies remote from the seat of danger for the moment did not contribute their fair share. Usually the case was worse than this. It often happened that the legislature of a colony immediately threatened with invasion would refuse to make its grant unless it could wring some concession from the governor in return. Thus, in Pennsylvania there was the burning question as to taxing the proprietary lands; and more than once, while firebrand and tomahawk were busy on the frontier, did the legislature sit quietly at Philadelphia, seeking to use the public distress as a tool with which to force the governor into submission. It is an old story how it proved impossible to get horses for the expedition against Fort Duquesne until Benjamin Franklin sent around to the farmers and pledged his personal credit for them. Sometimes the case was still worse, as in 1761, when Pontiac's confederates were wreaking such havoc in the Alleghanies, and Connecticut did not feel sufficient interest in the woes of Pennsylvanians to send them assistance. Such lamentable want of co-operation and promptness often gave advantages to the enemy such as neutralized their immense and permanent disadvantage of fighting on exterior lines.

The royal governors all understood these things and felt them keenly,

<sup>1</sup> Usually Delaware and Pennsylvania had the same governor.

As a rule, they were honorable men with a strong sense of responsibility for the welfare of their provinces. Influenced by this feeling, they were apt to claim powers which the people quite properly refused to grant; in times of warfare such claims are very likely to be made. The royal governors feared lest the people, while such zealous sticklers for liberty, should be beaten in war and have no liberty left to defend. They saw clearly that, to bring out the military resources of the country, some kind of continental government with taxing power was needed.

The idea of any such continental government was regarded by the people with fear and loathing. The citizen of Massachusetts or Virginia in those days regarded himself as a Massachusetts man or a Virginian, and also as an Englishman, but he was not accustomed to think of himself as an American. The sentiment of union between colonies had not come into existence, the feeling of local independence was intense and jealous, and a continental government was an unknown and untried horror. So late as 1788, when grim necessity had driven the people of the United States to adopt our present Constitution as the alternative to anarchy, it was with shivering dread that most of them accepted the situation. Yet this was after the thirteen colonies had stood shoulder to shoulder in an arduous war in which they had won their independence. A quarter of a century earlier, the repugnance felt toward an American union was much stronger.

It should never for one moment be lost sight of that the difficulty with which the royal governors had to contend in the days of the French war was exactly the same difficulty with which the Continental Congress had to contend throughout the war of independence and the critical period that followed it. We cannot understand American history until this fact has become part of our permanent mental structure. The difficulty was exactly the same; it was the absence of a continental government with taxing power. The Continental Congress had no such power; it could only ask the state legislatures for money, just as the royal governors had done; and if it took a state three years to raise what was sorely needed within three months, there was no help for it. Hence the slowness and feebleness with which the war of independence was conducted. When the Congress asked for an army of 90,000 men for the year 1777, the demand was moderate and could have been met without a greater strain than was cheerfully borne during our civil war; but the army furnished in response never reached the figure of 30,000, and the following year it made even a poorer show. Our statesmen were then learning by hard experience

exactly what the royal governors had learned before: that work of continental dimensions required a continental government to conduct it, and that no government is worthy of the name unless it can raise money by taxation. After the peace of 1783, our statesmen were soon taught by abundant and ugly symptoms that in the absence of such a government the states were in imminent danger of falling apart and coming to blows with each other, like the Italian states in the Middle Ages. It was only this greater dread that drove our people to do most reluctantly in 1788 what they had scornfully refused to do in 1754,



FIG. 71. Col. Isaac Barré. From an engraving by Cadell, after a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. (Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

and consent to the establishment of a continental government with taxing power. Let us not forget, then, that from first to last the difficulty was one and the same.

If we had surmounted that difficulty in 1754, the separation from Great Britain might perhaps not have occurred. In that year the prospect of an immediate renewal of war with France made it necessary to confer with the chiefs of the Six Nations, and we have seen how, in the congress that assembled at Albany, Benjamin Franklin proposed a plan which, had it been adopted, would probably have surmounted the difficulty. It would have created a federal government, with power of



PLATE VIII.



Thomas Jefferson.

From a drawing by Deprévalville, after a drawing by Desnoyers. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

taxation for federal purposes, with local rights fully guaranteed, and with a president or governor-general appointed by the crown. The royal governors of course approved the plan, while the people treated it with indignant contempt; the difficulty was acutely felt throughout the war, and then the British Parliament, in a perfectly friendly spirit, tried to mend matters.

Let me repeat that the spirit in which the British Parliament approached this question was at first entirely friendly. The necessity for a continental revenue continued, and always would continue. Scarcely had peace been made with France when Pontiac's terrible war broke out and furnished fresh illustrations of the perennial difficulty. Since the Americans would not create a continental taxing power for themselves, Parliament felt that it must undertake to supply the place of such a power. The failure of Franklin's plan of union seemed to force this work upon Parliament; certainly there was no other body that could raise money for the requisite continental purposes.

But when Parliament undertook such a step, it ventured upon an untried field. More than a century and a half of American history had elapsed, and no Parliament had ever raised money in America by direct taxation. As for the port duties which had been levied from time to time, the Americans had not actually resisted them, but had only evaded them whenever it was possible. As for Parliamentary legislation, in the very few instances in which it had been attempted—as for example, in the case of the Massachusetts Land Bank in 1740—the colonists had submitted with a very ill grace, as much as to say, "You had better not try it again!" According to the theory prevalent in the colonies and soon to be stated in print by Thomas Jefferson (PLATE VIII.), they owed allegiance to the king, but not to Parliament. The relation was like that of Scotland to England in the seventeenth century, or that of Hanover to Great Britain in the eighteenth, or that of Norway to Sweden in the nineteenth, with one and the same king, but separate and independent legislatures. On this theory the Americans had practically lived most of the time. But, as we have already seen, this was a point which the British statesmen and the British people of that day did not comprehend. In their minds Parliament was the supreme body at home; even the king wore his crown by act of Parliament, as the revolution of 1688 had unmistakably proved; in the empire at large there must be supreme authority somewhere, and as it clearly was not in the king, it must be in Parliament. It was further believed that any relaxation of Parliamentary authority would entail the probable disrup-

tion of the empire, involving the loss of the colonies and perhaps their seizure by France or Spain.

This vague dread of the disastrous consequences that might ensue upon the failure to assert the authority of Parliament was one of the principal rocks upon which the English empire split. The dread was felt by some of the wisest British statesmen, as well as by many patriotic and high-minded Tories in America, of whom Thomas Hutchinson may be cited as the most eminent. In the absence of actual experience it was impossible for any of them to realize the noble spectacle which Great Britain and her colonies were to present a century later. Taught by her melancholy experience in America, Great Britain has since consistently acted upon the theory maintained by Jefferson and Samuel Adams. The relations of the states of Canada and Australasia toward the mother country have been practically the same that were sustained by the thirteen American colonies before the time of the Stamp Act ; and the relations of the Dominion of Canada and the Federation of Australasia are like those which would have been sustained by the American Union toward Great Britain if Franklin's plan had been adopted. Canada and Australia have their independent legislatures with full powers of self-government and are in no real sense subject to Great Britain, but they stand on a practical basis of equality, the bond of connection being little more than the symbolic allegiance to the British crown. It is true that the governors-general or nominal supreme executives are appointed by the crown ; but since these colonies all have the cabinet form of government in which the prime ministers, or actual supreme executives, hold office on condition of keeping a majority in the legislatures, their virtual independence is assured. In one very important respect the Canadian and Australasian states are far more independent of Great Britain than the American colonies ever were ; for the mother country not only makes no attempt to regulate their trade by port duties, but she allows them unlimited liberty of making their own tariffs, even to the extent of blandly smiling when their dull protectionists enact tariff laws discriminating against her, for the ancient dame well knows that if they can stand that sort of thing, she can. To any statesman of the eighteenth century such legislative independence on the part of colonies would have seemed equivalent to the breaking-up of the empire. Yet the attempt to enforce legislative dependence in America did at that time break the empire in twain ; while on the other hand, at the present day no sooner does the mother country become involved in a war in Africa, than thousands of Canadians and Australians turn out unsolicited and

g forth as volunteers to risk their lives in her service. A more eloquent commentary upon the soundness of the American position as represented by Jefferson and Adams could not be desired.

After all the foregoing explanation I think we shall have no difficulty in understanding the fact that when George Grenville (Fig. 72) became prime minister, just as Pontiac's war was breaking out, he saw no harm in raising an American revenue for continental purposes by act of Parliament. Just what Grenville's theory of the matter may have been is of no consequence. Grenville cared not a penny for theories of govern-



FIG. 72.—George Grenville. (From a mezzotint by Watson, after a painting by Hare.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

ment; he was a man of business and liked to have things done promptly and in a shipshape manner. He was perfectly willing to have the Americans raise the revenue themselves; only if they would not do it, he would; there must be no more shillyshallying. The business must be managed as pleasantly for the Americans as possible; for Grenville was every inch a gentleman, amiable and urbane. What would be the least annoying kind of tax for his purpose? Doubtless, a stamp tax. William Shirley, the very popular royal governor of Massachusetts, had said so ten years before, and there seemed to be reason in it. A stamp

tax involves no awkward questions about personal property and incomes, puts no premium upon lying, and entails as little expense as possible in its collection. Moreover, it cannot be evaded, and the proceeds all go into the public treasury without leakage on the way. These are all excellent qualities in a system of taxation, and so Grenville thought. He got his Stamp Act ready; but, with commendable prudence and courtesy, he gave the Americans a year's notice in advance, so that, if they had anything better to suggest, it might be duly considered.

The Americans had no alternative to suggest except a system of requisitions, or, in other words, asking the thirteen separate legislatures to vote supplies. With that system they had floundered along for three-quarters of a century, and with it they were to flounder for a quarter of a century more, until their eyes should be opened. Grenville was tired of so much floundering, and so he brought in his Stamp Act, about which one of the most notable things is that Parliament passed it with scarcely a word of debate. As already observed, there was no unfriendly intent in the measure. It was not designed to take money from American pockets for British purposes. Every penny was to be used in America for the defence of the colonies. Some of the stamps were perhaps higher in price than they need have been, but, on the whole, there was little in the Stamp Act for the Americans to object to, except the poisonous principle upon which the whole thing was based. On that point Parliament was not sufficiently awake, though some demonstrations had already been made in America, and such men as Hutchinson had warned Grenville of the danger.

When it was known in America that the Stamp Act had become law, the resistance took two forms: there was mob violence and there was the sober appeal to reason. From the outset the law was nullified; people simply would not touch the stamps or have anything to do with them. Editors of newspapers derisively published their sheets decorated with a death's-head and cross-bones in the sacred corner allotted for the stamp. The law courts caused it to be understood that the absence of the stamp from deeds and contracts and other legal documents would be overlooked. The officers who had been appointed as agents for selling stamps were in many instances intimidated and forced to resign their office, or even to deliver up all the stamps at their disposal, that bonfires might be made of them. In Boston there was a disgraceful scene which calls for mention, if only to point a contrast which we shall have to make hereafter. Thomas Hutchinson, the foremost scholar of his time in America and the foremost writer except Franklin, was then Chief Justice

of Massachusetts. Some people believed him to have instigated the Stamp Act, which he had really opposed; others without due foundation suspected him of having informed against sundry citizens as smugglers. So one night in August, 1765, a drunken mob sacked his house, destroyed his furniture and pictures, and ruined the splendid library,




FIG. 73.—Facsimile of "Pennsylvania Journal." ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvii.)

property. It was an event in the history of crime, and belongs among such incidents as fill the Newgate Calendar. How did the people of Massachusetts treat this affair? Town meetings all over the province condemned it in the strongest terms, the leaders of the mob were thrown into prison, and the legislature promptly indemnified Hutchinson for his losses in so far as money could repair them. The story seems to show that Massachusetts had no fondness for riots and rioters.

Besides mob violence there was a sober appeal to reason, in which the American case was for the first time distinctly and fully stated. The principle of "No taxation without representation" was clearly set forth in Virginia by Patrick Henry, and in Massachusetts by Samuel Adams, and was incorporated in the resolutions adopted by the Congress at New York. This was the formal answer of the Americans to Parliament. When it reached that body it found George Grenville in opposition. Lord Rockingham had become prime minister, and a bill was brought in for the repeal of the Stamp Act. That measure had been passed almost without question, but its repeal was the occasion of a debate that lasted nearly all winter. For the first time the constitutional relations of the colonies to the imperial government were thoroughly discussed, and three distinct views found expression:

1. The Tories held that the Stamp Act was all right and ought to be enforced.
2. The New Whigs, represented by William Pitt, accepted the American doctrine of no taxation without representation, and urged that the Stamp Act should be repealed expressly, as founded upon an erroneous principle.
3. The Old Whigs, represented by Fox and Burke, refrained from committing themselves to such a doctrine, but nevertheless considered it bad statesmanship to insist upon a measure which public opinion in America unanimously condemned.

This third view prevailed, and the Stamp Act was repealed, while a declaratory resolve asserted the constitutional right of Parliament to legislate for the colonies in any way it might see fit. This reservation was, of course, intended to protect the unity of the empire.

The result was rightly regarded as a practical victory for the Americans; but it gave general satisfaction in England, for it seemed to remove a source of dispute that had most suddenly and unexpectedly loomed up in alarming proportions. The rejoicings in London were no less hearty than in New York. The affair had been creditably conducted. The dangerous question had been argued on broad statesman-

like grounds, and the undue claims of Parliament had been virtually relinquished, in spite of the declaratory resolve, about which the Americans did not fret themselves so long as it remained a mere general statement without any specific application. It is true, the difficulty in America, as to how that continental revenue was going to be raised, was left untouched; but friendly discussion might at length find some cure, and meanwhile the question might be allowed to drop until some more favorable moment.

A situation, however, was arising which would soon put an end to friendly discussion, and which would neither let the question drop nor deal with it fairly. It is a pity that great political questions could not




FIG. 74.—Old South Meeting-house, Boston, Mass.

more often be argued in an atmosphere of sweetness and light; their solution would exhibit a kind and degree of sense such as the world is not yet familiar with. Suppose that in 1860 we Americans North and South could have discussed the whole slavery question without passion; and suppose that all the slaves had been forthwith set free and their owners compensated at their full market value, with perhaps a little sweetening bonus additional; how trifling would have been the cost in dollars and cents, compared with the cost of the civil war, to say nothing of the saving of life! And then, in avoiding the war, we might probably have avoided its worst consequences—the wholesale surrender to protectionism, the wild inflation of the currency weakening the sense of commercial honor, the dangerous extravagance in pensions sapping

the sense of manly independence, the growth of the enfeebling methods of paternal government in numerous directions, the cancerous development of the spoils system—think what countless ills might have been avoided had our human nature been capable of discussing the negro question dispassionately. Of course the mere supposition seems grotesque, so great is the difference, in respect of foresight and self-control, between the human nature implied in it and that with which we are familiar. It is to be hoped that the slight modifications slowly wrought in mankind by civilized life will ultimately bring it to that stage of wisdom which now seems unattainable; but for many a weary year, no doubt, will still be seen the same old groping and stumbling, the same self-defeating selfishness.

In 1766 the questions connected with raising a continental revenue in America might have been carried along toward a peaceful settlement, had it been possible to keep them out of politics. But that was impossible. The discussion over the Stamp Act had dragged the American question into British politics, and there was one restless politician who soon came to stake his very political existence upon its solution. That politician was the young king, George III., who was entering upon his long reign with an arduous problem before his mind: how to break down cabinet government and Parliamentary supremacy and convert the British into a true monarchy, like France or Prussia. In order to carry out this purpose he relied chiefly upon a kind of corruption, in which the chief element was the fact that the representation in the House of Commons had got quite out of gear with the population of the country. During more than two centuries the change from the England of the Tudors had come about without any redistribution of seats in that representative chamber. Some districts had been developing new trades and industries, while others had simply been overgrown with ivy and moss, until there had arisen that state of things so often quoted and described, in which Old Sarum without a human inhabitant had two members of Parliament, while great cities like Birmingham and Manchester had none. There were not less than a hundred rotten boroughs which ought to have been disfranchised without a moment's delay. They were for the most part implements of corruption, either bought up or otherwise controlled by leading Whig or Tory families, or by the king.

For more than seventy years, ever since the expulsion of James II., this sort of corruption had been universally relied on in English polities, and people's minds had become callous under the infliction, very much

as the modern American mind sometimes appears torpid and acquiescent under its unclean regimen of Platts and Quays. During those seventy years the Tories had been for the most part discredited because of the Jacobite element in their party, and there was no more chance of seeing a Tory majority in the House of Commons than there was of seeing a Democratic President of the United States in the years just following the civil war. The Tories remained at the extreme point of disfavor during the reigns of George I. and George II., each of which had its Jacobite rebellion to suppress. The Old Whig families were then all-powerful in England, the first two Georges were simply their wards, and under the long and epoch-making administration of Sir Robert Walpole the modern system of cabinet government was set quite firmly upon its feet. Whenever it was needful for carrying any point in domestic or foreign policy, the great Whig leaders made free and avowed use of Parliamentary corruption, though Pitt always proudly abstained from such methods. Much of the time a decisive vote in the Commons was thrown by members from rotten boroughs, men who were simply owned, body and soul, for better or for worse, by the great Whig families.

When George III. came to the throne in 1760, a boy of twenty-two years, he had learned to regard this state of things with a feeling which may fairly be described as one of choking rage. It was not the corruption that disgusted him, but the subordination of the royal power. His aim in life, as defined from childhood, was to overthrow the Whig aristocracy and make himself a real monarch. There were two sets of circumstances which seemed to favor his ambition. In the first place, the disappearance of Jacobitism as an active political force brought the united Tory party to the support of the house of Hanover, so that there was at last a chance for the king to obtain a majority in Parliament. In the second place, the relations between the foremost political leaders happened to be such as to enable the king to frame a succession of short-lived and jarring ministries, thus temporarily bringing discredit upon cabinet government. Under such circumstances the young man was busily engaged in building up a party of personal adherents dependent upon himself as dispenser of patronage, when all at once the American question was thrown upon the stage in a way that greatly alarmed him.

For some years past there had been growing up in England a new party of Whigs, very different from the country squires who so long had ruled the land. They represented the trades and industries of modern imperial England; they entertained many democratic ideas, and

were disposed to be intolerant of ancient abuses. They saw that the body politic was poisoned by the rotten boroughs, and they knew that unless this sort of corruption could be stopped there was an end of English freedom. Accordingly in 1745 these New Whigs, under the lead of William Pitt, began the great agitation for Parliamentary reform which by 1782 seemed to have victory within sight, but was set back



FIG. 75.—Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia.

for half a century by the reactions of feeling attendant upon the French Revolution, and only achieved its first grand triumph with Earl Grey and Lord John Russell in 1832. When the Stamp Act was repealed in 1766, the question of Parliamentary reform had been before the public for twenty-one years, and it largely determined the character of the speeches and votes upon that memorable occasion.

The resolutions of Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams and the New York Congress asserted in the boldest language the principle of "No taxation without representation." That was one of the watchwords of the New Whigs, and hence Pitt, in urging the repeal of the Stamp Act, adopted the American position in full. None could deny that it was a fundamental and long-established principle of English liberty. It had been asserted by Simon de Montfort's Parliament in 1265; it had been expressly admitted by Edward I. in 1301; and since then it had never with success been directly impugned, though some kings had found ways of partially evading it, as for instance in the practice of benevolences which grew up during the Wars of the Roses and was with difficulty suppressed in the seventeenth century. No Englishman could stand up and deny the principle of "No taxation without representation" without incurring the risk of being promptly refuted. Nevertheless, the unreformed House of Commons had by slow stages arrived at a point where its very existence was a living denial of that principle. It was therefore impossible to separate the American case from the case of Parliamentary reform; the very language in which the argument for Massachusetts and Virginia was couched involved also the argument for Leeds and Birmingham. Hence in the Stamp Act debate the Old Whigs, who were opposed to Parliamentary reform, did not dare to adopt Pitt's position; that would have been suicidal. So they were obliged to urge the repeal of the Stamp Act simply upon grounds of general expediency.

The Old Whigs were opposed to reform because they felt that they needed the rotten boroughs in order to keep up their control of Parliament. The king was opposed to reform for much the same reason. His schemes were based upon the hope of beating the Old Whigs at their own game, and securing, by fair means or foul, enough rotten boroughs to control Parliament for his own purposes. In this policy he had for a time much success. The reform of Parliament, involving the abolition of the rotten boroughs, would be the death-blow to all such schemes. The king felt that it would be the ruin of all his political hopes; and this well-grounded fear possessed his half-crazy mind with all the overwhelming force of a morbid fixed idea. Hence his ferocious hatred of the elder Pitt, and hence the savage temper in which after 1766 he persisted in thrusting himself into American affairs. When once this desperate political gamester had entered the field, it was no longer possible for those affairs to be discussed reasonably or dealt with according to the merits of the case. In that atmosphere of doltsihness and greedy self-seeking there was no room for sweetness and light. In the king's mind

it all reduced itself to this : on the Stamp Act question the Americans had won a victory. That was not to be endured. Somehow or other a fight must be forced again on the question of taxation, and the Americans must be compelled to eat their words and surrender the principle in which they had intrenched themselves. This was the spirit in which the king took up the matter, and in it the original question as to raising a continental revenue for American purposes was quite lost sight of. There is nothing to show that the king cared a straw for the revenue. To snub and browbeat the Americans was all in all with him.

There was a certain kind of vulgar shrewdness in thus selecting the Americans as chief antagonists ; for, should their resistance tend to become rebellious, it would tend to array public opinion in England against them as disturbers of the peace, and would thus discredit the principle which they represented. Thus did this crowned mischief-maker, for whom a well-ventilated room in an asylum would have been a more suitable place than the throne, set himself to work to stir up ill-feeling between two great branches of the English race.

Thus after 1766 the story of the American Revolution enters upon a new stage. In the earlier or Grenville stage a great public question was discussed on grounds of statesmanship, and the British government, having tried an impracticable solution, promptly withdrew it. No war need come from such a situation. But in the second stage we see a desperate political schemer, to the neglect of public interests and in defiance of all sound statesmanship, pushing on a needless quarrel until it inevitably ends in war. This second stage we may call the Townshend-North stage.

It was a curious fortune that provided George III. (PLATE IX.) with two such advisers as Charles Townshend and Frederick North. Both were brilliant and frivolous young men, without much political principle ; both were inclined to take public life as an excellent joke. North lived long enough to find it no joke : Townshend stayed upon the scene till he had perpetrated one colossal piece of mischief, and then died, leaving North to take the consequences. I do not believe Lord North (Fig. 76) would ever have originated such a measure as the Revenue Act of 1767 : there was no malice in his nature, but in Townshend there was a strong vein of utterly reckless diablerie. Nobody could have been more willing to please the king by picking a quarrel with the Americans, and nobody knew better how to do it. Townshend was exceptionally well informed on American affairs, and sinned with his eyes wide open. In his case it will not do to repeat the commonplace phrases about the blundering

## PLATE IX.



George III. in his youth.

From a mezzotint by R. Purcell, after a painting by T. Frye. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.



of British ministers. It is quite right to say that Grenville blundered; but as for Townshend, his ingenuity was expressly devoted to brushing every American hair the wrong way.

In the debates on the repeal of the Stamp Act the Americans had been charged with inconsistency in having allowed Parliament to tax them by means of port duties, while they refused to allow it to tax them by means of stamped paper. In reply the friends of America had drawn a distinction between external and internal taxes, and had said that the



FIG. 76.—Lord North. (From a mezzotint by Burke, after a painting by N. Dance. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Americans did not deny Parliament's right to tax them in the former case, but only in the latter case. The distinction was more ingenious than sound, and I think it cannot be denied that the Americans had been guilty of inconsistency. They had for some years tacitly assented to port duties, because the nature of an indirect tax is not so quickly and distinctly realized as that of a direct tax, and thus they were longer in comprehending all that was implied in the situation. But the acquiescence in port duties had been by no means unqualified. During the whole reign of Charles II, the New England colonies had virtually

defied the custom-house, while in later times the activity of smugglers had risen to a point which reduced all tariff acts to a dead letter. So lately as 1761 the resistance to general search-warrants gave an earnest of what might be expected when any rash ministry should endeavor to enforce such tariff acts.

That year, 1761, had been made memorable in Boston by a scene in the court-room. Charles Paxton, the collector of the port, made application for "writs of assistance" wherewith to facilitate the detection of smuggled goods. The writ of assistance was a general search-warrant



A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "J. Otis".

FIG. 77.—James Otis. (From an unlettered proof by Jackman. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

in the form of a printed blank, which the collector was at liberty to fill out with the name of the person suspected and a description of the premises to be searched. It was felt that to arm the collector with such documents was to give him too much arbitrary power, and protests were uttered against Paxton's request. The case was argued before Chief Justice Hutchinson in the council chamber of the building now called the Old State House. On that occasion James Otis (Fig. 77), the most eloquent advocate at the Boston bar, argued that the issue of such writs was a violation of the whole spirit of the English constitution. The counsel

for the crown, Jeremiah Gridley, perhaps the most learned lawyer then living in America, replied that nevertheless such writs were allowed by a statute of Charles II., while a statute of William III. extended to the colonies all the rights and privileges which collectors possessed in England; and neither of these statutes had been repealed. The law of the case was thus pretty clear; but as weighty points of public policy were involved, Hutchinson withheld his decision until he could get advice from the attorney-general in England. In accordance with this advice, the writs were granted to Paxton in the course of the next term of court. There was something startling in the intensity of the feeling called forth by this affair. Upon many minds it began to dawn clearly that the fundamental question of the day was not so much how the law should be interpreted, as whether Americans were bound to obey laws which they had no voice in making. Many merchants felt that they were justified in resisting such laws, and consequently it happened more than once that warehouses were barricaded and the custom-house officers successfully defied. The attitude of the Americans was thus unmistakably shown, and no one understood it better than Townshend when he proceeded in 1767 to lay a duty upon certain dried fruits, glass, painters' colors, paper, and tea.

In order to understand this so-called Revenue Act, we must distinctly bear in mind that its primary purpose was something else than the raising of revenue. This is proved by the use which Townshend proposed to make of the money collected under the act. He intended, of course, to keep up a small army for defending the exposed western frontier, but this was only a small part of the story. We have already seen how for more than half a century the royal governors in various colonies had tried to persuade the legislatures to vote them fixed salaries; but the legislatures, unwilling to give the governors too loose a tether, had obstinately refused to do more than make an annual grant which expired unless renewed by a fresh grant. At the present day we have become more afraid of the mischief that can be done by legislators than of that which is likely to be done by governors; we have come to look upon the veto power as a safeguard against harmful legislation. But in those days it was different. In most of the colonies there was a jealous dread of the governor, and a disposition to curb him by making him feel his dependence upon the legislature for income. This was still one of the burning questions of American polities, and Townshend now proposed to settle it off-hand by ignoring the legislatures altogether. Henceforth the governors should be paid by the crown out of the revenues

collected in America ; and as if this were not enough, the judges should be paid in the same way. If after these expenses there should be any surplus remaining, it would be used for pensioning eminent American officials ; or in plain English, it would be used as a corruption fund. Thus did Townshend, a British chancellor of the exchequer, assert direct control over the internal administration of the American colonies, including even the courts of justice ; under these circumstances he undertook to maintain an army, which might be employed against the people as readily as against Indians ; and he actually had the impudence to demand of the Americans the money to support him in doing these things ! To all this, quoth Townshend, with a cynical twinkle in his eye, you Americans can't object, you know, for your friends say you are quite willing to submit to port duties.

There can be no doubt that this pretended Revenue Act was an outrageous piece of tyranny, and certainly no House of Commons which truly represented English opinion would ever have passed it. Townshend himself was far from sanguine about its passing, and it was only a wholesale and unblushing use of the rotten boroughs that carried it. Townshend's victory was an ugly symptom of the growing power of what we may call the royal machine. Through the aid of such men as Townshend, the king was getting to be almost as dangerous to liberty as an American boss of the present day. Probably Townshend looked forward to some rare sport when once the king and the Americans were set by the ears ; but he had no sooner carried his measures than sudden death removed him from the scene, and Lord North took his place.

Of course there never existed a self-respecting people that would not have resented and resisted such a measure as this of Townshend's. Yet there was but little disturbance of the peace in America. All the ordinary machinery of argument and petition was used to no purpose. In the following year, 1768, Massachusetts issued a circular letter inviting all the colonies to take some concerted action in resistance to the Revenue Act. The circular letter was sent to the king, accompanied with a petition. Both papers were drawn up by Samuel Adams, a member of a family which has long been eminent in American history. Samuel Adams (Fig. 78) was a thorough democrat, fully believing in government of the people, for the people, and by the people. To him self-government seemed the most indispensable thing in life. He has been well called "the man of the town meeting." He was one of the highest products of the old political life of New England—well educated, adroit, courageous, incorruptible, and eloquent. For skill in

drawing up state papers he has seldom been surpassed. He entertained no wish to see the colonies severed from Great Britain until the year 1768, when the cruel and insulting spirit of the Townshend Act convinced him that such a revolutionary step would be necessary. For the next eight years he devoted himself with the industry of a beaver and the tenacity of a bull-dog to bringing Massachusetts into an attitude of rebellion. Among all the American leaders he was emphatically "the irreconcileable," and he exerted so great an influence that he was long afterward commonly known as the "father of the Revolution."



FIG. 78.—Samuel Adams. From an engraving by Hall, after a painting by Copley  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

The only notice taken of the Massachusetts circular letter was an order in council directing the legislature to rescind it. The reply of the legislature was a vote refusing to rescind by a majority of 92 to 17. This refusal was greeted throughout the colonies with warm expressions of admiration, and one of Boston's skilled mechanics, Paul Revere, descendant of a noble family in Dauphiné, an artistic worker in metals, made a beautiful silver punch-bowl in honor of "The Illustrious Ninety-two."

It was high time for the British government to take warning; and very likely Lord North might have done so, but his easy good-nature left him too much under the influence of the implacable king. The effect of the circular letter which Massachusetts would not rescind was an agreement among the colonies to refrain from all commercial intercourse with Great Britain until the Revenue Act should be repealed.

This agreement was to some extent evaded by traders more intent upon private gain than public policy, but on the whole it was remarkably well kept until the war came. Doubtless it damaged and weakened the colonies more than it injured Great Britain, but it seemed the only kind of effective peaceful protest that could be made.

Smuggling, of course, went on more briskly than ever; and the seizure of one of John Hancock's ships for a false entry caused a riot in Boston in which one of the collector's boats was burned. Hancock (Fig. 79) was one of the richest merchants in Boston and a man of wide social influence, on account of which his adhesion to the popular cause



FIG. 79.—John Hancock. (From an engraving by J. B. Longacre, after a painting by Copley in 1765.)

was highly valued by Adams. Hancock and Adams are so closely associated in men's minds that the mention of one is sure to recall the other, but there was little resemblance between the two. Neither for grasp of intelligence nor for strength of will could Hancock for a moment be compared with his friend. His personal vanity was so great that a skillful appeal to it was almost capable of changing his policy; but so long as he followed the lead of Adams, he was of great service to the revolutionary party. The riot caused by the seizure of his ship led the king to the dangerous step of sending troops to Boston, and the sacking of Hutchinson's house three years before was quoted to silence those

members of Parliament who opposed this step. The troops stayed in Boston seventeen months, and all that time their mere presence there was in violation of an act of Parliament. According to British law, those soldiers were mere trespassers in Boston. Their only legal abode was the Castle, situated on a small island in the harbor. They were kept in town under pretext of preserving order, but really to aid in enforcing the Townshend Act. That after seventeen months a slight skirmish should have occurred, with a loss of half a dozen lives, was rather less than might have been expected. It was on the moonlit evening of March 5, 1770, that a crowd of citizens in King Street (now State Street) assailed with snowballs and abusive epithets a company of the Twenty-ninth regiment, when a sudden volley, probably fired without orders, slew seven of the crowd and wounded six more. Hutchinson, who was then acting as governor, was immediately called upon the scene, and further bloodshed was prevented by the prompt arrest of the offending soldiery. The next day a great town meeting was held at the Old South meeting-house, and a delegation led by Samuel Adams called upon Hutchinson and ordered him to remove all soldiers to the Castle. Hutchinson promptly obeyed, for he well knew that the law was on the side of the people. The soldiers were indicted for murder, and two were convicted of manslaughter, while all the rest were acquitted. The calm and honorable way in which the affair was handled by the courts is a sufficient comment upon the ludicrous notion that Boston was a disorderly town, requiring an armed soldiery to keep the peace.

Shortly after this affray in King Street, Lord North ventured upon two conciliatory measures. He proposed the repeal of all the duties in the Townshend Act; but the king insisted upon retaining at least one of them for the sake of the principle at issue, upon which he hoped at some convenient time to force another fight. Tea was selected for this purpose, because of its universal use; so the duty on tea was retained, contrary to Lord North's wishes, while all the other duties were repealed. The other conciliatory measure was the appointment of Hutchinson as royal governor of Massachusetts. In spite of his Tory polities, he had a large personal following. His abilities were of a very high order; and while his integrity was universally respected, his sweetness of temper and courtesy of manner were such as few could resist. Lord North believed that a native of Massachusetts endowed with such qualities would be less likely to irritate the people than a governor sent over from England; in this spirit the appointment was made and accepted.

For the next two years there was comparative quiet in Massachusetts, although there were lively discussions of principle between the governor and the assembly. But in various parts of the country there were instances of conflict with established authority which bore testimony to the prevailing unrest. In North Carolina, for example, a sturdy but somewhat lawless mountain population, kept in order by a kind of vigilance-committee system, were known as Regulators. In the course of the year 1771, provoked by sundry acts of extortion and arbitrary imprisonment, these Regulators rose in insurrection against the royal governor, William Tryon. The affair ended in a skirmish at the river Alumance, in which more than a hundred were killed and wounded. In Rhode Island the eight-gun schooner Gaspee made herself very obnoxious by the intemperate zeal with which she undertook to enforce the Revenue Act, until on a summer evening she happened to run aground, when she was almost instantly surrounded by a flotilla of boats, the crews of which overpowered her armament and burned her. Thereupon Rear Admiral Montagu, commanding the British fleet in American waters, offered a reward for the arrest of the offenders, that they might be taken over to England for trial. Then Stephen Hopkins, Chief Justice of Rhode Island, publicly announced that he would not recognize or enforce any such arrests within the limits of the colony.

The excitement over the Gaspee affair was soon submerged in the more furious excitement caused by an order in council directing that, in conformity with the Townshend Act, the salaries of judges should henceforth be paid by the crown. In Massachusetts the popular indignation reached a higher point than ever before, and the judges were threatened with impeachment should they dare to accept money from the royal exchequer. Samuel Adams made this an occasion for organizing revolution. The disputes between governor and assembly had come to end so often in the dissolution of the latter that some new method of ascertaining the popular will was desired. Now, throughout Massachusetts the local governments, which were the ultimate sources of all political power, were the town meetings. There were no municipal governments then in Massachusetts. The whole territory of the commonwealth was divided into townships analogous to English parishes, and each township governed itself through a primary assembly in which all the adult male inhabitants had the right to be present, to speak, and to vote. Now, at the suggestion of Samuel Adams, each town meeting appointed a standing committee to confer with similar committees from other towns. These "committees of correspondence"

could discuss questions of public policy as intelligently and could give as authoritative expression to the will of the people as any ordinary legislative assembly. They enabled the commonwealth to act independently of governor and legislature. Yet there was nothing about them that could possibly be stigmatized as illegal. Nobody could deny the right of a town to hold a town meeting, nor could anybody deny its right to seek the advice of other towns.



FIG. 80.—Joseph Warren. (From an unlettered proof in mezzotint by Webb. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

This idea was caught up and developed in a most fruitful manner by Virginia, where the youthful Dabney Carr, a friend of Jefferson, devised a plan for intercolonial committees of correspondence, whereby each colony might officially exchange views with its sister colonies. These committees were destined to play a leading part in the events which next succeeded.

We come now to an event the importance of which cannot easily be overestimated, since it turned out to be virtually the declaration of war which ended in the severance of the colonies from Great Britain. Yet the nature of this event has been grossly misunderstood by most writers on both sides of the Atlantic. I refer to the so-called "Boston Tea Party." It is customary to speak of this affair as a riot or sudden ebullition of unrestrained passion. In reality, it was nothing of the sort. We shall presently see that it was the deliberately reasoned act

of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, and was no more an act of popular temper than the act of settlement by which Parliament vested the succession of the English crown in the house of Hanover. In order to elucidate this point, let me cite two instances of mob violence which occurred in Boston at that period. The sacking of Hutchinson's house in 1765 and the chancery affray on King Street in 1770 were both cases of mob law, yet it is only very loose thinking that would attempt to liken the wanton destruction of a private house to the pardonable exhibition of ill temper at the insulting demeanor of soldiers whose mere presence in Boston was in flat violation of an act of Parliament. Our forefathers well knew the difference. The Hutchinson malefactors they cast into jail, but the memory of the King Street victims they kept green for many a year by an annual oration in the Old South meeting-house on the baleful effects of quartering soldiers among peaceful citizens in time of peace. In contrast with these two instances of mob law, we may now consider the Tea Party, which by no stretch of definition can properly be included among cases of mob law.

We have seen that in 1770 Lord North saw that the Revenue Act could not be enforced and was a mere source of needless irritation, and he proposed to repeal it. But a full repeal would put things back where they were after the repeal of the Stamp Act, and even worse, for it would be a second victory for the Americans. The king could not afford to put such a weapon into the hands of the New Whigs; and so, as we have seen, he prevailed upon Lord North to retain the duty on tea alone. In Parliament certain Whigs objected that the repeal of all the other duties would avail nothing to conciliate the Americans if the duty on tea were kept, since it was not revenue, but principle, that was at stake. Simple-hearted creatures! as if the king did not know all about that. He kept the duty on tea simply in order to bring on another fight on the question of principle. It was a question on which he was growing more and more fanatical, and nothing could prevail upon him to let it alone.

So for the next three years tea was the symbol with which the hostile spirits conjured. It stood for everything that true freemen loathed. In the deadly tea-chest lurked the complete surrender of self-government, the payment of governors and judges by the crown, the arbitrary suppression of legislatures, the denial of the principle that freemen can be taxed only by their own representatives. So long as they were threatened with tea, the colonists would not break the non-importation agreement of 1768. Once the merchants of New York undertook to order

from England various other articles than tea, and the news was greeted all over the country with such fury that nothing more of the sort was openly attempted. As for tea itself shipped from England, one would as soon have thought of trying to introduce the Black Death.



FIG. 81.—Ladies of Edenton, signing an agreement not to drink tea, or use any article imported from Great Britain. (From a rare mezzotint published in London, March, 1775. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

It was in 1773 that George III. hit upon his famous device for “trying the question” with America. This “trying the question” was his own phrase. It was observed that the Americans had more or less of

tea to drink, though not an ounce was brought in from England; whenever they solaced their nerves with the belligerent beverage, they smuggled it from Holland or the Dutch East Indies. The king, therefore, neatly arranged matters with the East India Company so that it could afford to offer tea in the American ports at a price far below its market value. This tea, with the duty upon it, would cost American customers less than the tea smuggled from Holland, and in this way the Americans were to be ensnared into surrendering the great principle at issue.

Under these circumstances the sending of the East India Company's tea-ships to America was in no proper sense an incident of commerce. The king's arrangement with the company really deprived it of commercial character. It was simply a political challenge. As Lord North openly confessed in the House of Commons, it was merely the king's method of "trying the question" with America. It was, moreover, an extremely insulting challenge. A grosser insult to any self-respecting people can hardly be imagined. It was King George's way of asking that perennial Boss Tweed question, "What are you going to do about it?" It was surely one of the most far-reaching political questions that was raised in that age, for it involved the whole case of the relations of an imperial government to its colonies; a solemn question, to be settled not by mobs, but by the sober and deliberate sense of the American people, and it was thus that it was settled once for all in Boston.

During the agitations of the past ten years Massachusetts had appeared rather the most stiff-necked and refractory of the English colonies, although, in their opposition to the Stamp Act, Virginia and South Carolina had been equally prompt and emphatic. On the present occasion circumstances perhaps accidental made Boston the battle-ground, and gave added point and concentrated meaning to everything that was done there. The royal challenge was aimed at the colonies as a whole, and tea-ships were sent to New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, as well as to Boston. In all four towns consignees were appointed to receive the tea and dispose of it after paying the duty. But in the three former towns the consignees quailed before the wrath of the people, resigned their commissions, and took oath that they would not act in the matter. So when the tea-ships at length arrived at New York and Philadelphia, they were turned about and sent home without ever coming within the jurisdiction of the custom-house. At Charleston the ship lingered in port beyond the legal term of twenty days, and then the collector seized the tea and brought it ashore; but as there was no consignee at hand to pay the duty, the boxes lay untouched in the custom-

house until they rotted and fell to pieces. But before these things happened, the battle had been fought in Boston. There the consignees, two of whom were sons of Governor Hutchinson, refused to resign ; and this refusal created a peculiar situation. It was all very well to let the tea come ashore in Charleston, where there was nobody to pay the duty ; but on no account would it do to let it come ashore at Boston, for, if it did, the duty would instantly be paid. The governor was a man of intense legality ; he did not approve the shabby trick of sending the tea, but, when a ship had once come into port, it must not, in his opinion, go out again without discharging all due formalities. His sons were like him for stubborn courage, and thus it was that Boston became the seat of war. With those two inflexible Puritans, Thomas Hutchinson and Samuel Adams, pitted against each other, it was truly a meeting of Greek with Greek, and one might be sure that something dramatic and incisive would come of it.

When it was known that the ships were coming, Boston asked the advice of all the other towns in Massachusetts. The reader may judge for himself whether the tone of the circular letter sent by the Committee of Correspondence is that of an incentive to riotous behavior : " Brethren, we are reduced to this dilemma, either to sit down quiet under this and every other burden that our enemies shall see fit to lay upon us, or to rise up and resist this and every plan laid for our destruction, as becomes wise freemen. In this extremity we earnestly request your advice."

It is worthy of note that the response to this earnest inquiry was unanimous ; not a single dissenting voice was heard in any quarter of the commonwealth. From every town came instructions that on no account whatever must the tea be allowed to come ashore. Similar advice came in from the other colonies. The action of the Boston consignees in refusing to resign had fixed the eyes of the whole country upon that town. It was generally felt that the weal or woe of America depended upon the action of the people there. If, through any weakness of Boston, a single ounce of tea should be landed, there was a widespread feeling that the chief bond of union between the colonies would be snapped. At no time, perhaps, in the whole history of English-speaking America, has there been such a solid unanimity of opinion as on this question of suffering the tea to be landed.

When the ships arrived late in November in Boston harbor, they were taken in charge by the committees of Boston, Cambridge, Charlestown, Roxbury, and Dorchester, and a military guard was placed over

them. From that time forth until the end, not a step was taken save under the direction of these five committees, to whose action a consistent unity was given by the prudent leadership of Samuel Adams, while in all that the committees did they felt that in the sight of the whole country they were discharging a sacred duty. Truly, for an instance of mob law, this tea party was somewhat conscientiously and prayerfully prepared!

There were just twenty days in which to try all legal measures for sending away the ships without landing the tea, but legal measures failed because one side was as stubborn as the other. After the ships had once come above the Castle, they could not go out again without the regular clearance from the collector of the port, or else a special pass from the governor. But the collector manoeuvred and wore away the time without granting a clearance. For nineteen days and nights the people's guard patrolled the wharves, sentinels watched from the church belfries, the tar-barrels on Beacon Hill were kept ready for lighting, and any attempt at landing the tea forcibly would have been met by an instant uprising of the neighboring counties. So things went on until the 16th of December, the last of the twenty days. The morning was a drizzling rain; but in the afternoon it cleared off bright and crisp and frosty, while all day in the Old South church a town meeting was busy with momentous issues. After midnight nothing but a personal assault could prevent the collector from seizing the tea and bringing it ashore, and nothing but personal violence could prevent the young Hutchinsons from paying the duty. There was but one peaceful avenue of escape from the situation. The governor could grant a pass which would enable the ships to go out without a clearance. Would he do so? Samuel Adams knew him too well to expect it. Francis Rotch, the owner of the principal ship, was sent out to the governor's country house on Milton Hill, to ask for a pass. While his return was awaited, a gentleman highly esteemed, already wasted with the disease that was soon to end his days, addressed the assembly. He reminded them of the probable consequences of what might be done that day, nothing less than war against the whole power of Great Britain, and begged them to act with such consequences fully in view. After this word of caution from Josiah Quincy, a final vote was taken. Suppose the governor should refuse the pass: might the tea on any account whatever be suffered to land? One cannot step into the venerable church to-day without hearing its rafters ring with that sturdy unanimous "No!" How the vote was to be carried into effect few people knew, but there

was a Boston merchant who seems to have been in the secret. It had grown dark, and the great church was dimly lighted with candles, when this gentleman got up and asked, "Mr. Moderator, did anyone ever think how tea would mix with salt water?" And the query was greeted with laughter and applause. At last the governor's refusal came, and never did such silence settle down over an assembly as when Adams arose and exclaimed, "This meeting can do nothing more to save the country!" The response to this solemn watchword was a war-whoop from outside, and strange Indian figures were seen passing in the moonlight. Was there ever such a riot as that which followed, when those thronging thousands upon the wharves stood with bated breath, while the busy click of hatchets came from the ships, and from moment to moment a broken chest was hoisted upon the bulwark and its fragrant contents emptied into the icy water? Things happened there, the like of which was surely never recorded in the history of riots. So pinetilious were those Indians that when one of them by accident broke a padlock belonging to one of the ship's officers, he bought a new padlock the next morning and made good the loss.

Who were these Indians? Admiral Montagu and other British gentlemen who with him beheld the proceedings saw fit to declare that they "were not a disorderly rabble, but men of sense, coolness, and dignity." Paul Revere was among them, and in all probability Joseph Warren was one. George Robert Twelves Hewes, one of the last survivors, died in 1835 at the age of ninety-eight. He used to tell how, while he was busily ripping open a chest, the man next to him raised his hatchet so high that the Indian blanket fell away from his arm and disclosed the well-known crimson velvet sleeve and point-lace ruffles of John Hancock.

It seems to me eminently fitting that the hand which subscribed so handsomely the Declaration of Independence should have taken part in the decisive act of defiance that brought on the war. We have been told that the destruction of the tea was "illegal"; so was the Declaration of Independence. Each rested upon the paramount right of self-preservation, and the former was no more the act of a mob than the latter. It was the deliberate and coolly reasoned act of the people of Massachusetts, cordially approved and stoutly defended by the people of the thirteen colonies. The contemporary British historian, Gordon, saw clearly that a moment had arrived when no compromise was possible, and when the only alternative, the surrender of the principle at stake, would have imperilled the whole future of America. Or, as Dr.

Ramsay said, you could not condemn the Tea Party without condemning the Revolution altogether, for in no other way could the men of Boston discharge the duty which they owed to the country. But a more fitting comment will never be uttered than that of the enthusiastic John Adams, the day after the event : "This is the most magnificent movement of all. There is a dignity, a majesty, a sublimity, in this last effort of the patriots, that I greatly admire. This destruction of the tea must have such important consequences and so lasting that I cannot but consider it an epoch in history."

Yes, this is the true judgment. If there is anything in human life that is dignified and grand, it is the self-restraint of masses of men under extreme provocation, and the steady guidance of their actions by the light of sober reason ; and from this point of view the Boston Tea Party will always remain a typical instance of what is majestic and sublime.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE SEVERANCE FROM GREAT BRITAIN.

WHILE American sentiment had been unanimously opposed to the landing of the tea, nevertheless after the event (as always happens) there were some differences of opinion as to the subsequent policy which should be pursued. There were also differences of opinion in England, where the friends of America argued that, since a conciliatory policy had failed through incompleteness, a more conciliatory policy ought henceforth to prevail. To the royal machine, however, if we may so call the party of personal adherents which the king had welded together by the cohesive force of patronage, it seemed that a vindictive course would be preferable. This quite suited the king's half-insane mood, traces of which are abundantly visible in the acts of Parliament which proceeded to deal with Massachusetts. These acts were passed in April, 1774; the two principal ones were known as the Boston Port Bill and the Regulating Act. By the former act, the port of Boston was to be closed until full indemnity should be paid to the East India Company for the destruction of its tea. As a port of entry, Boston was to be superseded by Salem. By the Regulating Act the charter of Massachusetts was annulled without notice, and the province was placed under the control of a military governor, with a council the members of which were to be appointed on a royal writ of mandamus. At the same time the laws which obstructed the quartering of troops in Boston or other American towns were repealed. These measures were not passed without fierce opposition. The Duke of Richmond declared in the House of Lords that, if it came to fighting, he hoped the Americans would defeat the king's troops. Similar expressions of sympathy, though perhaps somewhat less emphatic, were heard from men like Fox, Burke, Camden, Chatham, Barré, Conway, and others of eminence. The general sentiment of the city of London was strongly on the side of the Americans, and it is perfectly clear that even in the state of irritation already existing it would have been impossible for Lord North to have passed these acts without the aid of the rotten boroughs.

In pursuance of this dangerous policy the king sent General Thomas

Gage (Fig. 82), to Boston with four regiments. Gage was an amiable gentleman of no great military capacity, who had for several years been commander of the regular troops in America, with his headquarters at New York. Upon his arrival in Boston, Governor Hutchinson went to England in the hope of persuading the king of the folly of attempting a vindictive policy against Massachusetts. But nothing could persuade the king that any opposition which he was likely to encounter in America



*Jho: Gage*

FIG. 82.—Thomas Gage. (From an unlettered engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

could be formidable. He was inclined to take a light-hearted view of the matter, and felt sure that Gage would mend everything within a few months, after which he thought it likely that he might restore to Massachusetts her charter and send Hutchinson back as governor. Meanwhile he offered him a baronetey, which Hutchinson very properly refused.

If the king had been better informed, he would not have taken

things so lightly. His great mistake lay in supposing that he had Massachusetts alone to deal with. There were, indeed, considerable differences between the attitude of different colonies. The strongest sympathy with Massachusetts came from Virginia, where there were fewer Tories than anywhere else. From the Whig party in South Carolina there also came very cordial sympathy, although at the same time the Tory party in that state was strong. Somewhat less sympathy was felt in the middle group of states, especially New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, where there was a strong disinclination to war and some people felt that the attitude of Massachusetts was more belligerent than it need be. But whatever may have been the different shades of opinion, the effect of the king's policy was to bring all the colonies to the side of Massachusetts, for an act of arbitrary power aimed at any one colony obviously threatened the liberties of all. From all quarters of the country, therefore, even as far as the distant rice-swamps of Georgia, contributions of all useful provisions were sent to Boston, while one legislature after another declared that that town must be regarded as suffering in the common cause.

When, therefore, in spite of Gage's vigilance, the Massachusetts assembly at Salem contrived to pass a series of resolutions inviting the colonies to join in a Continental Congress at Philadelphia in the following September, the invitation met with a cordial response. The Congress was attended by delegates from all the colonies except Georgia. Peyton Randolph, of Virginia, was chosen president; and among those who took part in the debates were Edmund Pendleton, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and George Washington, of Virginia; Samuel Chase, of Maryland; John Dickinson, of Pennsylvania; the Livingstons, of New York and New Jersey; the Rutledges, of South Carolina; and the Adamses, of Massachusetts. This Congress adopted a declaration of rights claiming for the American people "a free and exclusive power of legislation in their provincial legislatures, where their rights of legislation could alone be preserved in all cases of taxation and internal polity." This paper also demanded the repeal of eleven acts of Parliament by which American rights had been infringed. The association for insuring commercial non-intercourse with Great Britain was renewed, and the committees of correspondence were clothed with the power of inspecting the entries at all custom-houses. Addresses, explaining and justifying the American position, were prepared for the king, for the people of Great Britain, and for the inhabitants of English-speaking America; and when the Congress adjourned

to await the effect of these measures, it appointed the 10th of May following as the day on which to begin its second session.

While these things were going on at Philadelphia, the attitude of Massachusetts, under direct provocation, became more distinctly rebellious. The councillors who accepted office under the king's writ of mandamus were intimidated and compelled to resign their offices. In September the towns of Suffolk County held a convention in an old house which is still standing in Milton. Dr. Warren presided, while a bold series of resolutions were unanimously adopted. There was nothing uncertain in the ringing tone of these resolutions; one would like to see something like it in a party platform of the present day. They



FIG. 83.—Sir William Howe. (From a mezzotint by Corbitt, published in London, November, 1777. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

called a spade a spade after the following fashion: They declared that a king who violates the chartered rights of his people forfeits their allegiance; they declared the Regulating Act null and void, and ordered all the officers appointed under it to resign at once; they directed the collectors of taxes to refuse to pay over money to Gage's treasurer; and they threatened the governor that, should he venture to arrest anyone for political reasons, they would retaliate by seizing upon crown officers as hostages. A copy of these resolutions was sent to the Congress at Philadelphia and received its warm approval. Next month the Massachusetts assembly changed itself into a provincial congress with John

Hancock as president, and chose a committee of safety with Dr. Warren for chairman. Arrangements were at once made for calling out the militia, and every village-green in the commonwealth soon became a busy drilling-ground. In this militia there was a considerable proportion of veterans of the last French war.



FIG. 84.—Richard, Lord Howe. (From a mezzotint by Corbitt, published in London, 1777. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

In November, 1774, a new House of Commons was elected, and the royal machine wielded the rotten boroughs with greater success than ever before. The new Parliament made no approach toward representing the English people, but descended so low as to make itself the mere mouthpiece of the king's party. Its only response to the papers of the Continental Congress was a joint resolution of the two Houses declar-

ing that they would support the king through thick and thin. They declared Massachusetts to be in a state of rebellion; they ordered the closing of all New England seaports; they passed an act forbidding New Englanders to catch fish on the Banks of Newfoundland; and they voted that the army in Boston should be increased to 10,000 men. In the choice of commanders for this army we may trace the placable temper of Lord North. William Howe (Fig. 83) was appointed to supersede Gage; and his elder brother, Richard, Viscount Howe (Fig. 84), was appointed admiral of the fleet for America. These officers, whose feelings toward the Americans were very friendly, were constituted commissioners with powers to treat with the colonies.

The declaration of Parliament that Massachusetts was in a state of rebellion was certainly true. The only government recognized



FIG. 85. "Three Paul Revere scenes. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xv.)

by the great majority of the people was that of the provincial congress, which was

a revolutionary body. As for the military governor appointed by the crown, he was as far as possible ignored, while the so-called Regulating Act was persistently nullified. Under such circumstances nothing was easier than to precipitate an armed collision. On two or three

occasions the outbreak was narrowly averted, but at last it came. During the winter the committee of safety had been collecting guns, ammunition, and other military stores at Concord, a village about twenty

miles from Boston, and Gage made up his mind to seize this warlike material. Moreover, the time was approaching for the second session of the Continental Congress, and meanwhile, before leaving for Philadelphia, John Hancock and Samuel Adams were visiting at the house of a friend in Lexington, on the road to Concord. Gage had received peremptory orders to arrest these two gentlemen and send them over to England, to be tried under a statute of Henry VIII. for treason committed abroad. On the night of April 18, a force of 800 men under Colonel Smith was sent in boats across Charles River to Lechmere Point, whence they took up their march inland. The secret was divined by Dr. Warren, who sent Paul Revere to give the alarm (Fig. 85). Revere easily eluded the soldiers and galloped on before them, shouting



FIG. 86.—Earl Percy. (From a mezzotint by Turner, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

the news at every farm-house and in every village street through which he passed. Before daybreak Smith saw so many signs of wakefulness that he sent back for reinforcements, and Lord Percy (Fig. 86), with 1200 men, was sent after him by land over Boston Neck and through Brighton and Old Cambridge.

When Smith reached Lexington at sunrise, he found that the birds were flown; Adams and Hancock had started for Philadelphia a few moments before. A company of the militia, known as minute-men, were drawn up on the village-green, and a few shots passed between them and the British, resulting in the loss of half a dozen lives. Later in the morning, when Smith reached Concord, he found that the military stores had been removed, so that his search was fruitless. It suddenly became apparent, moreover, that the situation was full of danger. An advance party of 200 British had been stationed at the north bridge near the Old Manse, while a force of minute-men was rapidly collecting on the hills beyond the river. When this force had reached about 400, they suddenly charged in good order and solid mass, crossing the bridge and bearing down the British troops by sheer weight of numbers. Moment by moment the force of militia increased. Parties of them were seen coming across the fields from all quarters, and Colonel Smith's retreat was begun none too soon. The turnpike between Concord and Lexington is a veritable death-trap for a retreating enemy. For nearly its whole length it is skirted by a low range of hills, behind the crest of which the minute-men could screen themselves while they poured a deadly fire into the columns marching along the road below. By three o'clock in the afternoon, on reaching Lexington, Colonel Smith's force was saved by Lord Percy's column. At the same time the fast-swelling companies of yeomanry were taken in hand by Dr. Warren and General Heath, and Percy's retreat upon Charlestown assumed more and more the character of a struggle to avoid capture. By sunset the British reached the slope of Bunker Hill upon the full run, having lost one-seventh of their number along the road.

As for the minute-men, they came pouring in for several days from all parts of New England, until in less than a week Gage was hermetically sealed in Boston by a rustic army stretching from Charlestown Neck through Cambridge in a semicircle around to the sea at Dorchester, numbering not less than 16,000 men, from all parts of New England. Henceforth the sway of Great Britain in Massachusetts was confined to the ground her soldiers stood upon. Thus quickly was a defensive fight developed into an aggressive siege.

In the next incident of the drama, the aggression was begun by the Americans. Since the fortress of Ticonderoga had been wrested from the French, it was held by a small British garrison. The romantic country east of it was occupied by a sturdy race of pioneers from the older parts of New England, under grants from the government of New

Hampshire. The country was commonly known as the New Hampshire Grants, while its inhabitants took pride in the name of Green Mountain Boys. A force of this yeomanry, conducted by Ethan Allen, a man of giant stature and eccentric wit, was joined by a small party from Connecticut under Captain Benedict Arnold, of New Haven, who had rushed to arms at the first tidings from Concord. The garrison of Ticonderoga was surprised and overwhelmed at early dawn. Its commandant naturally inquired in the name of what authority the surrender was demanded, a question which might admit of various circumlocutory



FIG. 87. Maj.-Gen. Charles Lee. (From an engraving published in Paris, 1775, after a painting by Campbell. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

answers, since the political status of the American colonies was certainly becoming dubious; but Allen was quick with an answer: "In the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress."

It was on May 10, the very day of this surrender, that the Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia. Increasing belligerency of temper was shown by the choice of the proscribed John Hancock for its president. The most important act of this Congress was the adoption of the New England army besieging Boston as the Continental army, and the appointment of a general-in-chief, with other important officers.

The army was adopted in the name of "The United Colonies of North America," and a beginning was made toward giving it a continental complexion by adding to it 3000 men from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including Daniel Morgan and his sharpshooters, of whom we shall hear more presently.

With regard to a commander for the Continental army, there were a few who would have given that position to Charles Lee (Fig. 87), a British soldier of fortune, who had served in America in the last French war and had since then wandered about Europe, spending some time in the Polish service. This Lee was in no way related to the famous Lees of Virginia. He had grown up from childhood in the British army, but was better known in England as a writer of caustic pamphlets than as a soldier. He was a shallow-pated, cantankerous coxcomb who attacked everybody, quite a master in the gentle art of making enemies. He had come over to America in the autumn of 1773, and blew his own trumpet so vehemently that some innocent Americans thought it would be well to entrust our army to the charge of such a highly trained European soldier. These considerations, however, were not deemed strong enough to entitle Lee to the chief command. Among native American soldiers there were two whose reputation, earned upon bloody fields, stood especially high. Both were Virginians. The one, representing the Scotch-Irish population of the mountain districts, was Andrew Lewis, who had lately inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Shawnees in the great battle of Point Pleasant. The other, a representative of the bluest-blooded aristocracy of tide-water Virginia, was George Washington, commander-in-chief of the militia of that commonwealth. The Massachusetts leaders, John Adams and his cousin Samuel, were deeply impressed with the desirableness of committing Virginia as quickly as possible to a foremost part in the impending struggle, and accordingly John Adams proposed that the commander of Virginia's forces should be made the commander of the Continental army. Washington's well-earned military reputation was such that there was no difficulty in agreeing upon this choice. The next work was the appointment of four major-generals and eight brigadiers. Lee's friends urged his appointment as first of the major-generals; but, much to his disgust, the choice fell upon Artemas Ward, who was then in command of the yeomanry besieging Boston. Lee was obliged to content himself with the second place among the major-generals. The other two were Philip Schuyler, of New York, and Israel Putnam (Fig. 88), of Connecticut.

While these things were going on at Philadelphia, an incident



PLATE IX.-*a.*



General Israel Putnam.

From the painting by H. L. Thompson, in the State House at Hartford, Conn.)

*Historical of the Nation.* Vol. XVII., page 192.

occurred in North Carolina which deserves mention for its own sake as well as for the singular controversy to which it gave rise. On May 31 the county committee of Mecklenburg resolved that the conduct of Parliament the previous winter in supporting the king had practically suspended the old constitutions of the colonies, and had operated to annul and vacate all civil and military commissions granted by the crown. The resolutions went on to say that "the provincial congress of each province, under the direction of the great Continental Congress, is invested with all the legislative and executive powers within their respective provinces, and that no other legislative or executive power does or can exist at this time in any of these colonies." Furthermore,



FIG. 88.—Israel Putnam. (After the portrait by Colonel Trumbull.)

this county committee adopted certain rules "for the choice of county officers, to exercise authority by virtue of this choice and independently of the British crown, until Parliament should resign its arbitrary pretensions." These resolves were put into the hands of the North Carolina delegates in Congress, but, being deemed somewhat premature and irregular, were never laid before that body. They ventured further in the direction of a severance from Great Britain than public opinion was prepared to go. In May, 1775, not even Thomas Jefferson, the writer of the Declaration of Independence, was in favor of separation from the mother country.

These resolves afterward gave rise to the very curious legend of a "Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence." Contemporary writers, probably not deeming the resolves of May 31 as especially important, passed them over in silence. About the beginning of the nineteenth century some North Carolina patriots endeavored to reproduce from memory an account of the Mecklenburg resolves. In its reckoning of dates, as in many other things, North Carolina preserved fashions elsewhere obsolete. In giving the date of the meeting at which the resolves were passed, these writers followed Old Style, which the rest of the English world had discarded half a century before, and, instead of May 31, they made it May 20. The declaration said to have been adopted on May 20 was simply a somewhat distorted recollection of the real resolves of May 31, embellished with a few turns of phrase from Jefferson's immortal document. An exhaustive inspection of all the numbers of all the newspapers published in the United States during the months of May and June, 1775, has failed to show any trace whatever of any such meeting on May 20 as the legend supposes. Yet, strange as it may seem, one still finds North Carolina writers who seem to think that local patriotism requires them to defend the legend, and endless ingenuity has been wasted in the attempt. Rightly considered, the legend belittles instead of magnifying the Mecklenburg men of 1775. A declaration of independence at that moment by a single county of a single colony would have been simply ludicrous and nothing else.

In the month of June an attempt was made to drive the British troops from Boston. Although Percy on his retreat from Lexington had sought shelter in the Charlestown peninsula under the guns of the fleet, yet no attempt had been made to fortify the heights which crown that peninsula and which commanded the town of Boston. The British evidently found it hard to realize that a war had really begun. A few heavy batteries mounted on Bunker Hill would make Boston untenable for the British, and General Ward decided to try the experiment. A party of 1200 men under Colonel William Prescott started from Cambridge on the evening of June 16, and, occupying one of the lower spurs of the Bunker Hill ridge, then called Breed's Hill, began building a redoubt there. In the course of that night, their position was strengthened by the arrival of Connecticut troops under Putnam and a contingent from New Hampshire under John Stark. These troops were stationed behind a rail fence on Prescott's left, to protect his flank. The next morning showed the American works progressing so rapidly that no time was to be lost, and in their impatience the British com-

mitted a serious blunder. The position of the Americans, whose only line of retreat lay over a narrow isthmus commanded on both sides by the fire of the British ships, was exceedingly precarious. The British were commanded by General Howe, who had lately arrived upon the scene to supersede General Gage. The proper thing for him to do was to send 3000 or 4000 men by water to occupy Charlestown Neck. In that case the whole American force must have surrendered, and there need have been no waste of life. Instead of this, Howe tried to carry the American position by storm. Three desperate assaults were made, of which the first two were repulsed, and the third only succeeded because the American supply of powder suddenly gave out. As it was, the British captured the hill, and the Americans made good their retreat to Winter Hill in Somerville. The Americans lost 449 men, and the British 1054, upon which General Greene uttered the comment, "We could well afford to sell them another hill at the same price." The affair had the moral effect of a victory for the Americans; nevertheless, it was a heavy blow for them in two ways. In the first place, one of the killed was Dr. Warren, who had lately been made president of the provincial congress and was on the field in the rank of major-general. In the second place, the Americans were prevented from aggressive measures against Boston until they could obtain a fresh supply of artillery.

On the 3d of July, General Washington, having arrived from Philadelphia, took formal command of the army under an ancient elm-tree on Cambridge Common. General Charles Lee was with him and took command of the left wing on Winter Hill. For the next eight months Washington found his time chiefly occupied in organizing an army out of the raw material at his disposal.

In the course of the summer the Continental Congress, wishing to avoid a separation from Great Britain, sent over to England a further statement of the American case, together with a petition to the king. These papers received no direct notice, but the king presently issued a proclamation declaring the thirteen colonies in rebellion and calling for troops to restore his authority. It proved difficult to get the requisite troops in England, for the popular sentiment strongly condemned the course of the king and his rotten-borough Parliament. Lord Chatham withdrew his eldest son from the army rather than have him serve against Americans. Other acts of similar significance occurred. It therefore became necessary to hire troops from those petty German princes who were willing to earn money by selling the flesh and blood of their

subjects. The greater part of these German troops were from Hesse Cassel and Brunswick, but all were commonly known in America as Hessians. The king could not have done anything more calculated to strengthen the small party in America which desired separation from Great Britain. This hiring of foreigners by an English prince to shoot down men who still called themselves Englishmen gave mortal offence. An incident which happened in October increased the bad feeling. A naval commander named Mowatt, upon the occasion of some slight altercation with the people of Falmouth, now known as Portland, threw



*R. M<sup>r</sup> Montgomery*

FIG. 89.—Richard Montgomery.

shells into the town and started a fire which consumed the greater part of it. This act was instantly disavowed by the British government, but the act itself could not be undone and helped the revolutionary party.

During the summer, Congress had entertained a scheme for conquering Canada. It was expected that the British would make use of Montreal as a base from which to invade the province of New York, and it was deemed wise to be beforehand. But the forces were inadequate for the task assigned them. Richard Montgomery (Fig. 89), with 2000 men, started from Ticonderoga and ended a skillful campaign by captur-

ing Montreal. His adversary, Sir Guy Carleton, had even a smaller force than he. But Carleton's force kept growing by reinforcements from England, and it was desirable that Montgomery's numbers should be increased. Here a notable blunder was committed. The conduct of Arnold's march through the wilderness of Maine was such as to win for him the reputation of bravest of the brave; nevertheless, that march ought never to have been made, for it entailed an utterly useless waste of life. In war, as in other things, fashion has its freaks and claims its victims. The invasion of a territory by converging marches from



*Guy Carleton*

FIG. 90.—Guy Carleton. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.)

remote points was one of the military fashions of that day, and its victims were many. As we shall presently see, it was partly that fashion which made Great Britain fail to put down the American rebellion. Washington was clearly at fault in permitting this movement, which had such irresistible charms for Arnold's romantic and danger-despising temperament. The proper thing to have done with him and his 1200 men would have been to send them by way of Ticonderoga to Montreal to help Montgomery. Instead of this, a party was sent up to the head-waters of the Kennebec, whence with infinite difficulty and frightful hardships they made their way over savage mountains, through forests

never before penetrated, until they were borne down the friendly waters of the Chaudiere to the mighty St. Lawrence. The result was that when Arnold reached Quebec, his force was too small to accomplish anything. Like the charge of the Light Brigade, it was magnificent, but it was not war. After all said and done, there was nothing left for Arnold but to reinforce Montgomery, which, if he had gone the right road, might have been done without losing a life.

Winter had now arrived, the American situation was precarious and likely to become more so, and therefore something must be done at once. In an excess of boldness it was decided to take Quebec by storm, and so the year 1775 went out in the agonies of a desperate midnight battle, in which Montgomery was slain, one of Arnold's legs was shattered, and Morgan was taken prisoner, after all three had performed prodigies of valor worthy of the old Crusaders. Quebec was not taken, but the Americans were badly defeated. By hook and by crook, however, with various changes of commanders, they contrived to maintain themselves in the country until the following summer, which saw them pushed back into New York.

We may now turn our attention to Boston, upon which Washington was unable to move until properly furnished with heavy guns. These were brought together during the winter, for the most part dragged on sledges all the way from Ticonderoga. There are heights in Dorchester by which Boston was then commanded as completely as by Bunker Hill. For some unaccountable reason, General Howe neglected to occupy these heights, so that when Washington's cannon arrived he succeeded in mounting them there. The position was far stronger than the one which the Americans had taken the year before in Charlestown. There was no obvious way of reaching it except by a front attack, and in this regard Bunker Hill had taught General Howe a lesson; so he evacuated Boston and sailed for Halifax, taking with him 900 Tories. The exodus of these people left the king's highway in Cambridge, now known as Brattle Street, wellnigh depopulated, and its fine colonial houses which had belonged to these exiles were summarily confiscated by the provincial congress and sold at auction.

While such things were going on in New England and Canada, there had been various acts of hostility in the Southern states. In January, Howe had sent Sir Henry Clinton from Boston with 2000 men to aid the Tory party in the Carolinas. Among the results of this movement was a fight at Moore's Creek in North Carolina toward the end of February, in which a force of Tory Highlanders under Donald Maclom-

ald was defeated by a force of Whigs under Colonel Richard Caswell. In Virginia, New Year's Day witnessed the culmination of a brief struggle between the royal governor, Lord Dunmore, and a party of revolutionists. On that day the town of Norfolk was set on fire by shells and burned to the ground.

The tendency of all the events here recounted was toward setting public opinion in America more and more strongly in favor of a declaration of independence. In the midsummer of 1775 there were probably very few who wished for independence, except Samuel Adams and some of the leaders in the mountain population at the South. But during the next twelve months public opinion drifted very steadily toward independence. Resistance to the new views was strongest in South




FIG. 91.—The State House at Philadelphia. (From an engraving by Fadden on the plan of Philadelphia, surveyed by Scull & Heap, published in London, March, 1777. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Carolina, Pennsylvania, and New York. In South Carolina both parties were strong, and the feeling between them was so bitter as to lead to local civil war. In New York the conditions were similar. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the situation presented no such lurid contrasts. Along with the tone of feeling generally milder, there was, on the part of the Quakers especially, an indisposition to extreme measures. In Maryland, moreover, so late as March, 1776, a popular convention deprecated anything like haste in severing the bonds that united the colonies with Great Britain. In that same month of March, Congress began issuing letters of marque and reprisal and ordered the sea-ports of the colonies to be thrown open to all nations. In the course

of the year various colonies, following the example of Massachusetts, had formed for themselves provisional or revolutionary governments. In Rhode Island and Connecticut this was not necessary, as they were already free and virtually independent republics; nothing was needed for them but to omit the formal or complimentary mention of the king's name in legal documents. In some instances the royal governors were deposed, and affairs managed by an executive council. Such local proceedings in the several colonies were often accompanied by some expression of sentiment concerning the general question of independence. At length, on May 6, Virginia chose a convention expressly for considering this question; and on the 14th this convention decided to instruct the Virginia delegates in Congress to propose a general declaration of independence for the united colonies. On the next day, May 15, Congress adopted a resolution which advised all the colonies that had not already done so to frame for themselves new governments, and in a preamble written by John Adams it was declared that the king had withdrawn his protection from the inhabitants of the united colonies, and therefore Americans could no longer take oath to support any government of which the authority emanated from the crown. This important resolution with its preamble was adopted after a warm debate. On June 7, Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, submitted to Congress the following motion:


"That these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown; and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."

"That it is expedient forthwith to take the most effectual measures for forming foreign alliances,

"That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies, for their consideration and approbation."

This motion, which was seconded by John Adams, was opposed by some of the ablest delegates from New York and Pennsylvania, on the ground that it was too far in advance of public opinion in the colonies which they represented. Three weeks more were spent in obtaining from different parts of the country local expressions of opinion, and finally on the 1st of July, when the question was brought up in Congress as a committee of the whole, the delegates from New York were excused from voting, as they had not yet been able to obtain the requisite instructions. Pennsylvania declared against independence by four votes against three. Of the three delegates from Delaware, one was

kept at home by illness, one voted yeas, and one nay, so that the vote of the colony was lost. South Carolina declared in the negative. The other nine colonies voted in the affirmative, thus carrying the measure by a two-thirds vote. It was felt, however, that in such an important matter, unanimity should be secured so far as possible; and Edward Rutledge, of South Carolina, intimated that if it should appear that unanimity could be reached by reversing the vote of his state, her delegates would probably do so. Accordingly, on the next day, when the



*Rob Morris.*

FIG. 92.—Robert Morris. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

decisive vote was taken, the sick member from Delaware was found in his seat, and his affirmative vote secured that of the colony. On the other hand, Robert Morris (Fig. 92) and John Dickinson were purposely absent, and the vote of Pennsylvania thus went in the affirmative by three against two. Then the courteous South Carolinians reversed their vote, and the unanimity of twelve colonies was secured, the delegates from New York still remaining helpless. On the 4th of July the Declaration was published to the world; on the 9th it was accepted by the province of New York.

This step, of course, made it impossible for this fratricidal war to cease until either the United States or Great Britain should be badly defeated. It was urged on by the two most powerful colonies, which were at the same time the oldest and the most thoroughly English, because they had come to feel that in no other way could their ancient liberties be preserved. The other colonies were brought to it with varying degrees of reluctance. One of its immediate effects was to add to the number of Tories. There were many persons, like Galloway, who were ready to join in the Continental Congress of 1774, but were by no means prepared to go the length of the Congress of 1776. Such persons naturally drifted over into the Tory position. We shall hereafter see that the effect of the French alliance was similar.

An alliance with France, our ancient enemy, however, was something for which events were not yet ripe. France was not ready to offer it, and our people needed to be educated into accepting it. For the next two years it was to be a duel between Great Britain and the United States. The antagonists were not so unequally matched as might at first seem. The population of the United States was then scarcely 3,000,000, while that of the British Islands was rather more than 9,000,000, while the disparity in wealth was still more marked; but these advantages on the part of Great Britain were offset by two great disadvantages. It was necessary for her, in those days of sailing-ships, to support an army separated from home by 3000 miles of salt water; and still more, the task before her was that of conquering the United States, or a considerable portion of the country, while on the other hand, the Americans were not only fighting at home, but it was not in the least incumbent upon them to attack Great Britain with a view to conquest; it was enough for them to prolong their resistance until her patience should be exhausted. More recently, in our great civil war, we have seen that such a disparity of requirements made the Southern Confederacy almost a match for the Federal government in spite of the immense superiority of the North in numbers and wealth. It was enough for the South if she could defend her frontier; but the task before the North demanded the complete occupation of the Southern territory. A similar state of things six score years ago went still further toward making the revolted colonies a fair match for their antagonist.

Indeed, if the United States had then possessed a continental government with taxing power, so that the states would have been enabled

to put forth their full strength, the odds would have been in their favor against Great Britain, even without any French alliance. As it was, the war languished from the same causes which had vexed the royal governors in former times—the lack of any central authority. Lack of public funds and of any business-like system of recruiting made it always difficult for Washington to maintain a suitable army in the field. The chief difficulty in fighting the British, therefore, lay not so much in



A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Will Moultrie". The signature is fluid and includes a small decorative flourish at the end.

FIG. 93.—Maj.-Gen. William Moultrie. (From an engraving by Seriven, after a painting by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

the general disparity of conditions as in our own imperfect organization, the vices of which were so great that, except for Washington's transcendent personal qualities, the revolutionary party would probably have succumbed at an early period in the struggle.

After the Declaration of Independence, we observe a change in the theatre of war. Until after the British were driven from Boston, the interest centred about that town as in the forefront of rebellion; but

afterward, when the enemy's object was the overthrow of the United States, the scene was shifted. The principal centre was New York, and New England figures but little more as a theatre of war except in operations subsidiary to the contest in New York. At first the British were inclined to strike at points where they expected help from the Tories ashore; hence, not only New York, but the Carolinas were among their objective points. The expedition which Sir Henry Clinton led southward in January did not come to a close until the last of June, when Sir Henry, reinforced by troops from England under Lord Cornwallis, brought his fleet up to Charleston harbor with intent to capture the city. The American force defending the place was commanded by Charles Lee, who, as a scientific European soldier, had never heard of palmetto forts, and sneered at Colonel William Moultrie (Fig. 93) for building such a structure on Sullivan's Island. The 28th of June did something to open his eyes, when the fleet was completely disabled and Sir Henry's plans all ruined by the fire from Moultrie's queer fortress. The whole country rang with the news, and Lee began to be commonly known as "the hero of Charleston."

This disaster ended for a time the British attempts at the South. They concentrated their efforts upon holding the line of the Hudson River. They seem to have thought that by establishing a kind of police over that region they might cut New England asunder from the states to the southward. This hope was not unreasonable, for New York was then a comparatively weak state, ranking in population only seventh among the thirteen, and of this population it was fair to suppose that nearly half were Tories. The extreme western frontier lay east of the present site of Utica, and from that point westward to Lake Erie the country was still possessed by the formidable Six Nations, which were expected to give valuable assistance to the British. As for Sir William Johnson, he had died in 1774—as some said, of grief at the prospect of war between his sovereign and his fellow-colonists. His able son, Sir John Johnson, felt that he could guarantee the allegiance of the Long House to the house of Hanover. It was the reliance upon such aid from the Indians that led the British to take undue risks.

For one thing, we may observe that their invasion of New York combined a descent from Canada with an attack upon the lower Hudson. In the summer of 1776, Sir Guy Carleton was preparing to advance upon Ticonderoga, while Benedict Arnold was building a fleet to oppose his progress. Early in October, Lake Champlain was the scene of an obstinate battle between these two fleets, in the neighbor-

hood of Valcour Island. Arnold, who fought with his usual skill and valor, was defeated, and Carleton advanced upon Ticonderoga; but finding the fortifications greatly strengthened and fearing for his communications, he presently retreated to Montreal. The solicitude about his communications was commendable, but there was one method of capturing the great fortress in a trice, had his eye discerned it. But other heads than Carleton's failed to detect this single opportunity; and if a long siege was to be required, his retrograde movement was justified. There can be no doubt, however, that it injured the British cause; for by relieving the pressure on General Schuyler at the north of the Hudson, it enabled him to reinforce General Washington at the south. As for Washington, he had arrived in the city of New York in April and made arrangements to defend the city. It was a task verging upon the impossible, since the British fleet could at pleasure control the waters on both sides. There was only one thing that could be done. The little city on the southern point of Manhattan Island was completely commanded by Brooklyn Heights, as much so as Boston was commanded by Dorchester Heights. American batteries on Brooklyn Heights made New York untenable for the British; therefore Washington caused these heights to be fortified, and placed there 9000 men, or half his little army, to defend them. But the position on Long Island was itself exceedingly hazardous; for if the American works should be confronted by the enemy while their ships closed in behind, it must needs be forced to surrender. Some writers have censured Washington for trying to hold such a position; but his conduct was guided by sound political considerations, which modified the purely military aspect of the case. If he declined to occupy Brooklyn Heights, he must surrender the city without a blow and retire to the Highlands of the Hudson, a course which must almost surely have given the Tory party a preponderance in the state. The part played by Washington was bold to the verge of rashness, for such was his character; but it stopped just at that verge. We do not censure Stonewall Jackson for getting his army into tight places, for he always knew how and when to get out of them. Such was also the case with Washington.

When the British troops arrived under General Howe from Halifax, and under Clinton and Cornwallis from South Carolina, their control of the water enabled them to land at Staten Island unopposed. There were 25,000 of them all told, against Washington's 18,000; and their first problem was to deal with the 9000 on Long Island. With their superiority in force, this was an easy thing to do. They landed at

Gravesend Bay and advanced northward. Some 3000 Americans under Stirling held the coast-road toward the American works, and a similar force under Sullivan (Fig. 94) held the road over the hills. The British had enough men to attack both these positions in front, and at the same time to make a flank march which brought them into the rear of both positions. As a result, the Americans were quickly defeated, with a loss of one-fifth their number killed and wounded and 1000 prisoners,



FIG. 94.—Maj.-Gen. John Sullivan. (From a rare mezzotint, published in London, August, 1776. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

among whom were both the generals. It should be noticed that the percentage of American loss shows excellent fighting on the part of raw troops.

After this battle it became clear that the American troops must be withdrawn from Brooklyn Heights, and this work was superintended by Washington in person. The transfer of the entire force across the East River under the very guns of the British ships, without so much as attracting the notice of a single sentinel, was one of the most consum-

mate feats on record. When the British, after some days, crossed the river and occupied the line of Thirty-fourth Street, Washington's forces were withdrawn to Harlem Heights. In an attempt to pierce their centre, Howe was repulsed with heavy loss. He then ascended the East River to Throg's Neck, hoping to strike at Washington's left flank; but the wily Virginian had anticipated the movement and presented to him a new front, well covered by a skirmish-line which detained him for several days in effecting a landing. In such wise was every one of Howe's thrusts parried by Washington, until, losing all patience, the British general at White Plains tried direct assault, and gained an outpost by losing two men for one. Before this advantage was followed up, Washington had taken an impregnable position at North Castle.

From this position Washington must, if possible, be lured. For this purpose Howe might make attacks or demonstrations in other directions, and such chances were ready at hand. On opposite sides of the Hudson had been built two fortresses, the one on the east bank called Fort Washington, the one on the west Fort Lee. At the present stage of the campaign they had ceased to be useful, and Washington ordered their evacuation. Here we come to the first serious break in his operations. Fortifications in the Highlands were deemed imperatively necessary, and Washington had gone to give some necessary supervision to the work, leaving Lee in command of the army at North Castle, and Greene in command of the two fortresses. During Washington's absence, Congress took fright at the series of apparently retrograde operations, and sent instructions to Fort Washington that it must be held until the last extremity. Such a letter from Congress reaching Greene at Fort Lee sorely puzzled him, and in his bewilderment he reinforced Fort Washington, which Howe immediately invested. Washington arrived at Fort Lee just in time to see the other fortress taken by storm, and its garrison of 3000 men captured.

Howe followed up this stroke by crossing into New Jersey so quickly that Greene had barely time to evacuate Fort Lee and save his men. A demonstration against Philadelphia would clearly be Howe's most profitable move, for there was then a timidity on the western bank of the Delaware River like that which afflicted the northern bank of the Potomac during our civil war. To meet the situation, Washington had already brought about half of his men, 7000 in number, across the Hudson, leaving Lee at North Castle until Howe's plan should be clearly indicated.

Was it a mistake in Washington thus to interpose a huge river between the two parts of his army? Not if he could depend upon his orders being obeyed. The enemy had no force at hand to interfere




FIG. 95.—Sketch of Palisades near Fort Lee by Lord Rawdon. (From the Emmet collection, Astor Library, New York.)

with Lee's crossing, and that general's orders were to cross at a moment's notice. Unfortunately, Lee was a traitor in the camp, busy with schemes of his own, in which the ruin of Washington played a foremost part. The blame for the loss of Fort Washington was generally laid upon the

commander-in-chief. Ward had resigned, leaving Lee second in command, so that now the path of glory seemed open for his peculiar tactics. He used his talent as a prolific letter-writer in sowing seeds of disaffection toward Washington wherever they seemed likely to do most good;




FIG. 96.—Sketch of Palisades near Fort Lee by Lord Rawdon. (From the Emmet collection, Astor Library, New York.)


he tried to assume control over the Highlands, diverting General Heath's force to his own uses; and when he received Washington's peremptory orders to cross the river, he answered them with quibbles and remained immovable.

It was this conduct of Lee's that made it necessary for Washington to retreat with a speed that resembled flight before Howe's army. The terms of service of his men were coming to an end, and for the most part they were too discouraged to re-enlist, especially the homesick New England men, whom each day's march carried farther away. The first week in December found Washington on the west side of the Delaware River at the head of scarcely 3000 men, and it was generally believed that the cause of American independence had received its death-blow. Congress fled from Philadelphia, and Lord Cornwallis actually packed his trunks and had them sent on board ship, in the belief that no more work remained for him in America. There were two persons in the American service, however, who did not take so gloomy a view. One of these was Charles Lee, who now expected to pluck for himself the victory out of which he flattered himself that he had cheated Washington. While Washington was fleeing across the Delaware, Lee had just crossed the Hudson and was marching upon Morristown. The significance of this movement is obvious. The position at Morristown, itself wellnigh impregnable, threatened the communications of an enemy moving upon Philadelphia with his base in New York harbor. From Morristown, Lee could easily compel the British to retreat upon New York, and this the rascal well knew. Instead of aiding Washington in such a movement at the outset, he preferred to let him march to ruin and then seize the credit for himself.

Man proposes, however, but it is for a Higher Power to dispose. Lee seemed on the verge of success when he succeeded in diverting to his own use a large part of the force which the retirement of Carleton had enabled Schuyler to send down from Albany. This force was commanded by the feeble Gates, who readily played into Lee's hands. It happened, however, that Lee passed one of those December nights at a lonely tavern four miles from his army, and there he was captured at daybreak by a party of British dragoons. He was straightway carried to New York and locked up in the City Hall on Wall Street, where Washington was afterward inaugurated President of the United States.

This capture of Lee at once set free his army to move across the Delaware to Washington's assistance, and with this reinforcement he meditated a blow which should relieve the situation. If Lee retained hope while his vile plan seemed succeeding, so Washington never lost hope even in the darkest moment. His was one of those natures which accumulating obstacles only nerve to more intense and dogged resolve. The British force was cantoned along the left bank of the Delaware for

a space of twenty miles. Its right wing was refused at Princeton, its centre at Trenton, its left wing below at Burlington. With the force now at his disposal amounting to 6000 men, Washington might hope to pierce its centre. On the night of Christmas he made the attempt. The crossing was full of danger from the great blocks of floating ice, and less than half of the troops succeeded in crossing; but with this diminished force Washington struck his blow, breaking through the centre at Trenton and capturing 1000 men. Unable to hold the post with so small a force, he recrossed the river the next day; but none the less



*Yours most truly  
Cornwallis*

FIG. 97.—Lord Cornwallis. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.)

did the British left wing, left in the air at Burlington, hastily retreat upon Princeton. The unwelcome news brought Cornwallis from New York, and speedily the whole British army was moving toward Trenton. Washington's objective was now Morristown, but how was he to reach it? Once more he crossed the Delaware and took position on a rising ground behind the Assumpink Creek, which flows at right angles into the Delaware just south of Trenton. When Cornwallis (Fig. 97) reached the northern bank at nightfall, it seemed to him that nothing would be

easier than to move forward next morning by his left, fording the creek and striking Washington's right flank, in which case the American force would be routed and perhaps captured. So, in order to increase the weight of his left wing, he ordered up his reserves from Princeton and went to bed.

All night long a front skirmish-line of Americans kept up a great bustle of digging and throwing up entrenchments, while Washington marched quietly around the British flank and proceeded blithely toward Princeton. The morning found Cornwallis confronting an empty camp, and before he had recovered from the shock the sound of distant cannon announced to him the fate of his reserves, which Washington was scattering in confusion in a sharp fight near Princeton. From that point Washington advanced to Morristown, which compelled the British to evacuate the state of New Jersey. Thus, by a series of movements worthy of Turenne or Frederick, the American commander, with a handful of half-trained men, had restored the fortunes of the campaign and replaced them at the point where the interference of Congress and the treachery of Lee had begun to threaten ruin. For merely coping with a superior enemy he had shown himself equal from the outset. All things considered, few pages of military history are more splendid than the story of Washington's incessant activity during the last half of the year 1776.

The net result of the operations of this first half-year was that Howe had taken the city of New York, which the British fleet had made a foregone conclusion. But as for dispersing Washington's army, or inflicting upon it a ruinous defeat, he seemed further from it than ever. Evidently another summer must be devoted to the conquest of the state of New York, and the same plan was adhered to, although more elaborately studied. The plan of invasion by converging lines, then so fashionable in Europe, was absurdly attempted in this American wilderness. The first line of invasion was to be directed from Montreal through Lake Champlain upon Albany. The command of this expedition was assigned to General Burgoyne (Fig. 98), as some dissatisfaction was felt with General Carleton for his retreat of the year before. The second invading column was to ascend the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, and then move upon the Mohawk valley by way of Oswego. As the object of this movement was to create a diversion and to play into the hands of Sir John Johnson and his Tory friends in the Mohawk valley, a force of 2000 men was deemed sufficient, and it was commanded by

Colonel Barry St. Leger. Burgoyne's force, on the other hand, numbered nearly 9000, including some of the best infantry of Europe. The third column was to be the army of Sir William Howe, who was expected to ascend the Hudson with a force sufficient to maintain himself against General Washington, and at the same time to unite his forces with those of Burgoyne. It was probable that Howe could employ for this purpose from 18,000 to 25,000 men.



*John Burgoyne*

FIG. 98.—General Burgoyne. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.)

The British secretary of state for the colonies at that time was a singular person, of a kind such as has scarcely been seen in English public life for the last two centuries, except under George III., who could stoop to the use of almost any kind of tool for carrying out his purposes. It should be enough to say of Lord George Germain that he had been cashiered for cowardice at the battle of Minden; and his general ill repute was such that when toward the end of the war the king was obliged to dismiss him from office, and tried to soothe his feelings by raising him to the peerage as Viscount Sackville (Fig. 99), there was much indignation in the House of Lords, and it was even proposed to utter a formal protest against having such a person in their time-honored body. To military knowledge Lord George made great

pretence, and his share in planning the campaigns in America is supposed to have been greater than that of either Lord North, the prime minister, or Lord Barrington, the secretary of war.

In making this plan, Lord George overrated the strength of the Tories in the Mohawk valley, and quite forgot to reckon with the existence of the Green Mountain Boys. Moreover, he totally neglected




FIG. 99. Lord George Germain, afterward Viscount Sackville. (From a mezzotint by McArdell, after a painting by Reynolds. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

to consider the dangers attendant upon the long distances to be traversed through the virgin forest. As for invasions by converging lines, experience has long since condemned them, save in rare cases; it almost always happens that somebody fails to reach the point of meeting at the right time.

What, then, should Lord George have done? The answer is plain. He should have sent Burgoyne and St. Leger with their 10,000 men or more by sea to the city of New York, and with this reinforcement

General Howe should have devoted himself to the task of annihilating Washington's army, if possible. That plan might have failed; the plan which was tried was almost certain to fail.

About the beginning of July, Burgoyne advanced upon the fortress of Ticonderoga, where one of his generals proved to be of keener vision than Carleton. A beetling eminence known as Sugar Loaf



*Ph: Schuyler*

FIG. 100.—Gen. Philip Schuyler. (From a painting by J. Trumbull.)

Hill commanded the fort, and on that eminence, which had been pronounced inaccessible, General Phillips placed batteries. The Americans were thus obliged to evacuate Ticonderoga, an incident which was greeted with extravagant joy by the British, and caused in America a panic that was quite needless. Burgoyne's antagonist, General Philip Schuyler (Fig. 100), so skilfully obstructed his advance that the month

of July was exhausted in reaching Fort Edward on the Hudson ; and by that time Burgoyne was already in serious danger of an attack upon his long line of communications. A force of American yeomanry was rapidly gathering in the Green Mountains and Berkshire Hills, under command of Benjamin Lincoln. Their depot of supplies was at Bennington, and Burgoyne sent 1000 men to capture it and thus thwart Lincoln's operations. In the choice of men for this movement, Burgoyne showed poor judgment. He had with him about 1000 Canadian bush-rangers,



FIG. 101.—John Stark. (From an unlettered mezzotint, after a portrait by Trumbull.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

who were just the men for such work. Instead of these he selected German heavy infantry, totally unfamiliar with the American forest and with the language and customs of New England. As a natural result, the German commander, Baum, was completely hoodwinked by John Stark (Fig. 101), and his army surrounded and captured. Only about seventy of their number found their way back to Burgoyne. The result of this operation was greatly increased danger to Burgoyne's line of communications, while all New England was inspired with the happy

thought that if 1000 men could be captured, why not six or seven times that number?

As for the diversion in the Mohawk valley which was to be effected by St. Leger's column, it furnished abundant illustration of the old adage that it is always the unexpected that happens. After landing at Oswego, St. Leger moved through the woods until he reached the divide between the Lake Ontario watershed and that of the Mohawk valley. The site was near that on which the city of Rome



FIG. 102.—Thayendanegea. (McKenney's "Indian Tribes.")

now stands. St. Leger's progress was there barred by a strong block-house built in 1758, and called Fort Stanwix. It was garrisoned by Colonel Peter Gansevoort with 600 men. Sir John Johnson with his Tories turned out to aid St. Leger, but it happened that in the Mohawk country were many Germans who had come about sixty years before from the Rhenish Palatinate, and these were nearly all staunch Whigs. In an attempt to relieve Fort Stanwix, their commander, Nicholas Herkimer, fell into an ambush prepared by the great Mohawk chief

Thayendanegea (Fig. 102), better known as Joseph Brant, in concert with some of Johnson's troops. The place of ambush was near Oriskany, and the battle which ensued was one of the most obstinate and bloody of that war. Both sides claimed the victory; but the gallant Herkimer, who died of his wounds, was clearly thwarted in his purpose of relieving Fort Stanwix. It was not long, however, before aid came up the Mohawk valley in the person of Benedict Arnold with 1200 Massachusetts troops. A report which preceded Arnold magnified the capture of Baum's little force into the capture of Burgoyne's whole army, and added the news that the entire American army was coming up the valley with hands free to annihilate the foe. This news produced a panic in St. Leger's camp, and made the situation so alarming that he turned about and retreated to Oswego and thence to Montreal.

There was nothing now that could save Burgoyne unless a strong British force should come up the Hudson River, but this part of the campaign went more widely aside of the mark than any of the others. Sir William Howe fancied that great advantages must come from capturing the "rebel capital," Philadelphia, and he did not realize the necessity of postponing any such enterprise until after Burgoyne's success was assured. Moreover the traitor, Charles Lee, in his prison at New York, sought to curry favor with Howe by supplying him with what was supposed to be valuable information. Lee wrote a paper in which, to quote his own words, he "forthwith abandons the American cause and enters zealously and heartily into the service of the British." This paper in Lee's own handwriting and endorsed by Howe's secretary, Sir Henry Strachey, as "Mr. Lee's plan—March 29, 1777," was carried to England by Strachey, and there at his house in Somerset it was discovered about eighty years afterward, and thus revealed for the first time that the officer in the Continental army ranking next after Washington was a traitor as black as Benedict Arnold.

The effect of this paper must have been to keep Howe's attention concentrated upon operations toward Philadelphia, rather than toward Albany. At the beginning of June, Howe might well believe that he could march across New Jersey and take Philadelphia in due season to allow him afterward to extend all needful aid to Burgoyne. The element which he did not sufficiently consider was the genius of Washington. No sooner had Howe approached Washington's position at Morristown than the latter began a series of movements. The month of June was used up in manoeuvres; and at the end of it Howe confessed himself baffled, and retreated upon New York.

Howe's next move was to take the larger part of his army to Philadelphia by sea. He left Sir Henry Clinton in command at New York with 7000 men, and hoped that these would be able to reinforce Burgoyne if necessary. As the ascent of the Delaware River was obstructed by Fort Mercer and Fort Mifflin, Howe very unwisely made the long circuit through Chesapeake Bay, landing at Elkton, or what was then called Head of Elk. In making this unnecessarily long detour, Howe was probably influenced by the arguments of Lee, who had much to say about the strength of the Tory party in Maryland. Again and again did the British commanders go out of their way in pursuit of Tory allies, and often that pleasing idea proved a will-o'-the-wisp, luring them into ruin.

The beauty of interior lines is well shown in this summer's operations. If the British had at any time begun a movement up the Hudson, Washington could easily from his position in New Jersey have moved so as to confront them near the Tappan Zee; while it was equally easy for him to interpose between Philadelphia and a force advancing from the south. When Howe landed at the Head of Elk it was the 25th of August, and his summer haymaking had not yet begun; yet now he found Washington's army confronting him and must defeat it before he could advance upon the rebel capital. But for this fact Howe might easily have taken Philadelphia and despatched northward a sufficient force to relieve Burgoyne before the end of September. Hence the operations of the early autumn in Pennsylvania were even more important than the battles about Saratoga, in effecting Burgoyne's overthrow. Washington's qualities as a Fabian general are here shown in a fine light. With an army of 11,000 men imperfectly organized, he could only play a defensive game against Howe's 18,000. His position was chosen with consummate wisdom on the further bank of the Brandywine Creek. Difficult ground made his left wing quite unassailable; his centre had the advantage of position against any front attack, which must ford the stream and approach him up a rather steep slope, well crowned by batteries. His weakest point was the right wing, which, however, could only be reached by a circuitous flank march of eighteen miles.

Against this position General Howe's plan of attack was correct. His great superiority of numbers enabled him without imprudence to divide his army. Keeping 10,000 men in line of battle before Washington's centre, he sent Cornwallis with 8000 on the long flank march to turn the American left. Had this movement been completely suc-




FIG. 103. Cliveden: the Chew House, Germantown, Pa. ("Magazine of American History," vol. iv.)

cessful, striking the American wing obliquely in the rear, it would probably have scattered the Americans in rout. But its success was only partial. Washington anticipated Cornwallis' attack by forming a new front, with his left wing at right angles to its old position. An obstinate fight ensued between Cornwallis and Sullivan, who commanded this wing. Gradually Sullivan was pushed to the rear, and the remainder of the army was obliged to fall back to avoid being outflanked. Their organization was but slightly disturbed, and the next morning found them ready for another battle, had it been called for. Nothing is more common than to read that the Americans were routed at the Brandywine; but such statements show only that the writer has either never studied the battle, or has not learned the correct use of the English language. So far was Washington from being routed that he detained General Howe a fortnight on the short march of twenty-six miles to Philadelphia. Before the arrival of the British, Congress had retired to the town of York in Pennsylvania, which forthwith became the "rebel capital." Such feeble work as Congress could do was done as well in one town as another, so that Howe's entrance into Philadelphia was not precisely the same sort of thing as an entrance of Napoleon into Berlin or Vienna.

In order to secure his hold upon Philadelphia, it was necessary for Howe to take Forts Mercer and Mifflin, which closed the ascent of the Delaware River to British ships. The resistance of the forts was sufficiently obstinate to call for reinforcements from Sir Henry Clinton at New York, thus fatally delaying the last chance for sending any aid to Burgoyne. While Howe was busy in reducing the forts, his main army, quartered at Germantown, was reduced to 10,000 men; and Washington took advantage of this comparative weakness to return to the offensive. He planned a night march upon Germantown, intending to surprise the British camp at daybreak, and, if possible, compel their army to surrender. The plan contained the fashionable vice of converging attacks by different roads, with the almost inevitable result that one of the attacking columns arrived too late for perfect co-operation with the others. As it was, the plan came surprisingly near to success. Although the Americans were finally repulsed and driven from the field, the boldness and dash with which Washington so quickly assumed the offensive produced a deep impression upon competent judges.

We may now return to Burgoyne, whose situation was already becoming desperate in the last week of August, when Howe landed at Head of Elk. One of Burgoyne's best generals, Baron Riedesel (Fig.

104), advised an immediate retreat to Canada, while there was time to save the army. But Burgoyne could not rid himself of the belief that Howe would come up the Hudson River to meet him. It was the settled plan, and why should Howe have abandoned it? In accordance with this idea, Burgoyne crossed the Hudson on the 13th of September. The able and virtuous Schuyler, who had commanded our northern army, had lately been superseded. His conduct of the campaign had been excellent, but he had many enemies, especially among the New England people, and blame was visited upon nearly everything that he did. The general by whom he was superseded was Horatio Gates, one of the feeblest of military charlatans. The American army under Gates occupied a ridge known as Bemis



*Riedesel*

FIG. 104. Baron Riedesel. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.)

Heights, running at right angles to the Hudson River, a few miles below Saratoga. The position was a strong one, and it was occupied by more than 15,000 men; yet there was a road known as the Quaker Road, by which its left flank could be turned. Burgoyne made the attempt on the 19th of September. As his army reached the spot known as Freeman's Farm, it seemed to Arnold that he ought to be allowed to proceed no further. Arnold therefore asked Gates to allow him to go down from the heights and attack the British. Gates (Fig. 106) was unwilling that this should be done. He relied upon the general rule that when you are occupying a very strong position it is unwise to risk a portion of your men in an inferior position. Arnold, on the other hand, based his decision not upon

any general rule, but upon the actual circumstances of the case before him. The strength of the position on Bemis Heights would be of no avail to its occupants if Burgoyne should advance down the Quaker Road and turn their flank. To prevent this it was best to attack him at Freeman's Farm, and to accomplish this successfully the Americans had men enough and to spare. At last Gates was prevailed upon to order the movement, but in the worst way possible, since he allowed Arnold only 3000 men for it. With these 3000, Arnold checked the progress of 4000 British, and held them until nightfall at Freeman's Farm, but could not prevent their staying and sleeping there while he withdrew to



FIG. 105.—Madame Riedesel. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xii.)

Bemis Heights. All that afternoon Gates watched the affair from the heights, and would not spare a single company from his 12,000 men, who were idle there. Arnold maintained that with 2000 more men he could not only have held the enemy in check, but have completely defeated them. This affair led to a fierce quarrel between the two generals, in the course of which Gates told Arnold he had better go and report to Washington in Pennsylvania. But before Arnold had started, a round robin signed by nearly all the leading officers begged him not to leave them at the critical moment of this campaign; so he stayed on the ground, although apparently relieved of all command.

As day after day passed and no word came from below, the outlook for Burgoyne grew steadily worse. On the 7th of October he advanced once more upon Freeman's Farm, with the same hope as before of descending the Quaker Road and turning the American position. His advance was at first repulsed by Daniel Morgan, and the position of his right wing seriously compromised. In the attempt to cure the evil, a weak place was made between right wing and centre, whereupon Arnold, who was watching from the heights, instantly leaped upon his horse, and, coming down upon the field, where he was greeted with loud



*Horatio Gates*

FIG. 106.—Horatio Gates.

hurrahs, took command and led a spirited charge which tore the wing apart from the centre, and tore it to pieces by a cross-fire between Arnold (Fig. 107) and Morgan. After having disposed of the wing, these two generals turned upon the British centre, struck it in flank, and drove it from the field. Just in the moment of victory a cannon-ball killed Arnold's horse under him and crushed the leg that had been wounded at Quebec.

It hardly needed this defeat to convince poor Burgoyne that his

case was hopeless. At the eleventh hour Sir Henry Clinton had felt able to move in his behalf. The absence of the troops sent to Fort Mercer and Fort Mifflin had been made good by fresh troops from Europe, so that Clinton was able to advance into the Highlands. The news of this movement never reached the ears of Burgoyne, but rumors of it were conveyed to Gates; consequently, when Burgoyne refused to surrender without conditions, the American general thought it more prudent to offer easy terms than to risk an attack from the British force below. It was arranged that the captured army, something less than 6000 in number, should march to Boston and sail thence for Europe, on



FIG. 107.—Benedict Arnold. (From an engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

condition of giving their parole not to serve again in America during the present war. To the discredit of Congress, this agreement into which Gates had entered was never carried out, but was evaded under various miserable pretexts. The captured army was removed to Charlottesville in Virginia, and thence into the region west of the Blue Ridge in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Those who wished to go home were gradually allowed to do so; but a large proportion of them, especially the Germans, seem to have settled down in this country and to have become good citizens. Burgoyne, on returning to England, resumed his seat in the House of Commons, and was thenceforward

conspicuous as a defender of the Americans. He had come to this country a Tory; he went back a Whig.

The effects of the American victory at Saratoga were very far-reaching. In England they would ordinarily have involved the fall of the ministry, and doubtless would have had that effect as it was, had it not been for the sudden death of Lord Chatham. Since the king's policy—of which Lord North had been, sometimes against his will, the exponent—had now been proved a failure, the natural thing was for North to resign, in order that the opposite policy might be tried in the hands of its own advocates. The obstacle to such a natural arrangement was the unwholesome power which had been attained by the royal machine, combined with the king's ferocious hatred of Lord Chatham, to whom everyone looked as Lord North's successor. In view of these circumstances Lord North sought to adopt the extraordinary course of remaining in office and exchanging his own policy for that of the opposite party. To this end, he announced that all the points for the sake of which the Americans had gone to war would now be conceded to them once for all. Commissioners were to be appointed, with full powers to treat with the Americans for a solid peace on the basis of conceding everything except absolute independence. Some such relationship as that between Great Britain and Canada or Australasia at the present day would probably have resulted from this scheme.

But ever since the Stamp Act, France had been watching with keenest scrutiny every stage of the growing dissensions between Great Britain and her colonies. Since the outbreak of war, France had given secret aid to the Americans. She had lent money to Congress and had permitted American privateers to dispose of their prizes in French ports. At the time of which we are speaking, Dr. Franklin was living in Paris as agent for the Continental Congress, and was using his influence to secure the recognition of the United States by the French government. It was not the purpose of France to risk anything in the affair, unless it should become distinctly for her advantage to do so. But she was possessed by an overwhelming desire to be revenged upon Great Britain for the loss of her vast possessions in America, and the hope of repaying the debt in kind was too enticing. The moment it appeared that the British government and the Americans were likely to get upon a more friendly footing, France saw that action could no longer be deferred; so she stepped in and offered the Americans the bait of her alliance, solemnly promising never to desist from war until

Great Britain should acknowledge the independence of the United States. This agreement was completed in February, 1778; and as soon as it was known in England, war against France was at once declared.

Had Lord Chatham continued to live, the schemes of France might even then have failed. In a few weeks the king would have been forced to give way, Lord North would have resigned, and Chatham would have stepped to the front. The war with France made it more than ever imperative that this change should be made; and when once Chatham had become prime minister, he would certainly have undertaken the difficult task of pacifying America. It was just possible that two such men as Chatham and Washington, two of the grandest, loftiest, and purest that the world has ever seen, might have succeeded in preventing the severance of English America from Great Britain. One thing is clear: that the Americans respected Chatham as they respected no other man; and if he could not have accomplished such a difficult task, surely no other man could. His sudden death, therefore, early in May, greatly simplified the situation for the king's party and for France. Lord North was to remain in office, and, since the Americans had made an alliance with the house of Bourbon, the war against them was to be conducted in a more bitter spirit than before. Such was the king's idea, which Lord North, with some reluctance, consented to follow.

It is probable that after the Franco-American alliance the feelings of the English people were less friendly to the Americans than before, and it is certain that in America the strength of the Tory party was increased. During the rest of the war, especially in its darker moments, there were many Americans who did not disapprove of the Declaration of Independence, but thought nevertheless that Congress would better have listened to England's conciliatory overtures rather than make an alliance with the despotic power which we had for generations been taught to regard as our deadliest foe.

The winter which followed the surrender of Burgoyne was spent by the principal British force in Philadelphia, where with various social amusements they had quite a jolly time. That winter was spent by the American army at Valley Forge, and the tale of its sufferings there from inadequate fuel, food, and clothing is a familiar one. It was an important winter for the army in some respects, for it saw the arrival of Baron von Steuben, an accomplished Prussian officer, who had been on the staff of Frederick the Great. Steuben introduced into the Continental army a system of tactics and discipline based upon Prussian

usage, and the effects of this were visible in the later years of the war.

The situation of Washington at that time was peculiarly trying. His two battles of Brandywine and Germantown, although we can now appreciate their value, counted at the time merely as two defeats, while the two battles fought by Arnold at Freeman's Farm were counted as great victories, and the credit for them was generally given to Gates, who received Burgoyne's surrender. There were many people, therefore, who considered the feeble Gates a greater general than Washington, and would have been glad to see the latter superseded by the former. A discontented soldier of fortune named Conway, who had long been in the French service, took offence at some fancied slight on the part of Washington, and became one of the leading spirits in an intrigue since known as the Conway Cabal, the purpose of which was by dint of calumnies and insults to drive Washington into resigning his position. In the dirty work of this intrigue Gates took an ample part, and, before the end, was so thoroughly convicted of treachery and falsehood that one is inclined to wonder how he could ever afterward have held up his head before his fellow-men. Insulting letters were concocted and left in Washington's way, Congress was persuaded to sanction measures which indicated want of confidence in him, and some of the conspirators went so far as to forge letters which purported to come from members of his household, and, if genuine, would have convicted him of unfaithfulness to the American cause. Instead of being driven out of his country's service, however, Washington acutely followed some of the clews presented him, detecting sundry of the plotters and sternly holding them up to scorn. At no time in his career does Washington appear more grand than in that winter at Valley Forge. It presently appeared that the effect of the Conway Cabal had been to strengthen Washington, while the men concerned in it had simply wrought their own disgrace.

So far as the general political outlook was concerned, the Valley Forge winter was not one of the dark seasons of the Revolution, but quite the contrary. People exulted in the overthrow of Burgoyne, and great hopes were built upon the French alliance. It was predicted that the British army would be driven out of the country before the end of the year, and indeed the opening of the summer saw what looked like a first gleam of great successes. For the first time the British naval supremacy on our coasts was to be disputed by a French fleet, and the knowledge of this fact led their army to evacuate Philadelphia. This

step was really a mere matter of military economy on the part of the British; Philadelphia had been of no use to them, and it was hardly worth while to be at the trouble of holding the mouths of two great rivers when one would suffice as a base for their operations; consequently



FIG. 108.<sup>1</sup>—Caricature representing the commerce of Great Britain in the form of a cow. (From an unlettered proof in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

in June, 1778, the British abandoned Philadelphia and marched across New Jersey. Sir William Howe, the Whig general, had lately gone home to defend his military conduct against the attacks of the king's friends, and the chief command in America was now held by Sir Henry

<sup>1</sup> EXPLANATION OF FIG. 108.

The commerce of Great Britain, represented in the figure of a milch cow.

The American Congress sawing off her horns, which are her natural strength and defence; the one being already gone, the other just a-going.

The jolly, plump Dutche man milking the poor, tame cow with great glee.

The Frenchman and Spaniard, each catching at their respective shares of the produce, and running away with bowls brimming full, laughing to one another at their success.

The good ship Eagle laid up, and moved at some distance from Philadelphia, without sails or guns, and showing nothing but naked port-holes;—all the rest of the fleet invisible, nobody knows where.

The two brothers napping it, one against the other, in the city of Philadelphia, out of sight of fleet and army.

The British lion lying on the ground fast asleep, so that a pug-dog tramples upon him, as on a lifeless log: he seems to see nothing, hear nothing, and feel nothing.

A free Englishman in mourning, standing by him, wringing his hands, casting up his eyes in despondency and despair, but unable to rouse the lion to correct all these invaders of his royal prerogative, and his subjects' property.

Clinton (Fig. 109). In the present retreat, Clinton's object was to reach New York without a battle; while it was greatly for Washington's interest that he should pursue and bring on a fight, whereby to cripple the British as much as possible. The plan was laid with Washington's customary skill, but was ruined by the misconduct of the rascally Charles Lee, who had resumed his place in the American army. Upon Lee's capture in December, 1776, a question had arisen as to whether it would be possible to punish him as a deserter from the British army; and in reply to a question from General Howe, the king had ordered him to be sent to England for trial. But Washington checked these proceedings by informing Howe that he held five Hessian field-officers as hostages for Lee's personal safety. This led to a long discussion, in which the king



FIG. 109. Sir Henry Clinton. (From a copy of a mezzotint. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

was discomfited and finally authorized General Howe to treat Lee as a prisoner of war, subject to exchange in the regular way. Lee was thus in a very peculiar position. He had secretly abandoned the American cause and joined the British, yet he could not avow this fact without giving up his American protection. His record was so bad that as a returned British prodigal he seemed likely to meet the executioner, rather than the fatted calf. Thus under a sort of moral compulsion he drifted back as an exchanged prisoner into the American service, this wretch, whom the chances of war might at any moment make commander-in-chief of our army.

Lee's behavior during this campaign was deemed unaccountable at the time, and has never since been satisfactorily explained. Wash-

ton's plan was to follow the British by a converging road and strike their rear-guard obliquely, so as to throw them into confusion before their advance-guard could return to their aid. The American attack was not to be simultaneous; but Lee, with the American van, was to engage the British rear and keep it hotly engaged until Washington



FIG. 110.—Marquis de Lafayette. (From a rare mezzotint by Charles Willson Peale.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

should come up and strike what was hoped would prove a crushing blow. Lee condemned this plan, and even refused to have anything to do with it. Washington then assigned the work to Lafayette, a young officer in whose judgment he had come to place great confidence.

The Marquis de Lafayette (Fig. 110) was a member of one of the

most aristocratic and famous families in France. In 1777, when he was eighteen years of age, he heard the story of Washington's campaign of Trenton and Princeton, and conceived such an admiration for that commander that an uncontrollable impulse brought him across the ocean to fight by his side. His coming was contrary to the orders of Louis XVI., who at that time was not ready to have it supposed that the French were giving aid to the Americans. On his arrival in this country, in spite of his youth, Lafayette received from Congress an appointment as major-general in the Continental army. He had associated on peculiarly intimate terms with Washington and Greene, and, without possessing genius himself, had learned from them many good lessons.



FIG. III.—Washington and Lee at Monmouth.

When Lee found that Washington's plan was to be carried out under Lafayette's direction, he became restive, and presently told Washington that he had changed his mind, and would like to undertake the movement. Lafayette gracefully yielded the point, and for the sake of general harmony the change was made. Everything went on successfully until the sultry morning of June 28, when Lee overtook the British near Monmouth Court-house, in a position where the contemplated blow upon their flank could hardly have failed to throw them into disorder; but just at that moment, to the general astonishment, Lee ordered a retreat. The British, in their turn, instantly gave chase. It was not long before Lee met Washington at the head of his advancing column. The men who then beheld Washington's face and listened to his terrific outburst of wrath could never forget the scene for the rest of their lives,

Washington's appearance, it was said, was positively awful, while Lee was so cowed that he could not articulate a word. Washington ordered him to the rear, while he himself went on to give orders which changed impending defeat into something that might be called victory. At all events the British were compelled to retire from the scene, though with far less damage than Washington had intended. Lee was tried by court-martial for disobedience of orders, and suspended from command. Duels and reriminations followed, and presently Congress dismissed Lee from the army. Had the facts been known then which have since



FIG. 112.—Charles Henry, Count d'Estaing. (From an engraving by Gunther, after a painting by Sublet. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

been discovered, he would undoubtedly have been shot or hanged. As it was, he lived in disgrace long enough to witness the triumph of the American cause, and in October, 1782, died in a tavern at Philadelphia, friendless and alone.

The military operations of the year 1778 did not fulfil the high expectations with which it started. Count d'Estaing (Fig. 112) arrived upon the scene with a fleet large enough to dispute the control of the waters, and for a moment Washington hoped to recapture New York. This proved impossible, because the French admiral could not get his great line-of-battle ships across the bar. It was next decided to attack Rhode Island,

where a British force of 6000 men was stationed, under command of Sir Robert Pigott. This enterprise was entrusted to the French fleet, assisted by a land force under Greene and Sullivan. It resulted in complete failure, fortunately without much loss of life. There were plentiful misunderstandings between the Americans and French, and in some towns popular indignation against the new alliance took the form of riots.



FIG. 143. Anthony Wayne. (From sketch by Col. J. Trumbull.)

As we shall presently see, the military policy of the British was now changed, and their attention was directed chiefly to the Southern states. At the North, during the remainder of the war, there were no military operations of a higher character than raids, unless we make an exception in the case of Stony Point. Small detachments of British, under cover of their ships, made incursions upon the coasts of Connecticut,

sometimes in order to obtain or destroy supplies, sometimes in order to divert Washington's attention from New York and afford an opening for Sir Henry Clinton. On one of these occasions, in the summer of 1779, when it was hoped that Washington would pursue the British into Connecticut, he preferred to recall them to New York, and did so by a very effective stroke. The British had taken one of the fortifications in the Highlands, known as Stony Point, and had taken great pains to fortify it. Washington ordered Anthony Wayne (Fig. 113) to storm this fort, and the work was done in the most brilliant and spirited manner, the Americans rushing over the works with levelled bayonets, and capturing the entire garrison without firing a shot.

The other operations at the North were mostly concerned with the Indians on the frontier, all the way from the Mohawk valley into Kentucky. There would probably have been very much the same trouble with the Indians, even if we had not been at war with Great Britain. Our frontier was steadily moving westward over the Alleghany Mountains, and fresh causes of war with the native tribes arose day by day. The Algonquin tribes of the Ohio valley were ready to fight us on their own account, and we could no longer rely upon the friendship of the Six Nations. They had, on the whole, been fast friends of the English as against the French; but when their friends the English became divided into two hostile camps, their minds were puzzled. It was hard for them to decide whether they ought to consider as their true friends the "King Georges" or "The Bostons," for so they distinguished between British and Americans. Upon this question the Long House was divided against itself: the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, under the influence of New England missionaries, sided with the Americans; while the rest of the league, under the influence of the Johnson family, took sides with the British. Upon the New York frontier were many Tories, whose wild forest life seems to have made them as savage as their cinnamon-colored friends, and the frontier raids of Tories and Indians are among the most harrowing memories of that troubled time. Especially odious is the fame of Captain John Butler and his son Walter. It is customary to associate with these Tories the name of the great war-chief, Joseph Brant (Fig. 114); but the latter deserves a better judgment than can be meted out to the former. Among Indians, Brant was as exceptional for humanity as the Butlers were noted among white men for ferocity. On the whole, Brant was the most remarkable Indian of whom we have any knowledge. A large part of the Mohawk tribe had been converted to Christianity, and Brant especially was a devout Christian; though he excelled

all other Indians for boldness and tenacity on the war-path, he usually spared his captives and never would allow torture under any circumstances whatever.

The best-remembered of all the Tory and Indian raids is the one which laid waste the vale of Wyoming in Pennsylvania in July, 1778. Many readers have formed their ideas of the great Mohawk chief from Campbell's celebrated poem, "Gertrude of Wyoming." But the "monster Brant" of that poem took no part in that expedition, and the




FIG. 111. JOSEPH BRANT. (From a mezzotint published in London, February, 1777, after a painting by Romney. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

shocking scenes at Wyoming occurred while he was nearly three hundred miles away. The blood-shed on that occasion was mostly the work of the Seneca tribe, with the assistance of the Butlers. Another affair of that season was the raid upon Cherry Valley, in which Brant was concerned. Things came to such a pass that Washington despatched a force under Sullivan, which devoted the summer of 1779 to overrunning and devastating the Iroquois country. The work was so thoroughly done that it may be counted as the heaviest blow which the

Long House had ever received since its foundation. Nevertheless, the molestation of the frontier by Indians did not fully cease until the end of the war.

The Indian war southwest of New York resulted in a memorable conquest for the United States. The vast territory out of which the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, with part of Minnesota, have since been formed was then given over to its native



A large, flowing cursive signature of "Clarke" in black ink, with a decorative flourish at the bottom.

FIG. 115.—George Rogers Clarke. (From an engraving by F. B. Welch.)

red men. According to the Quebec Act of 1774, which declared the Ohio River to be the southern boundary of Canada, all that fair land belonged to the British; but a young Virginian named George Rogers Clarke (Fig. 115) was not disposed to acquiesce in such a conclusion. He took counsel with Thomas Jefferson, and raised a small force of not over 300 Virginians, sturdy backwoodsmen, selected for character and accomplishments; and in 1779, in a wonderful forest campaign, he acquired for the United States the whole of that vast territory. Its

principal fortresses at Cahokia, Kaskaskia, Vincennes, Detroit, and other points were held by Virginia troops until after the end of the war. But for the memorable expedition of George Rogers Clarke, we should very likely have failed to obtain this territory at the peace of 1783.

Warfare in the interior of the country was necessarily of the guerilla sort, conducted by small bodies of men. The regular armies of the British could move but a short distance from the coast, by reason of their dependence upon the fleet. Any march into the interior involved the exposure of a steadily lengthening line of communications, as was illustrated by the fate of Burgoyne. On the other hand, the Americans were unable to gain any material advantage over the British at sea. We had no navy fit to engage in great operations. But in what might be called guerilla fighting on the ocean, there was much activity. The damage done to American shipping by British cruisers was immense, but in return the damage inflicted by American cruisers was very considerable. During the cruise of Gustavus Conyngham in the North Sea in the summer of 1778, he took so many prizes that marine insurance in London rose as high as 25 per cent., a rate until then unheard of. The most famous of our cruisers at that day was Paul Jones (Fig. 116), who was not a privateer, but a captain in regular standing in the American navy. In 1779 Paul Jones cruised about the British Islands, sometimes making brief raids on land. On a September evening he aroused much excitement among the good people of Edinburgh by dashing into the Frith of Forth, whence, however, he was presently swept by a powerful wind. A few evenings afterward his small flotilla encountered off Flamborough Head a fleet of forty British merchantmen, under convoy of a powerful 44-gun frigate, the Serapis, and a 20-gun sloop, the Countess of Scarborough. Jones had three ships, the largest of which, the Bon Homme Richard, so named after Franklin's Poor Richard, was about equivalent to a 38-gun frigate; the Pallas was equivalent to a 32-gun frigate; and the Alliance was an unusually fine 32-gun frigate built in a Massachusetts dockyard, but with a French commander and crew. In the fight which ensued, the Alliance disobeyed orders and took no part; the Pallas easily captured the inferior Countess of Scarborough; while the struggle between the Bon Homme Richard and the Serapis was one of the most desperate and sanguinary on record. It ended in the capture of the Serapis, whose captain, Robert Pearson, was deservedly knighted for the gallantry with which he fought his ship. On hearing of this, Paul Jones good-naturedly observed, "If ever I meet him again, I'll make a lord of him."

In spite of the British supremacy upon the sea, or rather perhaps because of it, a number of difficulties grew out of the maritime affairs which in many ways served to hamper Great Britain and to diminish her available fighting strength. These difficulties related mostly to the blockading of coasts and the rights of neutral ships and cargoes. Jealousy and dread of British naval strength led most of the continental



*PAUL JONES*

FIG. 116.—Paul Jones.

powers to agree upon a system of international rules intended to protect the rights of neutrals in time of war. Such a system of rules was promulgated in 1780 by the Empress Catherine of Russia, and it must be regarded as by far the most creditable event of her reign. One of these rules declares that the flag of a neutral power hoisted over a ship protects

all persons carried on such ship, and all goods and chattels except such as are contraband of war; and this class of contraband is limited to materials actually used in warfare, such as arms and ammunition. Another rule is that which forbids paper blockades, declaring that any blockade, in order to be respected, must be such as to make it dangerous for ships to pass through it. These rules of the Empress Catherine have done much toward limiting the area and diminishing the frequency of warfare. Their direct effect upon Great Britain was to limit her aggressive power. Russia, Sweden, and Denmark formed a league known as the Armed Neutrality, the purpose of which was to enforce the Empress Catherine's rules.

The breaking-out of war between England and France entailed various complications, one of which was the breaking-out of war between England and Spain. France persuaded Spain to come to her aid, according to the spirit of the old Family Compact. In return for sundry services, France joined Spain in laying siege to Gibraltar, and promised never to leave off war with Great Britain until that power should surrender Gibraltar to Spain. It will be remembered that France had promised the United States not to desist from the war until Great Britain should acknowledge their independence. Here was France bound to two different allies by two very different agreements, each of which might easily prove incompatible with the other. In point of fact, France did keep her promise to the United States, while she was unable to keep that which she had given to Spain. The latter power, on the other hand, while she entered into the contest as an ally of France, made no treaty of alliance with the United States, and made no secret of the fact that she detested the Americans. Before the end of the year 1780, complications arose with Holland which added her to the list of England's foes. The result of all this was that a great deal of British strength was absorbed in military operations in various quarters of the globe, such as Hindostan, the East and West Indies, the Mediterranean, and the western coast of Africa, so that her aggressive strength in America was reduced to a small figure. In 1780, Great Britain had at least 314,000 men under arms, while at the same time we read of Cornwallis in the Carolinas conducting a skilful and heroic fight with little armies of 2000 or 3000. These facts speak eloquently of the important consequences that grew out of the French alliance.

Such facts, however, were not well understood in America at the time. To many persons it seemed that the alliance had proved worthless. The joint enterprise of French and Americans at Newport had

been a complete failure. Another such joint enterprise at the South, rather more than a year later, met with similar ill fortune. It is time for us to turn our attention in that direction and observe the situation.

After the failure of the first plan to break through the American centre in the state of New York, the British government resorted to an entirely different method: namely, to begin at the extreme South and gradually work northward, leaving at each stage of progress a reconquered and loyal country in the rear. This plan had at least one circumstance to recommend it: there was unquestionably a strong Tory party in all the colonies south of Virginia. At the same time those



FIG. 117.—Casimir Pulaski. (From a lithograph by Villain, after a Polish painting.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

states contained a stronger revolutionary party than the British realized, while the mountain population was destined to prove as troublesome to the invaders as the Green Mountain Boys had shown themselves at the North.

In the autumn of 1778 the British landed in Georgia and soon had possession of the city of Savannah, while they reinstated the royal governor, Sir James Wright, and put things back, so far as possible, where they were before 1776. In the following autumn the fleet of Count d'Estaing again appeared upon the scene, and, in concert with the American land force under General Lincoln, an assault was made upon Savannah. It was repulsed with heavy loss, and thus once more

was the French alliance held up to view in the light of a failure. The spring of 1780 had a heavier calamity in store. Sir Henry Clinton had gone to South Carolina, taking Cornwallis with him, while the force in New York was left in charge of the able Hessian general, Knyphausen. In the month of May the city of Charleston, together with General Lincoln and his army of 6000 men, were surrendered to Sir Henry Clinton. In point of magnitude this was one of the most crushing calamities of the war. It was followed in South Carolina by something like a reign of terror; strife between Whigs and Tories had reached the acute stage of civil war. Under the guise of partisan war-



FIG. 118. — Baron de Kalb. (From an engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

fare, bands of armed men with no other object than plunder went hither and thither, making life hideous for well-disposed persons. All organized resistance to the British seemed to have been stamped out, and early in the summer Clinton returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis in South Carolina to preside over what were destined to be the last operations of the war.

The blow was keenly felt by Congress at Philadelphia and by Washington at his headquarters in Morristown. By dint of heroic exertions, coupled with all possible economy in the use of troops, an army of 3000 men was raised, about half of them old Continentals whom

long service had made fully a match for the best European infantry. The choice of a general to command this little force was of the first importance. General Gates was still in high favor with Congress, and he was appointed in spite of grave warnings from Washington. It was a moment of triumph for Gates. On his journey southward he stopped to visit his friend Charles Lee at a house in the Shenandoah valley, where that eccentric personage was then living in retirement. Lee was much too keen to share in the prevalent delusion as to Gates's ability, and he could not resist the temptation to make one of his



FIG. 119.—Francis Marion. (From an unlettered proof of engraving by Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

cutting remarks. As the newly made general of the Southern army mounted his horse to go, Lee wrung his hand fervently and exclaimed, "Good-bye, my dear Gates. Pray have a care that your Northern laurels do not change to Southern willows."

This saucy remark was like a prophecy of what was coming. We have not space in this chapter to give the details of the ensuing campaign; they may be found in my "History of the American Revolution." Suffice it to say that there was scarcely a mistake which it was possible to make, whether in strategy or in tactics, that Gates did not commit in those few weeks. The melancholy story was ended when he

confronted Cornwallis at Camden on the 16th of August. It was the most crushing defeat ever experienced by Americans on the field of battle. More than half of the little American force was swept out of existence, while the rest were left in too demoralized a state to be good for anything. Once more South Carolina seemed lost. The only signs of life left upon the American side were the flickering activities kept up by Marion (Fig. 119) and Sumter; in these there was the omen of a brighter future, but at present few gave heed to it.



FIG. 120.—Count Rochambeau.

An evil star seemed to pursue the French alliance. Both the campaigns undertaken with the aid of Count d'Estaing had completely failed. Early in 1780 Lafayette went home for a visit, and persuaded the French government to put forth greater efforts. Accordingly a force of 12,000 infantry was raised for America. The first half of it, commanded by Count Rochambeau (Fig. 120), succeeded in reaching Rhode Island in July, but had scarcely arrived when all the French ships were blockaded in Narragansett Bay by a British squadron. The other half was bottled up in Brest by a British fleet, and never got away from France. In spite of these mishaps, the French alliance, as we have already pointed out, had been of incalculable assistance to the Americans, inasmuch as it

locked up a vast amount of British energy which would otherwise have been available in America. This bringing of Rochambeau and his 6000 men across the ocean was also a most important gain for us, but that of course was not visible at the moment. In point of fact, both British and Americans were nearly at the end of their resources; but the American exhaustion was the more visible. It showed itself in the course of the summer in the complete collapse of the currency. Early in the war, Congress had begun issuing its promissory notes, the value of which depended upon the general belief that it would at some time be able to redeem them. From the beginning, this confidence was not able to keep them at par; but the decline was not rapid until after the disappointments of 1778. During the next eighteen months their






FIG. 121.—Specimen of Continental money.

value declined with frightful rapidity, until the worst thing that you could say about any object of contempt was that it was not worth a continental. When the price of tea in Continental currency reached \$90 a pound, and an ordinary suit of clothes cost \$2000, this wretched paper might well be said to have lost its purchasing power. Washington was confronted with the almost hopeless problem of keeping an army together without clothes, food, or money. In his correspondence we hear the note of discouragement for the first time in the summer of 1780, when in a letter to Congress he lets fall the words, "Indeed, I have almost ceased to hope."

At this trying time there were people in the country who thought that when we accepted the alliance with France, instead of listening to the conciliatory overtures of Lord North after Saratoga, we had made a



FIGS. 122 and 123.—Specimens of Continental money

great mistake. Had we listened to Lord North, it would have been a great and decisive victory for us, won through our own unaided exertions. We had driven the British government to concede everything that we had originally gone to war about. The circumstances were such that the British government could never again have put forth the

claims which had been the source of all the trouble. Had the United States in 1778 shown the magnanimity involved in merely waiving the question of independence, after having sustained its original position fully in a single-handed combat against Great Britain, its moral position would have been little short of sublime. Such was the view taken




FIG. 124.—Specimen of Virginia currency.




FIG. 125.—Specimen of New Jersey currency.

of the case by some of the more moderate Tories. It may well have been held by people who had assented to the Declaration of Independence. Such people could now find fault with Congress for having entered into an unprofitable foreign alliance, and for having undertaken a course of resistance which was evidently ending in universal ruin.




FIG. 126.—Beverley Robinson House, Arnold's headquarters. ("Magazine of American History," vol. iv.)

Might it not be better, even at this eleventh hour, to abandon this resistance, to give up the French alliance, and to make peace with Lord North's government, provided the latter was still inclined to make favorable terms?

Such was the course which the thoughts of Benedict Arnold seem to have been taking since the disappointing summer of 1778. In June of that year, when the British evacuated Philadelphia, he was placed in

command of that city, because the wound received at Saratoga had not yet sufficiently recovered to allow him to take the field. Before going to Philadelphia, Arnold had received from Congress sundry unquestionable slights, nor was he the only able officer who had to put up with such indignities. Stark, Greene, and Morgan, among others, received their share of ill treatment. After Arnold's arrival at Philadelphia, he got into quarrels with the civil government of Pennsylvania. Moreover, he associated much with Tories, and before the lapse of a year had married a lady belonging to one of the foremost Tory families. His



*Major André*

FIG. 127.—Major André. (From an engraving by W. G. Jackson.)

quarrels culminated in the bringing of sundry charges against him by the executive council of Pennsylvania. These charges were investigated twice, with the result that he was exonerated on all except two very trivial ones. On the first occasion a complete acquittal was recommended, but on the second occasion it was ordered that he should receive a reprimand from the head of the army on the score of the two trivial charges. Washington so worded the reprimand as to make it a delicate tribute to Arnold's military services, but there can be little doubt that the affair enraged Arnold sufficiently to push him over the brink upon

which he was hesitating. Desire for revenge upon Congress undoubtedly entered into the proceedings which followed.

The cause of American independence seemed so near the point of death that one more military reverse would probably bring the war to a close. Such a military reverse might be brought about by putting the British in possession of the Hudson River, for which they had vainly striven in the early years of the war. Arnold seems to have thought that by performing for them the enormous service of delivering West Point into their hands, he might secure for himself a leading part in the negotiations for peace that would in all probability follow. Having conceived such an idea, he proceeded to carry it out in a way that was




FIG. 128.—André rowing ashore from the *Vulture*. (From a sketch by himself.)

almost incredibly base. He sought from Washington the command of West Point, in order that he might hand it over to the enemy; and when Washington, by granting his request, gave him the highest possible proof of his confidence and esteem, he immediately entered into a plot with Sir Henry Clinton for the betrayal of the fortress. The results were the capture and execution of Clinton's agent, Major John André, the flight of Arnold to the British, and the total wreck of a once brilliant career. The whole story is one of the saddest and most shameful episodes in American history.

Scarcely a week had passed since the execution of André when the country was electrified with the unaccustomed news of victory. There



PLATE X.



General Nathaniel Greene.

From a mezzotint by Green, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

came the first of a brilliant series of successes at the South, which in the course of another year decided the war in favor of the Americans. One of Lord Cornwallis' best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, at the head of 1100 bush-ranging troops, mostly Carolina Tories, ventured on one of his excursions a little too far into the Appalachian region, and was suddenly set upon by the mountain population. Taking refuge in what seemed to him an inexpugnable position on the summit of King's Mountain, he was there attacked by the backwoodsmen, who stormed the hill and captured nearly all of Ferguson's force. The gallant major himself was among the slain, and this achievement cost the Americans only 28 killed and 61 wounded. The severity of the



FIG. 129.—Capture of André. (From an engraving by Jones & Smilie, after a painting by Durand. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

blow to Cornwallis consisted largely in its depriving him of so many light-armed troops accustomed to the American forest.

Soon after the victory at King's Mountain, Congress requested Washington to appoint a commander for the army in South Carolina, and he instantly gave the place to Greene (PLATE X.). This wise selection was the beginning of the end. As already observed, both parties to the war were so nearly exhausted that a decided military success on either side must be conclusive. The appointment of Greene secured such a military success for the Americans. It brought matters into such a shape that the great blow at Yorktown became possible.

Part of Greene's success at the South was due to the rare ability with which he used the talents of several able subordinates, giving to each one the exact work which he was best fitted to do. He had under his



FIG. 130.—Major André. From a sketch by himself, with pen, the day before his execution.

command some of the best officers in the Continental service, such as Daniel Morgan, the three partisans, Marion, Sumter, and Pickens, and two highly accomplished leaders of cavalry, William Washington, a cousin of the commander-in-chief, and Henry Lee (Fig. 132), familiarly



FIG. 131.—Benedict Arnold in effigy. From a wood cut representing the procession in Philadelphia, September 30, 1780. (Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Known as "Light-Horse Harry," father of the famous Robert Edward Lee of the great civil war.

Greene's utmost exertions could only gather 2000 men, with which

to oppose the 3000 with which Cornwallis held Camden. Under these circumstances Greene adopted a course the boldness of which was justified by the result. Avoiding battle with Cornwallis, he divided his own force into two portions to operate against the enemy's communications. He himself, with 1100 men, took a position from which he could threaten Cornwallis' communications with the coast; this work was done with truly artistic skill by Lee and Marion. At the same time



*H. Lee*

FIG. 132.—Henry Lee. (From an engraving by A. H. Ritchie.)

Daniel Morgan, with 900 men, was sent westward to threaten Cornwallis' communications with his interior forest garrisons. In this work Morgan's cavalry was commanded by William Washington, who soon annoyed Cornwallis to such an extent that the most active and enterprising of all the British subordinates, Colonel Banastre Tarleton (Fig. 133), was sent with 1100 men to look after him. Morgan and Washington

retreated before Tarleton until they came to a grazing-ground for cattle, commonly known as the Cowpens. In its rear flowed the Broad River, which made retreat impossible; but retreat was not what Morgan had in mind. Parallel with the river, at intervals of about 150 yards, ran a series of low hillocks with gently sloping sides, excellent ground for cavalry, and at the same time with slope enough to give the Americans the advantage in a charge. On the first of these ridges in front of the river, Morgan placed Washington with his cavalry. On the second slope



FIG. 143.—Banastre Tarleton. (From a mezzotint by Smith, after a painting by Reynolds. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

he stationed himself with about 500 Continental infantry, chiefly Maryland and Virginia troops who had been under arms during the whole of the war, and a fair match for any infantry that could be seen in Europe. On the next ridge in front he placed Andrew Pickens with a skirmish-line of Carolina militia, sturdy men who could be relied on for nerve and resource, though they were not veterans.

It was soon after sunrise on the bright, crisp morning of January 17, 1781, that Tarleton deployed his column in front of the American posi-

tion. Repeated successes had made Tarleton feel invincible, and he rushed against the Carolina skirmish-line in a splendid charge, which it could not withstand. They were not the kind of men, however, who would scatter and run, and in Pickens they had a most capable leader. In giving way before Tarleton, after meeting him with three or four effective volleys, they retired in good order, plying into column as they passed the extreme left of Morgan's Continentals. They continued their march in a great sweep around to the rear of Colonel Washington's hill, where Pickens received fresh orders from Morgan.



*Dan Morgan*

FIG. 134.—Daniel Morgan. (From an engraving by J. F. E. Prudhomme.)

Having thus brushed away Pickens and his troops, Tarleton advanced on the double-quick toward Morgan's line of Continentals. The numerical superiority of the British made it just possible that they might succeed in turning Morgan's right flank, but this danger he obviated by refusing it in a crotchet. Not a flash came from Morgan's levelled rifles, while on came the formidable line of redcoats until they were within thirty yards. Then all at once, like thunder from a clear sky,

came the crack of doom for the British. Colonel Washington, who had come down from his hill in a superb sweep, rushed upon their right flank at full gallop. Pickens and his men, who had continued their march and passed Morgan's right wing, suddenly wheeled and fell upon the British left flank; while simultaneously Morgan's line poured out a withering fire like that of Bunker Hill, and followed it with a rush of bayonets. Thus entrapped, the British did the only thing possible: threw down their arms and surrendered on the spot, all save Tarleton and a handful of followers, who in a sharp, furious fight cut their way out and fled. The British loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was about equal to the whole American force engaged. The total American loss was 12 killed and 61 wounded. The dimensions of this battle were tiny, but for brilliancy of design and neatness of execution was it not a kind of Leuthen in miniature?

Its most obvious effect upon the fortunes of Cornwallis was that it deprived him of nearly all his remaining light troops. He was now about to enter upon a chase that required him to throw away heavy baggage. As soon as Greene heard the news of the Cowpens, he set his main army in motion, with orders to push across North Carolina. Greene himself at once joined Morgan, who was retreating in a northeasterly direction before Cornwallis. Greene's purpose was to draw Cornwallis to a dangerous distance from his base, and away from all reasonable hope of reinforcement; while in marching toward Virginia, Greene was presently sure of meeting reinforcements that were coming down through that state. After a skilful retreat Greene had reunitied his army and received reinforcements which raised its numbers to 1000. With this force he attacked Cornwallis at Guilford Court-house on the 15th of March. After a desperate struggle of seven hours, the British drove from the field an enemy that outnumbered them two to one. In the honor-roll of the British army, Guilford Court-house is a distinguished name. It is also a name full of credit for the Americans, for it marks the culmination of a masterpiece of strategy on Greene's part. The circumstances under which it was fought were such that Cornwallis could only achieve safety by destroying Greene's army. Merely to push it off the field was not enough. But it was quite enough for Greene's purposes that he inflicted upon Cornwallis the loss of nearly one-third of his little force. On the following day there was a pursuit, as often happens after a battle, only that on this occasion the usual order of things was reversed, and the curious spectacle was witnessed of the vanquished army pursuing the victors. It was an imperative necessity

for Cornwallis to reach the coast, and he made for Wilmington, with Greene following closely upon his heels.

Greene's next movement shows the marvellous accuracy with which he read the situation. At Petersburg in Virginia was a British force commanded by General Phillips. Greene rightly believed that Cornwallis, if left to himself, would march to Petersburg, instead of acknowledging himself baffled by returning in ships to Charleston. As for the difficult march back to Camden, he was not likely to attempt it. After a pursuit of about fifty miles, therefore, Greene left Cornwallis to himself and marched with all possible celerity upon Camden.



FIG. 135.—Francis, Lord Rawdon, Marquis of Hastings. (From an engraving by Collyer after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

That important post, the principal centre of roads in the Carolinas, was held by Lord Rawdon (Fig. 135). The greatest success for Greene would have been the destruction of Rawdon's army. This he did not achieve, but, on the other hand, was defeated in a battle at Hobkirk's Hill; but under his directions, Marion and Lee captured Fort Watson, which commanded the communications of Camden with the coast, so that Rawdon was obliged to evacuate that place. Thus, step by step, the

whole of South Carolina was recovered by Greene. In his last battle, at Eutaw Springs on September 8, he began by defeating the British, who presently, taking a second position, defeated him; but once more it happened that on the following day the enemy retreated while he pursued. From that time forth the British retained nothing in the Carolinas, except the city of Charleston.

We may now return to Wilmington, and see how things fared with Lord Cornwallis during that memorable spring and summer. As Greene had divined, Cornwallis thought he could discern more advantage in a junction with Phillips than in a return to South Carolina. Accordingly Cornwallis marched to Petersburg, where he found himself at the head of a force exceeding 5000 men, to which was opposed a little army of observation numbering scarcely 3000, and commanded by Lafayette. This small force was a tempting bait, and Cornwallis pursued it as far north as the Rapidan, and back again to the James, without being able to bring Lafayette to battle. Meanwhile the American force kept increasing by reinforcements from the North, until after a campaign of six weeks it began to outnumber the British. Cornwallis had hoped to find many Tories in Virginia; but in this he was utterly disappointed, and at length he made up his mind to retire to the seacoast and await further reinforcements. He hoped to be able to persuade Sir Henry Clinton even to let go of New York if need be, in order to join him in striking a heavy blow at Virginia.

On general principles Cornwallis was taking the safest step possible, when he retired to the Yorktown peninsula; for he could always count upon the British control of the sea. It was early in August that he made his headquarters at Yorktown, having with him over 7000 men, while Lafayette with 5000 encamped on Malvern Hill and sent messengers to Washington, informing him of the situation.

Now it happened that the British control of the sea was to be for a moment rudely interrupted. The French government wished to take the island of Jamaica from the British; and with this end in view, they sent over to the West Indies a fleet of thirty-four ships, carrying 1700 guns and 20,000 men, an armament which was much more than a match for any British naval force in American waters. The admiral of this fleet, Comte de Grasse (Fig. 136), had permission to co-operate with Rochambeau upon the American coast, if thought desirable; the situation was discussed between Washington and Rochambeau, and the French troops in Rhode Island were transferred to the Hudson River and held in readiness for a start.



PLATE XI.



General George Washington.

Engraving by Le Mire after a painting by Le Pautre - Collection of Hampton E. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia

On the 14th of August, Washington received a despatch from Grasse, informing him that he was about sailing for Chesapeake Bay with his entire fleet, and could remain in that neighborhood for two months. This news at once decided Washington to move with his army from the Hudson River to the Yorktown peninsula, where, with the aid of Lafayette's forces and the French fleet, he might surround Cornwallis and force him to surrender. It was one of the happy thoughts that come to brilliant minds and require vast executive ability for their realization. In its conception and execution it was one of the



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "L'Amiral de Grasse".

FIG. 136.—Count de Grasse. (From an etching by H. B. Hall.)

greatest military feats ever performed in America. One beautiful feature in the scheme was the completeness with which Sir Henry Clinton was hoodwinked. Washington understood that he might take his army as far as Trenton without being suspected of anything more far-reaching than a cirenitous movement against Staten Island. The movement was kept profoundly secret; not a soul in the allied army suspected it; none save Washington and Rochambeau knew anything about it. After passing Trenton, a good deal of vague wonder was excited; but it was

not until Philadelphia was reached that the truth flashed upon men's minds. There they learned that they were going to the Head of Elk to embark on Chesapeake Bay, and there was a moment of such anxious exultation as the country had not felt since the victory at Bennington. The march, for those days, was a marvel of celerity. It was on August 19 that Washington started from the Hudson River; on September 18 his troops began landing on the Yorktown peninsula, and by the 26th they were all in position, cutting off all possibility of a retreat for Cornwallis by land, while the French fleet, which had entered Chesapeake Bay a few days before, cut off all retreat by water. Thus the problem was practically solved. Little short of a miracle could extricate the British general from such a situation. He held out as long as possible, which was about three weeks, while the allies proceeded methodically by the regular processes of a siege. On October 17, Cornwallis raised the white flag, and two days later his army marched forth as prisoners of war. When the news reached Lord North in his office at Downing Street, he walked up and down the room, flinging his arms about and moaning, "O God, it is all over!"

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE ESCAPE FROM ANARCHY.

THE loss of a second army in America left no doubt in any reasonable mind that Great Britain must acknowledge the independence of the United States; so everybody thought but the king, who still insisted that Lord North should remain in power and carry on the game. But during the winter the king's party steadily lost ground, and their fatuity in thus bringing about a dismemberment of the empire threw them into a disfavor from which they never recovered. In March, Lord North positively refused to serve as the king's cat's-paw any longer; and with parting words characterized by his usual urbanity, he resigned his place. The king raved like a maniac, and even threatened to go over to Hanover and abandon his British crown; but when it came to action he preferred to make a ministry that would be short-lived and jarring, so he mixed up Old Whigs and New Whigs with truly artistic effect. The Marquis of Rockingham became prime minister, and with him were the Old Whigs, Charles Fox, Lord Keppel, Lord John Cavendish, and the Duke of Richmond; the five New Whigs were the Duke of Grafton, Lords Shelburne, Camden, and Ashburton, and General Conway. Thus there were five from each party, while the eleventh, the Lord Chancellor Thurlow, was a Tory, who held over from Lord North's cabinet. The only point on which all these Whigs were united was in favoring the independence of the United States, yet the king had taken good care to prevent the making of a treaty if possible. Peace was to be made at once with France, Spain, Holland, and the United States. The negotiations with the first three powers were to be conducted by Charles Fox as secretary of state for foreign affairs; but since the United States were officially regarded as colonies until after the treaty acknowledging their independence should have been made, the negotiations with them must clearly be conducted by Lord Shelburne as secretary of state for the colonies. These two ministers differed in their views as to the best method of negotiating. Fox would have been willing to acknowledge American independence from the start, and independently of other considerations; while Shel-

Shelburne thought it would be better to hold that acknowledgment in reserve, to be used in bargaining. Some preliminary approaches to the French chief minister, Count Vergennes (Fig. 137), made it appear that France was likely to demand more than Great Britain was willing to grant. This belief led the British ministers to doubt if a satisfactory peace with France could be made at that time; and they began, therefore, to entertain the idea of making very liberal terms with the United States, in the hope of detaching them from the French alliance. While things stood thus, in the middle of May there came to England the news of



FIG. 137. Count Vergennes. (From an unlettered engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

a great victory. The huge fleet of Admiral Grasse, which had done so much for American independence, was annihilated in a stupendous battle in the West Indies by Admiral Rodney. The feeling in England now was "If France wishes to fight longer, who cares? We will make friends with the Americans anyway." The ministry therefore decided to propose the independence of the United States in the first instance, instead of making it the condition of a general treaty. Herenpon Charles Fox (Fig. 138) maintained that the United States were forthwith put into the position of an independent and foreign power, so that the conduct of the negotiations with them belonged to him and not to Shelburne.

This claim was denied by Shelburne; when Fox put the question in a cabinet meeting, in the form of a motion that the independence of the United States should be unconditionally acknowledged, it was lost, and Fox immediately resigned his office. Curiously enough, the next day



FIG. 138.—Right Hon. Charles James Fox. (From a mezzotint by Pether, after a bust modelled from life by Nollekens. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

witnessed the death of Lord Rockingham, so that the ministry was broken up and it became necessary to form a new one. The king thereupon offered the first place to Shelburne, whereupon Fox and Cavendish resigned, while Keppel and Richmond remained in office, thus virtually

breaking their connection with the Old Whigs. William Pitt, now twenty-three years old, became chancellor of the exchequer, with Lord Grantham for foreign secretary and Thomas Townshend for colonial secretary.

The next stage in the negotiations revealed a closer approach of the Americans to the British, along with something like an unacknowledged breach between Americans and French. In September the Spaniards and French met with a decisive defeat at Gibraltar. France had bound herself to continue the war until the English should be driven from Gibraltar, and it was now clear that there was no likelihood of their accomplishing this. Count Vergennes therefore tried to persuade England to give up Gibraltar to Spain, in exchange for some of the Spanish West Indies: and not succeeding in this, he devised a scheme for satisfying Spain at the expense of the Americans. It should be borne in mind that in assisting the Americans to win their independence, the French government was not actuated by any such feeling as friendship for America, but only by the feeling of hatred for England. The political objects of France were attained when the dismemberment of the British empire by the severance of its American colonies was secured, and up to that point France had fully kept her promises to America. The question as to how large the independent American nation was to be was quite another thing; and on this point France had no love for us, but wished us to be as insignificant as possible. Such considerations concerned the question as to what was to be done with the territory lying between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, southward from the Great Lakes. The triangle between the Ohio and Cumberland rivers and the mountains comprising the greater part of Kentucky, with portions of Tennessee, West Virginia, and Ohio, was already occupied by settlers from the Appalachian region. The portion stretching from the Ohio River up to Lake Superior had by an act of Parliament in 1774, known as the Quebec Act, been declared to be part of Canada. Vergennes proposed to leave it so now. The region south of the Ohio River, Vergennes would constitute into an Indian territory, of which the triangular piece above mentioned should be under the protection of the United States, while all the remainder should be under the protectorate of Spain. In this way it was hoped that the United States might be forever confined to the Atlantic seaboard.

The American commissioners for negotiating the treaty were Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and John Adams. Franklin had been living


some years in Paris as minister of the United States. Jay arrived there in the summer of 1782, and was presently followed by Adams. Henry Laurens (Fig. 139), of South Carolina, who had been captured during the war and confined in the Tower of London, was presently set free and added to the number of commissioners. Vergennes had contrived to conceal from Franklin his disposition to satisfy Spain and establish a



FIG. 139.—Henry Laurens. (From a mezzotint by Green, after a painting by Copley.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

claim upon Great Britain at the expense of the United States, but Jay soon detected these secret schemes, and insisted upon counteracting them by arriving at a separate preliminary understanding with England, in the course of which Vergennes should not be consulted. Franklin did not approve of this; but when Adams arrived upon the scene, he supported Jay. The question of the Newfoundland fisheries came up,

For more than two centuries the exclusive right to those fisheries had been shared between France and Great Britain, and the American colonies had come in for their share as part of the British empire. The Americans insisted that the independent United States should continue to share in the fisheries, and on this point Adams felt very strongly. Lord Shelburne was not quite ready to concede it, and it was ascertained that Vergennes was prepared on this point to back Shelburne



*John Jay —*

FIG. 110. John Jay. (From an engraving by A. B. Durand.)

against the Americans, in order to establish a claim on him for some other concession to French interests. These circumstances led Adams to take sides with Jay (Fig. 110), and the two prevailed over Franklin. It was agreed that the French should, so far as possible, be kept in the dark until Great Britain and the United States had arrived at a full understanding on all important points. It was certainly a very singular spectacle in diplomacy. The aid of France had just made us winners

in a war with England, and still we were expecting concessions from England which France would not be willing to have her grant.

As soon as Adams and Jay had thus simplified the matter, a friendly understanding with Lord Shelburne's government was easily reached. As for the territory north of the Ohio River, it was at that moment actually held by Virginia troops, and Shelburne made no objection to the United States keeping it. Thus the Mississippi River became our western boundary, and its navigation was made free to British ships as well as American. The northern boundary from the mouth of the Ste. Croix on the east up to the supposed sources of the Mississippi beyond the Lake of the Woods was somewhat vaguely settled, leaving open further questions to be settled by subsequent treaties. The Americans retained their right to catch fish on the Banks of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence without conceding to the British any right to fish along the coasts of the United States. Jay sought to establish complete reciprocity of trade between Great Britain and the United States, but this attempt was wrecked upon the objection that the ministry was not entitled to interfere with the Navigation Act. The failure of this clause in the treaty was truly lamentable, as its adoption would have greatly rebounded to the prosperity of both countries and have placed a powerful obstacle in the way of that so-called protective policy which has been and is one of the foulest sources of corruption in American political life.

These arrangements left only two questions to be settled; the one related to the payment of private debts, the other to the compensation of loyalists. With regard to the payment of debts owed by Americans to British merchants, the canny Franklin suggested that they might be either wholly or partially offset by the damage inflicted on private property by British raids in Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, and elsewhere. But this view was opposed by the other American commissioners, and no difficulty was found in establishing the provision that all private debts on either side, whether incurred before or during the war, should be discharged at their full value in sterling money.

The question as to the compensation of loyalists was far more difficult. The number of Tories in the United States was considerable, but difficult to estimate with precision. Virginia was perhaps the state in which the Tories were fewest and most insignificant; in Massachusetts they were few in number, but included some of the best people in the state; in Connecticut and New Hampshire they were probably somewhat more numerous; in the two Carolinas and in New York they were in a

large minority, possibly in the latter state even in a majority, and the result was intensely bitter feeling. In these three states the Toryism was of a virulent type, and the strife between the parties often reached the dimensions of civil warfare. On the other hand, in Maryland and Pennsylvania the Tories seem to have been in a majority, but their political complexion was much paler than in New York and the Carolinas. Their Toryism was so moderate, and the Whig feeling which opposed it was likewise so mild, that we find them in many cases occupying high positions soon after the war, as in the case of Judge Shippen, the father of Mrs. Benedict Arnold, who became Chief Justice of Pennsylvania.

In many of the states the treatment of Tories had been very harsh; they had been imprisoned or banished, they had submitted to many personal indignities, and their property had very generally been confiscated. Lord Shelburne's commissioners insisted that the United States government should make an appropriation in order to indemnify these loyalists. But the American commissioners would not hear of this. Franklin alluded to the savage frontier raids in which Tories had taken part with Indians in burning and massacring; he cited such instances as Wyoming and Cherry Valley, and declared that it was rather the business of the Tories to make indemnification for the ruin which they had wrought. But however this might be, there was a difficulty in the way that was very deep-seated: the acts of confiscation or banishment under which the Tories had suffered were all of them acts of state legislatures, and there was no power except that of the several states which could indemnify them. As for the Continental Congress, it had no power to lay taxes for that or any other purpose. Upon this point it was impossible to make the Americans budge an inch. They felt that they controlled the situation inasmuch as Lord Shelburne was in great haste to conclude the treaty, so far as detaching the United States from France was concerned. But Parliament was to meet in a few weeks, and it was extremely doubtful whether Shelburne would have a majority or not. It was quite possible that he might thus be forced to resign. The American commissioners understood these matters so well that on the question at issue they were inexorable. The utmost that they could be brought to do was to accept a compromise which left the victory in their hands; they were willing to promise that Congress should recommend to the several states the compensation of loyalists, and so the matter was left.

The arrangements above described were drafted in a treaty which

was to take effect as soon as it should receive the approval of France, and it was left for Franklin's blandishments to soothe the irritation of Vergennes and bring him to terms. Upon the negotiations with Spain, the hardy course of the American commissioners had a marked effect. Spain stood out so stiffly on the Gibraltar question that the British



FIG. 141.—Benjamin Franklin. (After a painting by Duplessis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

ministry had more than half made up its mind to exchange Gibraltar for Guadalupe. But as soon as the news of the completed understanding with America came from Paris, Shelburne instantly refused to give up Gibraltar on any account whatever. Instead of this, however, he was willing to let the Spaniards retain West Florida and the island of

Minorca and to cede to them East Florida besides. With regard to the status of France in relation to the North American continent, the treaty made no change. It was understood that as soon as it should go into operation the British should evacuate the positions which they still held in the United States : namely, the cities of Charleston and New York, and a few frontier posts in the North and Northwest, such as Ogdensburg, Fort Niagara, Detroit, and others.

When the treaty was shown to Vergennes he pointed a good deal, but allowed himself to be persuaded by Franklin. His chief objection was that it left the United States too much room for westward expansion. He saw that a nation stretching from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi



FIG. 412.—Ruin of Great Britain through loss of her colonies.—From an unlettered French caricature, published in a memoir of Franklin. (Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

River and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes might easily become a formidable rival to the European powers. But then there was, of course, a fair chance that the Americans might not succeed in forming a nation, but only a loose league, which might break up into mutually hostile states. But however it might be with the United States, Vergennes felt sure of one thing : that he had put an end to the maritime supremacy of England. Her imperial position had been attained largely through the possession of her colonies. In those days, men were so grossly ignorant of the very A B C of commerce that it was not uncommon to hear the assertion put forth as if it were a bit of superlative

wisdom, that "trade follows the flag." In those days, men of the calibre of Vergennes actually believed that if the American colonies were to become politically independent of Great Britain they would at once stop trading with her, or would at all events divert so much of their trade to other countries that Great Britain would be ruined. He believed that the English merchant-marine would thus be shrivelled to small dimensions, and that England's race of seamen would decline with it, until she would fall back into such a position as she had occupied in the time of Henry VIII. These views were common at the time, and those writers who pointed out the fallacies contained in them, such men as Josiah Tucker and Adam Smith, were ridiculed as mere "literary fellows" without practical knowledge. In point of fact, the severance of the United States from Great Britain probably never made any perceptible difference in the commercial prosperity of the British empire. As for the United States, our tariff and navigation laws have prolonged for us burdens similar to those of which our ancestors complained when they were inflicted by acts of Parliament, and we have undoubtedly failed to prosper as we might have done, could such burdens have been removed.

When the treaty was brought before Parliament, its ratification was opposed by one of the strangest political combinations known to modern history, the so-called coalition between Fox and North. The autumn of 1782 saw Old Whigs and Tories uniting against the New Whigs. The treaty was attacked both by Fox and by North for surrendering too much territory and for leaving the American loyalists inadequately protected. On these points they obtained a majority against Lord Shelburne, who accordingly resigned.

The rage and grief of George III, at this moment were wellnigh beyond description. He well understood that the coalition was formed largely for the purpose of curbing the royal power. From his point of view, Lord North had committed an unexampled act of treachery in handing him over to the tender mercies of his arch-enemy, Fox. So for five weeks there was no ministry in England, but at last the king was obliged to yield. The Duke of Portland, who was a mere figure-head, was made first lord of the treasury, with Fox for foreign secretary, North as secretary of home and colonies, and Lord John Cavendish as secretary of the exchequer. New commissioners were sent to Paris, and a new treaty was drafted, which was strictly identical with the former one. When laid before Parliament it was promptly ratified, thus showing that the former opposition to it was a mere trick for defeating Shelburne.

A few weeks after the signing of the treaty, the coalition ministry was broken down. It possessed a large majority in the House of Commons, but had little hold upon the people, and its momentary favor rapidly waned. In December, when the House of Lords threw out Fox's India Bill and the king called upon the ministers to give up their offices, they did not feel like withstanding him. The king then called upon the youthful William Pitt (Fig. 143), who now in his twenty-fifth year became first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, with a majority against him in the House of Commons. In this strange



FIG. 143. William Pitt. (From a mezzotint by Gold, after a painting by Owen.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

situation of affairs, Fox made the mistake of opposing a dissolution of Parliament. For three months, with consummate tact, Pitt carried on the debates over the political situation almost single-handed. By that time, when he saw that public opinion had completely veered to his side, he suddenly dissolved Parliament, and in the new election obtained a greater majority than had ever before been given to an English minister. This event proved the death-blow to the king's schemes for overthrowing cabinet government, those carefully laid schemes in behalf of which he had stupidly driven the Americans into rebellion and lost one of the

fairest portions of his empire. His system of short-lived and bickering ministries was at an end, and for the next seventeen years the real ruler of England was William Pitt, whose power was perhaps even greater than that wielded earlier in the century by Sir Robert Walpole. It is curious to reflect how closely connected was the American treaty with the series of ministerial crises which thus at length defeated the designs of George III. against English liberty, and reduced him, to use a phrase of Lord Chatham's, to that insignificance for which God and nature designed him. The victory of Parliamentary reform seemed near at hand, and had it not been for the revulsion of feeling presently called forth by the excesses of the French Revolution, it is probable that the end of the century would have witnessed that great victory for justice and liberty. As it was, neither Pitt nor the king lived long enough to witness the victory which the one so greatly desired, and the other so keenly dreaded. It was not until 1832 that the days of the rotten boroughs came to an end.

Turning now to the western shores of the Atlantic, we have to observe how the provisions of the treaty were carried out. First as regards the loyalists, the recommendation of Congress that such persons should be reimbursed for their losses was everywhere greeted with derision. In many of the states the loyalists and their families were subjected to all manner of insults. The mildest method was to frown them out of society or to refrain from all business relations with them; the roughest was to ride them on rails or tar and feather them. The thousand petty persecutions to which such people were subjected make one of the most disgraceful and disgusting chapters in American history. The newspapers fulminated against these "fawning spaniels of Britain," as they were called, and scores of pamphlets were issued, filled with incoherent bombast and frowsy with italics and exclamation-points, advocating fresh measures of vengeance against those who had dared to think differently from the majority of their countrymen. Usually it was not the heroes who had worked hardest and sacrificed most in the work of winning independence, who approved of these wretched proceedings. Such men of dauntless mould as Greene, Hamilton, Jay, and Marion emphatically condemned the persecution of Tories, and in return were called "trimmers" and "time-servers" by scurvy penny-a-liners, who had never contributed an hour's work to the cause of liberty.

Indeed, life was made so uncomfortable for the Tories that they migrated in large numbers. The British soldiers, as already observed,

when they evacuated Boston in 1776, took away 900 Tories to Halifax. But that was nothing compared with the exodus from New York at the end of the war. More than 12,000 went at one time to Nova Scotia. It has been estimated that between 1783 and 1785 more than 100,000 loyalists left the United States. Most of these persons settled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, or made the beginnings of upper Canada. If anyone is inclined to wonder that the people of Canada do not manifest an absolutely frantic desire to join their country to the United States, he may find sound food for reflection in the fact that a considerable percentage of the present population of Canada is descended from persons who were driven from the United States with kicks and curses. Such ungracious acts leave memories behind, but fortunately in these modern days there are many checks to the endurance of mere rancor.

It had hardly been expected that Congress would succeed in protecting the loyalists, much less that it would be able to secure compen-




FIG. 111. Medal commemorating the new constellation of states.

sation for them. This work was presently taken in hand by Parliament, and the men who had suffered so much for their attachment to the mother country were in most cases quite liberally indemnified.

When it came to enforcing the payment of private debts, Congress was equally unsuccessful. Six states—Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina—had all passed laws obstructing the collection of debts due to British creditors, and these laws were not repealed until after the adoption of the Federal Constitution. When proposals were from time to time made to repeal these laws, they were defended as necessary measures of retaliation. When the British troops left Charleston, they took with them on their fleet a large number of negroes, and this number was exaggerated twenty-fold by popular rumor. For the most part, these negroes were probably seeking their freedom; but in some cases, no doubt, they had been kidnapped and were taken away as booty to be sold in the West Indies. The general feeling in America was that until Great Britain should

make compensation for this slave-property, the laws obstructing the collection of private British debts should not be repealed.

For this attitude of the American legislatures with regard to the loyalists and also to private debts, Great Britain had a very easy means of retaliation. She neglected to send a minister to the United States, and she declined for the present to withdraw her garrisons from the northwestern frontier coasts mentioned in the treaty. This measure was very keenly felt by the Americans. It was commonly believed that the British garrisons secretly encouraged various Indian tribes in raids upon the frontier, but this accusation does not seem to have been well supported. There was probably more truth in the complaint that the possession of the frontier coast by British garrisons caused a certain portion of the fur-trade to pass through Canada that would otherwise have passed through the United States. It was declared that in the spring of 1787 more than a million dollars' worth of furs passed through Canadian hands to the London market that would have passed through Yankee hands if the forts had been surrendered. However this may have been, complaints were many and loud, but unavailing; and it was not until Washington's second term as President that this provision of the treaty was carried out. It was an affair, on the whole, in which neither can with good grace upbraid the other.

It is now time for us to give some account of the character and powers of the United States government from July 4, 1776, to April 30, 1789. During that period the supreme executive authority, such as it was, over the United States, was in the hands of the Continental Congress. The position of this Congress was in many respects singular and anomalous. When it first assembled in September, 1774, it was merely a diplomatic body assembled for the purpose of considering what common action had best be adopted by the states in view of the recent legislation of Parliament against Massachusetts. Its nature was analogous to that of the congresses which have met from time to time in Europe, and with increasing frequency during the nineteenth century. It was at first no more a legislative body than the congress of Vienna in 1815, or the congress of Berlin in 1878. It was the last in a series of American congresses which had begun with Leisler's congress at New York in the spring of 1690. Two other famous congresses had preceded it: the one at Albany in 1754, the other at New York on the occasion of the Stamp Act, in 1765. These earlier congresses simply discussed the situation of the moment and then dispersed. But the congress of 1774 became by degrees charged with the work of carrying on a war; so it continued its

checkered life, scarcely less eventful than that of the Long Parliament, until its existence was terminated when our present form of government went into operation. During that period the Congress gradually passed from a diplomatic into an executive and even a legislative body, and the Americans had become so used to hearing their supreme legislature called a congress that they retained the name in the new government formed under the Constitution. For that reason, our national legislature is called "Congress" instead of "Parliament." The latter name, indeed, would not have been relished as that of a legislative body outside of the several states and possessing in some degree a higher authority. In those days of extreme sensitiveness about state sovereignty, people preferred the milder implication of authority that seemed to be conveyed in the word "Congress."

In thus alluding to state sovereignty, it may be as well to remark that at no time does any one of the thirteen states appear to have been independent and sovereign, like any of the European states, whether great or small. New York was never a sovereign state in the same sense as Belgium, nor Rhode Island in the same sense as the republic of San Marino. Down to the 4th of July, 1776, all the thirteen were dependencies of the British crown. During the year following the arrival of General Gage, while Massachusetts was nullifying the Regulating Act and conducting her affairs through a revolutionary body known as the Provincial Congress, she had practically thrown off her allegiance to the British crown; and the same thing was true during the first year of her provisional government by an executive council, beginning in the summer of 1775. But even during that period Massachusetts participated in the doings of the Continental Congress, and shaped her course in accordance with the policy of that supreme body. Strong as the feeling of state sovereignty was, it is not likely that any Massachusetts man in 1775 conceived of his state as an independent ally of Virginia in anything like the same sense in which France might become an ally of England. Again, when the united colonies declared themselves independent of Great Britain, the act was that of a united body. The very motion which proposed such a declaration proposed also that a committee should be appointed for drawing up articles of confederation. At no time, therefore, was any such thing contemplated as the creation of completely sovereign states; there was always in view, and to some extent in operation, a federal union wherein the sovereignty of each state was to some extent limited.

The articles of confederation framed in pursuance of the recommen-

dation of June, 1776, had by 1779 been adopted by all the states except Maryland, which refused to ratify them until the western lands in dispute between several states should be ceded to Congress and made a national domain. To this point we shall recur hereafter. After it had been settled that the cession was to be made, Maryland ratified the articles early in 1781, and thus they went into operation. Before that time the authority under which Congress acted was evidently that which, for want of a better name, was in later years called an "implied war power." Under such an implied power, Congress called upon the states to furnish troops and money for carrying on the war, pledged the faith of the United States for the redemption of many million dollars in promissory notes, made alliance with foreign powers, and, in short, performed some of the highest attributes of sovereignty. The effect of the adoption of the articles of confederation was to limit and define the hitherto vague authority of this Congress, and thus in some measure to curtail it. Both before and after the adoption, Congress was left without the essential and fundamental attribute of sovereignty: namely, that of taxation. To clothe this Congress with such a power as that of taxation was not an easy matter, inasmuch as it was not strictly a representative body. It did not represent the population of the United States, nor was it elected by the people. On the other hand, each state was represented by delegates who were appointed by the state governments. No state could appoint less than two, or more than seven, delegates; but when it came to voting, the vote was taken by states, and not by the number of delegates. The vote of each state counted as one, without reference to the number of its delegates. The delegates were paid by their own states, and were forbidden to accept any salaried office under the United States, lest their allegiance to the Federal Union should grow stronger than their local allegiance. No one could be a delegate for more than three years out of every six, a silly provision which retarded their acquisition of experience without any compensating benefit. A mere majority in Congress was not enough to carry any measure of importance. Even for most of the ordinary business, the vote of nine states, or two-thirds of the whole, was requisite. During the recess of Congress, the general management of national affairs was in the hands of a committee consisting of one delegate from each state, and known as the Committee of the States. Congress had a president chosen by itself, and the position was surely the most dignified one in the country. But this president was simply the chairman of a deliberative body, and possessed no executive authority. The title of president was in those days regarded as

distinctly inferior to that of governor, and so much the less to be dreaded. The royal governors had sometimes demanded more authority than the people were willing to grant them, and there was everywhere a holy horror of the "one-man power." So, after the departure of the royal governors, the executive functions in the governments provisionally established were apt to be discharged by the council, the chairman of which was usually called president. Afterward the several states were bold enough to give the name of governor to their own chief executives elected by the people. But when it came to the chief executive of that dreaded power, the Federal Union, they called him by the milder title of President, even when, under the present Constitution, the powers granted him turned out to be more than royal. The jealousy of the one-man power led people to entrust such executive departments as those of war and finance to committees, thereby ensuring the most inefficient and clumsy work. In the department of finance especially, it was soon found necessary to appoint a single manager; and Robert Morris, of Pennsylvania, performed wonders in that capacity.

The several states were forbidden to enter into any alliance, whether among themselves or with foreign powers, save with the consent of Congress. The sole right of determining on peace and war, of making treaties, receiving ambassadors, and managing Indian affairs, was vested in Congress, which also had nominally the control of the army. In point of fact, however, the only way in which Congress could raise soldiers was through requisitions upon the states.

The fundamental weakness of Congress was its lack of the power of taxation. It could not raise money by means of excise or internal revenue taxes, neither could it impose or collect custom-house duties. The revenues from custom-houses all flowed into the state treasuries, and the different states carried on tariff wars against each other which in a few years would undoubtedly have developed into real wars. Moreover, all the states shared with Congress the power of coining money and issuing inconvertible paper currency. Under these circumstances the evils were very much the same as those which George Grenville twenty years before had tried to cure with his Stamp Act. They were much the same evils, but worse, as it was part of their nature to grow with the growth of the country. To obtain money for national purposes, Congress had no other means than making requisitions upon the several states. The amount that was to be required for the financial year was estimated in advance, and apportioned among the thirteen states according to the assessed value of their taxable property. Each state was

duly informed of the amount that was expected, and that was the end of the matter so far as the initiative of Congress was concerned. If it took three years for a state to raise money that was sorely needed within three months, there was no help for it. Hence, nearly all the states were chronically delinquent. The year 1785 was more than half over before the Continental taxes assessed for 1783 had all been paid in. At one moment in 1782 there was not a single dollar in the United States




FIG. 145.—John Adams. (From a lithograph by Motte. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

treasury. For such evils our finance department sometimes applied heroic remedies. For example, it would make drafts for large sums upon our ministers resident in Europe, and then the ministers must beg the money as best they could. Thus in 1784, John Adams (Fig. 145), who had for some time been minister at The Hague, was transferred to London. But he had hardly arrived there when he learned that the United States government had made a draft upon him for \$300,000, payable at one

of the banks in Amsterdam. This made it necessary for him to return to Holland. After a difficult and dangerous voyage in the German Ocean, Adams at length reached Amsterdam, where the bankers treated him very politely and were willing for a reasonable length of time to waive the protest of the draft. As for lending the money to pay it, however, they would not hear of such a thing. It was unbusinesslike to lend money on poor security, and the promise of the United States government was really no security at all. So Adams was driven to his wits' end to raise the money; and he accomplished it partly by loans at exorbitant interest from third-rate brokers, and partly by setting up a lottery.

All things considered, it does not seem strange that Adams should have met with ill success in his attempts to negotiate an even-handed commercial treaty ensuring free commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain. He found in Pitt a minister with most liberal ideas regarding trade, and doubtless could have accomplished much more, had it not been for the obvious difficulty of binding the United States by any agreement whatever. It was not enough to pledge Congress to some particular line of tariff policy, since such a policy could not be enacted by Congress, but only recommended to thirteen states with discordant views. All over Europe the question was scornfully asked, "Are we to consider the United States as thirteen nations or one?" There was no cure for this state of things except to clothe Congress with actual powers of sovereignty, and this was the one thing which almost all Americans in all parts of the country were convinced would be fatal to liberty. To erect a real government outside of and beyond the state government was a new and untried horror. The intercourse between the several states was at that time very slight. But little progress had been made toward surmounting the difficulties of travel. Intercourse was most frequent and regular between the towns of Boston and New York. A regular monthly mail had been established between the two places on New Year's Day, 1673, and by 1785 it had become a weekly mail. A stage-coach left New York every Monday morning soon after daybreak, and rolled into Boston somewhere between noon and nightfall of Saturday. About midway on the journey it met the coach coming the other way. In order to accomplish the distance in that time, it was necessary to be in motion all day and till ten o'clock at night. These two coaches carried not only all the passengers between the two towns, except such as preferred to go on horseback or by private carriage, but also all the parcels except the heavy freight,

which went on the circuitous sea-voyage around Cape Cod. At various stations on the route the coach changed horses, while the passengers took hasty refreshment. When it came to rivers, such as flow into the Sound at intervals of a few miles in Connecticut, it was necessary to get out and be ferried across in rowboats, taking another coach on the further bank; and in the winter season such crossing was sometimes attended with loss of life. In the year 1785 not a single broad river in the United States had been bridged. The condition of roads was generally very poor. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, where they were at their best, the roads were more like woodland-paths for




FIG. 146.—Jared Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, member of the Federal Convention. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal, after a painting by Charles Willson Peale.)

ox-teams than the broad macadamized turnpikes with which we are now familiar. People still went on horseback much more commonly than on wheels. Long journeys were very infrequent, and it was no uncommon thing for a man to go through a long lifetime without ever leaving his own state. The result was that the people of the different states knew little about each other; and as a natural result, they felt small confidence in each other. Each state felt it needful to be perpetually on its guard against the baleful machinations of other states, and it seemed a maxim of ordinary prudence not to entrust too much power to that federal body which other states had so large a share in controlling.

It was thus pretty clear that the American people would never con-

sent to the creation of a true federal union with true sovereignty at the head of it, until they were compelled to do so by the dread of something even worse. That worse alternative was anarchy, culminating in civil war; and toward such a state of anarchy we were beginning visibly to drift as soon as the peace of 1783 relieved us from the pressure which the war of independence had exerted. Clearly, a government which cannot raise money for its current expenses is not likely to find it easy to enforce its authority. Long before 1783 it had become evident that the Continental Congress was declining in ability and character. It had at first, in 1774, been composed of the ablest men in the several states; but by degrees the services of the ablest of these men were absorbed by their several states. A man like Jefferson, for example, could find more useful work and a more brilliant career in the service of Virginia than in that of the United States. This absorption of talent into the state services greatly weakened the Continental Congress.

Before the end of the war, that body fell into general ill favor because of its delinquency in paying the officers and soldiers of the Continental army. In January, 1781, some of the Pennsylvania troops in Washington's army at Morristown took it into their heads to march to Philadelphia and intimidate Congress into paying them, but this dangerous mutiny was promptly suppressed. In February, 1782, while Washington's headquarters were at Newburg on the Hudson, a still more dangerous measure was threatened. Certain addresses were circulated among the officers, recommending that the whole army should march to Philadelphia and demand of Congress the payment of their long arrears of wages. The extreme danger of any such step must be obvious enough to any reader of history. In a time of revolution in any country, when the accustomed government is hopelessly discredited, there is danger that the reins of government will be seized by the best-organized body that is at hand, which at such times is most likely to be the army. This was well illustrated in the cases of Cromwell and of Napoleon. In 1782 there was but a narrow step between the army's going to Philadelphia to demand payment and its taking possession of the machinery of government in order to secure its payment. In such cases it is only too easy for the armed force to pass from the attitude of an impotent creditor to that of a despotic receiver. It was hoped that Gates would lend himself to this wild scheme, but he had not the nerve; and Washington, in a speech of wonderful nobility and pathos, persuaded the officers to abandon it. By a great majority, they came over to Washington's policy of forbearance;

and nowhere, perhaps, do we find a nobler moment in that pure and lofty life. It was not long after this affair that some of the older officers conceived the idea of creating a national monarchy, with Washington for king. The idea was entertained by persons of most respectable and patriotic character; but Washington's only reply was to ask what he could ever have said or done which would lead anyone to imagine that he could possibly become a party to any such scheme. He well understood that the case was not one to be cured by a short-lived autoocracy, but by such fundamental reforms as might make an autoocracy forever unnecessary and impossible.

In my book entitled "The Critical Period of American History" I have treated somewhat at length of the troubles by which our country was beset during the four years following the peace of 1783, and which finally resulted in the assembling of the convention which framed our Federal Constitution. It is impossible, in a work so concise as the present, to enumerate all these events. I can only select a few points for mention, while indicating in general terms their significance.

Between the different states there were quite a number of unsettled disputes concerning boundaries, and in a few cases these dissensions approached the confines of civil war. One was the dispute between New York and New Hampshire over the ownership of the Green Mountains. The early royal governors of New York, persisting in the claims of their Dutch predecessors, declared that their province properly extended to the Connecticut River; but it proved impossible to sustain this claim against the more powerful colony of Connecticut backed by Massachusetts, and presently New York was obliged to be satisfied with a boundary running as at present a few miles east of the Hudson River. While the Berkshire Hills were gradually filled with settlers, it was recognized that they formed part of Massachusetts and not of New York, and in 1773 the boundary was adjusted by the tact of Governor Hutchinson in a manner quite satisfactory to the former colony. It was natural that when New Hampshire issued grants to settlers in the Green Mountains, she should expect that the same conclusions which applied to the Berkshire Hills would apply in this case. The settlers of Vermont were to a large extent New Hampshire men, who received their lands from the government of that province. Why should they not remain attached to it? But New York, on the other hand, put in a claim to the whole Green Mountain country as far as the Connecticut River, and on several occasions announced her intention to enforce this claim. Amid these bickerings there grew up a party of

Green Mountain Boys who were inclined to urge that Vermont should be made a separate state. In the course of the war of independence they applied to Congress for admission to the Union, but their request passed unheeded. It was believed by some persons that their discontent would lead them to offer their country to the British government as part of Canada, and intrigues were set on foot with this end in view. It is enough to add that, at the time when our Constitution was adopted, Vermont was a well-organized government ready for her admission,



*James Bowdoin*

FIG. 147. James Bowdoin.

which soon afterward occurred, as the fourteenth state of the Union. But before the claims of New York were relinquished there had been not only many threats, but sporadic instances of bloodshed on the border.

The case of the valley of Wyoming was one of the many instances of trouble growing out of ignorant or ill-considered grants of territory on the part of the Stuart kings. In 1662 the younger John Winthrop obtained from Charles II. a charter for Connecticut, in which that

province was described as extending westwardly to the Pacific Ocean; but the charter granted to William Penn in 1681 quite ignored the earlier grant, and gave to Pennsylvania a large piece of the Connecticut zone lying westward from New York. Connecticut had long since acquiesced in having her western zone severed from her by New York; but she set much store by this western zone, and sent immigrants thither who made settlements in the valley of Wyoming and the neighboring country. These Connecticut settlers not only suffered repeatedly from the assaults of the Indians, but were for many years involved in disputes with their Pennsylvania neighbors, which at times fairly earned the name which was given to them of "the Pennamite war."

Along with these territorial disputes the multifarious tariff acts caused much disturbance. The city of New York had for many years got its supplies of firewood from Connecticut, while garden vegetables, chickens, and dairy products were brought in from New Jersey. Such things, it was said, must be stopped. They threatened ruin to the domestic industries of New York. So the legislature of the latter state passed a Navigation Act compelling every Yankee sloop which came from the Sound into the East River, and every market-boat that was rowed across the Hudson River from New Jersey, to pay entrance-fees and obtain clearances at the custom-house, just as if they were ships from Naples or Hamburg, while at the same time a heavy duty was clapped upon every cord of logs or basket of kindling-wood brought in from Connecticut. The result was seen early in 1787 in a meeting of Connecticut merchants at New London, in which all present agreed under penalties not to send any article of commerce whatever into the state of New York for the next twelve months. The attitude of New Jersey was equally belligerent, and it required no unusual shrewdness to foresee that New York might easily be brought to blows with her two neighbors.

Among all the territorial disputes, the greatest was one which had a most auspicious settlement: namely, the dispute between four of the states concerning the territory northwest of the Ohio River. We have seen how Connecticut laid claim to a strip of this territory, beginning immediately west of New York's intruding wedge. Massachusetts had similar westward pretensions. She did not put forth any claims to the soil of New York, including the portion occupied by the Long House, nor could she assert any title to that part of Canada which lies between the Niagara River and Detroit, for the recent treaty had left that as British territory. But the moment Detroit was reached, Massachusetts

revived her claim to a strip of territory equal to herself in width and stretching westward as far as our Mississippi boundary. It happened, however, that New York laid claim to the whole of the northwest. It was clear that the Long House had reduced all the northwestern tribes to a tributary condition, and it was also clear that the Long House had occupied a position of vassalage with regard to the royal governors of New York; therefore New York was overlord of the whole northwest, Q. E. D. At the same time Virginia maintained that, according to her charter of 1609, the whole of that territory belonged to her; and what was more, Virginia had actual possession of it, so far as possession went in that vast wilderness. Its woodland fortresses were all occupied by Virginia troops; and had it not been for such occupation, the work of the sturdy Virginian, George Rogers Clarke, it was extremely doubtful if the United States would have succeeded in retaining that territory. Between these conflicting claims a satisfactory decision was difficult, but as early as 1779 Maryland took a stand in the matter which entitles her to be regarded in a peculiar sense as founder of our Federal Union. Maryland proposed that this entire disputed territory should be ceded to the United States as a national domain controlled by Congress, but not subject to any state. Not only did Maryland propose this, but she refused to ratify the articles of confederation until the needful cessions should either have been made, or at least distinctly promised. As soon as positive assurance was given on this point, early in 1781, Maryland ratified the articles of confederation. By 1785 the acts of cession were all completed, although Connecticut reserved for a while 3,250,000 acres on the southern shore of Lake Erie. Of the proceeds of the sale of this land, Connecticut appropriated a part for the relief of citizens who had suffered in British coast-raids and the rest in aid of schools and colleges. This district, still known as Connecticut Reserve or Western Reserve, became a part of Ohio in 1800.

By the acquisition of this northwestern territory the Continental Congress acquired something more than the positions which it had hitherto held, of diplomatic body or of a national council with inadequate legislative and executive powers. For the first time it became a land-owner on an immense scale, and the common interest felt in this northwestern territory was certainly a bond which held the Union together at a moment when there was urgent need of every such bond that could be had. When Congress passed laws concerning this territory, it exercised for the first time the right of eminent domain. An inhabitant of that territory, who was not a citizen of any one of the states, was nevertheless a

citizen of the United States. In 1787 Congress passed a famous group of laws for the government of that territory, which has ever since been known as the Ordinance of 1787, and which has formed the model for our territorial governments ever since. This ordinance provided that the northwestern territory might ultimately be cut up into states, not exceeding five in number, and any one of these might be admitted into the Union as soon as it should have 60,000 inhabitants. There was to be unqualified freedom of religious worship. No religious tests should be demanded of any public officer. The Kentish law of Gavelkind, or equal division, should apply to all property. No law could be made which should impair the obligation of contracts. And it was well understood that this provision implicitly forbade the use of paper money. The constitution which any state arising within this territory should frame for itself must conform to the ordinance, and in no case whatever could any such state ever secede or be separated from the Union. Moreover, the principle laid down by Thomas Jefferson that slavery should never be permitted within the national domain was first put into operation on this occasion. It was decreed that under no circumstances should slavery ever be allowed within the northwestern territory. This clause, however, was not carried without pacifying the fears of Georgia and South Carolina by enacting a fugitive-slave law.

It will be observed that in this Ordinance of 1787 Congress asserted full powers of sovereignty over the national domain without incurring a fiftieth part of the opposition with which ordinary legislation was attended. The least attempt to amend the revenue laws would convulse the country from Maine to Georgia; but here were laws made for the new national domain, destined to exert a potent influence upon the whole future of American history, without eliciting a word of antagonism as to the constitutional powers of Congress in the matter. There may have been many reasons for this; doubtless the chief one was that the territory legislated for was little more than an empty wilderness. To the southward of the Ohio River the case was different. In 1784, when Jefferson began drawing up plans for the government of the national domain, he desired that Virginia should cede Kentucky and that North Carolina should cede Tennessee to the United States, while he hoped that South Carolina and Georgia would relinquish such claims as they had to the land lying west of them. In this way Jefferson would have carried the national domain down to the Gulf of Mexico, and negro slavery would have been irrevocably confined to the Atlantic seaboard. But in this enlightened purpose Jefferson failed, for

he was dealing with insuperable obstacles. There was already a considerable population in the regions since known as Kentucky and Tennessee. Under those great pioneers, Daniel Boone (Fig. 148), James Robertson, John Sevier, and others, they had come pouring across the Alleghanies, a sturdy race destined to impress new features upon American life. They had won the land they occupied, by such hard fighting with the Indians that it was for a long time known as the "dark and bloody ground." They proposed to take their destinies into their own hands, and had no notion of being ruled by a roomfull of gentlemen in silk coats and lace ruffles, seated around a table in Philadelphia. The difficulties of the case were shown when in 1784 North Carolina offered



FIG. 148. Daniel Boone. From an engraving by Longacre, after a painting by Chester Harding. (Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

to cede the region west of her to the United States, and gave Congress two years in which to consider the offer. But the sturdy settlers west of the Great Smoky Mountains did not wish to be part of a national domain. They cared nothing for Congress, and so, if the state of North Carolina ceased to look after their affairs, they would govern themselves; so they held a convention at Jonesboro, seceded from North Carolina, and formed themselves into a state which they called Franklin. They chose John Sevier for governor, they elected a legislature, and then sent a delegate to Congress, requesting that their new state

might be admitted into the Union. Meanwhile North Carolina, not relishing these proceedings, repealed her act of cession and demanded allegiance from the backwoodsmen. The result was that the little state became a house divided against itself. Some men of Franklin wished to return to their old allegiance; others preferred to go on in the new ways. The result was a mild civil war among those romantic mounntains for a couple of years, when North Carolina prevailed and the state of Franklin came to an end. The effect of these things upon Virginia was to make her unwilling to release her grasp upon Kentucky until that region should be ripe for statehood.

It will be observed that Virginia and North Carolina were foremost in the westward movement of the American people. At the time of which we are speaking, while the settlers in Kentucky were approaching the Mississippi River, on the other hand, the New England people had scarcely crossed the Hudson River, except in the case of the Connecticut settlement at Wyoming. It was natural, therefore, that Virginia and North Carolina should appreciate the importance of the Mississippi River far more correctly than the remote New Englanders, who knew very little about that stream and cared still less. In this connection the fact that the mouth of that river was held by a narrow-minded and unfriendly power like Spain came very near involving the United States in serious trouble.

In arranging the troop of treaties which had established the peace of 1783, some question had arisen concerning the northern boundary of West Florida, or the region between the mouths of the Appalachicola and Mississippi rivers, comprising the sonthernmost extremities of the present states of Alabama and Mississippi, together with a bit of Louisiana. Great Britain ceded this strip of country to Spain while deelaring its northern boundary to be the thirty-first parallel. But in the treaty between Great Britain and the United States, which was negotiated somewhat earlier, there was a seeret article which provided that, if Great Britain should succeed in retaining West Florida, its northern boundary might be the parallel crossing the Mississippi at the mouth of the Yazoo. Now Spain claimed this more northerly line as of right, and when she discovered the purport of the seeret article she was extremely indignant. It was impossible to deny that the United States was willing to cede to Great Britain land which she was not willing to see in the hands of Spain, while Great Britain was likewise willing to yield to the United States a territory which she would not give up to Spain. The Spanish government forthwith began to bluster,

It refused to make any treaty of commerce with the United States until some atonement should be made for the addition of insult to injury in the secret article; and meanwhile the Mississippi River, below the mouth of the Yazoo, was closed to all American vessels under penalty of instant confiscation. After a few trading vessels from the Tennessee and Ohio rivers had been seized in accordance with this threat, there was intense excitement in the Mississippi valley: occasionally Spaniards were molested and their property destroyed. The Spanish minister, Gardequi, had several interviews on the subject with John Jay, who was then secretary of foreign affairs. Gardequi was ready to assent to a treaty of commerce or to concede the free navigation of the Mississ-




FIG. 149.—Lexington, Ky., in 1782. ("Magazine of American History.")

sippi, but he obstinately refused to yield both points; it must be either one or the other. At last Jay, finding the Spaniard inexorable, was inclined to think that it might be well to surrender for twenty-five years the right of navigating the lower Mississippi, provided that an advantageous commercial treaty might be made between the United States and Spain. Probably, if one were reduced to the necessity of choosing, Jay's choice was the right one; but it was none the less fraught with danger. It was true that the merchants of New York and Boston, in their anxiety for the commercial treaty, did not sufficiently appreciate

the importance of the Mississippi River. On the other hand, the settlers in Kentucky and Tennessee declared that if they were to be thus left in the lurch by Congress, they would secede from the Union and seek protection at the hands of Great Britain, whose fleet could teach the Spaniards at New Orleans better manners. But Virginia and the states to the south of her would never think of letting Kentucky and Tennessee slip away from them in such wise. They would be more likely to go with them and form a Southern confederacy, thus breaking the Union in twain.

All the sources of danger above mentioned were less alarming than the universal demoralization attendant upon the disturbances of trade caused by an unsound paper currency. The years 1783-87 were a true Bryanite paradise. More cheap money per head was then afloat than at any other time known to history. Of coinage, the specimens in circulation were enough to fit up a whole numismatic museum: duats, pistoles, pistareens, shillings, half-Joes, guineas, Carolins, crowns, moidores, doubloons, Spanish dollars, and so on. These were exchangeable against one another in all sorts of queer ratios abounding in difficult vulgar fractions. Scarcely one of them was ever seen that had not been more or less clipped, so that no responsible person felt like doing business without keeping on his desk a little box containing a pair of scales and a large assortment of outlandish weights in order to test the intrinsic value of every coin that passed through his fingers. The convenience of doing business under such conditions can readily be imagined. But as if this were not enough, the country was periodically deluged by issues of paper, sometimes from Congress, sometimes from the several states. There was the Continental currency, which had become so delightfully cheap that it took \$90 of it to buy a pound of tea, and \$1575 to purchase a barrel of flour. For some unaccountable reason, in the course of the year 1780, people got tired of this charmingly plentiful medium and threw it to the dogs. Not that they learned wisdom from experience; that would be almost too much to expect of average human nature. They complained that the money had not been made cheap enough, and so at it they went, the different states vying with each other in recklessness, until there were as many different kinds of paper as coin, and each kind worse than the others. A shilling was worth one thing in Boston, another thing in New York, and something else in Virginia. In that state, indeed, tobacco had long served most of the purposes of the currency, and New Englanders often paid their debts in jugs of rum and blocks of salt pork, which had at least this merit, that

the creditor knew what he was getting. As this state of things had been going on for some years, the constant fluctuations of prices begat a frantic spirit of speculation. Instead of relying upon steady industry and thrift, those qualities which go toward making a fine human character, people began to trust to the hazards of speculation, buying up poor scrip in one market in the hope of selling it at some advance in another. In this way the foundations of commercial morality were to a considerable extent sapped. In many quarters large fortunes were made by methods which would not always bear inspection, while poor people inveighed against the rich and entertained schemes of communism.



FIG. 150. Benjamin Lincoln. (From an unlettered proof after Chappel. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

In Rhode Island it was even seriously proposed that every fourteen years all property, real and personal, should be thrown into a common pool and evenly divided among the inhabitants. In no part of the country was there more widespread disturbance than in New England, where attempts to collect debts and foreclose mortgages were resisted by violence, while sometimes the courts were actually prevented from sitting by mobs of armed men. In Massachusetts there were peculiar features of interest. Then, as always, the soundest ideas about money were to be found in the coast-towns and among the population which was brought most into contact with foreign exchanges, while the wildest delusions prevailed among the inland farmers. In Massachusetts, during the

summer of 1786, several attempts at issuing a new paper currency failed. The rustic vote was not able to overcome the vote of merchants and persons of education, consequently there was an uprising among the inland farming populations of Worcester and Berkshire. Among the leaders of these insurgents the most conspicuous was a rather feeble creature named Daniel Shays, who had been a captain in the Continental army. But little in the way of atrocity is to be charged to these poor fellows; their rioting was of a mild type. They set fire to barns, gathered in crowds about the court-houses, and listened to inflammatory speeches. Now and then they burned a few legal documents, and on two or three occasions seized weapons from the public armory. In one instance they attempted to seize the arsenal at Springfield, but were defeated with some slaughter and driven away. At last, in February, 1787, about six months after the first outbreak, the main body of insurgents, with Shays himself, were captured at Petersham by General Lincoln (Fig. 150), a few scattered bands brought to bay in Berkshire surrendered, and that was the end of the Shays Rebellion. Several of the leaders were condemned to death; but as they were mostly ignorant men driven to desperation by undeniable hardships, much sympathy was felt for them, and all were pardoned by Governor Hancock.

This Shays Rebellion precipitated a movement which had for some time been gathering force for revising the articles of confederation. For several years the wisest men had felt that the government of the confederation was essentially defective, and that permanent public peace and prosperity could never be secured except by increasing the powers of the Federal government. The youthful Alexander Hamilton (Fig. 151), whose weight of sense was already generally recognized, had been preaching this lesson year after year, in season and out of season, through his pamphlets and speeches; but the subject seemed to be one on which it was impossible to arouse the public from its torpid slumber. The way in which the desired Federal Convention was brought together was curiously roundabout. Fortune at that moment was stealthy in her movements. Washington was very much interested in the prospects of the country's westward expansion, and he felt the importance of increasing the facilities of travel between east and west. He thus became interested in sundry projects which resulted in the building of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. In the regulation of such matters it was necessary that Virginia and Maryland should hold consultations with each other. Presently it appeared that there were points upon which it was desirable also to consult Delaware and Pennsylvania. A mutual understanding

as to trade regulations was one of the principal things desired. But this was also a great desideratum among all the thirteen states, and if four states could thus meet in the hope of agreeing upon some common scheme, why not the whole thirteen? This line of reasoning led to a call for a convention of delegates from all the states, to be held at Annapolis in September, 1786, to discuss measures calculated to secure a uniformity of trade regulations throughout the Union. This seemed like a great step in advance, but it was nothing to the step which was next taken.



FIG. 151.—Alexander Hamilton. (From a mezzotint by Max Rosenthal. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

When the convention met at Annapolis it was attended by delegates from only five states, so that apparently the only thing that could be done was to issue a call for another convention and then adjourn. This was accordingly done. The invitation, which was drafted by Hamilton, called for a convention to meet at Philadelphia in the following May, to discuss measures for clothing the Federal government with powers adequate to the preservation of order and the maintenance of the Union. The purpose as thus stated was far bolder than that which had been assigned for the convention at Annapolis. Things had lately happened which tended to make the friends of union more desperate. Chief among these were the troubles with Spain, involving a possible dis-

solution of the Union, the commercial war between New York and its two nearest neighbors, and the Shays rebellion in Massachusetts. In the course of the year there was further cause for alarm. An amendment to the articles of confederation, conceding to Congress a limited power of raising revenue by import duties, had been for some time before the public, and had indeed been accepted by twelve states; but in order to amend the articles, unanimous consent was necessary, and New York now proceeded to reject the desired amendment.

It was under such unpromising circumstances that the Federal Convention assembled at Philadelphia in May, 1787. Not often has a more remarkable group of men been brought together in a single room. Most of the delegates were men of ripe experience in various forms of civil self-government, and while among some a note of provinciality may have been manifest, yet, as a whole, the discussions were remarkable for breadth of view. Indeed, the general tone of American life and thought was less provincial than it came to be in the generation which followed the peace of 1815. The contemporaries of Washington and Franklin paid far more attention to foreign lands and distant ages than the contemporaries of Andrew Jackson. About half of the members of the Federal Convention were graduates of universities either in the Old World or the New; several were members of the Royal Society, and nearly all had distinguished themselves for valuable and genuine public services. The conditions, moreover, were favorable to personal disinterestedness. Probably not one of the delegates was influenced by the wish to obtain a place of honor or profit for himself or anybody else. This assembly sat with closed doors, and not a word of its deliberations was allowed to reach the ears of the public press until the Constitution had been agreed upon, engrossed, and signed. In this convention of fifty-five men there were four who ranked with the illustrious of all time; these were Washington, Franklin, Madison, and Hamilton, who played very different parts. Washington was president of the convention, and Franklin contributed a few useful suggestions. Hamilton's share in the work was slight, except for such stimulus as his mood may have imparted. He represented the state of New York, which was bitterly opposed to the objects of the convention, and his two colleagues were both inexorable Antifederalists. On every question that came up, they were sure to outvote Hamilton; so he threw all his energy into one great speech before the discussion had well begun. In the course of this speech he read an outline of his own idea of what the government of the United States ought to be. Concerning this

outline, we need only make two comments. He would have had Presidents and Senators chosen only from men possessed of large property, and would have had them hold office during life. Besides this, he would have had the governors of the several states appointed by the President instead of being elected by the people of their states. This would have made the position of the governors, appointed by a power beyond the limits of the state, almost exactly like that of the old royal governors; and had the suggestion been adopted, the Federal Union would probably not have lasted ten years. It was said, however, of Hamilton's speech, that while everybody praised its eloquence, nobody




FIG. 152. James Madison. (From an engraving in stipple by Edwin, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

had a good word for its substance. Soon afterward Hamilton returned to New York on pressing business, while his two colleagues quit the convention in disgust and hurried home. Thus, during most of the proceedings, the state of New York was unrepresented; but toward the close, Hamilton put in a noble stroke by returning to the scene of action and begging every member present to sign the completed document, no matter whether he fully approved it or not. It was well understood that it was far from expressing his own ideas, yet he signed it none the less, believing that the alternative was civil war.

We have now to give an outline sketch of the document by which anarchy was averted. In the framing of it, the greatest and most important name was that of James Madison (Fig. 152), to whom we must accredit the fundamental thought which inspired the so-called "Virginia Plan." A peculiarity of the United States government which never fails to excite the admiration of foreigners, when they have once come to understand it, is the fact that each citizen lives under two entirely distinct governments, each of which is supreme in its own sphere, each of which reaches him directly, and yet these two governments do not come into conflict with each other. The weakness of the old government under the articles of confederation was that it did not act upon individuals, but only upon states, and was therefore practically wellnigh powerless. If an individual resists the law, you can lock him up or hang him; but if a state proves recalcitrant, you cannot easily apply these effective measures. It is true that in the Middle Ages, when a town was delinquent in paying its dues to the overlord, that potentate would sometimes come with a retinue of archers and train of battering-rams, and, having broken a hole in the walls, would forthwith fight his way in and butcher half the inhabitants; but those were methods not to be recommended as models for the countrymen of Washington and Franklin. The strong point in our Federal government under the Constitution is that it acts upon individuals rather than upon states. In regard to internal revenue, the taxes are paid by a distiller or a tobacco-merchant, or whoever buys revenue-stamps to put upon his notes and deeds; they are not handed over to Congress from a state treasury. So, too, with regard to crime. Where a man offends against United States law, he is tried in a United States court and punished according to United States law; no single state is called upon to try him and hand him over as a prisoner to the Federal government. These all-important ends were secured in the main by two devices: one was the creation of a national House of Representatives, the other was the creation of a system of Federal courts. The substitution of a national assembly with full legislative powers for the old Continental Congress was the primary feature of the Virginia plan, and the one which called forth the most violent opposition. To carry out the idea properly, it was necessary that at brief intervals a complete census should be taken of the population of the United States. The example of England with her rotten boroughs had taught us a lesson. National censuses not more than ten years apart, entailing a fresh redistribution of seats, would go far toward preventing the growth of rotten boroughs. In the national House thus

created, the voting was not to be by states, but by individual representatives, so that the only basis of political power was to be population, except in so far as limited by property qualifications. The Virginia plan also contemplated the creation of a national Senate, or upper House, in which the representation should likewise be according to population.

The Virginia plan excited opposition because it would make the different states so unequal in Congress, and, it was thought, would afford an opportunity for the larger states to tyrannize over the others. Exhibitions of mutual hostility between neighboring states had been suf-



*Oliv. Ellsworth*

FIG. 151.—Oliver Ellsworth. (From an engraving by Maverick, after a painting by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

ficiently numerous to make this fear play a great part in the debates of the convention. When Madison, with his usual profound foresight, observed that the great struggle would come not between large states and small states, but between slave states and free states, the remark was too much in advance of the time to be appreciated. The states most opposed to the Virginia plan were those which had no opportunity for westward expansion, being already enclosed by boundaries not likely to be removed; such states were Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, and Connecticut. As for Rhode Island, she did not approve of the convention at all, and had refused to send delegates or take any part in the proceedings. An alternative to the dreaded scheme of Madison was

proposed by William Paterson, of New Jersey, and came to be known as the New Jersey plan. Its principal feature was that it insisted upon an equal representation of states in the Federal Congress, which would thus have been left in a ruinously weak position. Paterson's plan would have alleviated the existing difficulties by increasing the power of Congress over public revenues, and in some other details it would have patched up the old structure. Madison's plan, on the other hand, contemplated a peaceful revolution and the creation of something fit to be called a national government. The disputes over this question were



FIG. 154.—William Samuel Johnson. (From an engraving by Ritchie, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

bitter and prolonged. There were times when it seemed as if the convention would break up in anger without having accomplished anything. There were a few brave men, however, who made up their minds that, come what would, that meeting should not come to an end until its purpose should have been fulfilled. It was Connecticut that finally untied the Gordian knot, and inaugurated a compromise which made everything afterward seem comparatively easy.

The delegation from Connecticut consisted of three lawyers, men of unusually acute and powerful minds. Oliver Ellsworth (Fig. 153), a

graduate of Princeton College, was afterward Chief Justice of the United States; William Samuel Johnson (Fig. 154), a graduate of Yale College, had received from Oxford the degree of D.C.L. and was a Fellow of the Royal Society, and some time afterward was president of Columbia College; Roger Sherman (Fig. 155), a man entirely self-educated, was second to none in long-headed sagacity. It had been from the earliest times the practice in Connecticut to elect the two Houses of the legislature upon



*Roger Sherman*

FIG. 155.—Roger Sherman.

different principles. The House of Representatives consisted of two members from every town in the state, without regard to its population; while on the other hand, the council, or upper House, as well as the governor, was chosen by a majority vote of the whole population of the state. The Connecticut delegation accordingly suggested that different principles should be followed in the election of the two Federal Houses; that the Virginia plan be adopted for the House of Representatives, and the New

Jersey plan for the Federal Senate; thus the House of Representatives would be a national body, and in it should inhere all power of originating money bills; while on the other hand, the Senate, which would be a Federal rather than national body, representing states and not population, should have a revisory power over all acts of the lower House, thus preventing the greater states from wantonly voting away the property and liberties of their smaller sisters.

It was the adoption of this compromise that prevented the catastrophe which would have been involved in the breaking-up of the convention. Unquestionably, the Connecticut compromise saved the Union. One curious effect showed itself instantaneously. Up to that point the chief danger to the enterprise of forming a more perfect union lay in the opposition of the smaller states. But after the adoption of the Connecticut compromise the smaller states all became intensely Federalist, and through their aid various provisions were adopted which granted greater powers to the Federal government and were carried against the opposition of the larger states. As a piece of grand tactics, the Connecticut compromise has the true Napoleonic smack. Two other far-reaching compromises were required to persuade these thirteen states to try in good earnest to live in peace with one another. Both these compromises were connected with the presence of negro slavery in some of the states. The one related to the enumeration of population and of property for purposes of taxation and representation. Was representation in the lower House of Congress to be proportional to wealth or to population? It was soon agreed that it was much easier to count population than to assess the value of farms and stock, evidences of indebtedness, and the various things that can be reckoned as property. Consequently it was decided that the basis of representation should be population simply. At this point the question arose, How about negro slaves? Are they to be counted as population like other human beings, or to be reckoned as wealth along with horses and cows? This point had come up about four years before, in a fierce dispute in Congress over the question of apportioning the quotas of revenue to be required of the several states. If slaves were to be counted as population, the Southern states would have to pay more than their fair share into the Federal treasury; but if slaves were not to be counted, it was argued at the North that they would be paying less than their fair share. Consequently, the North was then inclined to maintain that slaves were population, while the South preferred to regard them as chattels. But now, when it came to apportioning representation, the Southerners

insisted that slaves must be counted as population, otherwise the Southern states would not have their fair number of representatives, while for the same reason the Northern people now insisted that slaves were mere chattels. Such are the curious workings of what the human creature is pleased to call his mind; they throw some light upon the cynical remark of old Hobbes, that the very axioms of geometry would be disputed if the interests of men's pockets were supposed to be involved in them. From such a double reduction to absurdity the country was on both occasions rescued by James Madison with a suggestion which had no earthly merit, nor pretended to have, except that it solved the difficulty. Whether for purposes of representation or of taxation, let the colored population be counted, but in such wise that every five darkies should count as three white men. The suggestion was adopted, and under this rule the United States lived as long as slavery endured.

The application of this three-fifths compromise worked much political injustice. It gave to every voter in a slave-holding state considerably more proportional weight than to a voter in a free state, and this kind of injustice was greatest in precisely those states where the slave population was largest. It was thus such states as South Carolina, and the more backward and barbarous of the newer ones, such as Mississippi, that were politically favored at the expense of states like New York and Massachusetts. Many writers have therefore unreservedly condemned the three-fifths compromise; nevertheless, it is as sure as anything can be that without the three-fifths compromise no durable Federal Union could have been formed. Unless South Carolina had been satisfied, the ship of state would have gone to pieces in 1787; and if there are any who think that this would have been a smaller evil than those which we have actually contrived to surmount, let such condemn the three-fifths compromise.

The other great compromise related to the stoppage of the African slave-trade. The public opinion of the civilized world had since 1750 been growing more and more emphatic in its condemnation of the slave-trade. When England in 1713 had taken from Spain and appropriated to herself the monopoly of the African slave-trade, scarcely a voice in England was aroused in hostility to the measure. But fifty years had not elapsed before that iniquity found itself condemned by many and eloquent voices. In the American colonies north of Mason and Dixon's line, slavery had never been economically important, and at the time we are considering it had gradually died out. It is sometimes said that

the Northern states sold their slaves to the South. Very likely such sales may from time to time have occurred, but the great body of the colored population of the North remained in its old neighborhoods as freemen. Anti-slavery feeling was growing with but little opposition in all the states north of South Carolina. In Virginia one result of the Asiento compact had been the too rapid introduction of slaves from Africa, until their presence in such large numbers became a source of

  
A handwritten signature of "Gouverneur Morris" in cursive script, enclosed in a decorative flourish.

FIG. 156.—Gouverneur Morris. (From an engraving by Jackman. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

alarm, and a party grew up strongly opposed to the continuance of the slave-trade. But in South Carolina and Georgia the state of feeling was entirely different. The average duration of negro life upon the rice and indigo plantations was short, and fresh supplies from Africa were frequently needed to countervail the great mortality. Hence it was felt in Georgia and South Carolina that the stoppage of the African slave-trade would be a serious, if not fatal, blow to their existence.

The fear that the Federal Constitution would somehow check the slave-trade was one of the principal sources of the dread with which it was regarded in these two states.

On the other hand, the chief source of the dread felt for the Constitution in Virginia was the fear that it would enable oppressive tariff and navigation laws to be enacted. The New Englanders were the great sailors of the age; the carrying-trade between the Atlantic coast and European ports was almost entirely in their hands. How easy it would be, if the New Englanders were to get a controlling voice in Congress,



FIG. 157. EDMUND RANDOLPH. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

for them to get navigation laws passed that would enable them to charge ruinous freights. Still more, manufactures of iron and wool were springing up, and in many places beginning to prosper greatly. What could be easier than for the men of iron and wool at the North to roll logs with the Yankee skippers and lay a blasting tariff upon all foreign goods, thus diminishing by half or two-thirds the purchasing power of a Virginia tobacco-crop? Influenced by such considerations, Virginia did not feel at all sure that she would ratify any Constitution whatever which should allow Congress to pass tariff and navigation laws by a simple majority vote. She demanded a two-thirds majority, in which case it was hoped that the agricultural and commercial interests of the nation might be protected against the schemes of manufacturers and ship-owners.

This situation afforded an opportunity for compromise. To defer indefinitely the abolition of the slave-trade was impossible; public opinion was too strongly declared on the matter to allow it to pass without mention. The most that South Carolina could do was to ask for twenty years' respite, until the year 1808; and she carried this point against Virginia by the aid of the New England delegates. On the other hand, the New England states that wished Congress to have the power of passing tariff and navigation acts by a simple majority carried their point against Virginia by the votes of South Carolina and Georgia. The immediate result was that Edmund Randolph (Fig. 157) and



FIG. 158.—George Mason. (From an etching by H. B. Hall.)

George Mason (Fig. 158) two of the leading delegates from Virginia, refused to sign the Constitution, and for a time there was much reason to fear that the support of that great state was lost.

After this great series of compromises had been carried through, there was much less difficulty in working out the various specific arrangements for the election of Federal officers and the partitioning of powers between Congress and the several states. In view of the great

evils which the country had suffered and was still suffering from the issues of paper money, it was decided henceforth to prohibit all such issues by the several states. The question whether it would not be best to prohibit the issue of paper currency by the United States was subjected to long and earnest discussion, and the conclusion was plainly reached and most emphatically declared that in the opinion of the convention the issue of an inconvertible paper currency, whether by Congress or by the state legislature, was contrary to public welfare and ought to be prohibited. Nevertheless, there were a few who thought that in case of war it might be well to leave a loophole open, in case there should turn out to be no other feasible alternative. Out of deference to these short-sighted objectors, the prohibition was not extended to the United States. It was thought by some that the formal prohibition would not be necessary in the case of the United States. It was thought that unless the United States government was expressly clothed with the power of issuing inconvertible paper, it would be understood that it was implicitly prohibited; for in interpreting the Federal Constitution, the great fundamental rule is that all powers not expressly given to the United States government are withheld. It did not occur to the men who framed that immortal document that a time would soon arrive when people would be found reading the Lord's Prayer backward and maintaining that whatever is not expressly prohibited is almost as good as granted. Thus the way was left open for that frightful calamity, the legal-tender act of 1862, in comparison with which all the other evils wrought by our civil war count almost as nothing.

One principal merit of the Federal Constitution was that it was based upon genuine concessions and compromises amid difficulties actually existing, and was not framed according to any general or abstract theories of human nature. In its constructive parts there was very little in it that was absolutely new, but it was built up mainly out of the experiences which our people had had of their old colonial constitutions; hence there was very little experimenting in the air. Scarcely a suggestion was adopted but had some really instructive experience to justify it. The feature which came nearest to being novel and which was really most original was the creation of a Federal judiciary, with its complete set of courts and officials, from the Supreme Court down to the United States marshal; so that every Federal enactment, great or small, was backed by a force practically irresistible. When we consider that the President is by the Constitution bound to enforce the decree of the

Supreme Federal Court, and that he is entitled, if necessary, in the execution of that duty, to call out the entire military force of the United States, we see how great was the change effected from the system which had preceded it. From being practically impotent, our Federal government has become endowed with power wellnigh boundless, as illustrated in the doggerel verses current a few years ago :

“Oh, don’t you do it, Mr. Debs,  
Don’t tackle Uncle Sam!  
Ten thousand thousand Johnny Rebs  
Can tell you that the project, Debs,  
Ain’t worth a tinker’s ——.”

The most original feature connected with the system of Federal courts is the power of setting aside acts of Congress as unconstitutional, which is rightly deemed an important safeguard of political liberty in America. This power had gradually grown up among us in colonial times from the fact that our colonial charters formed a kind of written constitution, which it was understood that neither the act of any part of a colonial government nor any act of Parliament or of any British official could contravene. Thus the question whether sundry acts were conformable to the charters was a familiar one. It involved questions which were accustomed to be settled in court, and this practice was easily inwrought into our Federal Constitution, having as the head of the system that Supreme Court of the United States from whose decisions there can be no appeal except to itself.

One of the most excellent features in our Federal Constitution is its judicious abstinence with regard to the amount of ground which it tries to cover by specific provisions. It is a glaring fault of most modern state constitutions that they try to comprise within themselves a whole code of law. In proportion to the extent of ground which they thus aim at covering is apt to be their inefficiency as durable instruments of government. A certain party wishes to promote something which is supposed to be a social reform; another party, for reasons sound or fallacious, opposes this reform. The former party carries the election and passes a law establishing its desired reform. But this triumph may be short-lived; the other party may win the elections next year and repeal the law. So, if our victorious party can call a convention for remodelling the state constitution, it will probably try to enact its desired social reform in the shape of a clause in the constitution, which must needs remain there, no matter how severely public opinion may turn against it, until it is removed by the slow and cumbrous pro-

cess of a constitutional amendment. To encumber a constitution with provisions which ought to be mere legislative enactment is greatly to impair its usefulness, and is therefore to some extent a blow against free government. Properly speaking, a constitution should be a mere instrument of government laying down certain fundamental principles and prescribing the mutual relations of the different parts of the governmental structure. Our Constitution is an excellent instance of this, and is worthy of praise not only for what it has done with so much success, but for that which it has very wisely refrained from attempting.



FIG. 159. Rufus King. (From an engraving by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

When the draft of the Constitution was finished in September, 1787, it was sent to Congress and approved by that body, and then copies were transmitted to the several states for ratification. These ratifications were made by conventions especially summoned for the purpose. The excellent effect of the Connecticut compromise upon the smaller states was seen in the order of the ratifications, which began in December with Delaware; next came the large state of Pennsylvania; then the small ones, New Jersey and Georgia; then Connecticut, which was about midway in size; and then, with the large state Massachusetts, began the first really serious opposition. This opposition came chiefly

from the rag-money party which had supported Shays in his late rebellion. As a rule, people of education in Massachusetts were Federalists, and in all that part of the state to the east of Worcester their majority was large, owing to the predominance of commercial interests and the number of seaport towns. In this section of the state the Federalist vote was three-fourths of the whole. Between Worcester and the Connecticut River, a section inhabited solely by farmers, the Federalist vote was only 14 per cent. of the whole; while in the Berkshire region the Federalist vote amounted to about 42 per cent. In the northern mountains of Berkshire the farming vote was as ill instructed as that of the Worcester highlands, but in southern Berkshire the sound-money influence of Connecticut and the enlightening effects of Yale College were felt. Hence the larger proportion of Federalism in Berkshire as a whole, compared with Worcester.

Another circumstance which affected the total vote was the fact that Maine was then a part of Massachusetts, and delegates from Maine took part in the convention. The Maine vote was Federalist in the seaports and Antifederalist in the interior. But the issue was complicated by the fact that the people of Maine were beginning to agitate for separation from Massachusetts, and many people voted against the Constitution because it was favored by the aristocratic set in Boston, who were popularly supposed to be averse to letting Maine go. Another source of opposition which strongly affected the aristocratic set itself was the fact that the Constitution did not contain a bill of rights; such, for example, as clauses guaranteeing freedom of speaking and printing, privilege of trial by jury, protection against unreasonable searches and unlawful imprisonment, and forbidding judicial torture. It was suggested that such a bill of rights might be appended to the Constitution in the form of a series of amendments. The question then arose, should the ratification of the state be made conditional upon the acceptance of this suggestion of amendments? It was wisely decided not to risk the encumbrance and possible danger involved in a conditional ratification, for it was morally certain that after what had been said such amendments would be added. When the ratification took place it was by the narrow majority of 187 votes against 168. Two marks of high civilization characterized this convention; one was that not less than eighteen men who had a few months before been engaged under Shays in armed rebellion were allowed to be present, to speak their minds without let or hindrance, and to vote. The result was that many of these gentlemen, impressed with such fairness of treatment, made up their minds that

perhaps the Constitution was not going to be such deadly poison after all. So they went home and persuaded their constituents to give it a hospitable trial. The other mark of high civilization was that when some pious persons of small brains found fault with the Constitution for not recognizing the existence of God, the clergymen who were present, a group of divines as learned and as pious as could be found anywhere on the earth's surface, immediately united in condemning this criticism, and never once showed any disposition to confuse the distinction between the things that are Caesar's and those that are God's.

In the ratification of Maryland, which followed next, the good effect of the Connecticut compromise was seen, and then in that of South Carolina the good results of the slavery compromises showed themselves. The Pinckneys, the Rutledges, and others of the strongest men of South Carolina were completely won over to Federalism, and that state remained strongly Federalist in her polities for about thirty years; a fact of inestimable importance in the early history of the Union. Nothing can be clearer than that in 1788 a refusal of South Carolina to ratify might very easily have brought with it the refusal of Virginia; and in view of the pressure which Spain was bringing to bear upon the lower Mississippi valley, it might have led to the formation of a separate Southern confederacy. But when the Federalists secured South Carolina, it was like planting batteries at a point that commanded the enemy's whole position. Particularly with regard to Virginia, it left her to face the situation without any important Southern ally. The ratification of Virginia was especially important; for as eight states had already ratified, her accession would make a two-thirds vote, which it was understood was sufficient to set the Constitution at work as between the ratifying states. Now, the distribution of opinion in Virginia was extremely interesting. Among the old Cavalier population of the tide-water region, the proportion was about 80 to 20 in favor of ratification. Among the small democratic farmers of the Piedmont region, with their rag-money proclivities, the proportion was about 74 against to 26 in the affirmative. In the Scotch-Irish and German population of the Shenandoah valley and the western counties, the proportion was about 97 in favor to 3 against the Constitution; perhaps a nearer approach to unanimity than could be found elsewhere in the United States. Lastly, as regards the Kentucky district, the majority was largely against ratification. Here the solidity of opinion in the western part of Virginia is very remarkable. The explanation is to be found partly in opposition to the secessionist feeling displayed by the Kentuckians, but still more to a circum-

stance purely local. These West Virginians were all dissenters from the Established Church. It was in the last phases of the great struggle for religious freedom in which Madison was the leader. A recent attempt had been made to impose a small tax for the support of ministers, and Patrick Henry's connection with this gave Madison an opportunity to turn it against him and identify in the minds of those people the triumph of the Constitution with that of the complete separation between church and state. The result was a unanimity in that West Virginia delegation, the like of which has seldom been seen, but which was no more than was needed to carry the victory in Madison's favor. After all said and done, the conflict was largely between the giant intelligence and sagacious foresight of Madison and Marshall on the one hand, and the passionate eloquence of Henry on the other, appealing to the very same sentiments of local independence which had so much weight in Massachusetts. As a result of the whole battle, Virginia ratified the Constitution by a vote of 89 against 79. But there can be very little doubt in the mind of anyone who carefully reads the debate, that in accepting the Constitution Virginia understood herself to be reserving the right of secession in case she should ever become dissatisfied with the result of the experiment. Anyone who will read Elliott's debates in connection with "The Letters and Times of the Tylers" will, I think, become clear on this point. Whatever the ratification of the Constitution may have meant to Massachusetts, it certainly meant to Virginia an acceptance with a reserved right of renunciation. Unless we distinctly understand this, we cannot do justice to the Virginians of 1861 who unquestionably went into the civil war with motives as pure and consciences as clear as any of those who gave up their lives for the Union.

The discussion in Virginia took so long that the ratification of New Hampshire was effected a few days earlier, and the couriers carrying the tidings from post to post must have crossed each other. The hardest, and in some respects most remarkable, struggle came in New York, where the convention, when it assembled in the little town of Poughkeepsie, was strongly Antifederalist. Had a vote been taken at the outset, it would probably have shown a two-thirds majority against ratification. The secret of this fierce opposition to change was an index to the satisfaction with which sundry influential men and strong business interests in New York contemplated their present situation. The policy of high tariffs directed against its neighbor states had proved successful. That is to say, it had paid Paul with money robbed from Peter, until Paul was very happy and wondered why people need make so much fuss about things

which suited him so well. Paul's chief spokesman on this occasion was George Clinton (Fig. 160), a man big in body and mind, full of determination and push; a man descended from one of England's oldest families, who knew how to shake hands and converse in most friendly fashion alike with prince and pauper. His devotion to what he conceived the interests of his own state was intense, and to his family New York owes many good deeds. But his narrowness of view and his strong hold upon the unthinking multitude made him the worst enemy to our Federal Union that could be found anywhere within its bounds. This man had built up a powerful political structure which must be




FIG. 160.—George Clinton.

broken down. The only way to break it down was to convert that two-thirds majority of nays into a bare majority of yeas; and this was achieved by the eloquence of Alexander Hamilton (Fig. 161), who on that occasion proved himself one of the greatest masters of persuasion that ever lived. With the true instinct of genius, Hamilton attacked in the right spot. The leader of the Clintonians, Melanchthon Smith, was a man of sufficiently broad intelligence to be reached through an appeal to the reasoning faculties; and when Hamilton won him over, it was like the breaking of the enemy's centre at Austerlitz. The final vote



PLATE XII.



Washington.

From an original lithograph by Rembrandt Peale, done from his own painting. — Collection  
of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

*Historical & Political Magazine*, Vol. A VII, page 376.

showed a majority of three in Hamilton's favor. There was a great celebration in the city of New York, in which the ship of state was dragged about the streets on a triumphal barge inscribed with the name "Hamilton."

New York was the eleventh state. Rhode Island and North Carolina still remained to be heard from, but in both states the friends of rag money were strong, and they were slow in making up their minds. North Carolina took a year longer to consider things, and Rhode Island did not come in till 1790; meanwhile the new government was put




FIG. 161.—Alexander Hamilton. (From an unlettered proof, after a painting by Trumbull. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

quietly into operation. When the electoral college of 69 members met, its vote was cast with unanimity for George Washington, who was accordingly chosen President. With regard to the Vice-Presidency there was some difference of opinion. Unquestionably, among those available, the services of Samuel Adams in bringing about the severance from Great Britain had been foremost; and since the President was a Virginian, it was natural that the other place should be supplied by Massachusetts. But Samuel Adams was felt to be only partially in sympathy with the Federalists, and the votes of Massachusetts were

given to his cousin, John Adams. There was a dread among the electors of giving Adams as many votes as Washington, and thus creating a tie, as it would have done under that first system. The result showed 34 votes for Adams, 9 for John Jay, and 26 scattering, with the declaration that Adams was elected. The inauguration took place on the 30th of April, 1789, on the balcony of what had long been known as the New City Hall in New York, on Wall Street, looking down into Broad Street. It was then used as a building for Federal purposes. In that building had been confined during the year 1777 the schemer, Charles Lee, who had tried to compass the downfall of Washington. In that building destiny had decreed that Washington should set in operation the government of the United States under its new Federal Constitution.

PLATE XIII.



The Capitol at Washington, 1900.

From a photograph by R. W. Philadelphia.

*History of the Nations*, Vol. XXII, page 330.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### PROBLEMS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC.

THE Constitution provided that the President should be assisted in his work by competent advisers, and this small body of men has come to be called the Cabinet, although it has nothing in common with British cabinets. It is an essential feature of cabinet government that the members of a cabinet shall also be members of the legislature, and that the cabinet, including its head, or prime minister, shall go out of office the moment they cease to command a majority in the legislature. Our American Cabinet answers more closely to the British Privy Council, as our President is not a prime minister, but an elective sovereign with a brief term of office.

The members of Washington's first Cabinet were Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury; Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State; Edmund Randolph, Attorney-General; and Henry Knox (Fig. 162), Secretary of the Navy. For Chief Justice of the United States, Washington appointed John Jay. In political complexion, Hamilton, Jay, and Knox were strong Federalists; the other two were less decided. Randolph had adopted and proposed the Virginia plan, and had then refused to sign the Constitution, but had afterward defended it in the Virginia convention. Jefferson declared himself to be more in favor of the Constitution than opposed to it, but the precise character of his views was to be determined by circumstances.

Those circumstances were destined to be of an aggressive character, for Hamilton, the most constructive genius in the Cabinet, was a man of bold and aggressive nature. In human life the question of money is the most fundamental of all, and Hamilton's position as Secretary of the Treasury was at that moment peculiarly important. The first problem before the new government was to restore the credit of the United States, which had become utterly bankrupt. It is not too much to say that the whole future of America depended upon the powers that could be successfully asserted by the Federal government at that moment. Students of history soon learn that it is not enough to have a good written constitution, but still more depends upon the powers

which are wielded by the men who put the constitution into practice. Hamilton was placed in that unique situation where his actions must constitute a precedent for future generations, and it was fortunate for the United States that we had in him a man at once clear-headed, absolutely fearless, and wellnigh irresistible in his powers of persuasion.

Hamilton's pet idea was one which experience has proved to be fallacious, but it served him as the occasion for introducing a method of constitutional interpretation which has survived because of its intrinsic merits. Hamilton had a lively horror of weak governments and of



FIG. 162. Maj.-Gen. Henry Knox. (From an undotted engraving by Savage. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

anarchy, and, as a member of Washington's staff during the Revolutionary war, he had made up his mind that if a chance were ever given him, he would forever put a stop to such things. In this feeling, Washington warmly sympathized with him. Now, Hamilton believed that the best way to strengthen the government was to enlist the personal interests of the money-lending classes in its favor. His pet institution, therefore, was a national bank, in which the government itself should be a large shareholder, and, in part, a director. The proposal to establish such a bank at once called forth intense opposition. Those who were already afraid of a despotism outside of their local governments

were now doubly afraid. Was not the monster, Federalism, now showing its cloven hoof? Would not a few years see the dreaded tyrants at our Federal capital combining with the rich men everywhere to foreclose mortgages, throw men into prison for debt, and otherwise rule the country with a rod of iron? But as many people were not frightened by these forebodings, the opponents of a national bank sought more effective arguments and declared that the creation of such an institution would be unconstitutional. The Constitution, said they, does not give Congress any right to charter a corporate body within the limits of the state. In order to meet this argument, Hamilton devised the doctrine of implied powers.




FIG. 163.—Marietta in 1790. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xx.)

The eighth section of the first article of the Constitution enumerates the specific powers which are granted to Congress, and at the close of this enumeration there is appended a clause which authorizes Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof." To avoid clumsiness in reference, I shall always hereafter allude to this clause by a phrase which I have been in the habit for many years of applying to it. I shall call it the "elastic clause," because everything depends upon just how far its meaning can be stretched. Of course no written constitution can be complete without such a clause. Voltaire once said that with man such as he is, if there were no God, it would be necessary to invent one. So of constitutions. If there were no elastic clause, it would be necessary to read one between the lines;

simply because no body of men, in framing an instrument of government, can possibly foresee all the emergencies of the future. The only question is, how much latitude of interpretation is allowable? The Hamiltonians said, without a national bank you cannot carry on the business of government, and therefore it is justified by the plea of necessity. But their opponents demurred, saying that necessity is the plea of tyrants, and had been urged in evil days to justify imprisonment for free speech. These arguments were well remembered a few years later. The immediate result was a partial victory for Hamilton, who succeeded in 1791 in getting a national bank established for twenty years.




FIG. 161.—Vauxhall Garden, New York, 1803. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xvi.)

Now came the question as to obtaining the money with which Congress was to pay the public debt, and the balances of which it was to keep on deposit in the national bank. One of the most fundamental and sweeping reforms of the new Constitution had been the prohibition of tariff acts by the several states. No power but Congress could henceforth raise money by customs duties. This had at once the inestimable advantage of insuring absolute free trade between the several states, which was probably the greatest direct commercial advantage which the United States obtained by the severance from Great Britain. It also diverted into the United States treasury the large sums which had hitherto been flowing into the state treasuries from import duties. Hamilton saw that such a revenue would be ample for the Federal government, and he also realized that he must chiefly depend upon it, since

direct taxes are always so unpopular. One of the weighty arguments against the new Federal government was that it would introduce a fourth tax. Why! did not every man already have to pay taxes to his town, his county, and his state? And could he ever endure the addition of a fourth tax to the list? Hamilton understood this point very well, and placed his reliance upon customs. He knew how safe it is to count upon human dullness, so that when a tax is wrapped up in the extra



FIG. 165.—Martha Washington. (From an engraving in mezzotint by John Sartain.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

twenty-five cents paid for a yard of cloth it is so effectually hidden that most people do not know it is there.

Here again, too, he saw the way open for enlisting capitalists on the side of his own loose interpretation of the elastic clause. He saw the great facilities of our country for establishing manufactures, and he adroitly advocated the policy of protection to young industries, thus enlisting in his behalf the selfish interests of all manufacturers. The

protective policy was vehemently attacked on the true and sufficient ground that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to lay taxes for any other purpose than the obtaining of revenue. Against this objection the friends of protective tariffs urged the loose construction of the elastic clause, but not with marked success; and so long as this question was argued upon purely constitutional grounds, the protectionists unquestionably had the worst of it.

Now came the question, What classes of public debts should be paid? There were three classes in existence. First, there were the debts owed by the United States to foreign powers, such as France and the Netherlands, which had lent us money during the war. All were agreed that such debts must be paid to the uttermost farthing, principal as well as interest. Secondly, there were the debts owed to American citizens who had bought up Continental securities. Hamilton insisted that these also should be paid in full. To this there was opposition. In seasons of depression Continental securities had become nearly worthless, whereupon speculators had from time to time bought them up by the bushel in hopes of a rise. If the government were to redeem them all now, it would be remunerating the clammy-hearted speculators instead of the generous people who by the original investments had made themselves benefactors of the country. Very good, replied Hamilton, only you must remember that my business is simply to redeem the national credit; and when one is trying to set on foot his shattered credit, he must begin by paying all his debts, to whomsoever due, without stopping to ask who is going to be benefited by the money. This direct shot had its due effect, and Hamilton again prevailed. With regard to the third class of debts, a great many people declared they were none of Hamilton's business. These were the debts owed to various American citizens, not by Congress, but by the several states. What in the world had a Federal Secretary of the Treasury to do with these state debts? Simply this: that Hamilton proposed that the United States should forthwith assume and pay them all. At this suggestion there went up a howl from one end of the country to the other. Despotism was advancing with giant strides. When a great-uncle or second cousin steps in and relieves an unfortunate relative from pecuniary embarrassments, does he not at once deem himself entitled to interfere with his mode of life? Doesn't he take it for granted that he has bought the right to be his perpetual adviser? And if Congress were now to pay the debts of Massachusetts or New Jersey, what would become of the dignity and self-government of those venerable states?

Again came the searching question, Where does the Constitution authorize Congress to use the public revenues in paying state debts? Hamilton again referred to the elastic clause, and rightly. If there was a single question during Washington's administration which called for heroic treatment and would not brook a moment's delay, it was the question of state debts. It had been one of the exciting causes of the Shays Rebellion. It was an abiding source of discontent. So long as these debts continued unpaid, every public creditor was bound to feel a stronger interest in the solvency of his own state than in the solvency of the United States. In such a chaos of feeling it would be next to impossible to get any great national measures dispassionately considered; but now the magician Hamilton, in paying the state debts, simply waved a wand and cried *Presto!* and forthwith all these state creditors were transformed into national creditors, every man of them feeling his own pecuniary welfare inseparably wrapped up with that of the Federal government. This project of assumption was doubtless Hamilton's most brilliant stroke. It went further than any other at the moment toward creating a Federalist bond of pecuniary interests, and it brought at once to Hamilton's side not only all the public creditors, but nearly all capitalists, with all the strongest conservative elements of society.

It also for the first time drew the line between North and South as it had not been drawn before. If you ask the question why Vermont will next year throw a Republican majority, and Alabama a Democratic majority, no matter what are the candidates or platforms to be voted for, you will find the answer if you go back to Hamilton's assumption of state debts. That policy made Federalists of the mass of New England population, and arrayed the mass of Southerners on the other side, for the following reasons: As there were not nearly so many capitalists, bankers, and other money-lenders at the South, so there were not nearly so many public creditors as at the North. Hamilton's assumption



FIG. 166.—Mrs. John Jay. (From an unlettered proof, after a painting by Pine. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

policy, therefore, benefited the North greatly, but the South not nearly so much. On the other hand, it was with a feeling of intense alarm that the planters of Virginia witnessed these bold and masterful stretches of authority on Hamilton's part. They believed him to be intent upon setting up a despotism, and the ready response which his proposals received from New York and New England filled them with terror. They felt that their sole refuge was to insist upon the strictest and most narrow interpretation of the elastic clause, and thus there grew up two great schools of constitutional interpretation which have formed the most deep-seated distinction between American parties. The Hamiltonian policy of loose construction, leading toward the continued



FIG. 167.—Mrs. Alexander Hamilton. (From an autotype, after the painting by Sharpless. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

increase of the Federal power, found most favor at the North; while the Jeffersonian policy of strict construction, accompanied with the most jealous dread of the growing Federal power, found most favor at first in Virginia, and ultimately all over the South. Connected with these circumstances we shall find the sentiment of union growing at the North under the stimulus of commercial interests, while at the South the sentiment of union remains so much weaker that it is at length unable to resist the incentives which in 1861 turned that part of the country into rebellion.

If the position of Jefferson was somewhat vague at the outset, it was definite enough after Hamilton's aggressive policy had been com-

pletely outlined. How was this hydra-headed monster to be foiled? One obvious weapon to use against him was the site of the proposed Federal capital. The Constitution had provided that the Federal government should no longer be dependent upon the hospitality of any particular state or city. At one moment in 1783 Congress had been compelled to fly from Philadelphia through fear of an armed mob which the Pennsylvania militia had been unable to suppress. Was it not rather undignified for the government of the United States not to



FIG. 168.—Mrs. James Madison. (From an unlettered proof, after a painting by Gilbert Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

own the very building in which it held its sessions? The result was the provision that a district of ten miles square should at some convenient place be ceded to the United States for the building of a Federal city. The selection of the site was under discussion at the same time as the assumption of state debts. Hamilton's friends were determined that the new Federal capital should not be farther south than the Delaware River. Jefferson was determined that it should be

at least as far south as the Potomac. It must be near enough for the Virginia planters to keep some sort of watch upon it, otherwise it was in danger of being seized, body and soul, by the merchants of New York and the skippers of Boston and Salem.

Thus this great question arrived at that stage which in American politics answers to the step taken by the algebraist when he has at length succeeded in making his statement in the form of an equation. On each side there was something that could be given and taken. And so it was in the present case. Jefferson and Hamilton (Fig. 169) had a friendly little dinner. The city of Washington was built on the bank




FIG. 169. Alexander Hamilton. (From a bust in N. Y. Chamber of Commerce.)

of the Potomac, and the Federal government assumed and paid twenty million dollars' worth of state debts. Like most compromises, it was an arrangement in which one side obtained vastly more than the other. From nearly all points of view, it was an overwhelming victory for Hamilton, for the Federalist party, and for the permanence of the American Union.

During the whole of Washington's first term as President these financial questions, involving, as they did, the whole attitude of mind with which the government was to be conducted, formed the chief sub-

ject of discussion. At the same time the outbreak of the French Revolution awakened an interest which none of the accepted adjectives expressing intensity would avail to describe. At first public opinion in the United States was almost unanimously on the side of the revolutionary party. It was felt by many that the nation which had helped us in winning our independence was now engaged in freeing itself from a corrupt despotism and deserved our most cordial sympathies. And this feeling subsisted so long as the moderate phase of the Revolution continued. In Washington's second administration it was otherwise. The execution of the king had lately taken place, the wholesale arrest of Girondist leaders soon followed, and the Reign of Terror was visibly approaching. Under these circumstances the feeling in America was very sharply divided, and there were more manifestations of anger and bitterness over European than over domestic questions. There were Americans who felt bound to defend the French leaders through everything, and had but mild words of reproof for the most shocking excesses of Carrier or Fouqué de Tinville; while there were others whose emotional recoil from the situation was almost as violent as that of Edmund Burke. Such people looked to England to save Europe from anarchy; and when war was declared between France and Great Britain in the spring of 1793, the excitement in this country had reached fever-heat.

It was now that Washington entered upon one of the most difficult and trying periods of his public career. He saw the imminent danger of our country drifting into the conflict as an ally of France, and he understood that our only sound policy was one of absolute neutrality. Accordingly, at the first news of war, he issued a proclamation of neutrality couched in strong and unmistakable terms. From this moment the partisans of the French began to revile Washington, often in most scurrilous language and with the vilest implications of unworthy motives. It was at this juncture that there came upon the scene that eccentric personage who called himself Citizen Genêt (Fig. 170). He was the minister of the French republic to the United States. Even at this early stage of their proceedings, the French began acting in foreign countries with that cool indifference to the established governments of such countries for which they soon became so conspicuous. They seemed to be laboring under a temporary mental aberration, of which one symptom was a belief that they already ruled the world. No sooner had Citizen Genêt arrived in Philadelphia than he began to grant letters of marque to cruisers sailing from American ports to capture British vessels; and

when their prizes were brought in, this airy creature actually appointed admiralty judges to try them; besides which, he opened recruiting offices to raise soldiers for the French army. The British minister naturally protested to Mr. Jefferson, and the latter informed Citizen Genêt that such things could not be allowed. But to this admonition the Frenchman paid little heed. All over the country there had sprung up little clubs of sympathizers with France, known as Democratic clubs. As usual at such times, their conduct was apt to be silly. Their members would address one another as Citizen and Citizeness, instead of the aristocratic Mr. and Mrs. They were apt to scoff at governments



FIG. 170.—Edmond Charles Genêt. (From an etching by H. B. Hall. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

in general, and to make game of the President, all of which Genêt understood far too seriously. One day an American cruiser, flying the French flag, sailed away from Philadelphia in defiance of express prohibition from the authorities. Genêt explained by declaring that he was tired of so much nonsense, and he proposed to appeal from the American government to the American people. The moment this remark was extensively quoted, the Frenchman suddenly found that his popularity had gone. Even the most ardent partisans of the French could not forgive such a remark as this, and, taking advantage of this state of feeling, our government sent the perfervid citizen home about his business.

The magic effect of Hamilton's measures had already become everywhere visible. With all our debts funded and in rapid process of payment, with an annual revenue considerably exceeding our expenses, with a steady currency of gold and silver back in circulation, and with a growing prosperity in which farmers and manufacturers shared alike, the change which seven years had wrought was something marvelous. The strength and elasticity of the new nation attracted comment abroad as well as at home, and the willingness to molest us somewhat diminished. We were still a very weak nation, perhaps a fair match for Denmark or for Portugal; but in 1794 our Federal Executive was able to make a respectable show of strength. The wisdom of Hamilton in relying upon customs duties for public revenue had been shown by one of the few instances in which he thought best to depart from his usual rule. He laid an excise of twenty-five cents a gallon upon whiskey. This excited the wrath of the Appalachian population of Western Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Kentucky; and there was some talk of their seceding from the Union and forming a mountain republic. Armed bodies of insurgents met at various places, and if Washington had been as weak as some persons in such a situation there might have been serious bloodshed. Some persons would have called out a force just large enough to encourage the insurgents; but Washington, without wasting words, called out 15,000 men, whereupon the famous whiskey insurrection at once collapsed.

As yet many of the provisions of the peace of 1783 remained unfulfilled. The exodus of the ill-treated Tories had not yet ceased, and the British garrisons had not yet been withdrawn from the northwestern fortresses, nor had any British minister yet appeared in Philadelphia. The Americans were, moreover, still excluded from the trade with the West Indies. But what caused most dissatisfaction of all in America was the right exercised by British commanders of searching American ships on the high seas and taking from them seamen on the ground that they were escaped British subjects. So strong was the desire of France to draw the United States into war with Great Britain that Washington felt the importance of a treaty with the latter power which should put an end to these grievances. Accordingly, in 1794, he sent Chief Justice Jay to London on a special mission for this purpose. Jay met with as much success as could have been expected at the time, for the English ministers were in an unusually grumpy mood and inclined to be captious in dealing with anything that called itself a republic. They agreed to surrender the western

coasts, to send a minister without further delay, and indeed to withdraw all grievances except two: they would not concede free trade with the West Indies, and they would not renounce the right of impressing seamen. When this treaty reached Philadelphia in the spring of 1795, it was ratified by the Senate and only awaited Washington's signature, when all at once its contents were made public in the papers, and the press rang with denunciations and threats in case Washington should dare to sign it. He was called the stepfather of his country. He was said to prefer British to American interests. It was hinted that he might be impeached, or perhaps even assassinated, if he should sign the



*Fisher Ames*

FIG. 171. Fisher Ames, defender of the Jay Treaty. (After a painting by Gilbert Stuart.)

obnoxious document. To this clamor Washington paid small heed. He signed the treaty, and the subsequent rapid revival of trade did much to justify him in the eyes of many people. As the time approached for the elections of 1796, Washington declined to serve as candidate for a third term. His withdrawal left John Adams as the representative Federalist in the ensuing election, while the votes of the opposite party were given to Thomas Jefferson. The result, according to the crude and simple system of that time, was the election of Adams for President, with Jefferson for Vice-President. Since Washington's first election the Constitution had been ratified by North Carolina and

Rhode Island, and three new states had been admitted into the Union—Vermont and Kentucky in 1791, and Tennessee in 1796. A short time before the election we were treated to a characteristic specimen of French insolence. In spite of the indignation over Jay's treaty a year before, the current of popularity was now setting strongly toward the Federalists, and there was little doubt that Adams would be elected. Under these circumstances Adet, the French minister, addressed an open letter to the Secretary of State, in which he reproached the Americans for having been deficient in gratitude toward France and announced that he had been instructed by his government to refrain from all diplomatic negotiations with the United States until the American temper should have been proved. It does not appear that this astonishing manifesto produced any effect upon the election. If resentment against some real or fancied injury at British hands ever turned the sympathies of our people toward France, there was sure to come in a moment some such insult as this to turn them the other way.

This was well illustrated in the stormy administration of John Adams. It was in many features a continuation of Washington's second term, except that now not Great Britain, but France, was the power most fiercely denounced. As before, the Federalists sympathized with England, and the Republicans with France; and as the contest over Hamilton's measures had ended in his decisive victory, it was only the questions of foreign policy that divided the parties.

Before we go on, a word of explanation must be devoted to the names of these parties. As a rule, American party names seem utterly devoid of meaning, and are so indeed except when we take into account the historic circumstances under which the names originated. At the outset, the meanings of the names Federalist and Antifederalist are plain enough. The Federalists were those who wished through constitutional reforms to frame a more perfect union, but as a result of Hamilton's strong measures we soon find their opponents accusing them of leanings toward monarchy. This kind of innuendo came with especial ease from opponents who were sympathizing with France as a republic. It was as if the Jeffersonians had said to the Federalists, "You are not really Republicans; you are Monarchists in disguise. We are the only true Republicans." Accordingly, Jefferson and his friends called themselves Republicans. On the other hand, the Federalists were not disposed to let the matter rest here. "No, indeed," they retorted in substance, "you are not the only real Republicans. We are as good Republicans as you, and far better. You are nothing but Democrats." It must be

remembered that at that moment, while the guillotine was rampant in France, the word Democrat had a very distinct flavor of reproach; it was quite as hateful an epithet as Nihilist or Anarchist at the present day. The followers of Jefferson thus began by calling themselves Republicans, while their opponents occasionally stigmatized them as Democrats, and thus matters stood for several years. We shall see that in course of time sundry Republicans accepted the name of Democrat until, after another generation, from a term of reproach, the word became with many a badge of honor.



FIG. 172. Mrs. John Adams. (From an unlettered artist proof, after Gilbert Stuart.  
Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

In 1797 President Adams recalled the ardent Republican, James Monroe, who had been minister to France, and appointed a Federalist, Cotesworth Pinckney, in his place; but Pinckney had no sooner arrived in Paris than the United States were again grossly insulted. The French Directory issued a manifesto in which they announced their intention of holding no more diplomatic relations with the United States until reparation should be made for sundry grievances. Foremost among these grievances they named the Jay treaty with Great Britain, and at the same time notice was given to Pinckney to leave France without a moment's delay.

It will be easily imagined that the receipt of this news in America did not help the Republicans. The matter was angrily discussed, but finally President Adams, with the entire approval of Congress, sent a special embassy to France, composed of three commissioners empowered to deal with the situation. These men were Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry; and as one reads their names, one's thoughts have a tendency to revert to a well-known Biblical phrase about pearls and a certain domestic animal to which it is not worth while to offer them. The commissioners remained some weeks in Paris in profound quiet at their hotel. Their cards announcing their arrival were ignored, but presently they were approached by three creatures who described themselves as emissaries from Talleyrand, empowered to dis-




FIG. 173.—Elbridge Gerry.

enss matters with them informally. It presently appeared that these persons were in quest of a few million dollars as blackmail. The American commissioners prevailed upon them to put their suggestions in writing, after which Pinckney and Marshall returned at once to America; but Gerry (Fig. 173), the Republican member of the commission, still amid insult and rebuff, unwilling to abandon his faith in his French friends, remained for some time in Paris without achieving anything save more or less damage to his political reputation.

After President Adams had seen the envoys and heard their story, he sent a message to Congress, accompanying it with the French papers, in which the initials X, Y, Z were substituted for the names of Talleyrand's minions. These papers have since been known as the X, Y, Z

despatches. When published, they were greeted with a roar that resounded from the seacoast to the Mississippi River. The suggestion of soothing-money was met with the war-cry, "Millions for defence, not one cent for tribute." Hostilities on the ocean had already been going on for two years; the French were capturing American merchant-ships with as much diligence as if war had been declared. American frigates now began to play a hand in the game, and Commodore Truxton in the Constellation captured two French frigates, thus somewhat astonishing the government of the Directory.



*Jo: Hopkinson*

FIG. 174. Joseph Hopkinson, author of "Hail Columbia," 1798. (From an engraving by Longaere, after a portrait by Sully. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

An army was now raised and other preparations for war were diligently carried on. Washington was called once more from his home at Mount Vernon to take command of this army with the rank of lieutenant-general. Washington assented on condition that he should be allowed to appoint his major-generals. Congress at once agreed to this, whereupon Washington sent in his three names in order of seniority: Hamilton, Cotesworth Pinckney, and Knox. When these names, after having been approved by Congress, were sent up to President Adams,

his treatment of them was very singular. A bitter feud had for some time been growing up between the President and Hamilton, not based upon any important differences of principle or policy, but simply on the fact that one party was not large enough to contain two men of such restless and masterful personality. Like most quarrels in which principle is not involved, it abounded in silly and puerile situations. For example, there is no doubt that Hamilton had intrigued against Adams during the Presidential candidacy of the latter. If Hamilton's schemes




FIG. 175.—Rev. Francis Asbury, Methodist missionary preacher. (From an engraving by Tanner, after a painting by Paradise. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

had succeeded, they would have given the first place on the electoral list to Thomas Pinckney rather than to Adams. During the latter's Presidency he was apt to complain that the members of his own Cabinet lent a readier ear to Hamilton than to himself, and he dreaded the influence of Hamilton as too zealously British and therefore likely to assist in plunging the country into war with France. When the names of the major-generals were laid before President Adams for approval, he changed their order, making them Knox, Cotesworth Pinckney, Hamil-

ton. Now, this was a very gross interference with General Washington's plans. In view of his own advanced age it was quite clear that great responsibility would devolve upon the senior major-general. He was very likely to be called upon to command the army. Washington well understood the high qualifications of Hamilton for such a post. In changing the order of the names, Adams, who in military matters was utterly obtuse, had put in the more responsible place an officer of far inferior quality. The result was a scandalous dispute which split the Federalist party into two hostile camps until Washington settled the business by quietly announcing that unless his wishes were respected he should resign. Before such a thrust as this, even the obstinacy of John Adams was obliged to give way, and he was put in the peculiarly humiliating attitude of a man who has not only tried to do a mean thing, but failed.

Far be it, however, from any serious writer of history to speak slightingly of John Adams. If he could be very weak at times, he could also be very strong. None of our Presidents ever desired a second term more intensely than he. It was hard for him to understand why people should rate him so much lower than Washington, and a second term was absolutely necessary to heal his wounded vanity. As a politician, he understood very well that the most effectual way to ruin his chances for the second term would be to divide his party on the eve of election. Yet this suicidal act he now proceeded to commit (give ear, O modern Presidents, if any such there be, who desire second terms!) from motives of purely disinterested regard for the nation's welfare. Not that he ever prated of such disinterestedness, but his actions speak as eloquently as the immortal deed of that Roman Curtius who leaped into the abysmal gulf that yawned in the Forum. Adams felt as strongly as Washington the imperative necessity of avoiding war, and especially of keeping the United States from getting dragged into the quarrels of stronger nations. The warlike preparations of the United States, and in particular the capture of two French war-ships, had opened the eyes of the Directory. They concluded, on the whole, that they had enough on their hands without engaging in a war with the United States, and they signified to President Adams that they were ready to discuss matters with a view to removing all outstanding difficulties. Against the fierce opposition of his own party, especially the Hamiltonian wing of it, Adams sent commissioners to Paris, who arrived there in the spring of 1800 and found the government in the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul. With Napoleon, matters were soon amicably arranged and the danger of war was averted. The result at home upon

the Federal party was somewhat disintegrating; it was certainly among the causes which defeated Adams' re-election. There can be no doubt that he fully understood this point and deliberately sacrificed himself to the public good. Of all the acts in his public career, it is the one to which his descendants have most reason to point with pride.

A large, flowing signature in cursive script that reads "Eli Whitney". The signature is written in black ink on a white background.

FIG. 176.—Eli Whitney, inventor of the cotton-gin.

At the same time, however, there was another rock upon which the Federalists were wrecking their party. For several years French emissaries had been extremely irritating in their ways of doing things. They would form secret clubs, hold meetings for raising money and troops, insult the President and Congress, and send to the Republican

press all manner of incendiary material which the editors gleefully published. In 1798, in the heat of the indignation which greeted the X, Y, Z despatches, the Federalists were high in public favor. They seemed to be riding on the top of the tide, and in a moment of undue enthusiasm passed two laws calculated to curb and discourage French intriguers. These were the famous Alien and Sedition laws. The alien law authorized the President, in the case of any person of foreign birth whom he should judge to be dangerous to the peace and liberties of the United States, to order such alien to leave the country immediately under certain specified penalties of fine and imprisonment. The sedition law imposed a heavy fine and imprisonment upon all persons who should combine to oppose any measure of the government, and also upon such as should write or publish anything of a malicious or scandalous character against either President or Congress.

About the unconstitutionality of these edicts, there could of course never be a doubt. Both are plain infringements of the first amendment to the Constitution, and it can be shown that they contravene some of the provisions of the fifth amendment. There is no doubt that their enactment was a piece of extreme folly. It caused a sudden revulsion of feeling in favor of the Republicans, and called forth vigorous remonstrance. Party feeling has perhaps never in this country been so bitter, except just before the civil war. The answer to the alien and sedition laws was embodied in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. In this affair both the Hamiltonian and the Jeffersonian parties showed their weak sides. Against the excesses of a Federalism which had lost its temper, the protest of Republicanism was so energetic as to savor for the moment of political disintegration. A series of resolutions drawn up by Madison was adopted in 1798 by the legislature of Virginia; while a similar series, still more pronounced, drawn up by Jefferson, was adopted in the same year by the legislature of Kentucky. The Virginia resolutions asserted with truth that, in adopting the Federal Constitution, the states had surrendered only a limited portion of their powers, and went on to declare that, whenever the Federal government should exceed its constitutional authority, it was the business of the state governments to interfere and pronounce such action unconstitutional. Accordingly, Virginia declared the alien and sedition laws unconstitutional, and invited the other states to join in the declaration. Not meeting with a favorable response, Virginia renewed these resolutions the next year. There was nothing necessarily seditious or tending toward secession in the Virginia resolutions, but the attitude assumed

in them was uncalled-for on the part of any state, inasmuch as there existed the Federal Supreme Court, a tribunal competent to decide upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. The Kentucky resolutions went further. They declared that our Federal Constitution was a compact, to which the several states were the one party and the Federal government was the other, and each party must decide for itself as to when the compact was infringed and as to the proper remedy to be adopted. When the resolutions were repeated in 1799, a clause was added which went still further and mentioned "nullification" as the suitable remedy, and one that any state might employ. In the Virginia resolutions there was neither mention nor intention of nullification as a remedy. Mr. Madison lived to witness South Carolina's attempt at nullification in 1832; and in a very able paper, written in the last year of his life, he conclusively refuted the idea that his resolutions of 1798 afforded any justification for such an attempt, and showed that what they really contemplated was a protest on the part of all the state governments in common. Doubtless such a remedy was clumsy and impracticable, and the suggestion of it does not deserve to be ranked along with Mr. Madison's best work in constructive statesmanship; but it certainly contained no logical basis for what its author unspurtingly denominated as the "twin heresies" of nullification and secession.

With regard to the Kentucky resolutions, the case is different. They certainly furnished a method of stating the case, as to the relations between the states and the Federal government, of which Calhoun afterward made use in developing his theory of nullification. There has been much interesting discussion as to how far Jefferson is to be held responsible for this view. But this discussion has generally proceeded upon the tacit and perhaps unconscious assumption that in 1798 such an idea as that of nullification was a novel heresy, and that in lending countenance to it, even in the slightest degree, Jefferson figured as in some sense the inventor of a notion which bore fruit in the secession movement of 1861 and the great civil war. A dispassionate student of history can have no wish to absolve Jefferson or anyone else from the proper responsibility for his political acts. But the way in which this case is usually stated, and still more the mood in which it is apt to be stated, is not strictly historical. It would be more instructive to bear in mind that in 1798, before Marshall's career as Chief Justice had begun, the functions of the Supreme Court and its efficiency in checking usurpations of power were as yet mere matter of theory and very imperfectly realized by the people; that the new government was

as yet an experiment believed by half the people to be a very hazardous experiment; that thus far its administration had been monopolized by one party, the measures of which, even when most beneficial, had been regarded with widespread distrust and dread; and that this distrust now seemed all at once to be justified by the passage of laws that were certainly the most atrocious in all our history except the fugitive-slave law. If under these circumstances there were some who believed that a confederacy in which such laws might be nullified was preferable to a union in which men might be sent to jail, as under the Stuart kings, for expressing their honest opinions in the newspapers, we ought not to blame them. Such a union would not have been worth the efforts that it cost to frame it. Taught by experience, we can now see that the fears expressed or implied in the Kentucky resolutions were really groundless. But that they were so, that the people were relieved of such fears and the public confidence restored, so that the Union began for the first time to be really loved and cherished with a sentiment of loyalty, was due chiefly to Jefferson's election as President in 1800 and the conservative policy which he thereafter pursued. When the government passed out of the hands of the party which had enacted the alien and sedition laws, the dread subsided, and the vitality of the Kentucky resolutions was suspended until Calhoun revived it thirty years later.

Attention has already been called to the differences between loose construction and strict construction which have characterized our most fundamental opposition between parties. As a rule, the old Federalist party, the Whig party of Webster's time, and the later Republican party have been loose constructionists in their ideas and methods; while on the other hand, the Republican party of Jefferson and the Democratic party, until it put on the dunce-cap in 1896, have been strict constructionists. But along with these distinctions it must be carefully borne in mind that the very same party which is strict constructionist when in opposition is sure to be more or less loose constructionist when in power. In other words, it is in the nature of the government for the moment to magnify its powers, while it is the business of the opposition to subject such claims to a jealous scrutiny; and in these circumstances we have one of the greatest safeguards of the stability of free government.

The election of 1800 affords an excellent illustration. Never, except in 1860, did political passion rise so high as in that year. For eleven years the government had been in the hands of Federalists,

Nobody knew what the Republicans would do; only it was pretty clear that if their acts when in power were to be as intemperate as their speeches when in opposition, there was much to be feared. They had opposed all the measures of Hamilton under which the country had been so marvellously prospering; would they not now, out of sheer regard for consistency, cancel all those measures? Nay, more: they had just been indulging in talk about nullification; would they not now, if entrusted with the government, go on and surrender all claim to control over the several states? And then, look at their great leader and candidate, Thomas Jefferson, author of the Kentucky resolutions. Could there be a particle of difference between electing him President and signing the death-warrant of the Federal Union?

The people who used such arguments did not sufficiently estimate the strength of the influence which the possession of responsible power exerts. In point of fact, the surest way to kill the Kentucky resolutions was to make their author President of the United States. From the year 1801 onward the extreme Republicans became the defenders of a more perfect Union, and the only threats of nullification or secession were such as came with a very ill grace from Federalist quarters. As for Hamilton's measures, not one of them was interfered with. Jefferson and his friends understood the blessings of an unimpaired credit and steady revenue too well to wish to reverse the policy that had borne such fruits. In a word, not one of the evil results which had been predicted from the change of party ever came. It was a great object-lesson for the American people.

The intensity of the dread felt toward Jefferson was shown in the last stage of the election. In accordance with the method prescribed in the Constitution, the candidate who had the greatest number of electoral votes was declared President, while the candidate with the next greatest number of votes was declared Vice-President. This method had already had one awkward consequence when it made Adams President and Jefferson Vice-President. It now produced another awkward situation of a different kind. The person intended by the Republicans for the Vice-Presidency was Aaron Burr. For want of care to make his vote smaller than that cast for Jefferson, the result was a tie. When the electoral votes were counted in Congress, they were found to be 73 for Jefferson, 73 for Burr, 65 for Adams, 64 for Pinckney, 1 for Jay. The difference between Pinckney and Adams shows that the Federalists had managed their voting more carefully than the Republicans. As there was no choice, it was left for the

House of Representatives to choose between Jefferson and Burr. So great was the dread of the former that many Federalists were ready to give their votes to Burr, whose reputation was unquestionably worse than that of any other man in public life. It was the advice of Hamilton that largely contributed to the defeat of this nefarious scheme. As for Burr, his willingness to coquette with the Federalists worked his speedy political ruin.

The immediate result of this affair was the twelfth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that the candidates voted for as Vice-Presidents shall be distinctly and separately mentioned from those that are voted for as Presidents. Since that amendment went into operation it has been customary for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates to have the same number of electoral votes, and it has also become impossible, save under very extraordinary circumstances, for the President and Vice-President to be of opposite parties.

An interesting feature of the election of 1800 was its demonstration of the futility of that elaborate device, the electoral college. The framers of the Constitution had proceeded upon the assumption that the people would not know enough to choose their President intelligently. It was sought to rectify this alleged evil by having the people in each state choose a certain number of their most eminent fellow-citizens as electors; and it was supposed that these electors, on assembling together, would use their superior wisdom to decide upon the ideally best man for the office of President. Such a scheme seemed wise and practical to the eminently sensible and practical men who framed our Constitution. Yet on the first occasion which put it to a test we see that this much-lauded board of electors became a mere machine for registering the party vote, and such it has remained ever since. So completely is this failure of the electoral college to answer its intended purpose understood that we often hear suggestions that it would be better if the President were to be elected directly by the people; but in this respect the electoral college is certainly one of our great safeguards. It has never done what it was designed to do, but it has served another end of at least equal importance. It would be a great calamity if the ascertainment of the vote for President were to depend upon the counting of all the ballots in all parts of the country. The element of uncertainty, with the possible chances of quarrel, would be immeasurably increased. In the election of 1884, when the result depended upon the difference of only a thousand votes or so in the state of New York, the uncertainty approached a dangerous point.

How much worse would it have been had the result depended upon a much smaller majority spread over our immense country, abounding, as it does, in ill-known and turbulent localities. Nothing shows better than the history of Presidential elections how desirable it is to let well enough alone.

The inauguration of President Jefferson has been a theme of anecdotes, some of which do not seem well substantiated—as for example, the story of his serving as his own groom and tying his horse to the fence. Such a story is nevertheless characteristic of the want of ceremony for which Jefferson was always notable. Perhaps it would not be incorrect to say that the disuse of the Presidential address at the opening of Congress was due to one of his personal peculiarities. Although a man of Herculean presence, endowed with unusual strength, Jefferson had a weak, husky voice, and appeared at his worst when speaking in public. On the other hand, he excelled as a ready writer; hence we find him discarding the Presidential address in favor of the Presidential message, a change which, on the whole, cannot be called an improvement.

It is notable that at this first great change of parties there was a very small change of public officials. The spoils system was not yet introduced into national polities. The beastly idea had, however, been conceived, and had already begun to be put into practice in the states whose names have since become bywords as sink-holes of political filth, New York and Pennsylvania. Among Jefferson's advisers there were some who advised him to turn out certain worthy place-holders in favor of sundry needy persons who had voted for him. The argument was used that by helping to elect him and defeat the tyrannical party which had enacted the alien and sedition laws, these applicants had saved the country from destruction and deserved to be rewarded with places in the custom-house. "Indeed," replied Jefferson, with a merry laugh, "I have heard that the city of Rome was once saved by geese, but I never read in Livy or elsewhere that those geese were made revenue officers."

Another point to be mentioned is that the inauguration of President Jefferson was the first one that took place in the city of Washington. That city had been designed by Major L'Enfant, a French officer of engineers, who took a lesson from the Reign of Terror in Paris. His leading thought was to plan a city in which riots could be quickly suppressed by the massing of cannon at convenient points. Hence the combination of the monotonous checkerboard plan with that of the

radiating spokes of a wheel; resulting in a city of broad, smiling avenues and magnificent, imposing vistas. There has been little or no call for the suppression of riots, but the French engineer builded better than he knew. As there was something in this new location that gives a peculiarly national flavor to Jefferson's administration, so its most important act exhibits him in the light of a loose constructionist of the boldest kind. For twenty years the United States had been suffering great annoyance from the power exercised over the Mississippi River by an unfriendly and backward government like that of Spain. We have already mentioned some of these annoyances in connection with the threats of secession heard at the southwest in 1786. An extraordinary chance now arose for removing all such annoyances once for all. The vast Louisiana territory, extending from the Mississippi River to the crest of the Rocky Mountains and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian boundary, had once belonged to France, but had been ceded by her to Spain in 1763. Now, in 1801 there came the news that Spain had ceded this territory back to France. The First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, was perhaps dallying with schemes for the restoration of French dominion in the New World. At all events, his acquisition of Louisiana was regarded as a menace, though perhaps unintentional, to the United States, and Jefferson instructed our minister at Paris to represent it as likely to drive the United States into an alliance with England. What might have come from this situation cannot be known, for within two years it had completely changed. It had become evident that France and England were going to war again. Now, Napoleon could not hope to keep Louisiana against the opposition of the British fleet. The possession of such an exposed territory in America was simply a weak point inviting a blow from England at any moment. The surrender of New Orleans to a British fleet might awkwardly compromise Napoleon. He was, therefore, so glad to get rid of the country that he was not disposed to haggle about the price; and so the whole territory was handed over to the United States in exchange for \$15,000,000. In area the Louisiana purchase was nearly equivalent to Austria-Hungary, the German empire, Sweden and Norway, France and Spain. The purchase more than doubled the area of the United States.

Here the strict constructionist might inquire, By what constitutional right did President Jefferson make this purchase? The Constitution had made no express provision for any such startling exercise of power; probably the Federal Convention had not so much as thought of such a thing. What is more, this acquisition of territory soon reopened the

question as to slavery, which the framers of the Constitution thought they had forever closed by their compromises. By and by, the question was to arise as to what was to be done about slavery in states formed from the Louisiana territory, a question to be settled only by civil war and by the abolition of slavery altogether. In Jefferson's time, such far-reaching results were not yet dreamed of. The desirableness of ousting European influence from the mouth of the Mississippi River was very great, and the purchase was so generally approved that Jefferson abandoned his half-formed purpose of asking Congress to propose a constitutional amendment to justify him. Perhaps it was not needed. A quarter of a century later, Chief Justice Marshall laid down the doctrine that "The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the power of making war and of making treaties; consequently that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty." In the time of Jefferson's Presidency, this would have been called pretty bold loose construction. To the general approval of the Louisiana purchase there was one exception. In New England some people feared that in so huge a nation as this portended, their own corner of the country would be reduced to insignificance. The uneasiness continued until the time of the second war with England. In 1811 Josiah Quincy, afterward president of Harvard, declared in a fervent speech in the House of Representatives, that if the state of Louisiana, the first beyond the great river, should be admitted into the Union, it would be high time for the New England states to secede and form a separate confederacy.

Of the many evils which had been predicted as the result of Jefferson's election, none was ever realized. On the contrary, the benefits inaugurated under Federalist rule were for the first time felt to their full extent because they were not disturbed by the presence of war in Europe. It will be observed that from the beginning of Washington's administration down to the summer of 1815, Great Britain and France were perpetually at war with each other except during the exact period covered by Jefferson's first administration. Thus, out of twenty-three years there were only those four during which an American ship might safely sail wherever it liked on a peaceful errand. It was only during those four years that our ministers abroad could feel sure of being treated like gentlemen, or that our weary ears could get a moment's repose from the everlasting disension as to whether we ought to hate England or France the more bitterly. Thus the first administration of Jefferson came to be regarded as a kind of golden age; and while in 1800 he was elected

by a bare majority, in 1804 he swept the country with 162 electoral votes against 14 for the Federalist candidate, Rufus King. His second administration was to witness many trying scenes, but without diminishing his hold upon the people. He might have had a third term, had he wished it; but, like Washington, he declined to serve, and this double refusal constituted a kind of precedent which has remained to our own time and is doubtless valued at far more than its worth.



*Albert Gallatin*

FIG. 177.—Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, 1801-1813.

From 1805 until 1812 the great question for the United States was, how far it would be possible to keep clear of war and entangling foreign alliances. The country was too weak to bear any serious stress of war, and our early Presidents understood the dangerous effect which war is liable to exercise upon free institutions. Among our historians a majority have been New Englanders, tinged with the peculiar Federalism of that section, and it has been customary for them to sneer at Jefferson and Madison for their love of peace. In point of fact, the mental attitude of those two great Presidents toward war was pretty

much the same as that of their predecessors, Washington and Adams; and it is all summed up in Washington's Farewell Address, a document which is often quoted as if it were a piece of sibylline wisdom applicable to all times and circumstances, instead of being, as it really was, a priceless piece of advice addressed by a far-seeing man to his fellow-countrymen in view of a peculiar and transient group of conditions. The country whose affairs were administered by our first four Presidents was, in a military sense, a weak one, and it had its own important problems of public economy and finance to deal with. It was highly undesirable that the best part of its energies should be absorbed in fighting. It was a sad spectacle to see its citizens more deeply interested in the affairs of Paris than in those of New York. It was against such extravagancies, such wanderings from the paths of prudence, that Washington wished to guard his people. Viewed in relation to the circumstances which called it forth, Washington's Farewell Address was a consummate piece of wisdom, while the general principles which ran through it are always worthy of high consideration. To regard it as a weapon of argument, however, without regard to its originating circumstances, is both to ignore historical perspective and to do injustice to Washington.

The difficulty of guiding the country along these paths of prudence was excessive, and the lapse of time made it only the more difficult. The war between Great Britain and Napoleon became far more furious and desperate than the old war against the French republic. Things were coming to a crisis for neutral nations after the Berlin and Milan Decrees, whereby Napoleon endeavored to cripple the naval power of Great Britain. It became impossible for American ships to avoid the Napoleonic decrees without running ashore on the English retaliatory orders in council. Between this particular *Seylla* and *Charybdis*, the whole width of the ocean afforded scarcely room to steer with safety.

If one were determined to avoid war, it was not exactly easy to know what to do in such a crisis. In point of fact, both England and France were injuring and insulting us simply because we were a weak power; somewhat as we treated Chile with a high hand in 1890. If there were to be war, it would have been quite logical to declare it against both France and England, but that would have been Quixotic. Nothing could well seem stranger than the course adopted by Jefferson's government, in its famous embargo bill. This amounted to a cessation of maritime intercourse with the rest of the world. No ship could leave an American port with a cargo bound for any

foreign port whatever, nor could any ship deliver a foreign cargo in any American port. Had this act been completely enforced, it would no doubt have left for English and French cruisers no victims to pounce upon. But, compared to the damage which those cruisers inflicted upon our trade, this embargo bill inflicted tenfold damage. It was like saving your property from burglars by destroying it yourself in advance. Naturally, therefore, the embargo act was hotly resented in that part of the country upon which it bore hardest, in the New England states. So great was the disaffection there that threats of




FIG. 178.—Escape of the Constitution. ("Magazine of American History," vol. xxix.)

secession were heard. At length in 1809 the President received information from John Quincy Adams which led to the repeal of the embargo act. The secessionist tendency on the part of many prominent men in Boston was growing ripe for action. There was much reason to fear a separation from the Union, followed perhaps by a union with the Canadian provinces. The information was so threatening that it led Jefferson to procure the repeal of the embargo act. In later years, when Adams was President of the United States, the nature of his secret disclosures to Jefferson became known to many of the persons

implicated in Boston, and these persons indignantly denied the truth of his statements and called him to account. President Adams thereupon drew up a statement in which his position was completely maintained and his opponents were completely refuted; it is one of the finest pieces of political writing in the English language. After having completed this paper, President Adams did not publish it. Like his father, he was capable of disinterested self-sacrifice to a very extraordinary degree. The time of his writing the paper was the time when Calhoun's doctrine of nullification was showing formidable activity in South Carolina and Georgia, and Adams saw that his graphic disclosures of secessionism in New England twenty years earlier would be likely to have a baleful effect upon the country. He felt that they would tend to weaken the Union party, so he locked up the paper and let his opponents go down to their graves in the belief that they had refuted and humiliated him; and it was only in 1877, when his grandson, Henry Adams, published his "Documents Relating to New England Federalism," that the truth was known and the hero vindicated.

The repeal of the embargo act just before the inauguration of President Madison was followed by the passage of the non-intercourse act, which allowed commercial intercourse with all nations except England and France. The United States tried to hold out the hope of repealing this non-intercourse act as a bribe whereby to induce France and England to repeal their obnoxious decrees so far as the United States were concerned. The Ananias at Paris answered after his wonted manner; he publicly announced that the operation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees was suspended so far as the United States were concerned; at the same time he gave secret instructions to all his officials that those decrees should be executed just as before. Congress was thus fooled into repealing the non-intercourse act with France. When further demand was made upon England to suspend the operation of her orders in council, she refused to do so on the ground that Napoleon had not really revoked his own decrees, but only told a falsehood in the matter. The result was exactly what Napoleon had intended. By keeping up the non-intercourse act against Great Britain alone, we were almost sure to drift into actual hostilities with that power; and so it happened in May, 1811, when the British sloop-of-war Little Belt fired upon the American frigate President, and was in turn badly mauled and compelled to surrender. For several months Napoleon had been, like Br'er Rabbit, "layin' low," and had thus produced a false feeling of security on the part of American skippers who had come to crowd his ports.

Now in a trice their vessels were all confiscated, and many millions of dollars thus passed into the treasury of the Corsican bandit.

Under ordinary circumstances it may be questioned if this act of treachery would not have gone far toward directing the whole current of American wrath against France; it was more damaging and more insulting to the United States than anything that England had done. An immediate declaration of war against France would have been good statesmanship. It would have at once brought England to our side, and would thus have obtained for us more in the way of concession than we were able to wring from her by two and a half years of war. It would probably have enabled us to avoid the evils which that war entailed, as we shall hereafter see. Above all, it would have prevented our appearing before the world in the odious and contemptible light of an ally and tool of Napoleon. There can be no doubt that our failure to declare war against Napoleon in the summer of 1811 was one of the lost opportunities of history.

But the elections of 1811 brought into Congress new leaders who represented new aspirations on the part of American Democracy. Chief among these were Henry Clay, of Kentucky, William Crawford, of Georgia, and John Calhoun, of South Carolina. These men were quite ready to throw overboard the policy of Washington's Farewell Address, they were more free-handed than had been the fashion with regard to public revenue, and they were actuated by dreams of territorial conquest. They represented the bitter feeling toward England which had grown up during two generations or more in the Appalachian region, largely derived from the Scotch-Irish stock which had been driven to America by unjust Parliamentary legislation. The feeling toward the mother country which had been left by the war of independence in New England and tide-water Virginia, where the resistance to George III. had been strongest, was kind and charitable by comparison with the bitterness entertained by the inhabitants of the Appalachian region.

The policy entertained by Clay and Calhoun was in many ways harmonious with the aggressive Democratic tendencies which were taking possession of the country and which we shall presently have occasion to describe. They prevailed, largely because they were pronounced and aggressive ideas. No doubt Clay and Calhoun knew more precisely what they wanted than the advocates of a peace policy. They could also raise against the latter the everlasting cry of "British gold!" which was of great service to them. They persuaded President Madison, against his better judgment, to sanction their proceedings, and

although Great Britain at the eleventh hour repealed her orders in council, it was too late to arrest the impetus which the movement had acquired. In June, 1812, war was declared against Great Britain, and preparations for invading Canada were at once begun. The new war abounded in surprises. Among these, the most remarkable were a series of naval victories gained by the Americans in duels with British frigates. The first of these literally astonished the world. That the Constitution, a 44-gun frigate, should defeat the Guerrière, a 38-gun frigate, was natural enough. But such a defeat! After half an hour spent in manoeuvring, the Constitution's superior sailing qualities and




FIG. 179.—Battle of Constitution and Java. (From a mezzotint by Pocock, from a sketch by Buchanan. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

the skill with which she was handled give her the advantage of position; then follows half an hour of firing, at the end of which the Guerrière is a complete wreck, with all her masts overboard and her hull filling so rapidly that little more than time enough is left to save her crew; while the Constitution, scarcely scratched, is within a few minutes ready for another fight. Half a dozen similar fights succeeded, in each of which there was a similar preponderance of strength, say 20 per cent., on the part of the American vessel, accompanied by a fearful disproportion of loss, although perhaps in no case was the proportion so extreme as in that of the Constitution and Guerrière. The similarity of these results pointed to a common cause. For a dozen years following the

war of independence, American shipyards had been gradually improving the build of their ships, until in the Presidency of John Adams a type of singular efficiency had been attained. Such a frigate as the Constitution was at least a match for a British 50-gun ship. While she was larger and threw a greater weight of metal than any British frigate of similar rating, she was at the same time more nimble in movement and responded more quickly to movements of rudder and sail. Owing to the absurd British navigation laws of that day, which prevented their buying American ships, the British had failed to learn



FIG. 180.—Captain Isaac Hull. (From a mezzotint by Freeman, after a painting by Stuart. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

of these improvements until the time arrived when they were made to feel them in such an unpleasant way. Their first impressions were summed up in the old familiar accusation that American frigates were 7 f's in disguise—an extreme statement, but containing the usual kernel of truth. Besides this, the American crews showed a marked superiority in gunnery. There could be no doubt about that. It was as marked in those days as it has been ever since. The swift destruction of the Guerriere was all of a piece with the sinking of the Alabama in 1864, and with the exploits of Dewey's and Sampson's fleets in 1898. This point was well understood by that acute and gallant British officer,

Philip Broke (Fig. 181), captain of the Shannon. He took extraordinary pains in drilling his crew in gunnery, and when he felt ready for action he challenged the American frigate Chesapeake to single combat. The fight which ensued took place at the mouth of Boston harbor. The conditions of the Constitution and Guerrière were nearly reversed. The Shannon was about 20 per cent. stronger than her antagonist, while against her crew, which Captain Broke had so sedulously trained, the Chesapeake had a newly gathered crew not yet accustomed to acting together. As a natural result, the Chesapeake was badly beaten and captured. For this thoroughly intelligent and creditable achievement,



FIG. 181.—Sir Philip Broke. (From an unlettered engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Captain Broke was forthwith made a baronet; the Thames River, it is said, was illuminated all the way from Westminster bridge to the Tower; and the extravagance of this jubilation is an index to the intensity of the mortification which the previous defeats had caused. We may be sure that British Shannons might have captured French Chesaapeakes once a week, and the British public would have thought nothing of it. But to this day you will seldom find a British cabman or gardener's boy who has not heard of the Chesapeake and Shannon. That they do not remember the Constitution and Guerrière is not surprising, for we do not expect to find the unpleasant side of history accurately preserved in popu-

ular reminiscences. Among the other oceanic incidents of the war especially worth noting, one was the cruise of the Essex under Captain David Porter in the Pacific Ocean. After an adventurous voyage in which many prizes were taken, the Essex was at last captured in the harbor of Valparaiso by the two frigates Phebe and Chernub. The other was the fight of the Constitution with two British vessels, the frigate Cyane and the sloop Levant, in the course of which she captured them both.

It should be mentioned in this connection that the officers of the American navy were not novices in this war with Great Britain. In



FIG. 182.—Stephen Decatur. (From an engraving by Henry Meyer, after a painting by Jarvis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Jefferson's first administration we had a war with the Barbary States on the Mediterranean which served as a preparatory school, very much as the war with Mexico in later years trained up most of the officers distinguished on both sides in the civil war. Few things in all our history are more creditable to us than our attack upon the pirate states of the Mediterranean (Fig. 182). It was an early assertion of that police jurisdiction over the world's thoroughfares which it is the duty of great civilized maritime nations to exercise.

While victories like those of the Constitution and her gallant sisters

were in a high degree interesting from many points of view, they exercised, nevertheless, but very little influence upon the course of the war. Indeed, they scarcely served to disguise the overwhelming superiority of the enemy upon the ocean. During the greater part of the war our cruisers were so carefully blockaded that they were of comparatively little use.

As regards our aggressive campaigns against Canada, they began with dire disaster. The points by which Canada seemed to be most easily invaded were Niagara and Detroit. The British territory confronting them was then called Upper Canada, and since 1793 had



FIG. 183.—Arthur St. Clair.

Toronto for its capital. Its population may have numbered somewhat more than 100,000, mostly Tories whose families had been driven from the United States, and who were not likely to welcome the invaders with open arms. It so happened that these Canadians found a very enterprising and capable leader in General Brock (Fig. 186). All the operations in this northwestern region were complicated by the fact that war had already begun there. This war which came first upon the scene was a struggle against the Indians. Since Washington's first administration there had been several campaigns against the Algonquin tribes of the northwest, in the course of which Arthur St. Clair (Fig. 183) had met

with a bloody defeat, while Anthony Wayne had acquired fresh glory ; and so it had in general fared ill with the red men until Tecumseh (Fig. 184), chief of the Shawnees, began to renew the designs of Pontiac and to form a league of tribes that should hold back the tide of the white man's progress. It was Tecumseh's hope to unite the Creeks, Choctaws, and Cherokees of the south with the Shawnees, Wyandottes, and Pottawatomies of the north in a grand confederacy which might summon



FIG. 184.—Tecumseh. (Powell's "Annual Reports, U. S. Bureau of Ethnology," vol. xiv.)

all its resources for a decisive blow. But it is characteristic of all Indian conspiracies to ruin themselves by premature explosion; the element of patience seems to be lacking. So it happened that in 1811, while Tecumseh was busy at the south, the ardor of his native tribe became uncontrollable. Under his brother, Elskwatawa (Fig. 185), otherwise known as The Prophet, they precipitated hostilities in the Indiana territory and met with a crushing defeat at Tippecanoe at the hands of William Henry Harrison, a Virginian who was then governor of the

territory. When war broke out between Great Britain and the United States, it found this Indian war already in progress. Tecumseh was able to render valuable aid to the Canadians, and it was not unnatural that military operations should begin somewhere in Upper Canada.

It was, nevertheless, a difficult country for such operations, and the situation was especially embarrassing for the Americans. Since they had no naval force upon Lake Erie to keep up a system of communications between Detroit and the settled country in Ohio, it was not possi-



FIG. 185.—Elskwatawa, the Shawnee prophet. (Powell's "Annual Reports, U. S. Bureau of Ethnology," vol. xiv.)

ble for the Americans even to hold Detroit, much less to use it as a base for invading Canada; for at any moment Tecumseh's Indians might close in behind and cut it off. The fortress of Detroit was then held by General William Hull, a veteran of the war of independence, and then governor of Michigan territory. Congress expected General Hull to effect a conquest of Upper Canada; and accordingly, as soon as war was declared, he crossed from Detroit to Sandwich with about 1200

men. Scarcely had he done this when news came of the capture of Mackinaw and Fort Dearborn, on the present site of Chicago, by the Indians, who massacred their prisoners in cold blood. The advance of General Brock with a superior force soon obliged Hull to retreat into Detroit, which he presently surrendered, along with his entire force, in order to avoid useless bloodshed. Thus, while the country rang from end to end with plaudits for Isaac Hull (Fig. 180), captain of the Constitution, his unfortunate nephew was fiercely denounced for this inauspicious beginning of the war upon land. Indeed, things came near



FIG. 186.—Sir Isaac Brock.

going to a shameful length. So furious was the wrath of the people that General Hull was tried by court-martial and condemned to death. He was, however, pardoned by President Madison, and our country was spared the reprobation of being a place where one general is executed in order to encourage the others. The case of General Hull has been made a subject of careful investigation, and very little doubt is left that he behaved as well as possible under the circumstances, and deserves credit for surrendering a post which it was impossible to hold.

The whole campaign was a colossal blunder, but the blame therefor belongs with those who planned it.

The brief career of the gallant Brock now drew to a close. In October, 1812, a force of New York militia crossed Niagara River and attempted to seize Queenston Heights. In the hot fight which ensued, Sir Isaac Brock was slain. The Americans captured the heights, but could not hold them without reinforcements from their army on the New York side of the river; but these men, with incredible baseness, refused to cross to the aid of their comrades, and stood idle spectators while fresh forces of Canadians, coming upon the scene, surrounded and captured the Americans upon the heights; an exhibition of pol-



FIG. 187.—Brock Monument on Queenston Heights.

troonery which has fortunately had few parallels, if any, in American history.

Turning back to the northwest, we find General Hull superseded by Harrison, who sets out to recover Detroit, but is defeated at the river Raisin in January, 1813, by British and Indians under General Proctor and Tecumseh. A wholesale massacre of prisoners by the Indians made the name of the river Raisin for a long time thereafter a name at which men shuddered. As for Harrison, his progress was completely stopped.

These preliminary operations made it clear that a base must be obtained upon Lake Erie before anything could be accomplished further

westward. The British needed such a base as well as the Americans, and the summer of 1813 witnessed strenuous efforts on both sides to gain control of that small inland sea. The British got together a fleet of six ships carrying 63 guns, commanded by an old seasoned sea-dog, Captain Barclay, who had seen much rough service under Nelson. The American fleet of nine smaller vessels—carrying, however, a greater weight of metal, distributed among 54 large guns—was commanded by Oliver Hazard Perry (Fig. 188), a young captain who had never seen a battle. The result of the fight was the capture of the whole British fleet. This victory was decisive in so far as it enabled Harrison to enter



FIG. 188. COM. OLIVER H. PERRY. (From an engraving by Meyer, after a painting by Jarvis. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

Canada and to defeat Proctor and Tecumseh in the battle of the Thames, in which the great Indian chieftain was killed. This enabled the Americans to retake Detroit, thus restoring the situation that existed at the outset, except that we had now in addition the control of Lake Erie (Fig. 189).

It was remarkable how different this business of conquering Canada looked when contemplated from the halls of Congress by Clay and his fire-eaters, and when attempted on the spot by much-enduring soldiers. Another attempt was made in the summer of 1814 by way of the Niagara River. The American forces were led by Jacob Brown and

Winfield Scott, and two fierce battles were fought : at Chippewa July 5, and at Lundy's Lane July 25 ; but neither of these could be counted a victory for the Americans, and they presently found it necessary to recross the river. At the same time the British undertook to repeat Burgoyne's experiment of an invasion by way of Lake Champlain ; but their naval force was annihilated by Commodore Macdonough (Fig. 190), and their expedition was accordingly abandoned. On the Nova Scotia frontier their success seemed, for the moment at least, more considerable. British troops occupied Maine as far as the Penobscot River, so that some alarm was felt lest they should advance into the heart of New England. They were destined, however, to make no further advance in this direction.




FIG. 189.—Battle of Lake Erie. (From an engraving by Murray, Draper, Fairman & Co., after a drawing by Sully & Kearney. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

In spite of the vicissitudes of the war against Canada, the successes against the Indian tribes went on from more to more. In August, 1813, Tecumseh's allies, the Creeks, massacred the garrison at Fort Mims in Alabama. This horror aroused the settlers in the southwest, and they were put under command of Andrew Jackson (Fig. 192), general of the Tennessee militia, a born general with wide experience of Indian warfare. After an indefatigable campaign of seven months, ending with the bloody battle of Tallapoosa in March, 1814, Jackson extinguished the Creek confederacy and left the Indians of the southwest thereafter harmless.

At that very time Napoleon, whose cat's-paw we had allowed our-

selves to be made, was dethroned and sent off to Elba. Thus some of Wellington's veterans were liberated for service in America, but they accomplished little beside landing in Washington and burning several public buildings; an act of vandalism which our writers have deservedly condemned, without, however, remembering that it was a reprisal for the burning of Canadian public buildings at Toronto by our troops in May, 1813. When such unpleasant stories have to be told, history gains nothing by suppressing half of the truth.



*Macdonough*

FIG. 190.—Commodore Thomas Macdonough.

From the outset this war had been extremely unpopular in New England, and even the fact that the naval victories redounded chiefly to the credit of New England did but little to enliven the gloom with which the situation was regarded. The governors of New England states were backward in raising troops, and their criticisms of the administration were more visibly and intensely sincere than their denun-




FIG. 191.—Macdonough's victory at Lake Champlain. (After an engraving by B. Tanner, from the painting by Reinagle. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

ciations of the common enemy. Some of the leading Federalists had long dawdled with ideas of secession, and such extremists had the more



FIG. 192.—Andrew Jackson. (From an engraving by Longacre, after a painting by Wood. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

influence in their frustum of a party after its most eminent and broad-minded leaders, such men as the two Adamses and Daniel Webster, had ceased to approve of its proceedings.

In December, 1814, a convention was held at Hartford, which was attended by delegates from all the New England states except New Hampshire. The abstineness of New Hampshire was probably due to the personal influence of Daniel Webster. The people at Hartford talked over a good many things in their convention, and among these we need especially to notice one demand which would have practically dissolved the Union. They demanded that custom-house duties collected in New England should thereafter be paid to the states within whose borders they were collected. This would have gone far toward reviving



FIG. 193. Peace of Ghent, 1814, and Triumph of America. (From an engraving by Chataigner, after a design by Phanton. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

the chaotic times of the Continental Congress, and it speaks ill for the intelligence and for the patriotism of these New England leaders.

While this mischief was brewing at Hartford, the ancient city of Ghent witnessed the sittings of half a dozen gentlemen charged with the business of patching up a peace between the United States and Great Britain. It really could not be said that either side had accomplished anything by two years and a half of desultory fighting. The treaty left things pretty much as they had been before the war, and in America it would naturally have been greeted with violent rage and disgust had it not been for an occurrence which put all people into good humor and made them ready to smile at almost anything (Fig. 193).

The transmission of intelligence was so slow in those days that the last battles, both on sea and on land, were fought after peace had been made. It was after the new year 1815 had come in that "Old Iron-sides," as the Constitution was called, captured the *Cyane* and *Leyant*; but this was nothing to what happened on land, where the American hunger for victory had so long been unpeased. The last of the British expeditions that visited American waters was also the most formidable. Its purpose was to conquer the Mississippi River and obtain possession of that vast Louisiana territory which Napoleon had sold to the United States. So confident were the British, that governors for St. Louis and



FIG. 194.—Sir Edward Pakenham. (From an etching by Albert Rosenthal. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

other Mississippi towns were sent out in advance. The land force consisted of 12,000 of Wellington's veterans from the Spanish peninsula, commanded by Sir Edward Pakenham (Fig. 194), who was a relative of the Iron Duke. On January 8, 1815, Andrew Jackson (Fig. 192) with about 6000 men awaited Pakenham's attack in a strongly intrenched position. The attack was a colossal blunder on the part of the British general, the same kind of blunder that was committed by Howe at Bunker Hill, by Burnside at Fredericksburg, and by Grant at Cold Harbor. The result at New Orleans was that the British were driven from the field in twenty-five minutes, leaving 2500 men killed

and wounded, while the total American loss was 8 killed and 13 wounded (Fig. 195). Among the slain was Pakenham himself. The news of this victory was borne far and wide over the land just as the news of the treaty of Ghent was received, and the effect upon most minds was as soothing as if Andrew Jackson had forced Great Britain




FIG. 195.—Battle of New Orleans. (From a colored engraving by J. Yeager, after a painting by West. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

down upon her knees and compelled her to yield every one of the points for the sake of which Clay and his friends had gone to war. Moreover, it quite took away any possible look of our being beholden to Napoleon; for it showed that the territory we had bought of him we were quite able to defend without assistance. On the whole, the United States had come out of the affair pretty well.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE SPANISH REVOLT AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

IT is now time to pause for a moment in our account of the United States, and turn back to the consideration of the colonies which had been planted by Spain in South America, the West Indies, and Mexico. A few words are all that can be devoted to that extensive subject, while we point out some of the leading steps in the revolt by which those Spanish colonies won their political independence. The contrast between their case and that of the English colonies which became the United States may be best summed up by saying that the



FIG. 196.—A view of Lima. (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia.)

English colonies possessed almost complete political freedom before the Revolution, and were led to revolt through a fear that they might in course of time be dispossessed of it. On the other hand, the Spanish colonies had never possessed any kind of freedom—political, religious, or commercial. They were ruled by governors appointed from without, whose political responsibility was very imperfectly secured and who often

had a direct interest in fleecing their subjects. Taxes were uncertain in amount and apt to be excessive. There was no freedom of the press or of public meeting. People had no means of making their grievances known except riot or revolution. All homes were subject to rigid ecclesiastical scrutiny, officers of the Inquisition went about in all directions, and, in the cities of Mexico and Lima, men and women were occasionally burned at the stake. The manufacture and sale of commodities were hampered by a thousand stupid restrictions. Yet during the eighteenth century some progress was to be seen in this respect. Previous to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, the custom had been for one large fleet of galleons to sail each year, under strong convoy, between the ports of Spain and those of Spanish America; but in 1748 a great change was effected, and trade was carried on by duly registered ships which sailed as often as they were wanted. In 1765 the commerce of all the Spanish islands was thrown open to all Spaniards trading from the principal Spanish ports, and a uniform duty of six per cent. was demanded. In 1774 the trade between the various parts of Spanish America was thrown open. These liberal measures were found so successful that in 1778 and again in 1784 there was a general reduction of customs duties, the effect of which upon trade was very stimulating. So beneficially was the intercourse between Spain and her colonies increased that a regular mail service was established. It is rather curious that these liberal measures should have been going on in Spanish America at the very time when the English colonies were contending against the stupid and reactionary policy of George III. The explanation lies in the fact that while the English king at that time wielded an exceptional influence in behalf of a narrow policy, on the other hand, Charles III. was by far the ablest sovereign that Spain has had since the middle of the sixteenth century, and in the reforms above enumerated we see the illustrations of his enlightened spirit. If Charles III. could have had a son and grandson like himself, the revolt of the Spanish colonies might never have occurred. Yet even the liberal measures just mentioned were not sufficient for the occasion; for the domestic government of the Spanish colonies remained as harrowing and as tyrannical as ever. The roots of the evil were too deep-seated to be removed by any beneficent despots. Symptoms of political uneasiness might have been witnessed here and there, as for example in Peru, where the old Inca nobility took advantage of the war between Spain and Great Britain in 1780 to revolt in favor of one of their number who was called Tupac Amaru, or Child of the Sun. Had this

revolution succeeded, it might very likely have brought back some modified form of the *lnea régime*. In point of fact, it was suppressed with frightful barbarity.

The intercourse between the Old World and Spanish America was naturally most lively in the islands of the West Indies, which were nearest to the highways of commerce. Yet it was not in any Spanish region, but in a French one, that the intercourse was closest; and from this quarter came the first convulsions which revolutionized such a considerable portion of the earth. It will be remembered that in the course of the seventeenth century the buccaneers overran the western portion of the island which the Spaniards called Santo Domingo. This French part of the island afterward received the native Indian name of Haiti, which is sometimes incorrectly given to the whole island. At the beginning of the great French revolution in 1789 the French portion of Santo Domingo was a miracle of agricultural prosperity; the plantations, showing everywhere most careful and elaborate cultivation, reached in many places to the tops of the mountains, and the city of Cap François rivalled in elegance many a European capital. Slave labor seemed to be witnessed there at its best; but along with the slaves there were industrious and well-educated free blacks, many of whom had visited Europe and gained mental stimulus in that way. As a rule, the planters were intelligent and cultivated, like those of Virginia and South Carolina. The province was considered a part of France, and elected deputies to sit in the National Assembly at Paris. Naturally, the slaveholding planters did not wish to have the slaves represented in these elections, for such a step was likely to result in general emancipation, entailing the ruin of the planters. The National Assembly, however, acting on the real French principle that it is better to die than to be illogical, asserted its great principle of equal rights and insisted upon giving suffrage to the blacks. This led the planters to coquette or perhaps intrigue with the English, in the hope of preventing emancipation. When it was known among the blacks that the planters were seeking aid from the national enemy to rivet their chains, there was such a tremendous explosion as history has seldom seen. During the autumn of 1791 more than 2000 whites and 10,000 blacks lost their lives. In the next year the English, having undertaken to set metes and bounds to the work of the French Revolution, attacked Santo Domingo in behalf of the planters and against the slaves; and thereupon began the glorious career of the negro Toussaint Louverture (Fig. 197), one of the best and most brilliant men that his race has ever produced. After six years

of trying warfare, Toussaint drove the English from the island; and presently a constitution was framed, and the liberator was elected President of the republic of Haiti. The year 1800 witnessed the inauguration of this new negro republic, the independence of which Great Britain presently recognized.

We are now introduced to an interesting and complicated series of events which mark a gigantic attempt on the part of France to recover her colonial empire or establish a new one which should be the equivalent of what she had lost. The conquest of the Low Countries in 1795



FIG. 197. Toussaint Louverture. (From an unlettered engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

by Pichegru would naturally have put France in possession of the rich colonies of the Dutch in the East Indies and other parts of the world. But here two circumstances intervened to spoil this French dream of empire. One was England's maritime superiority; the other was the fact that Dutch colonists everywhere, if they must choose between English rule and French, preferred the former. Consequently, such places as Malacca, Ceylon, Cape Colony, and Guiana readily surrendered to the British. In 1797 that wretched Spanish minister Godoy, known to his contemporaries as Prince of the Peace, concluded a treaty by



FIG. 198.—Toussaint Louverture. (From Rainsford's "Black Empire of Haiti."

which he handed over to France the Spanish part of the island of Santo Domingo. But it was feared by the French that this acquisition would be of little use to them so long as the western portion of the island remained an independent republic in the hands of the revolted negroes. Accordingly in 1801 Bonaparte, then First Consul, turned his attention to the affairs of Haiti. There were many planters there who had been forcibly dispossessed of their estates and were now clamoring for restitution. Bonaparte took up arms in behalf of these people and sought

to re-enslave the negroes. For the moment the Peace of Amiens left him at liberty to send a considerable force of the finest soldiery of France, but these veterans of Hohenlinden proved no match for an army of negroes led by Toussaint Louverture (Fig. 198). After obstinate but fruitless fighting, the French carried their point by treachery in so far as to arrest Toussaint and send him with his wife and children



FIG. 199. JEAN JACQUES DESSALINES.—From an engraving in the collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.

to France, where he perished in a dungeon in 1803. He left behind him, however, two generals—Dessalines and Christophe—who inflicted a series of defeats upon the French, and finally in 1803 drove them to their ships. In 1804 Dessalines (Fig. 199), a negro as black as the ace of spades, was proclaimed Emperor of Haiti. Thus ended a most disgraceful episode in the career of Napoleon Bonaparte.

When it came to disputing with England the control of the world's great commercial routes, the plans of that great general, but unsound statesman, approached the verge of insanity. His expedition to Egypt in 1798 aimed at nothing less than the turning back of the main currents of trade to the old routes which had been in use before the days of Columbus. If France could not control the oceanic routes to Cathay, then sooth there should be no oceanic routes, but trade should follow its old Mediterranean courses, where France might hope to control it. The battle of the Nile ended this ridiculous dream. A few years later the insensate Berlin and Milan Decrees showed a similar incapacity for gauging the great forces at work in the world. But in 1808 Napoleon made a stroke which might have seemed for the moment well planned. Although the English had completely foiled him in his Oriental schemes, he might at least seize upon the colonial empire of Spain, and thus make an auspicious beginning toward the universal colonial empire which he coveted. It was the moment of his greatest power, when, to short-sighted people, he seemed the most tremendous incarnation of strength that had ever appeared in Europe. The preceding year had been the year of Tilsit; now the "Man of Tilsit," in the pursuit of a dazzling will-o'-the-wisp, committed a colossal blunder. Spain was already subservient to his ends, and he might have wielded her resources at pleasure without overturning her government; but the rough-and-ready ways of the bandit came natural to him, and he overthrew the Spanish monarchy with a cynical contempt for the national feeling which speedily led to a great popular uprising.

As the effect upon Spain itself was entirely different from what he had anticipated, so too was its effect upon the Spanish colonies. There was more or less uneasiness in Spanish America, as I have already hinted. The winning of independence by the English colonies had not been without its effect upon men's minds, and the French ideas of 1789 had found an entrance here and there into the heads of Spanish Americans. Nevertheless, so long as the old legitimate king, Charles IV., occupied the throne, the loyalty so deeply ingrained in the Spanish nature sufficed to hold the revolutionary tendencies in check. But many a planter in Venezuela or Chile, who felt that he owed allegiance to Charles of Bourbon, cared not a penny for King Joseph Bonaparte or the brother who backed him. Instead of acquiring Spanish America, therefore, by seizing the government at Madrid, Napoleon acquired nothing but an uncommonly furious wolf, which it was particularly difficult to hold by the ears. While he was struggling with the mother

country the colonial world of Spain suddenly slipped away and set up for itself. Immediately after the downfall of Charles IV., one American colony after another declared its independence. The winning of this independence in all cases required more or less fighting, and a few words must be devoted to this story. In the course of it, we must never lose sight of the fact that there was a great difference between the English and the Spanish colonies as regards the winning of independence. The English colonies were in possession of full political freedom before they had become an independent nation. On the other hand, the Spanish colonies not only did not possess freedom before they



FIG. 200.—Ferdinand VII. of Spain. (From Walton's "Spanish Colonies," vol. i.)

won their independence, but they did not gain it even then. In the most favorable instances their gain in political freedom attendant upon their winning of independence was but slight and partial. Consequently, their subsequent career has been more or less turbulent. What they really gained by the severance from Spain was an improved opportunity for working out for themselves the political habits that belong to free nations, and such kind of work is slow and painful; it cannot be done in a moment. To withhold our sympathy from the republics of Spanish America because of their many political shortcomings would be to show ourselves in a high degree dull and narrow-minded.

In order to understand the beginnings of the Spanish-American revolution, we must remember that it was first directed against the usurping French government in Spain. The strong Spanish sense of nationality was at first invoked by the revolutionists. Their resistance was primarily not against Spain, but against French domination. These sentiments were expressed in various parts of Spanish America by little juntas of men intent upon organizing resistance to the Bonapartes. These juntas at first showed a disposition to recognize as their king the infante Ferdinand, afterward Ferdinand VII. (Fig. 200), son of Charles IV., who had just abdicated. It has been said that if Ferdinand could have recovered Spain quickly, and had then adopted liberal lines of policy, he might have retained all the Spanish-American colonies. As it happened, however, it took six years, with the aid of the English, to drive the French from Spain; and as for liberal lines of policy, or anything else that was sensible, from Ferdinand, one might as well have expected to gather figs from thistles.

When the patriotic juntas of the Spanish-American states found their overtures received with scorn by the patriotic national junta at Cadiz, their thoughts were naturally turned in the direction of independence. So besotted were the minds of the Spanish leaders that instead of hailing the sympathy extended to them from their colonies in America, they were inclined rather to chide them for taking any independent action at all. Thus a disposition toward independence gained a footing in Spanish America, and increased in strength until the dominion of Spain was entirely overthrown. The history of this important revolution is somewhat difficult for English-speaking people to understand. Instead of the town meetings of New England, the county court days of Virginia, the manorial courts of Maryland, the gatherings of Sons of Liberty in New York, the committees of correspondence, the debates in legislative bodies, and all the machinery so familiar to people who have been governed through long ages by free discussion—instead of all this, we find in Spanish America the old despotic machine left standing, but composed of a new set of people. Remembering that this new set of people, the revolutionists, were just as likely to claim despotic power as the old set which they superseded, we shall have the key to much that seems eccentric in Spanish-American history.

It was not strange that the revolutionary movement should first acquire an impetus in the Colombian states, or those which bordered on the stretch of coast discovered by Columbus. Proximity to the West Indies had introduced here perhaps more of a leaven of European ideas

than elsewhere. Indeed, it was from the island of Trinidad that some of the earliest attempts at revolution were made. Francisco Miranda (Fig. 201) was a native of Caracas. In his youth he had served in one of the French contingents in the United States. After the peace of 1783, he went to Europe and served under Dumouriez. In 1806, having raised about 500 men in the island of Trinidad, Miranda landed on the coast of Venezuela, hoping to be hailed as a deliverer. But people paid little attention to him, and he was obliged to go back to his island, whence he



FIG. 201. Francisco Miranda. (From Antepara's "South American Emancipation Documents," London, 1810.)

did not again emerge for four years. In 1810 the leading citizens of Caracas deposed the Spanish officers of that town and elected a governing junta; these acts they performed in the name of Ferdinand VII. Similar juntas were presently set up in such places as Cartagena, Santa Fé, and Quito, as well as in places so remote as Chile and Mexico. When these proceedings were duly reported to the Spanish junta at Cadiz, that imperial body committed a fatal error: it disavowed the

action of the American juntas, and declared the port of Caracas to be in a state of blockade. The result was that all the provinces of Venezuela elected delegates to a congress which assembled at Caracas, and on the 5th of July, 1811, issued a document in which Venezuela declared itself independent of Spain. It was not long before similar declarations followed on the parts of New Granada and Mexico.

It is desirable that superstitious people who wish to adopt any new line of action should not dwell in countries afflicted by earthquakes. In March, 1812, Venezuela was devastated by one of the most terrible inflictions of this sort on record. The town of Caracas was almost entirely destroyed, and many other places were leveled with the ground. Many of the people believed this earthquake to be a visitation from heaven upon their sin in throwing off their old allegiance, and this feeling was encouraged by the priesthood. So potent was this gross superstition that General Miranda, who up to that moment had been meeting with notable success, suddenly found his men deserting by scores and going over to the loyalist ranks. What was still worse, one of his captains, in command of the important fortress of Puerto Cabello, was prevailed upon to surrender it. Before the end of June, Miranda was obliged to capitulate on terms; but the terms of the surrender were violated by the loyalist commander, Monteverde. Miranda was sent to Spain, and there perished in a dungeon, while Monteverde carried on a reign of terror at Caracas. One of Miranda's most trusted lieutenants was Simon Bolivar (Fig. 202); he was also a native of Caracas. In the course of a journey in Europe and the United States, he had acquired many sound political ideas, and from the beginning he had been one of the most devoted friends of the movement for independence in Spanish America. During Monteverde's supremacy in Venezuela, Bolivar had remained in New Granada with a considerable force of men; but when Monteverde's atrocities had goaded the Venezuelan people to the point of fresh rebellion, Bolivar came upon the scene at the head of a small body of troops, and won a series of brilliant successes which ended in August, 1813, in his entering Caracas in triumph. He was hailed as liberator of Venezuela, and was presently chosen dictator over that republic.

But the end was not yet. The defeated loyalists rose against the new government and put forth all possible efforts, even to the extent of arming their negro slaves. Bolivar was defeated in a battle at La Puerta, and compelled once more to retire into New Granada, while the loyalists exultingly took possession of Caracas. For a time it seemed as if the cause of Spanish-American independence was overthrown;

New Granada was the only quarter where it was able to maintain itself. The overthrow of Napoleon in 1814 established Ferdinand VII. securely upon the throne, and left him at liberty to devote his energies to the suppression of rebellion. Accordingly in 1815 General Morillo, with a powerful fleet, laid siege to Cartagena, which surrendered to him after a siege of nearly four months, in the course of which 5000 of the inhabitants perished of hunger. The wretched victor forthwith proceeded to wreak upon the vanquished population unheard-of atrocities. Meanwhile Bolívar had gone to Haiti and obtained valuable assistance



FIG. 202.—Simón Bolívar. (From an engraving by Longaere, after a Spanish painting in Lima. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

from that island. With his new expedition Bolívar landed at the eastern extremity of Venezuela, and slowly worked his way westward, gaining strength as he advanced. Thus the year 1817 passed away, and at the end of it the liberator was joined by several hundreds of British and French volunteers whose occupation in Europe had been taken away by the general peace, and who were not unwilling to indulge in a scrummage with Spain. With these allies Bolívar moved from victory to victory until in August, 1819, his lieutenant, Santander, won the decisive battle of Boyacá in New Granada, which broke down the sway of the loyalists. In 1821 the provinces of Venezuela and New

Granada, together with the presidency of Quito, sent delegates to a convention which assembled at Cuenca. There it was decreed that the three states should form a single republic, to be known as the United States of Colombia, and a federal constitution was forthwith concocted. It was a queer constitution, a kind of crazy-quilt, made up of English, French, and American patchwork, and it was not strange that it did not

*Mr Belgrano*  
A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Mr Belgrano". The signature is written over a horizontal line and is flanked by two stylized, symmetrical loops or flourishes.

FIG. 203.—Belgrano. (From Mitre's "Historia de Belgrano.")

work well. Bolívar was chosen President, and in the course of the next three years quite put an end to the Spanish power. One of the crowning events of the war was the destruction of a Spanish fleet in Colombian waters.

The revolution in the Argentine states broke out at nearly the same time as that in the Colombian states, and from the same causes. In 1810, as soon as it was known in Buenos Ayres that Napoleon had

overthrown the Spanish government, the colonists refused to obey the constituted officers and elected a junta of their own to govern the country. Most of the troops at hand sympathized with the revolutionists, and presently forces were sent into the Banda Oriental and up the Plata River into the upper districts of Peru, in order to spread the rebellion. Here began the romantic career of the Argentine commander, Belgrano (Fig. 203). A condition approaching to anarchy prevailed



FIG. 204. DON AMBROSIO O'HIGGINS. (Araño's "Historia de Chile," vol. vii.)

until 1816, when there was held at Tucumán a congress which created a confederacy to be called the United Provinces of the Plata River. It was long, however, before any good result was realized from this act of confederation. For a long time to come, the state of affairs in this interesting part of South America was exceedingly turbulent.

The revolution in Chile was accomplished with comparatively little difficulty. On the news from Spain in 1810, it became evident that the Spanish troops in Chile had more sympathy with the colony than with the mother country, for their first act was to depose their general and appoint in his stead a commander more favorably inclined toward revolution. A ruling junta was then set up at Santiago. Early in the summer of 1811 the first Chilean congress met, and threw open all the seaports to foreign trade. It also took active measures for the abolition of slavery. But these proceedings were soon rudely checked. The hand of Spain was still too strong to be thrown off in a moment. Spain still maintained a considerable force in Peru, and in 1813 the viceroy of Peru invaded Chile. The Chilean army was commanded by a very remarkable person, Don Bernardo O'Higgins, whose name indicates his Irish descent. This gentleman was son of Don Ambrosio O'Higgins (Fig. 204), who was himself one of Chile's foremost men. Don Bernardo had been educated in England, and had once been a warm friend of the Colombian revolutionist, Miranda. Don Bernardo attempted to compromise matters with the Spaniards, but in vain. A powerful force from Peru, under General Osorio, invaded Chile and overran the country. For a time the patriots were scattered; many of them had fled across the Andes into the Argentine country, and for a time it seemed as if Chilean independence was wrecked. Much-needed help, however, came from the Argentine pampas. José de San Martín had served with great credit in the Napoleonic wars, and was a man of far-reaching ideas. The recent overthrow of Chile made it plain to him that the cause of South-American independence would never be secure so long as the Spaniards were able to wield the immense resources of Peru. It was therefore necessary that Peru should be attacked, but Chile must first be liberated. In 1816 San Martín accomplished an extraordinary march over the Andes with an army of 4000 men, and in a short time, after defeating the Spaniards at Chacabuco, entered Santiago in triumph. A new junta was formed, with O'Higgins for its chief director, with powers practically dictatorial. Nearly two years elapsed before the Spaniards, under Osorio, again tried the fortunes of war. On April 5, 1818, in an obstinate battle at the river Maipo, Osorio was totally defeated. This victory showed San Martín to be a truly great general, and it secured the independence of Chile. About that time Lord Cochrane, an eccentric person but able commander, who for some reason had been obliged to quit the British service, came to Valparaiso and was put in command of the Chilean fleet. It was soon ascertained that under his guidance the

Chilean naval power was far more than a match for that of Peru. This point having been made clear, San Martin and Cochrane made a joint expedition against Peru, and drove the Spanish government from Lima. After this great achievement early in August, 1821, San Martin was appointed Protector of Peru. One of his first acts was the abolition of negro slavery and the lightening of many burdens that annoyed the Indian population. It happened that Bolivar was then in Ecuador, and on July 25, 1822, San Martin met him in an interview at Guayaquil. In this interview San Martin sought help for Peru from Bolivar; he found himself unequal to the task of ruling the Peruvian military party. These people would no more endure the rule of this soldier from the Plata



FIG. 205 View of harbor of Valparaiso. (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia.)

River than the old Scottish nobles would submit to be led by William Wallace; so the brave and noble San Martin left Peru and went to Europe. Then Bolivar marched with his army into the country and destroyed the remnant of Spanish power there. In 1824 the congress at Lima appointed Bolivar dictator, and in the following December he completely crushed the Spaniards in the decisive battle of Ayacucho, where the English general, William Miller (Fig. 206), won lasting renown for his skill as a cavalry leader.

Since 1776 the Peruvian provinces on the lofty divide between the watershed of the Amazon and that of the Plata had been considered a part of the Argentine country, and governed from Buenos Ayres. In

1825 a convention of these upper provinces was held at Chuquisaca, which constituted them into a separate and independent state called Bolivia, in honor of the liberator. Bolívar was chosen Perpetual Protector of this new republic, and was requested to prepare for it a code of government. This code prepared by Bolívar was in many parts a copy of the Code Napoléon, and it provided for a despotic government. It vested the supreme executive authority in a President who was to hold office for life, without responsibility to the legislature, and who



FIG. 206.—William Miller. (From John Miller's "Life of Gen. Miller,")

had power to nominate his successor. Such a scheme, emanating from the liberator himself, shows how little the Spanish Americans really understood political freedom. Their liberation set them free from the yoke of Spain, but not from despotism. A long agitation, the end of which we have not yet seen, was necessary to produce that happy result. Bolívar's code was accepted not only by Bolivia, but also by Peru; but it served to divide the population of these two republics into angry parties. With the Colombian states combined with those of

Peru and Bolivia under his sway, Bolivar was now ruler over a very considerable part of South America, and it was his aim to unite these republics into a powerful federation like the United States in North America. Yet his methods were not calculated to bring about such a result. He has been accused of egotistic and ignoble ambition like that which actuated Napoleon; but the facts of his life, if calmly considered, do not seem to bear out this view. In his resignation of the dictatorship of Peru in 1825, he seems to have been entirely disinterested; but the Peruvian Congress simply would not allow him to lay down his authority; they felt that they needed his services and must have them. As an expression of its gratitude for his services, that congress made him a grant of a million dollars, which he declined. Nor was this the only occasion on which the thought of himself and his own interests seemed far from being uppermost with him. His inclination toward monarchical rule seems rather to have followed from the consciousness that in a low stage of political development a desired end can often be more quickly and neatly accomplished by dictatorship than by parliamentary government.

The acceptance of the Bolivian code was the signal for disturbances not only in the Peruvian, but also in the Colombian states. Bolivar was obliged to repair to Caracas, from which point he succeeded in quieting the disturbances. Once more he insisted upon retiring into private life, but the Colombian Congress would not hear of such a thing. He then called for a national convention to decide upon constitutional questions for Colombia. He issued a declaration of amnesty, and he called for a congress which met at Panama in 1827, with the purpose of establishing an international code for the Spanish-American republics. Meanwhile, a rebellion against Bolivar's authority had broken out in Peru. There was a growing republican reaction against monarchical ideas and against too much centralization. Under the influence of this reaction, a division of the Colombian regular army stationed at Lima gave their support to the Peruvian republicans hostile to Bolivar, deposed his council, abolished the Bolivian code, and set up a provisional government. This was the beginning of permanent political separation between the Peruvian and the Colombian states. It was also the beginning of a long fight between factions in Peru, in which political principle was so overridden by private interests that it may best be described as a scramble for power.

On the Colombian side the course of events was hardly more encouraging. While Bolivar was undoubtedly an able and devoted

patriot, he had neither the clearness of view nor the patience and tact required for a successful statesman. He had not, indeed, been reared in a favorable soil for statesmanship, while the problems before him were of surpassing difficulty. Anyone who considers the physical geography of South America, from the Gulf of Guayaquil to the mouth of the Orinoco River, will see that anything like a permanent confederation of Ecuador, New Granada, and Venezuela was in that age of the world an idle dream. In some later age, if those regions become far more densely populated, with flourishing commerce and manufactures, and a people accustomed to self-government and equipped with railroads and telegraphs, such a confederation will become practicable. In Bolivar's time it was not. The federation was practically broken up by the secession of Venezuela in 1826 and Ecuador in the following year, under the lead of their respective provincial governors, so that when Bolivar's national convention met at Ocaña in March, 1828, the only questions with which it was able to deal were such as related to the nature and extent of Bolivar's own sovereignty. His own party consisted of delegates from Ecuador and Venezuela, representing the people in those states who still favored federation. In New Granada itself, Bolivar had little support; one of his chief opponents was his old companion in arms, Santander. Under these circumstances Bolivar became violent, and at first threatened the convention with 3000 troops; but presently, reconsidering the matter, withdrew his own adherents from the convention and left it without a quorum. These proceedings resulted in the dissolution of the convention, after which a junta of notables appointed Bolivar dictator. But he had now lost much of his popularity. Loud complaints were heard through the country, and an attempt was made to assassinate the dictator and came very near succeeding. Presently the withdrawal of Ecuador and Venezuela was completed, and Bolivar felt that he could obtain no help from those states. Under these circumstances a convention was held at Bogota in 1830; and this convention, by refusing to elect Bolivar President, virtually relegated him to private life. He died a few months afterward—as some people thought, of disappointment and chagrin. Statues of the liberator have since been erected in Caracas, Bogota, and Lima, while in 1883 such a statue, presented by the republic of Venezuela to the city of New York, was set up in Central Park. The old Colombian Federation has never been renewed, but the title "United States of Colombia" remains upon the map, restricted in meaning to the province of Granada.

The revolution by which Mexico gained her independence had but little direct connection with the revolt of the South American states, although its occasion was furnished by the same series of European events. In Mexico the majority of the population is descended from the native Indians of Montezuma's time, and if that unhappy chieftain were to return to this world to-day he might easily recognize the tones of his own familiar speech on the streets of Tenochtitlan. As Mexico and Peru, during the two centuries following the Spanish conquest, were, on account of their mineral wealth, especially liable to excite the cupidity of Spain's enemies, she always kept a larger military force there than in her other colonies; and as Mexico was, on the whole, more




FIG. 207. View of Mexico. (From a photograph by Rau, Philadelphia.)

exposed in situation than Peru, the largest force of all was usually kept there: not less than 40,000 regular Spanish troops, besides a militia of from 20,000 to 30,000, recruited among the native and Creole population. Soon after the conquest the horrible worship of Tezcatlipoca was extinguished, and the natives were willingly converted to Christianity by the noble Franciscan and Dominican monks who devoted their lives to that missionary work. As the population of Mexico was not of active mind, and the country was remote from all the progressive influences that moulded European thought, it was not strange that the church

acquired a peculiarly strong hold there, or that the general type of its teachings should have been narrow and unenlightening. Nowhere, perhaps, has the human mind had a harder struggle in the effort to free itself from ecclesiasticism than in Mexico; but even among the Mexican clergy there was a great majority which could be counted upon for resistance to the despotism of Spain. There existed in Mexico at the beginning of the nineteenth century two parties, the Gachupines and the Guadalupes. The former were composed chiefly of Spanish officials, civil and ecclesiastical, appointed in Spain and paid out of the provincial treasury. The Guadalupes, on the other hand, were the native party, representing the Spanish Creoles and also the Mexicans of Indian



FIG. 208.—Miguel Hidalgo. (From Alaman's "Historia de Méjico," tom. i.)

descent. Now it happened that most of the bishops were born Spaniards, while nearly all the lower clergy were shut out from all hope of promotion. At the first moment of revolution, therefore, the lower clergy were likely to declare themselves in its favor; and when we consider the great influence which they exercised over the Indian population, we shall understand how important they were. Not only had their wealth been swelled, as in other countries, by extensive gifts of land held in mortmain, but they had further increased their landed property by lending money to the farmers and taking mortgages for security. In these ways, more than half of the land in Mexico was held by clergy-

men who were not averse to seeing the authority of Spanish bishops thrown off.

The revolution in Mexico began in 1808 with the first news of the deposition of Charles IV. Then the municipal board of the city of Mexico took a very bold step. It called upon the viceroy, whose name was Iturrignaray, to invite the several provinces to choose delegates to a national convention for the purpose of dealing with the new situation which had arisen. The viceroy would have complied with this request, but the Spanish officials in and about the city of Mexico forthwith deposed him and chose a junta from their own number to serve as a



FIG. 209. José María Morelos. (From Alaman's "Historia de Méjico," tom. iv.)

provisional government. Things remained in this anomalous situation for two years, when suddenly an aged country priest named Miguel Hidalgo (Fig. 208) denounced the existing government as illegal and tyrannical, and, collecting several thousand men, marched upon the city of Mexico. He won one or two small victories, and his numbers were swelled with fresh recruits until, when he arrived within sight of the capital, it was at the head of 100,000 men. Nevertheless, the loyalists were able to get together such a force as to defeat him, and in July, 1811, he was taken prisoner and shot. Similar ill-fated attempts were made between the years 1810 and 1817 by Morelos (Fig. 209), Matamoros, and Xavier Mina. One after another, in spite of temporary successes, these leaders

were defeated and put to death. Affairs now took a singular turn. One of the principal officers in the Mexican army was a young Creole named Agustin de Iturbide. In 1821, while Iturbide was engaged in stamping out the last remnants of revolution in the country, he suddenly experienced a change of heart and constructed a plan for the settlement of all existing difficulties. This scheme, known as the Plan of Iguala, consisted in the main of three important guarantees: 1. That Mexico should be acknowledged as an independent kingdom under a resident Bourbon prince. 2. That the Catholic Church, which sundry reformers



FIG. 210.—Agustín de Iturbide, proclaimed Emperor of Mexico, 1821. From Alaman's "Historia de Méjico," tom. v.)

had denounced, should be strictly maintained. 3. That all civil rights should be equally shared among all bona-fide inhabitants of Mexico, whether Spaniards or Creoles.

This Plan of Iguala was generally adopted in Mexico, and even received the sanction of a new viceroy sent from Spain; but when it was submitted to the Spanish government it was rejected, as Iturbide had foreseen. Accordingly in May, 1822, Iturbide was proclaimed Emperor of Mexico under the style of Agustín I. (Fig. 210). This

step, however, put an end to the harmony. One of Agustin's principal supporters, the young Creole general, Santa Anna, headed a revolt against him in the name of republican government, and in less than a year Agustin had to give up his crown and agree to go and live in Italy on a pension of \$25,000 a year. But hardly had he started when, in spite of the warnings of his friends, he concluded to go back, preferring the risk of a violent death in Mexico to a quiet life upon a modest competence in Italy. No sooner had the deposed emperor landed upon his native soil than he was instantly seized and shot. After this event, through various vicissitudes, the government of Mexico remained for a while firmly in the hands of Santa Anna, sometimes as President, sometimes as the power behind the throne.

The states now known as Central America, lying between the southern extremity of Mexico and the Isthmus of Panama, were formerly governed by officers known as intendants, and were generally known collectively as Guatemala, since in that province resided the captain-general. The great majority of its population is of Indian descent. Its occupations were for the most part corn-planting and cattle-farming, and in its general social condition it was a kind of backward Mexico. The separation of these provinces from Spain was begun by Guatemala in 1821, and its example was speedily followed by that of the other provinces. It happened that there were no Spanish troops in this part of America, so that the Spanish party found itself quite unable to hinder the revolution. At first these Central states united themselves to Mexico, under the government of Iturbide; but upon the death of that rash person, when a federal republic was proclaimed in Mexico, the Central American states preferred to set up a confederation of their own, and in one respect their action was highly enlightened. Their constitution, adopted in 1823, abolished slavery and declared the slave-trade to be piracy. But their confederation scarcely lasted three years, and since its fall the career of its several states has been a checkered series of usurpations and revolutions.

The only remaining Spanish possessions in America were the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, together with East and West Florida. The revolutionary party in Cuba was weaker than elsewhere, and in 1808, when the news of Charles IV.'s deposition arrived, Cuba asserted her undying allegiance to the Bourbon dynasty; but she did it without the intervention of revolutionary juntas, and for this loyal act was long afterward known as the "ever faithful isle." As for Florida, where

the Spaniards had never acquired much more than a precarious foothold, it had for many years been becoming a nest of outlaws, and chaos reigned supreme there. The war of 1812-15 in the United States made matters still worse. Many of the Indians of the Creek confederacy, after its overwhelming defeat by Andrew Jackson, had found a refuge in Florida; and runaway negroes from the plantations of Georgia and South Carolina were continually escaping thither. During the war, sundry British officers and adventurers, acting on their own responsibility upon this neutral soil, committed many acts which their government would never have sanctioned. They stirred up Indians and negroes to commit atrocities on the United States frontier. Moreover, while the Spanish government was engaged in warfare with the revolted states of Peru and Colombia, the coasts of Florida naturally became a haunt for contraband traders, privateers, and filibusters. One adventurer would announce his intention to make Florida a free republic; another would go about committing robbery on his own account; a third would set up an agency for kidnapping negroes on speculation. The disorder was hideous. On the Appalachicola River the British had built a fort and amply stocked it with arms and ammunition, to serve as a base of operations against the United States. On the departure of the British the fort was seized and held by negroes. This alarmed the people of Georgia, and in July, 1816, the United States troops, with permission from the Spanish authorities, marched in and bombarded the negro fort. A hot shot found its way into the magazine, 300 negroes were blown into fragments, and the fort was demolished.

In this case the Spaniards were ready to leave to United States troops a disagreeable work for which their own force was incompetent. Every day made it plainer that Spain was quite unable to preserve order in Florida, and for this reason the United States entered upon negotiations for the purchase of that country. Meanwhile the turmoil increased. White men were murdered by Indians, and United States troops under Colonel Twiggs captured and burned a considerable Seminole village known as Fowltown. The Indians retaliated by the wholesale massacre of fifty people who were ascending the Appalachicola River in boats; some of the victims were tortured with firebrands. Jackson was now ordered to the frontier. He wrote at once to President Monroe: "Let it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr. John Rhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished." Mr. Rhea was a Representative from Tennessee, a confidential friend

of both Jackson and Monroe. The President was ill when Jackson's letter reached him, and does not seem to have given it due consideration. On referring to it a year later, he could not remember that he had ever seen it before. Rhea, however, seems to have written a letter to Jackson, telling him that the President approved of his suggestion. As to this point, the united testimony of Jackson, Rhea, and Judge Overton seems conclusive. Afterward Mr. Monroe, through Rhea, seems to have requested Jackson to burn this letter, and an entry on the general's letter-book shows that it was accordingly burnt April 12, 1819. There can be no doubt that, whatever the President's intention may have been, or how far it may have been correctly interpreted by Rhea, the general honestly considered himself authorized to take possession of Florida on the ground that the Spanish government had shown itself incompetent to prevent the denizens of that country from engaging in hostilities against the United States. Jackson acted upon this belief with his accustomed promptness. He raised troops in Tennessee and neighboring states, invaded Florida in March, 1818, captured St. Marks, and pushed on to the Seminole headquarters on the Suwanee River. In less than three months from this time, he had overthrown the Indians and brought order out of chaos. His measures were praised by his friends as vigorous, while his enemies stigmatized them as high-handed. In one instance his conduct was certainly open to question. At St. Marks his troops captured an aged Scotch trader and friend of the Indians, named Alexander Arbuthnot; near Suwanee, some time afterward, they seized Robert Ambrister, a young English lieutenant of marines, nephew of the governor of New Providence. Jackson believed that these men had incited the Indians to make war upon the United States, and were now engaged in aiding and abetting them in their hostilities. They were tried by a court-martial at St. Marks. On evidence which surely does not to-day seem conclusive, Arbuthnot was found guilty and sentenced to be hung. Appearances were more strongly against Ambrister. He did not make it clear what his business was in Florida, and threw himself upon the mercy of the court, which at first condemned him to be shot, but on further consideration commuted the sentence to fifty lashes and a year's imprisonment. Jackson arbitrarily revived the first sentence, and Ambrister was accordingly shot. A few minutes afterward Arbuthnot was hanged from the yard-arm of his own ship, declaring with his last breath that his country would avenge him. In this affair Jackson unquestionably acted from a stern sense of duty; as he himself said,

"My God would not have smiled on me, had I punished only the poor ignorant savages and spared the white men who set them on." Here, as on some other occasions, however, when under the influence of strong feeling, it may be doubted if he was to the full extent capable of estimating evidence. Throughout life, Jackson was liable to act with violent energy upon the strength of opinions formed hastily and based upon inadequate data. It is, however, very probable that in the present case the men were guilty.

On his way home, hearing that some Indians had sought refuge in Pensacola, Jackson captured the town, turned out the Spanish governor, and left a garrison of his own there. He had now virtually conquered Florida, but he had moved rather too fast for the government at Washington. He had gone further, perhaps, than was permissible in trespassing upon neutral territory; and his summary execution of two British subjects aroused serious indignation in England. For a moment we seemed on the verge of war with Great Britain and Spain at once. Whatever authority President Monroe may have intended, through the Rhea letter, to confer upon Jackson, he certainly felt that the general had gone too far. With one exception, his Cabinet agreed with him that it would be best to disavow Jackson's acts and make reparation for them. But John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, was, in point of boldness, not unlike Jackson. He felt equal to the task of dealing with the two foreign powers, and upon his advice the administration decided to assume the responsibility for what Jackson had done. Pensacola and St. Marks were restored to Spain, and an order of Jackson's for the seizing of St. Augustine was countermanded by the President. But Adams represented to Spain that the American general, in his invasion of Florida, was virtually assisting the Spanish government in maintaining order there; and to Great Britain he justified the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister on the ground that their conduct had been such that they had forfeited their allegiance and become virtual outlaws. Spain and Great Britain accepted the explanations; had either nation felt in the mood for war with the United States, it might have been otherwise. As soon as the administration had adopted Jackson's measures, they were for that reason attacked in Congress by Clay, whose opposition was at this time somewhat factious; and this was the beginning of the bitter and lifelong feud between Jackson and Clay. In 1819 the purchase of Florida from Spain was effected, and in 1821 Jackson was appointed governor of that territory.

At this time sundry events occurred in Europe which led to the development of what has ever since been known as the Monroe Doctrine. In 1820 a revolution broke out in Spain against the tyranny of Ferdinand VII., and it was only suppressed through the active intervention of the restored Bourbon monarchy in France. A French force under the Duke of Angoulême invaded Spain, captured Cadiz, and sup-



FIG. 211. James Monroe. (From a lithograph by N. Currier. Collection of Hampton L. Carson, Esq., Philadelphia.)

pressed the revolutionary party. Thereupon Ferdinand VII., unable to learn from experience, renewed his tyrannical courses, while Angoulême was quite unable to restrain him. This state of things aroused much anxiety both in London and in Washington. George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, recognized that the Bourbon Family Compact was revived. John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State

at Washington, saw that if France could help Ferdinand VII. to put down rebellion at home, she might help him to put it down in America. Moreover, what if France should see fit to claim, in reward for her services in Spain, a transfer to herself of the Spanish claim upon Mexico or Colombia? The United States had endured sluggish Spain as a neighbor; would she find it endurable to have active and powerful France at her doors? These reflections also occurred to Canning. In one respect Great Britain had perhaps the keener interest in the independence of the Spanish colonies, for in those days she exported more of the goods that Spanish America wanted, and was not likely to smile upon the prospect of having France as a competitor in that field. Thus the United States and Great Britain were at one in wishing to see the New World kept as free as possible from foreign European influences.

Still another possible danger was to be considered. After the overthrow of Napoleon in 1815, Czar Alexander formed a kind of league known as the Holy Alliance, the real purpose of which was to uphold absolute monarchy and to lend a hand wherever possible in suppressing republican movements. This alliance was joined by Austria, Prussia, France, Spain, Naples, and Sardinia, and the very heart and soul of it was Prince Metternich, the chancellor of the Austrian empire. American statesmen well knew that Prince Metternich and Czar Alexander regarded the very existence of the United States as a standing refutation of all their cherished political doctrines. Now, there were sundry indications that the Holy Alliance might give armed assistance in subduing Mexico and perhaps other Spanish-American states. And in such an event there was imminent danger that those countries might fall into the power of European nations far stronger than Spain. For example, there was Russia, which had long possessed Alaska, and had lately been showing much activity upon our northwestern coasts. Russia had established trading-posts as far south as the coast of California. Suppose Russia should assist Spain in subduing Mexico, and then conclude to take California in payment: could the United States look with equanimity upon any such complications? Such were the considerations which led to the doctrine announced in President Monroe's message to Congress in 1823. There is little doubt that the substance of the doctrine was the work of John Quincy Adams. He was, no doubt, its real author; but as it first appeared in President Monroe's message, it is naturally enough known as the Monroe Doctrine. The pith of it was contained in two closely linked declarations: 1. That the United States regarded the continents of North and South America as no longer open

to colonization by European powers. 2. That any attempt on the part of any European nation or nations to interfere with any independent American government would be regarded by the United States as unfriendly conduct, and, as such, would be appropriately resented. At the same time, there was added, with a kind of two-edged significance, that the United States did not propose to interfere in the affairs of the Old World.

This action certainly marks an era in the history of the United States. A few years before, it would have provoked a smile on the part of European governments. But it was now addressed to a world which had fresh in its memory the exploits of Old Ironsides and the victory of Jackson at New Orleans; and moreover, it was apparent to the whole world that, as against the Holy Alliance, England and the United States were thoroughly united in feeling. Even at that day the moral influence of such a combination was too great to be resisted. In the European money market, Monroe's message counted as a decisive victory for the Spanish-American republics, and their funds at once began rising in value. It is also worthy of notice that, in the course of the following year, Russia made a treaty with us in which she relinquished all claim upon the Pacific coast south of  $54^{\circ} 40'$ , the southern limit of Alaska. As for the Holy Alliance, we hear very little more of it.

In later times, with the increasing growth of the United States in power, we shall notice now and then a reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, more particularly at the close of our civil war, when a word of warning from our State Department caused the emperor of the French to retire from the scene in ignominious haste.

# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS.

(FOR GENERAL INDEX, SEE VOLUME XXIV.)

## INDEPENDENCE OF THE NEW WORLD.

### CHAPTER I.

#### FIRST AND SECOND WARS WITH FRANCE.

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| Louis XIV.'s Plans in the New World . . . . .                                      | 17   |
| The Feudal System in Canada ; the Seigneuries . . . . .                            | 17   |
| The Officers of the Government : Governor, Bishop, and Intendant . . . . .         | 18   |
| The Paternalism of the Government , the King's Bounty . . . . .                    | 18   |
| Slow Growth of the Population in New France . . . . .                              | 19   |
| Hostility to the Huguenots . . . . .   | 20   |
| Strength of the French Due to their Relations with the Indians. . . . .            | 21   |
| The French Occupy Positions far in the Interior . . . . .                          | 21   |
| They Undertake to Humiliate or to Convert the Long House . . . . .                 | 22   |
| Jean Talon and the Marquis de Tracy . . . . .                                      | 22   |
| The Mohawks Retreat before Tracy . . . . .   | 22   |
| Nicholas Perrot and the Site of Chicago (1670) . . . . .                           | 22   |
| The Explorations of Father Marquette and of Joliet . . . . .                       | 23   |
| Count Frontenac and Robert de la Salle . . . . .                                   | 23   |
| La Salle's Ship Griffin and her Loss (1679) . . . . .                              | 24   |
| His March through the Forests from Fort Crèvecoeur to the Niagara . . . . .        | 24   |
| The Mutiny of the Garrison of the Fort . . . . .                                   | 25   |
| Father Hennepin's Explorations: his View of Niagara Falls . . . . .                | 25   |
| La Salle Descends the Mississippi and Names the Adjacent Region Louisiana (1682) . | 26   |
| Death of La Salle (1687) . . . . .   | 26   |
| The Claim of France to Ownership of the Mississippi Valley . . . . .               | 27   |
| The French Scheme for Seizing the Hudson River . . . . .                           | 28   |
| The Warriors of the Long House Invade Canada in 1689 . . . . .                     | 28   |
| Frontenac Makes a General Advance against the British Settlements (1690) . . . . . | 28   |
| Iberville at Schenectady ; de Rouville at Salmon Falls; Portneuf at Casco Bay . .  | 28   |
| Frontenac's Successes against the Iroquois . . . . .                               | 28   |
| Leisler's Congress of English Colonies against French Aggression (1690) . . . . .  | 29   |
| Sir William Phipps and his Expedition to Acadia (1690) . . . . .                   | 29   |
| He later Attacks Quebec (1690) . . . . .   | 29   |
| Fitz-John Winthrop, Starting from Albany, is Defeated (1690) . . . . .             | 29   |
| Distress in Massachusetts . . . . .  | 29   |
| Paper Money Known as Bills of Credit . . . . .                                     | 29   |
| The Witchcraft Delusion; Execution of Mrs. Ann Hibbins . . . . .                   | 29   |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Cotton Mather: his Fame and his Learning (1663-1728) . . . . .                    | 29   |
| The Delusion in Salem in 1691 and later . . . . .                                 | 30   |
| Relation of Cotton Mather to the Persecutions . . . . .                           | 33   |
| The Successes of the French in Maine . . . . .                                    | 34   |
| They Regard the Kennebec as their Border . . . . .                                | 34   |
| Iberville Attacks Newfoundland and Turns upon Hudson Bay (1696) . . . . .         | 35   |
| The Hudson Bay Company . . . . .  | 35   |
| The French and Algonquins at Haverhill, Massachusetts, in 1697 . . . . .          | 35   |
| The Story of Hannah Dustin . . . . .  | 35   |
| Frontenac repeatedly Invades the Mohawk Region . . . . .                          | 36   |
| Death of Frontenac (1697) . . . . .   | 36   |
| The Treaty of Ryswick Robs France of Frontenac's Acquisitions . . . . .           | 36   |
| The War between William III. and Louis XIV. (1702-12) . . . . .                   | 37   |
| The Victories of Marlborough Give England a Supreme Place in the World . . . . .  | 37   |
| This War in the New World "a War of Skirmishes and Outposts" . . . . .            | 37   |
| The Deerfield Massacre 1704 . . . . .   | 37   |
| Attacks upon Haverhill, Exeter, and Other Villages . . . . .                      | 38   |
| "Canada Delenda Est" . . . . .  | 38   |
| Nicholson's Conquest of Port Royal in Acadia (1709) . . . . .                     | 38   |
| The Failure of his Great Expedition against Quebec (1711) . . . . .               | 39   |
| Contrasts between the First and Second Wars with France . . . . .                 | 40   |
| France Gives up to England Newfoundland and the Hudson Bay Region (1713) . .      | 40   |
| England Retains "Nova Scotia": France, Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island .     | 40   |
| The "Asiento Contract": the African Slave Trade in English Hands . . . . .        | 40   |
| Relation of the War of the Spanish Succession to the American Civil War . . . . . | 40   |
| French Discoveries in the South Dangerous to the Southermost English Colonies .   | 41   |

## CHAPTER II.

### THE CAROLINAS AND GEORGIA.

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Carolina and its Eight Lords-Palatine (1663) . . . . .                       | 42 |
| Shaftesbury, Locke, and the Constitution of the Colony . . . . .             | 42 |
| The Settlement on Albemarle Sound (1653-64) . . . . .                        | 42 |
| The Clarendon Colony: the Ashley Colony and Charleston . . . . .             | 42 |
| The Albemarle Colony a Rogues' Paradise . . . . .                            | 43 |
| Smuggling between the Colony and Massachusetts Bay . . . . .                 | 43 |
| The Career of John Culpeper . . . . .  | 43 |
| Seth Sothel, Lord-Proprietor and Governor (1683-90) . . . . .                | 44 |
| North and South Carolina . . . . .   | 45 |
| The Quaker Archdale Governor of the Albemarle and Ashley Colonies (1695) . . | 45 |
| Great Immigration of Huguenots into South Carolina . . . . .                 | 46 |
| Political Rights, after a Struggle, Granted to Dissenters . . . . .          | 46 |
| The Quakers and Carey's Rebellion . . . . .                                  | 46 |
| Huguenots and Swiss in North Carolina . . . . .                              | 46 |
| Hostile Contact with the Indians . . . . .                                   | 47 |
| The Three Indian Stocks between Virginia and Florida . . . . .               | 47 |
| The Tuscaroras Attack the Settlement at New Bern (1713) . . . . .            | 47 |
| They are ultimately Beaten Back and Migrate to Central New York . . . . .    | 47 |
| French and Spaniards before Charleston (1706) . . . . .                      | 48 |
| War of Indians against South Carolina (1715) . . . . .                       | 48 |
| The Massacre at Popocaligo, Charles Craven (1715) . . . . .                  | 48 |

|   | PAGE. |
|---|-------|
| Governor Johnson and the Pirates of the Carolina Coast . . . . .                              | 48    |
| The Pirate Blackbeard and his Prisoners . . . . .   | 49    |
| The Lords-Proprietors are Deposed (1729) . . . . .  | 50    |
| Sir Francis Nicholson Appointed Royal Governor . . . . .                                      | 50    |
| Of the Proprietary Governments the Penns' and the Calverts' alone Survive till 1776 . . . . . | 50    |
| Causes of the Fall of the Proprietary Governments . . . . .                                   | 51    |
| Georgia, a New Frontier Colony, Founded by Oglethorpe (1732) . . . . .                        | 52    |
| Nature of the Colonists; Prisons Emptied to Furnish them . . . . .                            | 53    |
| The Trustees and their Absolute Sway . . . . .  | 54    |
| Negro Slavery and the Sale of Rum Prohibited . . . . .  | 54    |
| Georgia Grows at the Expense of South Carolina . . . . .                                      | 54    |
| Oglethorpe's Colony a Bulwark against French Aggression . . . . .                             | 55    |
| The French Build Kaskaskia (1700), Detroit (1701), and Vincennes (1705) . . . . .             | 55    |
| Mobile (1702) and New Orleans (1718) also Founded . . . . .                                   | 55    |
| Protestant Germans and Scotch Highlanders Join Oglethorpe's Colony . . . . .                  | 56    |
| The Spaniards Harass British Trade . . . . .  | 56    |
| A British Fleet, under Vernon, in the West Indies . . . . .                                   | 56    |
| Oglethorpe, Aided by the Creeks, Attacks the Spaniards in Florida . . . . .                   | 56    |
| The Battle of Frederica (July 9, 1742) . . . . .  | 56    |
| The Spaniards Feared no more on the South . . . . .   | 56    |
| The Rule of the Trustees becomes Unpopular . . . . .  | 56    |
| Georgia becomes, in 1752, a Royal Colony . . . . .  | 57    |

## CHAPTER III.

## THIRD AND FOURTH WARS WITH FRANCE.

|   |    |
|---|----|
| An American Seventy Years' War with France Opens in 1689 . . . . .                | 58 |
| Four Wars within this Period . . . . .  | 58 |
| Effect of the Continual Presence of the Enemy on Political Development . . . . .  | 58 |
| Events between the Second and Third Wars . . . . .                                | 58 |
| The French Establish "Spheres of Influence" over Native Tribes . . . . .          | 58 |
| Father Rasle's Settlement on the Kennebec River . . . . .                         | 59 |
| Colonel Hilton Burns Norridgewock (1707) . . . . .                                | 59 |
| Governor Shute and the Maine Indians . . . . .                                    | 59 |
| French Machinations with the Indians against the English Settlers . . . . .       | 60 |
| Vandreuil's Letters to Rasle (1721) . . . . .                                     | 60 |
| The Indians Burn the Town of Brunswick (1721) . . . . .                           | 61 |
| The Massachusetts General Court Decides on War against the Indians . . . . .      | 61 |
| Wide Extent of this War . . . . .   | 61 |
| Massacres at Falmouth, Wells, and Saco . . . . .                                  | 61 |
| Horrors at Northfield, Fort Dummer (Brattleboro), and elsewhere . . . . .         | 61 |
| Father Rasle Slain at Norridgewock (August, 1724) . . . . .                       | 61 |
| Price Set on Indian Scalps . . . . .  | 61 |
| Captain Lovewell's Fight (May 7, 1725) . . . . .                                  | 61 |
| Acadia Remains French in Sympathies . . . . .                                     | 62 |
| The French Build the Great Fortress of Louisburg on the Island of Cape Breton . . | 62 |
| Burnet Diverts the Fur-Trade from the Saint Lawrence to the Mohawk Valley . .     | 63 |
| The Six Nations Faithful to the English . . . . .                                 | 63 |
| Sir William Johnson and his Influence over the Indians . . . . .                  | 63 |
| The French Build the Fortress of Crown Point on Lake Champlain . . . . .          | 64 |
| French Exploration in the Far West . . . . .                                      | 64 |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| Verendrye Ascends the Missouri and Sees the Rockies in 1742 . . . . .              | 64   |
| England Enters the War of the Austrian Succession . . . . .                        | 65   |
| Occasion of this War; the Third War with France (1742-48) . . . . .                | 65   |
| Between France and Great Britain, this is a War for Commercial Supremacy . . . . . | 66   |
| Hostilities Begin in Nova Scotia . . . . .   | 66   |
| Pepperell's Expedition against Louisburg (June 17, 1745) . . . . .                 | 66   |
| The French Counter-attempts . . . . .  | 67   |
| D'Anville's Fleet; Jonquière's Fleet Defeated by Anson (1747) . . . . .            | 67   |
| Peace Concluded; Louisburg Given back to France . . . . .                          | 67   |
| The Financial Situation in New England . . . . .                                   | 68   |
| The Curse of Inconvertible Paper Currency then and since . . . . .                 | 68   |
| Conditions in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts . . . . .               | 69   |
| The Louisburg Indemnity Used to Buy up the Paper Money . . . . .                   | 69   |
| Ultimate Popularity of Thomas Hutchinson for this Act . . . . .                    | 70   |
| Eight Years of Truce after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) . . . . .          | 70   |
| The Question of the Acadian Boundary . . . . .                                     | 70   |
| A British Occupation of the whole Alleghany Region . . . . .                       | 70   |
| Galissonnière Seeks to Plant French Colonists South of Lake Erie . . . . .         | 70   |
| By Celoron's Expedition this Region is Marked as French Property . . . . .         | 70   |
| The French Build a Fort at Venango on the Alleghany . . . . .                      | 71   |
| The British Occupy Nova Scotia and Found Halifax (1749) . . . . .                  | 71   |
| German Immigrants Build Lunenburg . . . . .  | 71   |
| The Exile of the Acadian Peasantry . . . . .                                       | 71   |
| This Banishment a Military Necessity . . . . .                                     | 71   |
| Hostilities between French and English; Fort Beausejour . . . . .                  | 72   |
| The Abiding Disloyalty of the Acadians . . . . .                                   | 73   |
| Such as Refuse the Oath of Allegiance are Deported (1755) . . . . .                | 74   |
| Many Settle in Louisiana; Many Return later . . . . .                              | 74   |
| Concerted Action Necessary among the American Colonists . . . . .                  | 74   |
| Instances of it: Leisler's Congress; Penn's Scheme; England's Way . . . . .        | 74   |
| A Congress at Albany in 1754 . . . . .   | 75   |
| Benjamin Franklin's Famous Plan . . . . .  | 75   |
| The Ohio Company in 1750 Extends its Surveys as far as Louisville . . . . .        | 75   |
| A Line of French Forts from Presque Isle (Erie) to Venango . . . . .               | 75   |
| Danger to the English Settlers from this French Intrusion . . . . .                | 76   |
| Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia Determines to Check the French . . . . .            | 76   |
| George Washington Sent as his Messenger . . . . .                                  | 77   |
| The English Build a Fort on the Site of Pittsburg (1754) . . . . .                 | 78   |
| The French Drive them away and Build Fort Duquesne . . . . .                       | 78   |
| Washington, Commanding a Virginia Force, Builds Fort Necessity . . . . .           | 78   |
| He is Defeated by the French . . . . .   | 78   |
| Braddock's Expedition; his Officers . . . . .                                      | 78   |
| His Fearful Defeat; the Virginia Militia (July 9, 1755) . . . . .                  | 79   |
| Sir William Johnson's Operations in New York . . . . .                             | 80   |
| Rout of the French; Fort William Henry on Lake George . . . . .                    | 81   |
| The Seven Years' War in Europe Begun in 1756 . . . . .                             | 81   |
| The Momentous Nature of this War . . . . .   | 81   |
| Montcalm, the French Commander, Schemes against the Long House . . . . .           | 81   |
| He Captures Oswego, and Builds a Fort at Ticonderoga (1756) . . . . .              | 81   |
| The Fort Edward Massacre (1757) . . . . .  | 82   |
| William Pitt becomes Prime Minister . . . . .                                      | 82   |
| He Sends Amherst and Wolfe to America . . . . .                                    | 82   |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| They Recapture Louisburg (1758) . . . . .   | 82   |
| Abercrombie Advances unsuccessfully against Ticonderoga . . . . .                     | 84   |
| French Disaster at Fort Frontenac . . . . .   | 85   |
| Forbes's Expedition against Fort Duquesne . . . . .                                   | 86   |
| Fort Pitt Built near the Deserted French Fort . . . . .                               | 86   |
| French Reverses in Europe and in India . . . . .                                      | 86   |
| The Consummation of the Great Drama (1759) . . . . .                                  | 87   |
| The French Defeated at Minden, Westphalia (August 1, 1759) . . . . .                  | 87   |
| They Lose Forts Niagara and Ticonderoga . . . . .                                     | 87   |
| Wolfe's Army Captures Quebec (September 12, 1759) . . . . .                           | 88   |
| Death of Wolfe and Montcalm . . . . .   | 89   |
| Canada Acquired by England (September, 1760) . . . . .                                | 89   |
| Affairs on the Continent . . . . .  | 90   |
| George III. Refuses Aid to Frederick the Great . . . . .                              | 90   |
| Peace Made between Russia and Prussia . . . . .                                       | 90   |
| England, in 1762, Declares War against Spain . . . . .                                | 90   |
| The British Capture Havana and Manila . . . . .                                       | 90   |
| The Treaty of Paris (February 10, 1763) and its Provisions . . . . .                  | 90   |
| Cuba and the Philippines Restored to Spain . . . . .                                  | 91   |
| Florida Ceded to Great Britain . . . . .  | 91   |
| France Cedes to Spain New Orleans and the Louisiana Territory . . . . .               | 91   |
| Canada and the North Surrendered to Great Britain . . . . .                           | 91   |
| France Retains in North America only the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon . . . . . | 91   |
| Great Significance of this Treaty of Paris . . . . .                                  | 91   |
| Contrasts between French and English Colonization . . . . .                           | 92   |
| The Despotism in Canada and its Resultant Corruption and Thievery . . . . .           | 92   |
| Jonquière, Bigot, and other Products of the Spoils System (1750-7) . . . . .          | 92   |
| The Great Indian War . . . . .  | 93   |
| The Conspiracy of Pontiac (1763) . . . . .  | 93   |
| The Ambuscade of the Devil's Hole on the Niagara . . . . .                            | 94   |
| The Western Algonquins on the Pennsylvania Border . . . . .                           | 94   |
| Attitude of the Quakers toward the Indians . . . . .                                  | 96   |
| The Affair at Conestoga; the Paxton Boys (1764) . . . . .                             | 96   |
| The Indian Communities of the Moravians . . . . .                                     | 97   |
| The Paxton Boys on the March to Philadelphia . . . . .                                | 97   |
| Dr. Franklin Mediates . . . . .   | 98   |
| Pamphlet War between Quakers and Presbyterians . . . . .                              | 99   |
| Collapse of Pontiac's Conspiracy (1765) . . . . .                                     | 99   |
| The Senecas Won back to the English by Sir William Johnson . . . . .                  | 99   |
| A Turning-point in the History of America . . . . .                                   | 100  |

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Three Distinguishable Types of American Society in the Colonies . . . . . | 101 |
| Individual Differences within these Zones . . . . .                       | 101 |
| Complexity of American Social Life . . . . .                              | 102 |
| Survey of the Colonies at the Middle of the Eighteenth Century . . . . .  | 102 |
| The Predominant English Character of the Older Settlements . . . . .      | 102 |
| New England almost entirely English before 1765 . . . . .                 | 102 |
| Slight Sprinkling of Scotch, Huguenots, and Scotch-Irish . . . . .        | 102 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Virginia and Maryland also Predominantly English before 1765 . . . . .              | 103  |
| Larger Foreign Element in the Southern Colonies . . . . .                           | 103  |
| Mixture of Races at New Netherland . . . . .  | 104  |
| Dutch and English the Official Languages there . . . . .                            | 104  |
| French, Swedes, Germans, Flemings, Jews . . . . .                                   | 104  |
| In 1765 New York the least English of the Thirteen Colonies . . . . .               | 104  |
| Pennsylvania and New Jersey mainly English . . . . .                                | 104  |
| German Immigration from the Rhenish Palatinate, 1710-1740 . . . . .                 | 104  |
| Scotch-Irish Arrive in Great Numbers from 1710 onward . . . . .                     | 104  |
| One-fifth of the Population of 2,500,000 in 1765 Scotch-Irish . . . . .             | 104  |
| They Settle in New England, New York, New Jersey, and Western Pennsylvania .        | 105  |
| The German Mennonites, Dunkers, and Moravians . . . . .                             | 105  |
| Pennsylvania Dutch a Dialect of High German . . . . .                               | 106  |
| Pennsylvania the Centre of Diffusion for Scotch-Irish and German Settlers . .       | 106  |
| Social Characteristics . . . . .  | 107  |
| Great Dimensions and Religious Purposes of the New England Immigrations .           | 107  |
| Life in the Wilderness Begins in New England thoroughly Organized . . .             | 107  |
| Comparison of Colonies of Greece and in New England . . . . .                       | 108  |
| The New England Parish-Township Corresponds to the Greek City-State . .             | 108  |
| Economic Conditions Favorable to Political Development . . . . .                    | 108  |
| Township and Parish Identical . . . . .   | 109  |
| The Meeting-House; the Town House . . . . .   | 109  |
| Origins of the Government by Town Meeting . . . . .                                 | 110  |
| In England, under the Plantagenets, the Town Meeting Survives in the Court-Baron    | 110  |
| Vestries and Vestrymen; Open and Close Vestries . . . . .                           | 110  |
| In New England the Court-Baron of the Manorial System Reverts to Town Meeting       | 110  |
| The Meeting of Church is Town Meeting Engaged upon Ecclesiastical Matters .         | 110  |
| New England Reproduces England of the Earlier Plantagenets . . . . .                | 111  |
| The Thrifty and Respectable Character of the Immigrants of 1620-40 . . . .          | 111  |
| They were the Yeomanry of England, not Peasants . . . . .                           | 111  |
| Their Leaders were Squires and Country Parsons of Ancient Families . . . .          | 111  |
| No Social Gulls in New England . . . . .  | 112  |
| Negro Slavery: 2000 Slaves in Connecticut in 1765 . . . . .                         | 112  |
| Sir John Hawkins and his Crest as Kidnapper of Slaves . . . . .                     | 112  |
| The Different Attitude toward the Theocratic Ideal Leads to Different Settlements . | 113  |
| Conditions Favorable to Liberalism and Mental Flexibility . . . . .                 | 113  |
| Public Schools Supported by Public Taxes . . . . .                                  | 113  |
| The Inland Population purely Agricultural . . . . .                                 | 113  |
| Seaports, Commerce, and Banking . . . . .   | 114  |
| The Better Country Farm-houses like English Manor-houses . . . . .                  | 114  |
| Noble Colonial Mansions: the Vassall House in Cambridge . . . . .                   | 111  |
| The New England Clergy . . . . .  | 114  |
| The Established Congregational or Independent Church . . . . .                      | 115  |
| Baptists in Rhode Island . . . . .  | 115  |
| The Episcopal Church: King's Chapel in Boston . . . . .                             | 115  |
| The Methodist Wave in New England . . . . .   | 116  |
| George Whitefield and his Methods . . . . .   | 116  |
| The "Great Awakening" of 1721 and afterward . . . . .                               | 116  |
| Jonathan Edwards, the Greatest Intellect of the Western Hemisphere . . . .          | 116  |
| The Learning of the Clergy . . . . .  | 117  |
| Founding of Harvard (1636), Yale (1701), and Dartmouth (1769) Colleges . .          | 117  |
| Literature in New England . . . . .   | 118  |

|   | PAGE. |
|---|-------|
| Letters, Journals, Memoirs, and Controversial Tracts . . . . .                      | 118   |
| The Journal of Winthrop; Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation . . . . .        | 119   |
| Poetry: Ann Bradstreet and Michael Wigglesworth . . . . .                           | 119   |
| Cotton Mather; his "Magnalia" and "Wonders of the Invisible World" . . . . .        | 119   |
| Virginia: its Social System . . . . .   | 120   |
| The Population purely English . . . . .   | 120   |
| Sparseness of Population and Lack of Compactness in the Settlements . . . . .       | 120   |
| The Cultivation of Tobacco . . . . .  | 120   |
| Tendency toward Large Estates . . . . .   | 120   |
| Slave Labor, White and Black . . . . .  | 120   |
| Indentured White Servants . . . . .   | 120   |
| The Episcopal Church . . . . .  | 122   |
| The Unit of Representation the County, not the Town . . . . .                       | 122   |
| The Open Vestry a Representative Body . . . . .                                     | 122   |
| The Influx of Cavaliers after the Execution of Charles I. (1649) . . . . .          | 122   |
| Great Similarity of the Virginian and New England Colonists . . . . .               | 122   |
| They Differ only in Political and Ecclesiastical Views . . . . .                    | 122   |
| Size of Plantations Increases . . . . .   | 122   |
| Increase also in Importation of Negro Slaves . . . . .                              | 122   |
| Rise of an Aristocracy of Wealthy Planters . . . . .                                | 123   |
| Significance of Bacon's Rebellion (1676) . . . . .                                  | 123   |
| Virginia Reproduced Rural England of the Stuart Period . . . . .                    | 123   |
| Absence of Seaports and of Large Towns . . . . .                                    | 123   |
| The Rivers of Virginia . . . . .  | 123   |
| Williamsburg and Norfolk . . . . .  | 124   |
| Meagreness of Literature: the Earlier Writers . . . . .                             | 124   |
| Ebenezer Cook's "The Sot-Weed Factor" a Poem of Merit . . . . .                     | 124   |
| North Carolina: Two Periods in the Formation of the Colony . . . . .                | 124   |
| The Albemarle Colony: the Wretched Character of its Earlier Settlers . . . . .      | 125   |
| Accession of Germans and Swiss under Count de Graffenreid . . . . .                 | 125   |
| The Scotch-Irish and Germans enter the Back Country . . . . .                       | 125   |
| New Ecclesiastical Conditions Introduced . . . . .                                  | 125   |
| Distinction between Presbyterianism and Congregationalism . . . . .                 | 125   |
| The Great Scotch-Irish Presbyterian Immigration . . . . .                           | 125   |
| The Presbyterians of the Shenandoah Valley Successful over the Episcopalian .       | 126   |
| The Episcopal Church of Virginia Disestablished . . . . .                           | 126   |
| Complete Religious Freedom the Result of the Controversy . . . . .                  | 126   |
| Improvement in North Carolina Due to German and Scotch-Irish Immigration .          | 126   |
| The Origin of the "Mean Whites" or "Crackers" . . . . .                             | 127   |
| The Isolation of Communities in Western North Carolina . . . . .                    | 127   |
| South Carolina: High Order of the Coast Population . . . . .                        | 127   |
| Influence of the Huguenot, Scotch-Irish, and German Settlers . . . . .              | 127   |
| The Democratic Character of Church and State . . . . .                              | 127   |
| This Democracy really an Oligarchy of Slave-Masters . . . . .                       | 127   |
| Slavery in South Carolina more Cruel than in North Carolina . . . . .               | 128   |
| Negro Slavery in South Carolina and Georgia the Corner-stone of the Social Fabric . | 128   |
| Physical Conditions that Favored the Growth of Cities . . . . .                     | 128   |
| Charleston and its Charming Life . . . . .  | 128   |
| New York and its Cosmopolitanism . . . . .  | 129   |
| Size of the Cities of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Charleston .   | 130   |
| Aristocratic Complexion of New York Society . . . . .                               | 130   |
| Negroes and Negro Slavery in New York . . . . .                                     | 130   |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| First Printing-press in New York in 1693 . . . . .                       | 131  |
| King's College (Columbia) Founded in 1750 . . . . .                      | 131  |
| The Colonial Post: Philadelphia its Headquarters . . . . .               | 131  |
| Spotswood, then Franklin, Postmaster-Generals . . . . .                  | 131  |
| Causes of the Rapid Growth of Philadelphia and of Pennsylvania . . . . . | 131  |
| Pennsylvania the most Democratic of the Thirteen Colonies . . . . .      | 132  |
| Its Heterogeneous Population; Quakers and Slavery . . . . .              | 132  |
| The Redemptioners Prefer Pennsylvania as a Home . . . . .                | 133  |
| Agriculture in the Colony: Wheat and Other Exports . . . . .             | 133  |
| Maryland Approaches the Type of the Middle Colonies . . . . .            | 133  |
| The Founding of Baltimore in 1729 . . . . .                              | 133  |
| Different Attitude of the Quakers and Puritans toward Learning . . . . . | 133  |
| Philadelphia becomes a Centre of Liberal Culture . . . . .               | 134  |
| William Penn, James Logan, and David Lloyd . . . . .                     | 134  |
| Benjamin Franklin and his Fame even before the Revolution . . . . .      | 124  |
| His Autobiography the First American Classic . . . . .                   | 135  |

## CHAPTER V.

### BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Ill-defined Relations between Colonies and Crown . . . . .                              | 136 |
| The English Way of Quiet Self-assertion . . . . .                                       | 136 |
| Parliament originally without Control over Colonial Affairs . . . . .                   | 136 |
| The Parliamentary Commissioners after 1649 . . . . .                                    | 137 |
| Massachusetts Declines to Surrender its Charter in 1651 . . . . .                       | 138 |
| The Massachusetts Coinage . . . . .   | 138 |
| The Province Does not Recognize Cromwell's Authority . . . . .                          | 138 |
| Affection of the Colonists for the Mother-country . . . . .                             | 139 |
| Idea of a Political Separation not Regarded with Favor . . . . .                        | 140 |
| Because Good Englishmen, they Resent any Abridgment of their Rights . . . . .           | 141 |
| The Colonists Recognize the Paramount Authority of the King . . . . .                   | 142 |
| They Deny that of Parliament because not Represented in it . . . . .                    | 142 |
| They Regard their Legislature as Coördinate with Parliament, not as Subordinate to it . | 142 |
| Nature of the Loyalty of the English People . . . . .                                   | 143 |
| Loyalty Counts for Nothing if it Comes into Collision with Personal Independence .      | 143 |
| The Argument in the Declaration of Independence . . . . .                               | 143 |
| The Parliamentary Majority, not George III., the Guilty Party . . . . .                 | 144 |
| After 1688, according to the British View, Colonial Affairs Subject to Parliament .     | 145 |
| Fatal Antagonism between the American and the British View . . . . .                    | 146 |
| Original Theory of the Relation of the Colony to the Mother-country . . . . .           | 146 |
| The Colony Exists to Enrich the Mother-country . . . . .                                | 146 |
| Harassing Commercial Restrictions . . . . .   | 147 |
| Comparison of these with Tariff Legislation in the United States since 1861 . . . . .   | 148 |
| Influence of Selfish Interests on Economic Opinion . . . . .                            | 149 |
| Tardiness of the Dawning of the Idea of Commercial Freedom . . . . .                    | 149 |
| The Colonists did not Resent the Navigation Act . . . . .                               | 150 |
| The Stamp Act (1765), however, they Regarded as Illegal . . . . .                       | 150 |
| "Taxation without Representation is Tyranny" . . . . .                                  | 151 |
| Criticism of this Doctrine in England . . . . .   | 151 |
| The American Revolution a Consequence of the French War . . . . .                       | 152 |
| This War Caused the Quarrels that Led to the Revolution . . . . .                       | 152 |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| The Colonies Required to Help Defray the War Debt . . . . .                                    | 153  |
| The War of Independence Undertaken to Maintain Old Liberties . . . . .                         | 153  |
| The Grand Conservatism of the English Race . . . . .   | 153  |
| The War of Independence, the Barons' War, the Great Rebellion Identical in Principle . . . . . | 153  |
| Political Advantage of Separation from England . . . . .                                       | 155  |
| A Confederation became an Immediate Necessity . . . . .  | 155  |
| The United States a Successful Experiment in Federalism . . . . .                              | 156  |
| The Place of America in History : Universal Federation the Goal of Humanity . . . . .          | 156  |
| The Revolution Arose from the Need of a Continental Revenue . . . . .                          | 157  |
| England's Constant Struggle with France after 1689, and the Expenditures Involved . . . . .    | 157  |
| Need of a Continental Taxing-Power . . . . .   | 158  |
| The Feeling of Local Independence Opposed a Continental Government . . . . .                   | 159  |
| Causes of the Feebleness of the Continental Congress . . . . .                                 | 159  |
| The Albany Plan of 1754; Franklin's Proposal . . . . .   | 160  |
| This Plan for Taxation and for Federation Rejected . . . . .                                   | 161  |
| Parliament Undertakes to Secure the Needed Revenue . . . . .                                   | 161  |
| For the First Time in a Century and a Half a Direct Tax Imposed on America . . . . .           | 161  |
| Importance, in British Eyes, of the Supremacy of Parliament . . . . .                          | 161  |
| Great Britain and her Colonies To-day . . . . .  | 162  |
| The Independence of the Canadian and Australasian States . . . . .                             | 162  |
| George Grenville and the Stamp Act . . . . .   | 163  |
| The Act Passes without Debate (1765) . . . . .   | 164  |
| The Revenue Secured by it to be Used in America . . . . .                                      | 164  |
| Two Forms of Resistance to the Act . . . . .   | 164  |
| Riot in Boston : Chief Justice Hutchinson's House Sacked (August, 1765) . . . . .              | 165  |
| Sober Appeal to Reason against the Act . . . . .   | 166  |
| Debate on the Repeal in Parliament (1766) . . . . .  | 166  |
| Views of the Tories, the New Whigs, and the Old Whigs . . . . .                                | 166  |
| George III., and his Short-sighted Policy . . . . .  | 168  |
| He Seeks to Break down the Parliamentary and Cabinet Government Supremacy . . . . .            | 168  |
| The Tories long Discredited . . . . .  | 169  |
| The King Secures their United Support . . . . .  | 169  |
| The New Whigs Agitate for Parliamentary Reform . . . . .                                       | 170  |
| "No Taxation without Representation" an Ancient Principle of English Liberty . . . . .         | 171  |
| It Involved Parliamentary Reform . . . . .   | 171  |
| The King Opposed to the Reform of Parliament . . . . .   | 171  |
| He is Enraged by the Victory of the Americans in the Repeal of the Stamp Act . . . . .         | 172  |
| After 1766 the Townshend-North Stage in the Story of the Revolution . . . . .                  | 172  |
| Charles Townshend and Lord North . . . . .   | 172  |
| Townshend's Recklessness . . . . .   | 172  |
| The Americans Distinguish between Port Duties and Stamped Paper . . . . .                      | 173  |
| James Otis Denounces Paxton's "Writs of Assistance" (1761) . . . . .                           | 174  |
| Townshend's Revenue Act of 1767 . . . . .  | 175  |
| Its Provisions an Outrageous Piece of Tyranny . . . . .  | 176  |
| Death of Townshend (1767); Lord North on the Scene . . . . .                                   | 176  |
| Massachusetts Invites the Colonies to Concerted Action against the Act (1768) . . . . .        | 176  |
| Samuel Adams, "the Man of the Town Meeting" . . . . .  | 176  |
| The Townshend Act Makes him a Rebel . . . . .  | 177  |
| Paul Revere and "The Illustrous Ninety-two" . . . . .  | 177  |
| Quarrels with the Collector of Boston . . . . .  | 178  |
| John Hancock's Ship Seized . . . . .   | 178  |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| Hancock and Adams . . . . .  | 178  |
| British Troops in Boston a Violation of an Act of Parliament . . . . .             | 179  |
| The "Boston Massacre," March 5, 1770 . . . . .                                     | 179  |
| The Troops Removed to Castle Island . . . . .                                      | 179  |
| Conciliatory Measures; the Revenue Act partially Repealed . . . . .                | 179  |
| Hutchinson Appointed Royal Governor . . . . .                                      | 179  |
| Conflicts with Established Authority Elsewhere . . . . .                           | 180  |
| The Regulators of North Carolina (1771) . . . . .                                  | 180  |
| The Affair of the <i>Gaspee</i> . . . . .  | 180  |
| The Town Meetings of Massachusetts . . . . .                                       | 180  |
| "Committees of Correspondence" . . . . .   | 180  |
| Dabney Carr, of Virginia, and Intercolonial Committees of Correspondence . . . . . | 181  |
| Significance of the Retention of the Tea Tax . . . . .                             | 182  |
| King George III's Device for "Trying the Question" . . . . .                       | 183  |
| The Challenge Aimed at the Colonies as a Whole . . . . .                           | 184  |
| The New York and Philadelphia Tea Ships Turned back . . . . .                      | 184  |
| The Charleston Ship Lands its Cargo, but it is Untouched . . . . .                 | 184  |
| The Tea Meant for Boston must not Come Ashore . . . . .                            | 185  |
| The Boston Tea Party (December 16, 1773) . . . . .                                 | 186  |

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE SEVERANCE FROM GREAT BRITAIN.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| The King Adopts a Vindictive Course toward Boston . . . . .                           | 189 |
| The Boston Port Bill and Regulating Act (April, 1774) . . . . .                       | 189 |
| Troops to be Quartered in American Towns . . . . .                                    | 189 |
| The City of London on the American Side . . . . .                                     | 189 |
| General Gage with Four Regiments Sent to Boston (1774) . . . . .                      | 190 |
| Governor Hutchinson Pleads with the King . . . . .                                    | 190 |
| Sympathy for Massachusetts in Virginia and Elsewhere . . . . .                        | 191 |
| Continental Congress Assembles in Philadelphia, in September (1774) . . . . .         | 191 |
| The Congress Issues a Declaration of Rights . . . . .                                 | 191 |
| Other Acts of the Congress . . . . .  | 191 |
| Massachusetts becomes more Rebellious . . . . .                                       | 192 |
| The Suffolk County Resolutions . . . . .  | 192 |
| The Massachusetts Assembly becomes a Provincial Congress . . . . .                    | 193 |
| A Committee of Safety Chosen . . . . .  | 193 |
| Parliament in November, 1774, Supports the King . . . . .                             | 193 |
| It Declares Massachusetts to be in a State of Rebellion . . . . .                     | 194 |
| The British Army in Boston Increased to 10,000; the Two Howes . . . . .               | 194 |
| The British Expedition to Concord . . . . .   | 195 |
| Concord and Lexington (April 19, 1775) . . . . .                                      | 195 |
| Sixteen Thousand Men Hem in Gage in Boston . . . . .                                  | 196 |
| Fort Ticonderoga Seized in the Name of Jehovah and the Continental Congress . . . . . | 197 |
| The Continental Congress Assembles on May 10 . . . . .                                | 197 |
| It Adopts the New England Army as the Continental Army . . . . .                      | 197 |
| "The United Colonies of North America" . . . . .                                      | 198 |
| Washington Chosen Commander-in-chief (June 15) . . . . .                              | 198 |
| Other Candidates; the Four Major-generals . . . . .                                   | 198 |
| The Mecklenburg Resolves in North Carolina . . . . .                                  | 199 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| The Legend of the "Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence"                                 | 200  |
| The Battle of Bunker Hill (June 17, 1775) . . . . .   | 200  |
| Washington Assumes Command of the Army (July 3) . . . . .                                   | 201  |
| The King Determines to Crush the Rebellion . . . . .  | 201  |
| "Hessians" Hired to Fight in America . . . . .  | 202  |
| The Affair at Falmouth (Portland) in October . . . . .                                      | 202  |
| Continental Expedition into Canada . . . . .  | 202  |
| Montgomery Captures Montreal . . . . .  | 203  |
| Benedict Arnold's March through the Wilderness . . . . .                                    | 203  |
| Failure of the Attempt against Quebec (December 31) . . . . .                               | 204  |
| Washington Occupies Dorchester Heights . . . . .  | 204  |
| General Howe Evacuates Boston (March 17, 1776); the Tory Exodus . . . . .                   | 204  |
| Hostilities in the South; Fight at Moore's Creek in North Carolina (February) . . . . .     | 204  |
| Growth of Sentiment in Favor of a Declaration of Independence . . . . .                     | 205  |
| Difference of Feeling in Different Parts of the Country . . . . .                           | 205  |
| Virginia Instructs her Delegates to Propose a General Declaration of Independence . . . . . | 206  |
| The Continental Congress Moves toward Such a Declaration . . . . .                          | 206  |
| Twelve Colonies Accept the Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) . . . . .             | 207  |
| New York Subscribes to it on July 9 . . . . .   | 207  |
| Increase in the Number of Tories . . . . .  | 208  |
| Advantages and Disadvantages of the Colonies in the Impending Contest . . . . .             | 208  |
| The Theatre of War Shifts from Boston to New York . . . . .                                 | 210  |
| The British Failure at Charleston: Moultrie's Palmetto Forts (June 28) . . . . .            | 210  |
| The British Undertake to Hold the Line of the Hudson . . . . .                              | 210  |
| They Advance from Canada; Arnold Defeated on Lake Champlain (October) . . . . .             | 211  |
| Washington Occupies New York, and Fortifies Brooklyn Heights . . . . .                      | 211  |
| The Battle of Long Island (August 27) . . . . .   | 212  |
| Washington Retreats from New York . . . . .   | 212  |
| The Battle of White Plains (October 28) . . . . .   | 214  |
| Fort Washington on the Hudson Captured by Howe . . . . .                                    | 215  |
| Untrustworthiness of Charles Lee; his Plots against Washington . . . . .                    | 215  |
| Washington Hastens across the Delaware . . . . .  | 216  |
| Congress Abandons Philadelphia . . . . .  | 216  |
| Lee Marches upon Morristown . . . . .   | 216  |
| He is Captured by the British . . . . .   | 216  |
| His Army now Reinforces Washington . . . . .  | 216  |
| Washington Crosses the Delaware (December 25) . . . . .                                     | 217  |
| The Battles of Trenton (December 26, 1776) and Princeton (January 3, 1777) . . . . .        | 217  |
| Two Lines of Invasion into New York Planned by the British . . . . .                        | 218  |
| Burgoyne's Expedition from Montreal through Lake Champlain . . . . .                        | 218  |
| The Incapacity of Lord Germain, the King's Secretary of State for the Colonies . . . . .    | 219  |
| The Americans Evacuate Ticonderoga . . . . .  | 221  |
| The Battle of Bennington (August 16, 1777) . . . . .  | 222  |
| The Line of British Invasion by the Mohawk . . . . .  | 223  |
| Herkimer Attempts to Relieve Fort Stanwix . . . . .   | 223  |
| The Battle of Oriskany (August 6, 1777) . . . . .   | 224  |
| St. Leger Abandons the Mohawk Line of Invasion . . . . .                                    | 224  |
| Treachery of the Prisoner Major-General Charles Lee . . . . .                               | 224  |
| Howe's Unsuccessful Operations against Washington at Morristown . . . . .                   | 224  |
| Howe Attempts to Take an Army to Philadelphia by Sea . . . . .                              | 225  |
| He Lands at Elkton (August 25) . . . . .  | 225  |
| Wisdom of Washington's Fabian Tactics . . . . .   | 225  |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| The Battle of Brandywine Creek (September 11) . . . . .                           | 227  |
| Howe Occupies Philadelphia . . . . .  | 227  |
| Washington's Night Attack on Germantown (October 4) . . . . .                     | 227  |
| Burgoyne's Situation is Desperate in August . . . . .                             | 228  |
| Schuyler Superseded by the Incapable Gates . . . . .                              | 228  |
| Arnold Holds Burgoyne at Freeman's Farm . . . . .                                 | 229  |
| Quarrel between Gates and Arnold . . . . .  | 229  |
| The Battle of Saratoga (October 7); Defeat and Surrender of Burgoyne . . . . .    | 230  |
| The Prisoners of War Removed to Virginia . . . . .                                | 231  |
| Effect of the Victory at Saratoga . . . . .                                       | 232  |
| Death of Lord Chatham (May 11, 1778); North Announces a Change of Policy . .      | 232  |
| France Offers her Aid to the Colonies (February, 1778) . . . . .                  | 232  |
| The American Army at Valley Forge in the Winter of 1777-78 . . . . .              | 233  |
| Arrival of Baron von Steuben; his System of Tactics and Discipline . . . . .      | 233  |
| Petty Intrigues against Washington; the Conway Cabal . . . . .                    | 234  |
| The British Abandon Philadelphia in June, 1778 . . . . .                          | 235  |
| Sir William Howe Superseded by Sir Henry Clinton . . . . .                        | 236  |
| The Question of the Status of Charles Lee . . . . .                               | 236  |
| He Resumes his Place in the American Army . . . . .                               | 236  |
| He Fails to Execute Washington's Scheme against Clinton . . . . .                 | 237  |
| Lafayette becomes Major-General in the Continental Army . . . . .                 | 238  |
| The Affair at Monmouth (June 28, 1778) . . . . .                                  | 238  |
| Washington's Wrath against Charles Lee . . . . .                                  | 238  |
| Lee Court-Martialed and Dismissed from the Army . . . . .                         | 239  |
| Count d'Estaing Arrives with a French Fleet . . . . .                             | 239  |
| Failure of the Expedition against Rhode Island . . . . .                          | 240  |
| Anthony Wayne and Stony Point (July 15, 1779) . . . . .                           | 241  |
| The Indians Vex the Americans . . . . .   | 241  |
| The "King Georges" and the "Bostons" . . . . .                                    | 241  |
| The Butlers and Joseph Brant . . . . .  | 241  |
| The Tory and Indian Raid in the Wyoming Valley . . . . .                          | 242  |
| Sullivan in the Summer of 1779 Devastates the Iroquois Territory . . . . .        | 242  |
| The Forest Campaign of George Rogers Clark . . . . .                              | 243  |
| Virginia Troops Occupy Cahokia, Kaskaskia, Detroit, and Other Points . . . . .    | 244  |
| British Cruisers do Great Damage . . . . .  | 244  |
| Captain Paul Jones and his Successes (1779) . . . . .                             | 244  |
| Rules Adopted by the Continental Powers as to Neutrals at Sea . . . . .           | 245  |
| Contraband of War; Paper Blockades not Recognized . . . . .                       | 246  |
| The Armed Neutrality of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark . . . . .                     | 246  |
| England at War with Spain and Holland . . . . .                                   | 246  |
| Operations in the Far South . . . . .   | 247  |
| The British Take Savannah (1778) and Charleston (May, 1780) . . . . .             | 247  |
| Reign of Terror in South Carolina; Whigs and Tories . . . . .                     | 248  |
| Horatio Gates and Charles Lee . . . . .   | 249  |
| Defeat of Gates by Cornwallis at Camden (August 16, 1780) . . . . .               | 250  |
| Failure of Count d'Estaing's Operations . . . . .                                 | 250  |
| Count Rochambeau and his Men . . . . .  | 250  |
| Collapse of the Continental Currency . . . . .                                    | 251  |
| The British and the Americans almost at the End of their Resources . . . . .      | 251  |
| Benedict Arnold becomes Disaffected . . . . .                                     | 255  |
| His Treason (1780) and the Capture of Major André . . . . .                       | 256  |
| American Successes in the South; Battle of King's Mountain (October 17, 1780) . . | 257  |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| General Nathaniel Greene Commander in South Carolina . . . . .                | 257  |
| His Subordinates: Daniel Morgan, Marion, Sumter, Pickens, Henry Lee . . . . . | 258  |
| The Battle of the Cowpens (January 17, 1781) . . . . .                        | 259  |
| Tarleton and Morgan . . . . .   | 261  |
| Cornwallis's Success at Guilford Court-House (March 15) . . . . .             | 262  |
| South Carolina Recovered by Greene; Eutaw Springs (September 8) . . . . .     | 263  |
| Cornwallis at Petersburg, where Lafayette Refuses Battle . . . . .            | 264  |
| Cornwallis Retires to the Yorktown Peninsula . . . . .                        | 264  |
| The French Expedition against the West Indies . . . . .                       | 264  |
| De Grasse Sails for Chesapeake Bay . . . . .                                  | 265  |
| Washington's Rapid March from the Hudson River . . . . .                      | 266  |
| Surrender of Cornwallis (October 17, 1781) . . . . .                          | 266  |
| "O God, it is all over!" . . . . .  | 266  |

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE ESCAPE FROM ANARCHY.

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| A New Ministry in England: Old Whigs and New Whigs . . . . .                         | 267 |
| Independence of the Colonies to be Granted . . . . .                                 | 267 |
| Defeat of Grasse's Fleet by Rodney (April 12, 1782) . . . . .                        | 268 |
| Shelburne becomes Prime Minister . . . . .   | 269 |
| Spaniards and French Defeated at Gibraltar (1782) . . . . .                          | 270 |
| The French Alliance Due to Hatred of England, not to Love for America . . . . .      | 270 |
| Vergennes's Scheme for Satisfying Spain . . . . .                                    | 270 |
| The American Commissioners for Negotiating the Treaty of Peace . . . . .             | 270 |
| The Question of the Newfoundland Fisheries . . . . .                                 | 271 |
| Secret Negotiations between the English and American Commissioners . . . . .         | 272 |
| Boundaries of the United States Agreed upon . . . . .                                | 273 |
| The Mississippi River the Western Boundary . . . . .                                 | 273 |
| Jay's Scheme for Reciprocity in Trade Fails . . . . .                                | 273 |
| The Payment of Private Debts and the Compensation of Loyalists . . . . .             | 273 |
| The Treaty Unacceptable to Vergennes . . . . .                                       | 276 |
| He Believed, however, that it Ended England's Maritime Supremacy . . . . .           | 276 |
| The Treaty Attacked by a Coalition of Fox and North . . . . .                        | 277 |
| Fall of the Shelburne Ministry . . . . .   | 277 |
| The New Ministry Ratifies an Identical Treaty (September 3, 1783) . . . . .          | 277 |
| The Coalition Ministry Breaks up; William Pitt Enters the Ministry . . . . .         | 278 |
| Pitt for Seventeen Years the Real Ruler of England . . . . .                         | 279 |
| The Execution of the Treaty in America . . . . .                                     | 279 |
| Disgraceful Treatment of the Tories . . . . .  | 279 |
| Parliament Indemnifies Many of Them . . . . .  | 280 |
| Several States Obstruct the Payment of Private Debts . . . . .                       | 280 |
| England Adopts Retaliatory Methods . . . . .   | 281 |
| She Retains her Garrisons on the Northwestern Frontier . . . . .                     | 281 |
| The Character of the United States Government from July 4, 1776, to April 30, 1789 . | 281 |
| Executive Authority Lodged in the Continental Congress . . . . .                     | 281 |
| Congress at first only a Diplomatic Body . . . . .                                   | 281 |
| Other Congresses . . . . .   | 281 |
| Congress becomes also a Legislative Body; its Name . . . . .                         | 282 |
| State Sovereignty and its Early Limitations . . . . .                                | 282 |
| The Creation of completely Sovereign States never Contemplated . . . . .             | 282 |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| The Articles of Confederation of 1776 slowly Ratified . . . . .                          | 283  |
| The Authority of Congress only that of an "Implied War Power" . . . . .                  | 283  |
| Congress Lacked the Power of Taxation . . . . .  | 283  |
| Representation of the States . . . . .   | 283  |
| Minor Regulations; "the Committee of the States" . . . . .                               | 283  |
| The President of Congress . . . . .  | 283  |
| Rights of the States under the Confederation . . . . .                                   | 284  |
| The Fundamental Weakness of the Confederation its Lack of Power to Tax . . . . .         | 284  |
| Requisitions on the States . . . . .   | 284  |
| Poverty of the Treasury; Financial Expedients . . . . .                                  | 285  |
| The United States Thirteen Nations or One? . . . . .                                     | 286  |
| Slight Intercourse between the States . . . . .  | 286  |
| From Boston to New York; Roads and Bridges . . . . .                                     | 286  |
| Jealousies and Lack of Confidence between the States . . . . .                           | 287  |
| Anarchy Imminent; Decline of the Congress in Ability and Character . . . . .             | 288  |
| Decline of the Authority of Congress . . . . .   | 288  |
| The Army on the Point of Menacing it . . . . .   | 288  |
| Washington's High-Minded and Unselfish Patriotism . . . . .                              | 289  |
| Boundary Disputes between the States . . . . .   | 289  |
| Dispute between New York and New Hampshire over Vermont . . . . .                        | 289  |
| The Green Mountain Boys . . . . .  | 290  |
| The Wyoming Valley and the Pennamite War . . . . .                                       | 291  |
| Interstate Tariff Acts . . . . .   | 291  |
| Disputes over the Territory Northwest of the Ohio . . . . .                              | 291  |
| Conflicting Claims of Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts . . . . .                 | 291  |
| Claims of Virginia . . . . .   | 292  |
| The Proposition of Maryland in 1779 . . . . .  | 292  |
| The Disputed Territory becomes National Domain in 1781 . . . . .                         | 292  |
| Connecticut's Western Reserve in Ohio . . . . .  | 292  |
| The Continental Congress becomes a Great Land-owner . . . . .                            | 292  |
| The Territorial Ordinance of 1787 . . . . .  | 293  |
| Its Minor Provisions; Slavery Forbidden . . . . .  | 293  |
| Jefferson's Plans for Kentucky and Tennessee in 1781 . . . . .                           | 293  |
| The Pioneers in this Region; Boone, Sevier, and Robertson . . . . .                      | 294  |
| The State of Franklin Seedes from North Carolina 1784 . . . . .                          | 294  |
| Virginia and North Carolina Foremost in the Western Movement . . . . .                   | 295  |
| Dispute with Spain over the Northern Boundary of West Florida . . . . .                  | 295  |
| Demoralization Due to Unsound Paper Currency (1783-7) . . . . .                          | 297  |
| The Spirit of Speculation . . . . .  | 297  |
| Wild Delusions among the Inland Population . . . . .                                     | 298  |
| The Shays Rebellion (1786-7) . . . . .   | 299  |
| Need for Revision of the Articles of Confederation . . . . .                             | 299  |
| Alexander Hamilton . . . . .   | 299  |
| A Convention Held at Annapolis to Consider Trade Regulations (September, 1786) . . . . . | 300  |
| It Adjourns after Issuing a Call for a Convention at Philadelphia . . . . .              | 300  |
| The Federal Convention Convenes in May, 1787 . . . . .                                   | 301  |
| Character of the Delegates . . . . .   | 301  |
| Hamilton's Scheme for a Government . . . . .   | 302  |
| His Disinterestedness . . . . .  | 302  |
| James Madison and the "Virginia Plan" . . . . .  | 303  |
| The United States Citizen Lives under Two Governments . . . . .                          | 303  |
| Distinction between the Federal and the State Government . . . . .                       | 303  |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Paterson's "New Jersey Plan" . . . . .  | 305  |
| Connecticut Delegates Propose a Compromise between the Two Plans . . . . .        | 306  |
| A Senate to be Based on the States; a House on the People . . . . .               | 306  |
| Effect of this Compromise . . . . .   | 307  |
| The Smaller States become Federalists . . . . .                                   | 307  |
| Compromise as to Enumeration of Population . . . . .                              | 307  |
| Political Injustice of the Three-fifths Compromise . . . . .                      | 308  |
| Question of the Stoppage of the Slave Trade . . . . .                             | 308  |
| Virginia Demands a Two-thirds Majority for Tariff and Navigation Laws . . . . .   | 310  |
| Compromise on these two Points . . . . .  | 311  |
| Minor Provisions of the Constitution; Currency . . . . .                          | 312  |
| All Powers not expressly Given to the Government Considered as Withheld . . . . . | 312  |
| The Constitution Based on Genuine Compromises and Experiences . . . . .           | 312  |
| The Federal Courts . . . . .  | 312  |
| Their Powers to Pass on the Constitutionality of Acts of Congress . . . . .       | 313  |
| The Wise Reserve of the Constitution . . . . .                                    | 313  |
| The Constitution Ratified by the Continental Congress (September, 1787) . . . . . | 314  |
| The Slow Ratification of the Constitution by the States . . . . .                 | 314  |
| The Ratification in Massachusetts . . . . .                                       | 315  |
| In Maryland, South Carolina, and Virginia . . . . .                               | 316  |
| Virginia apparently Reserves the Right of Secession . . . . .                     | 317  |
| The Struggle over Ratification in New York . . . . .                              | 317  |
| Hamilton's Victory over George Clinton . . . . .                                  | 318  |
| Rhode Island the Last State to Ratify . . . . .                                   | 319  |
| The New Government goes into Operation (April 30, 1789) . . . . .                 | 320  |
| Washington, the First President; John Adams, Vice-President . . . . .             | 320  |

## CHAPTER VIII.

## PROBLEMS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Differences between the American and English Cabinets . . . . .   | 321 |
| The American Cabinet like the British Privy Council . . . . .   | 321 |
| Washington's First Cabinet . . . . .  | 321 |
| The Importance of Hamilton's Position as Secretary of the Treasury . . . . .                                    | 321 |
| The Doctrine of Implied Powers . . . . .  | 323 |
| The Elastic Clause of the Constitution . . . . .  | 323 |
| A National Bank Established for Twenty Years (1791) . . . . .   | 324 |
| Interstate Free Trade the Greatest Commercial Advantage that Arose from Separation from Great Britain . . . . . | 324 |
| Hamilton Places his Reliance on Customs Duties . . . . .  | 324 |
| He Advocates the Policy of Protection to Young Industries . . . . .   | 325 |
| Three Classes of Public Debts . . . . .   | 326 |
| Debts to Foreign Powers for Aid Received in War . . . . .   | 326 |
| Debts to Holders of Continental Securities . . . . .  | 326 |
| Debts of States to Individual American Citizens . . . . .   | 326 |
| The Government Assumes All these Debts . . . . .  | 327 |
| The Southerners Believed Hamilton to Have a Despotism in View . . . . .   | 328 |
| Popularity of the Doctrine of Loose Construction in the North . . . . .   | 328 |
| Jefferson's Position now becomes Defined . . . . .  | 329 |
| The Capital of the New Republic on the Potomac . . . . .  | 330 |
| Divided Feeling in the United States over the French Revolution . . . . .                                       | 331 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Washington Issues a Proclamation of Neutrality (1793) . . . . .                                 | 331  |
| Citizen Genêt and his Letters of Marque . . . . .   | 331  |
| Democratic Clubs of French Sympathizers . . . . .   | 332  |
| Genêt's Loss of Popularity . . . . .  | 332  |
| Success of Hamilton's Financial Measures . . . . .  | 333  |
| Excise Tax on Whiskey and the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 . . . . .                               | 333  |
| The British Reassert their Right of Search on the High Seas . . . . .                           | 334  |
| The Jay Treaty (1795): Washington Denounced . . . . .   | 334  |
| End of Washington's Second Administration . . . . .   | 334  |
| John Adams becomes President and Jefferson Vice-President . . . . .                             | 334  |
| Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1791), and Tennessee (1796) Admitted . . . . .                        | 335  |
| French Insolence before the Elections; Adet . . . . .   | 335  |
| Party Lines Sharply Drawn between Federalists and Republicans . . . . .                         | 335  |
| The Names Federalist, Republican, and Democrat . . . . .  | 335  |
| The French Directory Insults the United States (1797) . . . . .                                 | 336  |
| John Adams Sends Three Commissioners to France . . . . .  | 337  |
| The X, Y, Z Despatches . . . . .  | 337  |
| War with France Imminent . . . . .  | 338  |
| Quarrel between Adams and Hamilton . . . . .  | 339  |
| The Federalist Party Split into two Hostile Camps . . . . .                                     | 340  |
| Adams Forced to Yield . . . . .   | 340  |
| His Weakness and his Strength; his Desire for a Second Term . . . . .                           | 340  |
| War with France Averted (1800) . . . . .  | 340  |
| Adams Sacrifices his Ambition for his Country's Good . . . . .                                  | 341  |
| The Alien and Sedition Laws (1798) . . . . .  | 342  |
| The Effect of Their Enactment on the Future of the Federalist Party . . . . .                   | 342  |
| Protests against these Laws . . . . .   | 343  |
| "Nullification" in the Kentucky Resolutions (1799) . . . . .                                    | 343  |
| Jefferson not Responsible for the Doctrine . . . . .  | 343  |
| Federalists, Whigs, and the Later Republican Party Loose Constructionists . . . . .             | 344  |
| Jefferson's Republicans and the Democratic Party (until 1896) Strict Constructionists . . . . . | 344  |
| Strict Constructionists become in Office Loose Constructionists . . . . .                       | 344  |
| Election of Jefferson and Burr (1800) . . . . .   | 345  |
| The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution . . . . .   | 346  |
| Utility of the Electoral College: its Safeguard . . . . .                                       | 346  |
| Jefferson's Want of Ceremony . . . . .  | 347  |
| Public Officials not Changed with the Administration . . . . .                                  | 347  |
| The City of Washington and Major D'Enfant's Plans for it . . . . .                              | 347  |
| Jefferson becomes a Loose Constructionist . . . . .   | 348  |
| The Louisiana Purchase (1803); it more than Doubles the Area of the United States . . . . .     | 348  |
| New England Objected to the Purchase . . . . .  | 349  |
| The First Administration of Jefferson a Golden Age . . . . .                                    | 349  |
| His Triumphant Re-election in 1804 . . . . .  | 350  |
| Washington's Farewell Address (September, 1796) . . . . .                                       | 351  |
| Commercial Difficulties with England and France . . . . .                                       | 351  |
| The Embargo Act and its Repeal (1809) . . . . .   | 351  |
| Secession Sentiment in New England . . . . .  | 352  |
| The Self-Sacrifice of John Quincy Adams . . . . .   | 353  |
| The Non-Intercourse Act . . . . .   | 353  |
| James Madison President (1809-17) . . . . .   | 353  |
| Clay, Crawford, and Calhoun New Leaders . . . . .   | 354  |
| War Declared against Great Britain in 1812 . . . . .  | 355  |

|  | PAGE |
|--|------|
| Naval Victories: the Constitution and the Guerrière (August 19)              | 355  |
| Superiority in Gunnery an American Trait . . . . .                           | 356  |
| The Chesapeake and the Shannon (June 1, 1813) . . . . .                      | 357  |
| Cruise of the Essex . . . . .  | 358  |
| The War with the Barbary States in 1801 a Preparation for the Navy . . . . . | 358  |
| The Canadian Frontier . . . . .  | 359  |
| St. Clair and Tecumseh . . . . .   | 359  |
| The Battle of Tippecanoe (November 7, 1811) . . . . .                        | 360  |
| General William Hull's Surrender to General Brock . . . . .                  | 362  |
| The Capture and Loss of Queenston Heights (October 13, 1812) . . . . .       | 363  |
| Operations on Lake Erie (September, 1813); Oliver Hazard Perry . . . . .     | 364  |
| The Battles of Chippewa (July 5, 1814) and Lundy's Lane (July 25) . . . . .  | 365  |
| Macdonough's Victory on Lake Champlain (September 11) . . . . .              | 365  |
| Jackson Defeats the Indians in Alabama . . . . .                             | 365  |
| Burning of Washington a Reprisal for the Burning of Toronto . . . . .        | 366  |
| The War Unpopular in New England . . . . .                                   | 366  |
| The Hartford Convention, December, 1814 . . . . .                            | 368  |
| The Peace of Ghent (December 24, 1814) . . . . .                             | 368  |
| Jackson's Brilliant Victory at New Orleans (January 8, 1815) . . . . .       | 369  |

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE SPANISH REVOLT AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Contrast between the Spanish and the English Colonies . . . . .                       | 371 |
| The Latter Possessed almost Complete Political Freedom . . . . .                      | 371 |
| The Spanish Colonies never had Freedom, Political, Religious, or Commercial . . . . . | 371 |
| Vexations Restrictions on Trade . . . . .   | 372 |
| Certain Liberal Measures in 1774 . . . . .  | 372 |
| The Domestic Government of the Spanish Colonies Remains Tyrannical . . . . .          | 372 |
| The Revolt of the Inca Nobility in Peru in 1780 . . . . .                             | 372 |
| Santo Domingo and its Brilliant Life . . . . .  | 373 |
| The Uprising of the Blacks in 1791 . . . . .  | 373 |
| Toussaint Louverture (1743-1803) and his Career . . . . .                             | 373 |
| Gigantic Attempt of France to Recover her Colonial Empire . . . . .                   | 374 |
| French Veterans in Haiti (1801-03) . . . . .  | 375 |
| Napoleon and the Spanish Colonies . . . . .   | 377 |
| After the Downfall of Charles IV, these Colonies become Independent . . . . .         | 377 |
| Lack of Political Training and Discipline in the Spanish Colonies . . . . .           | 378 |
| Beginnings of the Spanish Revolt . . . . .  | 379 |
| At first Directed against French Government in Spain . . . . .                        | 379 |
| Contrasts between the Spanish and American Revolutions . . . . .                      | 379 |
| The Revolt Begins in the Colombian States . . . . .                                   | 379 |
| Miranda, and his Attempt in Venezuela (1806) . . . . .                                | 380 |
| Venezuela Declares her Independence (July 5, 1811) . . . . .                          | 381 |
| New Granada and Mexico soon Follow . . . . .  | 381 |
| Loyalist Reaction in Venezuela; Monteverde . . . . .                                  | 381 |
| Fall of Miranda (1812); Simon Bolívar's Successes . . . . .                           | 381 |
| Ferdinand VII, Reinstated (1814); Morillo in Cartagena . . . . .                      | 382 |
| Bolívar's Victory of Boyacá (August 7, 1819) . . . . .                                | 382 |
| The United States of Colombia Proclaimed (December, 1819) . . . . .                   | 383 |
| The Revolution in the Argentine States (1810) . . . . .                               | 383 |

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Belgrano; the United Provinces of Plata River . . . . .                             | 384  |
| The Chilean Revolution (1810) . . . . .   | 385  |
| Don Bernardo O'Higgins and José San Martín . . . . .                                | 385  |
| Spanish Peru a Menace to Chile . . . . .  | 385  |
| The Spaniards Expelled; San Martín Protector of Peru . . . . .                      | 386  |
| Bolívar Dictator of Peru . . . . .  | 386  |
| The New State of Bolivia Formed (August, 1825); its Code . . . . .                  | 387  |
| Great Power of Bolívar at this Time . . . . .                                       | 388  |
| Factional Quarrels . . . . .  | 388  |
| Political Overthrow of Bolívar . . . . .  | 389  |
| Dissolution of the Old Colombian Federation . . . . .                               | 389  |
| The Mexican Revolution . . . . .  | 390  |
| Origin of the Mexican Population . . . . .  | 390  |
| Mexico under Spanish Rule: Power of the Church . . . . .                            | 391  |
| The Two Parties—Gachupines and Guadalupes . . . . .                                 | 391  |
| The Revolution in Mexico Begins in 1808; Iturriigaray . . . . .                     | 392  |
| The Priest Miguel Hidalgo and his Fate . . . . .                                    | 392  |
| Other Attempts: Morelos, Matamoros, and Mina . . . . .                              | 392  |
| Iturbide, and the Plan of Iguala . . . . .  | 393  |
| Iturbide, Emperor of Mexico (May, 1822), and his Deposition by Santa Anna . . . . . | 393  |
| Severance of the States of Central America from Spain (1821) . . . . .              | 394  |
| Their Short-lived Confederation . . . . .   | 394  |
| Cuba, the "Ever Faithful Isle": Porto Rico and Florida . . . . .                    | 394  |
| Creek Indians and Runaway Negroes Infest Florida . . . . .                          | 395  |
| Florida a Scene of Disorder and Bloodshed . . . . .                                 | 395  |
| Andrew Jackson Conquers the Seminoles and Seizes Florida . . . . .                  | 396  |
| The Affair of Arbutnott and Ambrister . . . . .                                     | 396  |
| Florida Purchased from Spain in 1819; Jackson Governor of the Territory . . . . .   | 397  |
| The Revolution in Spain of 1820 . . . . .   | 398  |
| Ferdinand VII, in Effect Renews the Bourbon Family Compact . . . . .                | 398  |
| The Monroe Doctrine Announced (December, 1823); George Canning . . . . .            | 399  |
| Common Interest of Great Britain and the United States . . . . .                    | 399  |
| The Holy Alliance (September 26, 1815) . . . . .                                    | 399  |
| The Monroe Doctrine in Substance the Work of John Quincy Adams . . . . .            | 399  |
| Significance of the Doctrine . . . . .  | 400  |
| Its Reassertion at Later Dates . . . . .  | 400  |







**UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY  
Los Angeles**

**This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.**

---

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|

Form L9-7m-7, '56 (C110784) 444



D 000 140 345 0

\*D

20  
H62  
v.22

RANCH,  
CALIFORNIA  
Y,  
CALIF

